Defense of Crimea in 1941-1942 briefly. Crimean War: Sevastopol

When Plan Barbarossa began in mid-1941, an attack on the Crimean Peninsula was not even planned. The implication was that when major Soviet political centers like Moscow came under German control, the entire Soviet Union itself would fall to pieces.

But these hopes were quickly dashed in July 1941, when two Soviet air attacks on Axis-held oil fields in Romania, launched from Sevastopol, destroyed 11,000 tons of oil.

Composition of the Wehrmacht Attack Forces

On July 23, 1941, Adolf Hitler issued Directive 33, which prioritized the conquest of Crimea. On August 21, Hitler declared that "the capture of the Crimean Peninsula is of enormous importance for the protection of oil supplies from Romania."

The attack on Sevastopol was entrusted to the Eleventh Army under the command of Colonel General. In October 1941, the army was relieved of other Barbarossa missions and was now focused on attacking the Crimea.

Lacking sufficient tanks, Manstein could not carry out the mobile action with which he had succeeded in France. Instead, he relied on his infantry. There were also Romanian troops under his command. Some of the Romanians, especially the Mountain Brigade troops, were known to be elite fighters, but in general the Romanians were poorly equipped and thus never deployed independently without direct German support.

Beginning of the invasion of Crimea

On October 18, General Erik Hansen, commander of the German 54th Corps, together with the 22nd, 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions, began an attack on the Soviet 51st Army in Ishuni. Although the Soviet army had greater numbers and air superiority, Hansen's army advanced slowly, capturing Yishun on October 28 after the arrival of three groups of BF109s overpowered the Soviet air force. USSR troops retreated to Sevastopol, marking the beginning of the siege.

The beginning of the siege of Sevastopol

Even before the remnants of the Soviet 51st Army began to retreat to Sevastopol, Vice Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky had already trained thousands of people to build defensive structures.

He also formed several naval infantry units from the ship's sailors; the sailors were not trained in land combat, but they helped boost the numbers that Oktyabrsky desperately needed on the front lines. On October 30, the Navy's Black Sea Fleet brought in the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade from Novorossiysk to further ease the situation.

On October 30, 1941, advanced units of the German 132nd Infantry Division were discovered. The Soviet army opened fire with 305 mm coastal defense guns at the suspected German position; The location of these guns, coastal battery 30, would soon be called “Fort Maxim Gorky I”.

Meanwhile, the Soviet naval infantry withstood the first attack on Sevastopol. On November 9, 19,894 soldiers, ten T-26 tanks, 152 guns and 20 mortars arrived from the sea, and Oktyabrsky already had 52,000 soldiers at his disposal.

On November 10, Manstein finally decided that he was sufficiently prepared to launch a full-fledged offensive. The German 50th Infantry Division, under the command of General Friedrich Schmidt, attacked first, capturing the village of Uppa near the Chernaya River southeast of Sevastopol.

The next day, the 132nd Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General Fritz Lindemann captured the village of Mekenzia in the northeast. By November 15, the attack was stopped by a furious response from Soviet soldiers and sailors supported by naval artillery from the Paris Commune. Manstein refused to advance on November 21, losing 2,000 soldiers, although the losses of the Soviet army were much greater.

In December 1941, Oktyabrsky received naval reinforcements in the form of the new 388th Rifle Division, and Soviet engineers took advantage of the brief respite to lay extensive minefields while Manstein's men regrouped for another attack.

The next German attack began on December 17, with artillery bombardment beginning at six in the morning. 34 Ju-87 Stukas and 20 bombers prepared for the attack, which began with the advance of the 22nd Infantry Division into territory held by the Soviet 8th Naval Brigade north of the Belbek River.

Soon the German 50th and 132nd rifle divisions also began an attack on the central line of defense. On December 22, the 8th Naval Brigade retreated to the city, and on December 23, the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade captured a strategic point southeast of the city.

Meanwhile, Axis forces also headed towards Kerch on the eastern side of the peninsula. Soviet Lieutenant General Vladimir Lvov made a daring amphibious landing with 5,000 soldiers of the 51st Army on December 26, followed by a larger landing with 23,000 soldiers of the 44th Army with a tank battalion at Feodosia on December 29. This move forced Germany to postpone the next attack on Sevastopol in order to cope with the new threat.

Previously, Hitler demanded that Sevastopol be captured by the end of the year in order to boost morale that had fallen after the unsuccessful invasion of Russia, but this demand was not fulfilled. At that time, the losses of the German army were much higher than expected - only from December 17 to 31 they lost 8,595 soldiers. The Soviet army, as in almost every battle of World War II, suffered much greater losses of personnel - 7,000 dead and 20,000 prisoners.

On January 15, 1942, Manstein launched a hasty counterattack, capturing Feodosia, however, this offensive was launched before his troops were ready, due to which they failed to destroy the 44th and 51st armies, but this attack prevented the Soviet army to keep the initiative. Soviet soldiers knew that seizing the initiative was vital and launched a series of attacks from February to April 1942. All attacks failed in attempts to break through the defense line of the German army, which continued to besiege Sevastopol on land.

Progress of the defense of Sevastopol

After a long period of preparation, Manstein decided that the time had come for a new large-scale offensive. On May 8, 1942, he launched Operation Bustard Hunt, which required General Maximillian's corps to attack the Soviet 44th Army on the south coast.

The operation began at four in the morning with a ten-minute artillery bombardment, and by half past seven the leading Soviet troops were routed under pressure from German attacks from the front and the landing of the 902nd Assault Group and the 436th Infantry Regiment in the rear. Afterwards, numerous German and Romanian forces moved towards Kerch.

On May 9, an important airport in Marfovka, thirty kilometers from which the offensive began, had already been captured by German troops, who destroyed 35 I-153 fighters located there. Lieutenant General Dmitry Kozlov panicked, which allowed Manstein to advance further with the 22nd Panzer Division, which quickly destroyed the remnants of the 51st Army.

On May 14, German troops entered Kerch from the eastern side of the peninsula, and on May 20 they finally captured the city. Due to the panic and inaction of Kozlov and his men, only 37,000 soldiers were evacuated from Kerch, while 28,000 were killed and 147,000 captured. Manstein's victory effectively destroyed three Soviet armies with only 3,397 casualties.

After Operation Bustard Hunt, the 22nd Tank Division was moved north from Crimea to prepare for the operation in Kharkov.

With pressure eased in the east, the Germans again concentrated on Sevastopol, launching Operation Sturgeon. At five forty in the morning on June 2, 1942, a major bombardment of defensive positions near Sevastopol began. At six in the morning the Luftwaffe joined the attack and dropped 570 tons of bombs.

On the night of June 6, the Soviet army, which had previously fired artillery against attacks by German batteries, opened fire on German positions. Oktyabrsky knew that this bombardment had to come from the north, otherwise it would not have lasted so long. As Oktyabrsky suspected, the Germans were moving. The soldiers of the 132nd Infantry Division moved towards the Belbek River, and the 22nd Infantry Division also changed its location. Progress was slow, but the Germans advanced through heavy Soviet mortar fire and air strikes. In the afternoon, around seven in the evening, the first and only counterattack of the battalion of the Soviet 747th Infantry Regiment began; The Germans lost 2,357 people, including 340 killed.

Also, on June 7, Fretter-Picot, whose corps occupied the southern defensive line of the Soviet army, decided that he would not sit back while the generals in the north earned glory in a large-scale offensive, and began to probe the Soviet defenses. He achieved minor successes, but his attack resulted in a disproportionate number of casualties, and Manstein forbade him to attack in a similar manner.

On June 8, the Soviet army launched a counterattack, but despite tank support, coordination between infantry, artillery and tanks was poor and the attack failed. At ten in the morning the Germans attacked, and, having suffered losses of 1,700 soldiers, advanced three kilometers closer to Sevastopol. On June 9, the German 132nd Rifle Division attacked coastal battery 30 "Fort Maxim Gorky", but was pushed back twice, at ten in the morning and noon, by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division. Several other Soviet counterattacks also occurred on June 9, but they did not make a significant contribution to the battle.

On June 11, Major General Ivan Petrov launched a large-scale counterattack using all available artillery in Sevastopol against the German 132nd Rifle Division. The counterattack reached a distance of a kilometer behind the German front line, but the Soviet troops were exhausted both morally and in ammunition to gain anything from this success. By the end of the day they had lost the captured territory to effective German air attacks. In the south, Fretter-Picot also made another attempt to advance. The 401st Regiment of the German 72nd Infantry Division allowed it to advance two kilometers, and Fretter-Picot sent his reserves, the 266th Infantry Division, and captured one of the forts.

On June 13, Hansen's corps captured Fort Stalin, which was a weakly defended anti-aircraft position with three machine gun emplacements. Despite only having 200 soldiers inside, the fort's defenders fought bravely for over an hour before falling. At five thirty in the morning, when Soviet troops learned that Fort Stalin had fallen, the nearby Fort Volga opened fire on it, followed by a counterattack that failed to retake the fort. Almost all of the fort's two hundred defenders were dead. Not too large-scale, but brutal battles, like the one that took place at Fort Stalin, were repeated over the next few days in a war of attrition.

On June 16, Hansen sent the 132nd Infantry Division against Coastal Battery 30, Fort Maxim Gorky, while the 22nd and 24th Rifle Divisions attacked the center of the Soviet defense line, held by the Soviet 95th Rifle Division, penetrated the defenses, destroying the front line and leaving shore battery 30 by itself. The German 436th and 437th Infantry Regiments reached the fort and began the attack. An attack bomber destroyed the fort's west tower as the others were slowed down by lack of ammunition. Under such pressure, the entire northern defense line collapsed. While the Germans were methodically clearing Soviet bunkers with grenades and flamethrowers, on June 20 their troops reached Severnaya Bay. On June 21, after a two-day battle, the Germans captured Fort Lenin along with 158 prisoners. On June 23, Fort Konstantinovsky was captured. With the northern defenses defeated, Hansen's troops moved south, where Fretter-Picot advanced much more slowly.

To compensate for the slow progress of the corps, Romanian reinforcements were called in. Prior to this, the troops of Major General Georg Avramescu had not been assigned to carry out any major offensives. However, when they launched their first major offensive, they proved their worth by breaking through Soviet defenses near the Chernaya River, where the Germans failed, capturing a Soviet stronghold dubbed "Bastion II", and then repelling a counterattack. On June 27, Hansen's troops united with Avramescu's troops east of the Chernaya River.

On June 29, at night, German troops achieved the effect of complete surprise when they crossed the Northern Bay with the 902nd and 90th assault teams in 130 boats. Soviet forces realized what was happening too late and fired flares to alert headquarters when the coast was already captured. Petrov had at his disposal six T-26 tanks that could have been used to protect the coastline, but due to his indecisiveness the moment was lost. A German corps attacked in the south, defeating the Soviet 7th Naval Brigade and the 775th Rifle Regiment. German victories on the border of the Northern Bay and in the south cut off Soviet troops, weakening them for the upcoming attack on Sevastopol.

On the night of June 30, Soviet troops destroyed a large ammunition depot near Northern Bay to prevent the Germans from capturing it. This warehouse was located inside a champagne factory, whose buildings also served as a field hospital for 2,000 wounded, some of whom may still have been in the building when it collapsed.

On June 30, the order was given to evacuate Sevastopol. All defenses then fell as the soldiers fled in every possible way to save their lives. On July 1, Petrov and Oktyabrsky left the city on a submarine, leaving behind 23,000 people, many of them wounded. Later that day, German troops entered the city. Manstein tried to exclude the Romanians from the final offensive, not wanting to share the glory with them, but Major General Georg Manoli disobeyed the order, sending the 4th Mountain Division into the city and placing the Romanian flag on the Nakhimov statue. The final act of defiance was carried out by troops of the 109th Infantry Division fighting the bunkers around Shore Battery 35 and the men who were fighting on the runway at Cape Chersonesos. Both flanks were defeated on July 4th.

The result of the battle for Sevastopol

The battle for Sevastopol cost both sides a lot, even according to the most conservative estimates. About 18,000 Soviet soldiers died, 95,000 were captured, and only 25,157 were successfully evacuated. The German 11th Army suffered casualties of 4,264 dead, 21,626 wounded and 1,522 missing, for a total of approximately 27,000 soldiers. Romanian casualties were 1,597 dead, 6,571 wounded and 277 missing, for a total of 8,454.

The city itself was also heavily damaged, mainly due to prolonged and powerful artillery shelling, half of the buildings in Sevastopol were destroyed. The capture of Sevastopol was.

Epilogue

Even before the city was completely captured, Manstein received the rank of field marshal for his victory, and a vacation in Romania. As soon as he left, . For the next two years, Germany held the city and the killings continued under the control of SS Gruppenführer Alvenslieben.

Throughout the summer of 1854, the Anglo-French fleet prepared for a landing in the Crimea. Their goal was the naval base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol. It was the defense of Sevastopol in 1854-1855. was a turning point in the Crimean War, one of its most tragic and majestic pages.

Beginning of hostilities in Crimea

Lord Raglan and Saint-Arnaud were appointed troops of the coalition forces of the Anglo-French and Turkish troops. Commander of the Russian troops A.S. Menshikov, due to his shortsightedness, did not immediately understand that the Allies’ goal was to capture Sevastopol.

• September 13, 1854 Allied troops from England, France, Turkey and Italy landed troops near Yevpatoria, then occupied the city without a fight, and coalition forces began advancing deeper into the Crimean Peninsula.
• September 20, 1854 Menshikov made an attempt to stop the advance of the Anglo-French-Turkish troops, the number of which reached about 72 thousand soldiers. The battle on the Alma River did not bring the desired result. After the defeat on Alma, Russian troops, by order of the same Menshikov, began to retreat to Bakhchisarai, leaving Sevastopol practically unprotected.

From the sea side, Sevastopol was well protected. Russian coastal artillery batteries could shoot ships in a roadstead at a distance of 2.5 kilometers. The Alexander Battery, built in 1846 and having the appearance of a fortress, was considered especially effective. Unfortunately, the military potential of the Alexander Battery was practically not used. From the sea side, Sevastopol remained unprotected due to the long absence of a potential enemy.

• The overall commander of all the main forces of the coalition, Saint-Arnaud, made an unforgivable mistake when he considered that the Allied troops would not be able to immediately take Sevastopol and decided to bypass the city from the south. Thus, he gave a short respite to the Sevastopol garrison to build fortifications.

The garrison of Sevastopol began intensively preparing for defense and building fortifications. Disagreements arose between Russian admirals Kornilov and Nakhimov: V.A. Kornilov wanted to organize a naval battle with the Anglo-French fleet, P.S. Nakhimov proposed to sink some of the ships in order to prevent the Allied fleet from entering the bays. As a result, some of the ships of the Russian fleet were sunk, and their crews went ashore, thereby strengthening the Sevastopol garrison.

Defense of Sevastopol in 1854

Admirals Nakhimov P.S., Kornilov V.A. and Istomin V.I. took command of the defense of Sevastopol. The scheme of the most important fortifications of the city was developed by the brilliant general engineer Totleben. Under his leadership, bastions were built from earthen ramparts with living quarters for soldiers, reinforced with sandbags and large baskets of earth, which corresponded to the modern conditions of military operations of those times.

• October 5, 1854 coalition troops began the first bombardment of Sevastopol. This day is considered to be the beginning of the siege of Sevastopol. The Allies concentrated the main fire on Russian batteries located on Malakhov Kurgan, the key height of the naval base. Although the Allied bombing caused heavy losses in the Russian camp, return fire from Russian artillery blew up three gunpowder magazines and seriously damaged four Allied ships. On this day, Admiral Kornilov was mortally wounded on Malakhov Kurgan. The main command of the defense passed to Nakhimov. On March 19, 1855, Istomin also died on the Malakhov Kurgan.

• Having suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, the Allies did not dare to launch an immediate assault on Sevastopol, which its defenders took advantage of. Russian soldiers and sailors rebuilt destroyed fortifications and replaced damaged guns. They were prepared for a long siege.
• October 25, 1854 The battle of Balaklava took place. Prince Menshikov tried to divert coalition forces from besieged Sevastopol. This battle did not bring a decisive advantage to either side. Russian troops managed to recapture part of the Turkish redoubts and inflict heavy losses on the British. However, the siege was not lifted.
• November 5, 1854 The Battle of Inkerman took place. Another attempt by Prince Menshikov to divert part of the Allied forces to himself. Although the attack by units of the Russian army had initial success, it was not possible to consolidate it. In addition, the Russian troops suffered significant damage due to the difference in the class of weapons - the Russian army did not have rifled guns (fittings) and cannons, unlike the French and British.

Emperor Nicholas I was extremely dissatisfied with the unsuccessful actions of the Russian army in Crimea. He demanded immediate decisive action from Menshikov.

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Defense of Sevastopol in 1855

At the end of January 1855, Menshikov received fresh reinforcements from Russia. But after futile attempts to lift the siege of Sevastopol, this commander began to fall into despair.

• January 26, 1855 Sardinia took the side of the coalition. Pelissier became the new commander of the combined forces of the Allies.
• February 17, 1855 Menshikov ordered General Khrulev to attack Yevpatoria with a division of 20 thousand people. However, having lost about 700 soldiers, Khrulev abandoned further attacks on the city. Having received news of Prince Menshikov's next failure, Nicholas I removed him from command. Artillery General M.D. Gorchakov was appointed the new commander of the Russian troops.
• The Allies constantly received new reinforcements, ammunition and food by sea, while the forces of the defenders of Sevastopol were melting away. By the beginning of 1855, the garrison of Sevastopol numbered approximately 40 thousand people. The number of combined Anglo-French and Turkish forces by the beginning of 1855 reached 130 thousand. The conspirators began to prepare for a decisive assault on Sevastopol. The French engineer Niel arrived to carry out the siege work. All efforts were directed mainly against the Malakhov Kurgan.
• April 9, 1855 The allies launched a second fierce bombardment; after a series of night attacks by Anglo-French forces, a general assault on Sevastopol was expected. But it never took place.

The key figure in the city's defense was P. S. Nakhimov. Sailors and soldiers called him “father” and “our soul.” This may seem incredible, but Nakhimov knew almost all the soldiers and sailors of the garrison by sight. On June 28, 1855, the favorite of sailors and soldiers was mortally wounded while walking around the Malakhov Kurgan. This was a real tragedy for the hero city. Speaking briefly about the participants in the defense of Sevastopol, one cannot fail to note the participation of children and women in the hostilities. In the intervals between shelling of Sevastopol, children brought food and ammunition to the bastions. The first Russian sisters of mercy also appeared, one of them was Daria Lavrentievna Mikhailova, nicknamed Daria of Sevastopol. Under artillery fire, she picked up the wounded on the battlefield, not only Russians, but also enemy soldiers. One of the most famous heroes of Sevastopol was the sailor Pyotr Koshka.

Rice. 2. Admiral Nakhimov on the 5th bastion. Pryashnikov I.M..

• May 26, 1855 all the advanced structures of the Ship side, including the Kamchatka Lunette, located directly in front of the Malakhov Kurgan, were captured by the French. General Khrulev made a number of unsuccessful attempts to recapture the redoubts from the enemy.
• June 3, 1855 At the cost of huge losses, the allies under the leadership of Pelissier managed to capture the Fedyukhin Heights. The position of the besieged garrison became more and more desperate. Gorchakov ordered the construction of a bridge for the withdrawal of troops from Sevastopol.
• September 4, 1855 The most fierce bombing of the city began. Sevastopol was burning. The batteries of the besieged Russian garrison could no longer respond to the fire of the enemy batteries. Immediately after the shelling, a general assault on Sevastopol by Anglo-French troops began. Malakhov Kurgan was taken by French units, attacks were repulsed in other areas, but this no longer mattered.

After the capture of Malakhov Kurgan, further defense of the city lost its meaning. Gorchakov ordered the troops to be withdrawn to the northern side. The French and British did not dare to enter the city for a long time, because they were afraid that it was mined.

The outcome of the war after the fall of Sevastopol became obvious: the Russian army was exsanguinated by losses in manpower and equipment, there was not enough money for its further supply, and due to the lag in industry, the internal economy of the Russian Empire was upset. The new Russian Emperor Alexander II asked for peace.

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The defense of Sevastopol in the Crimean War went down in Russian history as one of its most majestic pages, on which every line was written with the blood of its defenders. This article tells about how the siege was conducted and the most important events in the defense of Sevastopol.

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The defense of Sevastopol is one of the large and extended military operations of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

Background and position of troops

Ukraine was an important point for the Germans, the capture of which would allow fascist troops to open the way to Moscow from the south, as well as secure supplies of food and coal to continue military operations in the winter. By the end of September 1941, Hitler's troops were already able to capture Smolensk and. Leningrad was encircled, and significant successes were achieved in the South-Western direction - most of the Soviet troops in this direction were defeated, and the south-western part of Ukraine was already under the jurisdiction of the German command. In mid-September, fascist troops approached Crimea, another important point in the conquest of Ukraine.

Crimea was necessary for the Germans, as it was one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus. Moreover, aviation was based in Crimea; with the loss of the peninsula, the Soviet army would have lost the opportunity to carry out raids on Romania (which was under Hitler’s jurisdiction), and the Germans themselves would have been able to bomb the Caucasus. It was because of the importance of Crimea that the Soviet command decided to abandon and redirect troops from the city to the peninsula.

At the time the defense of Sevastopol began, the enemy forces were approximately equal.

Progress of the defense of Sevastopol

Since the operation was very lengthy, several main stages can be distinguished:

• the first German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from November 11 to November 21, 1941;
• the second German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from December 17 to December 31, 1941;
• relative calm, which lasted from early January to May 31, 1942;
• the third German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from June 7 to July 4, 1942.

On October 25, German troops broke through the defenses of the Soviet army at the Ishun positions and broke into Crimea - seven divisions and two Romanian detachments were supposed to occupy the peninsula in the shortest possible time. The Soviet command, seeing the pressure of the Germans, decided to retreat towards Kerch; later this part of the army went to Kuban. A smaller part of the Soviet troops began to retreat towards Sevastopol through the mountain passes of Crimea, and then along the coast. Both parts of the army were pursued by German troops, and a separate detachment of two German divisions headed directly towards Sevastopol to capture the city.

As a result, by November 1941, there were about 20 thousand Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On November 5, clashes began between Soviet and German troops on the approaches to the city.

First attack on Sevastopol

On November 11, several German divisions attacked Soviet troops on the approaches to the city, and the fighting continued until November 21. The Germans managed to advance several kilometers to the south and east, and the front line was established 12 km from Sevastopol. At the same time, the fighting subsided, both sides began to strengthen their armies, the Soviet received reinforcements in the form of soldiers and ammunition.

While the Soviet command in Sevastopol was strengthening the defense, German troops continued to seize Crimea, and as a result, by November 16, the entire peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was occupied by the Germans. The remaining fascist forces reformed and headed towards the city to break the last stronghold of Soviet defense.

Second attack on Sevastopol

Initially, the next attack on the city was planned for November 27, but due to a delay, the offensive began only on December 17, 1941. During a fierce battle, the Germans again managed to suppress Soviet resistance and significantly advance deeper to the north.

On December 19, Admiral Zhukov reported that the front without support would not hold out even until the 20th, but contrary to forecasts, the soldiers were able to hold back the Germans until December 21, after which reinforcements arrived in Sevastopol.

As a result, in two weeks of fighting, the Germans managed to advance an average of 10 km towards the city. The offensive stopped on December 31 due to heavy losses suffered by the German army during the battles with Soviet defensive units.

January-May 1942

At the beginning of January, reinforcements again arrived in Sevastopol, and the German army, on the contrary, thinned out, since a significant part of it went to the east of Crimea. In January-February 1942, there were only minor skirmishes between German and Soviet troops. In general, this period can be considered relatively calm. Until May, the Soviet army was regularly replenished with new units.

Third attack on Sevastopol

On May 18, after the Germans managed to defeat the Soviet army in the east of Crimea, the German command again focused on Sevastopol: an assault on the city was planned, for which the Germans drove a large amount of heavy artillery to the borders.

On June 2, German artillery and aviation began to inflict heavy blows on Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On June 7, several German divisions launched a land offensive, while the Romanian army distracted Soviet soldiers with fighting in the east.

By June 17, the northern defense of Sevastopol was actually captured, and the Germans significantly advanced to the south. Although reinforcements were actively sent to the Soviet troops, this did not help. On June 29, 1942, the Germans entered Sevastopol.

On July 1, Sevastopol was completely occupied by the Germans, and the remnants of the Soviet troops went to Chersonesos, where fighting continued for some time. The Soviet soldiers who were waiting for evacuation did not wait for it and were captured.

Results of the defense of Sevastopol

The defense of Sevastopol went down in history as one of the most difficult and lengthy defensive operations, in which Soviet troops suffered heavy human losses. In addition, the surrender of Sevastopol was the last stage in the conquest of Crimea by the Germans, which opened up a number of new directions and opportunities for Hitler.

A new super project by a leading military historian.

From Manstein’s breakthrough through Perekop positions to the failure of the first assault on Sevastopol, from the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean Front to the Kerch disaster and the fall of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the long German occupation of the peninsula to the rapid (in just a month) liberation of Crimea in the victorious spring of 1944 years, when our advancing troops lost four times less than the defending enemy - this book analyzes in detail all the operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the struggle for Crimea.

Separately, the actions of our ground forces - tank crews, infantry, artillery - and the combat work of the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet are considered.

Sections of this page:

The task of defeating Soviet troops in Crimea was first set on February 12, 1942 in the “Order on the conduct of combat operations on the Eastern Front at the end of the winter period” by the main command of the German ground forces. It said the following: “Along with the liquidation of the enemy breakthrough west of Izyum, the immediate task of Army Group [South. – A.I.] – a quick return of the Kerch Peninsula and the capture of Sevastopol is possible in order to free up forces for a further offensive.”

Moreover, even before the start of the first offensive of the Crimean Front, E. von Manstein, in his report to the GA “South” on February 21, 1942, directly wrote: “The special danger of crises in the Crimea is combined with an exceptional chance of success.”

Moreover, the commander of the 11th Army revealed this idea in his report on February 19: “In this part of the Russian front, due to the enemy’s massing of forces in a narrow space, in the rear of which is the sea, a chance for success emerges. There is no such chance on any other sector of the front - at least this spring.” Even then, Manstein spoke about the need to defeat the group of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula before the assault on Sevastopol.

The commander of the 11th Army proposed “a quick breakthrough to the harbors and the destruction of both armies located on the peninsula.” In addition to the 22nd TD already promised to him, Manstein asked for decisive success to allocate another tank division from the 1st TA, as well as large aviation forces, for the operation in Crimea. True, at that stage of planning a strike on Soviet troops on the Parpach Isthmus, he intended to use aviation mainly to influence the supply ports of Kerch and Kamysh-Burun.

At a meeting on March 28, 1942, F. Halder wrote down in his diary Hitler’s main statements, in which Crimea was already given priority: “Actions should begin in the south - in Crimea” and “Crimea. Kerch is the concentration of the main aviation forces.” Soon these ideas were formalized in Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942, signed by Hitler. It identified the main goals of the 1942 campaign - the Caucasus and Leningrad. To release large forces of the 11th Army, stuck in positional battles on an isolated section of the front, Directive No. 41 set the task of “clearing the Kerch Peninsula from the enemy in Crimea and capturing Sevastopol.” At a meeting with Hitler in April 1942, Sonderstern and Manstein presented an operation plan to defeat Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula. The operation received the code name “Hunting for Bustards” (Trappenjagd).

The plan was in many ways reminiscent of the “sickle strike” with which the Allies were defeated in the West two years before the events described, in May 1940. The main attack was supposed to be carried out by XXX AK forces with three infantry divisions in the first echelon: 132nd Infantry Division ( right), 28th LPD (in the center) and 50th LPD (left). Next, it was planned to bring the 22nd TD into battle in the Arma-Eli area and envelop the maneuver against the northern wing of the Soviet group on the Parpach Isthmus.

German attack plan for the Parpach positions of the 63rd State Duma with a landing from assault boats.

One of the common misconceptions regarding the events of May 1942 in Crimea is the belief in the quantitative superiority of Soviet troops over the German strike force. It is a consequence of an uncritical assessment of the data of E. von Manstein, who wrote in his memoirs about carrying out the offensive “with a balance of forces of 2.1 in favor of the enemy.” Today we have the opportunity to turn to the documents and not speculate with Manstein about the “hordes of the Mongols.” As is known, by the beginning of the decisive battle for the Kerch Peninsula, the Crimean Front (with part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) numbered 249,800 people. In turn, the 11th Army on May 2, 1942, based on the number of “eaters”, numbered 232,549 (243,760 on May 11) military personnel in army units and formations, 24 (25) thousand Luftwaffe personnel, 2 thousand . people from the Kriegsmarine and 94.6 (95) thousand people of the Romanian troops. In total, this gave over 350 thousand people to the total number of Manstein’s army. In addition, several thousand personnel of the Imperial Railways, SD, the Todt Organization in Crimea, and 9.3 thousand collaborators, designated in the German report as “Tatars,” were subordinate to her. In any case, there was no talk of any significant numerical superiority of the Crimean Front over Manstein’s troops aimed at it. Strengthening occurred in all directions. The 11th Army was given the VIII Air Corps, specially trained for interaction with ground forces by the Luftwaffe air force. At the beginning of May 1942, 460 aircraft arrived in Crimea, including a group of the latest Henschel-129 attack aircraft (15 aircraft).

It is traditionally argued that no defensive grouping of troops of the Crimean Front was created, the troops were in an offensive formation, no reserves were allocated, which prevented the Soviet troops from effectively defending themselves. Documents currently available indicate that the Crimean Front at the turn of April-May 1942, without any doubt, was preparing to defend itself. Moreover, with regard to the strip of the 44th Army, quite reasonable assumptions were made about the possible directions of enemy attacks: from Koi-Asan to Parpach and further along the railway and along the Feodosiya highway to Arma-Eli. The Germans in “Hunting the Bustard” chose the second option and advanced in May 1942 along the Armagh-Eli highway.

The entire zone defended by the front troops was fortified. Thus, during negotiations between the commander of the 47th Army and the front headquarters on May 3, 1942, Kolganov reported: “In front of the front of the 47th Army there is a continuous minefield […] west of Tulumchak and south of Korpech there is a second minefield. To cover the artillery base, the forward units were given 50 anti-tank hedgehogs and 500 mines.” At the same negotiations, possible counterattacks by the 55th Tank Brigade were discussed.

If we talk about the position of the troops of the Crimean Front as a whole, then seven of its rifle divisions were in the first line on a front of approximately 22 km, seven rifle divisions at a distance of 3–12 km in depth were in army reserves, including two divisions on Ak- Monai positions. In the northern part of the peninsula, 20–25 km from the front, three rifle brigades were located (12, 143 brigades, 83 mechanized brigades). Further to the east there was one cavalry division of front-line subordination (72nd cavalry division), and on the eastern tip of the peninsula there was one rifle division (156th infantry division), also of front-line subordination.

By the beginning of the German offensive in the 44th Army, the 63rd State Guards Division and the 276th Infantry Division were in the first line, and veterans of the battles on the Parpach Isthmus, the 404th and 157th Infantry Divisions, were withdrawn to the rear for additional staffing, simultaneously serving as an army reserve . The winter instructions of the Headquarters on the mandatory occupation of the Ak-Monai positions were carried out; they were occupied by the 396th Infantry Division with three companies of high-explosive flamethrowers. That is, it is still incorrect to talk about the absence of reserves. Another purely defensive measure was the arrival on the Parpach Isthmus literally at the beginning of May of units of the 151st fortified area (UR), intended to occupy the Ak-Monai positions together with the 396th Infantry Division (in the 44th A zone) and the 224th Infantry Division ( in lane 51st and 47th A). The UR was well staffed (2,967 people out of 2,949 in the state), but poorly equipped with weapons. On April 29, 1942, of the 128 assigned heavy machine guns, the 151st UR had none, and none of the 32 45-mm guns. True, out of 32 76-mm guns, all were available. Moreover, what is curious is that it was in the 343rd OPAB, which soon found itself on the path of the German strike force, that the vehicles allocated to the ABTU of the front were used in early May 1942 for their intended purpose, for the delivery of guns and ammunition.

The preparation of the operation by the German command during a long operational pause made it possible to select a vulnerable sector of the defense of the Crimean Front. This was the strip of the 44th Army adjacent to the Black Sea, more precisely, its left flank. It is interesting to note that back in February 1942, the chief of staff of the spacecraft engineering troops, Major General engineer I.P. Galitsky, in a report on the development of the Ak-Monai positions, designated the enemy’s attack along the coast of the Feodosia Gulf as “not promising success, since the Black Sea Fleet is a strong obstacle to this offensive action.” In reality, the Black Sea Fleet did not become a hindrance, one might even say that it did not have any influence on the German offensive.

The 63rd State Division was located in the direction of the planned main attack of the Germans. The national composition of the division was very heterogeneous. Summary data on the national composition of the 44th A formations is shown in table. 1. According to the data presented, it is clear that the share of the peoples of the Caucasus in the 63rd State Duma was quite significant, although not dominant. At the same time, one cannot help but note the deployment of the Azerbaijani 396th Infantry Division, which had no experience of serious battles, to the Ak-Monai positions.

The state of defense of the 63rd State Guards Division was not brilliant. An inspection carried out in the division regarding the execution of order No. 143 on strengthening the equipment of positions a few days before the German offensive (report dated May 7) showed: “the trenches and communication passages were made very narrow and small in places,” the parapets were not decorated, there were primitive loopholes only for some fighters.

In general, the 63rd State Guards Division was one of the weakest formations of the Crimean Front. At the same time, it cannot be said that she was a complete outsider in terms of weapons. Poor availability of 45 mm guns was a common problem for Soviet troops in Crimea in the spring of 1942; their number in divisions ranged from 2 to 18 per division, with an average of 6–8 pieces. As of April 26, out of 603 “forty-five” guns required by the state, the Crimean Front had only 206 guns of this type, out of 416 divisional 76-mm guns - 236, out of 4754 anti-tank guns - 1372. It cannot be said that a quick solution to this problem was expected. According to a certificate from the chief of artillery supply, in the first ten days of May, only 48 45-mm guns were expected to arrive (which is significant, all of them were intended for the 151st UR) and 1,100 anti-tank rifles. Approving the defense plan of the 44th Army, on April 26, the Front Military Council additionally ordered: “Provide all units of the first and second echelons with bottles of KS to fight tanks.” The provision of a mobile reserve of engineering units was also recommended, but these were measures of limited effectiveness. The main enemy of tanks was still artillery.

The problem of anti-tank defense was somewhat mitigated by the presence of four regiments of 76-mm USV cannons on the Crimean Front, but they still had to be in the right place at the right time. This was especially true given the horse-drawn traction of the USV regiments. In general, a massive enemy tank attack would be a big problem for any division of the Crimean Front. It is often forgotten that in 1942 the Red Army was on a starvation diet, both in terms of weapons and ammunition. It was very difficult to reproduce in Crimea in May 1942 the defense on the Kursk Bulge of the July 1943 model with four 45-mm guns and 29 Maxims of the 63rd State Duma.

Tanks, primarily the T-34 and KV, could and did become the mainstay of the defense of the Crimean Front. From April 12 to May 1, 1942, it was possible to repair 82 tanks from among those previously disabled. The state of the tank forces of the Crimean Front is shown in the table. KV tanks remained the core of the Crimean Front's tank forces (see Table 2).

Tanks 38(t) of the 22nd TD on the march, May 1942.

In the event of an enemy attack in the 44th Army, a counterattack plan was developed according to three options, which was finally recorded in combat order No. 028 of April 28, 1942. The first option was developed in the event of an enemy attack in the 51st Army zone along the railway. Vladislavovka, st. Ak-Monay, the second - in case of an attack along the Feodosia road to Arma-Eli, the third - in case of a breakthrough in the area of ​​​​the station. Ak-Monay and the development of the impact further along the railway. (actually a development of the first option). All three options included art. support from the RGK regiments.

As mentioned above, the 2nd option turned out to be relevant. It assumed the formation of two shock, “tank groups”:

a) 56th Tank Brigade, 157th Infantry Division, 13th MTSP and 124th Tank Brigade (counterattack from the area of ​​heights 63, 8 to the southwest);

b) 39th Tank Brigade, 404th Infantry Division and 126th Tank Brigade (counterattack from the Arma-Eli region to the southwest on As-Chalula).

The task was “to liquidate the breached pr-ka and restore the previous position of the left flank of the 44th Army.” The 124th detachment was an additional tank reserve. Nevertheless, the Crimean Front did not have a full-fledged mechanized formation (tank corps) to carry out counterattacks. Several tank brigades and a motorcycle regiment were not a full-fledged equivalent of such a formation, either in terms of numbers or weapons.

It is interesting to note that later Colonel S.I. Chernyak in the acquittal letter to G.M. Malenkov wrote in November 1942: “I gave an order in the area where the division was located to prepare a defensive line and bury all the troops in the ground, to have a preparatory line in the depths.” However, as Chernyak describes the situation, having seen D.T.’s fighters busy with earthworks. Kozlov carried out a scolding and ordered to “give people rest and prepare them for the attack.” In light of the above combat order No. 028, this is not surprising; the formations were preparing for counterattacks.

However, the practice of withdrawing to the rear on the Crimean front had one significant drawback. The formations were withdrawn to the rear for replenishment while maintaining their artillery regiments at the front. Thus, the artillery of the 404th and 157th Infantry Divisions, which had been withdrawn to the rear by May, was in positions to support the 63rd State Guards Division and the 276th Infantry Division. This created the preconditions for the divisions withdrawn to reserve to enter without artillery, as subsequently happened. One should not think that this was a decision unique to the 44th Army. The same practice took place in the 51st and 47th armies. This made the artillery group of the Crimean Front, on the one hand, a strong enemy in the first line, but very vulnerable if this line was broken through.

At the same time, theoretically, the Crimean Front could repeat the success of March 20, 1942 with a tank counterattack, but only if the qualitative composition of the enemy group remained unchanged. It was she who underwent changes that had fatal consequences for the Soviet troops in Crimea. The German command has strengthened its armored vehicles in Crimea to a high standard. The 22nd TD received 12 newest Pz.IV with a 75-mm long-barreled gun, 20 Pz.III with a 50-mm long-barreled gun and a Marder self-propelled gun with a 76.2-mm gun for the anti-tank division. In total, as of May 1, 1942, the 22nd TD consisted of 42 Pz.II, 120 Pz.38(t), 20 Pz.III, 30 Pz.IV, and a total of 212 tanks. Two companies of the formation were equipped with armored personnel carriers, one in each motorized infantry regiment. Thus, the 22nd TD entered the battle in Operation Bustard Hunt in much better condition than in the counteroffensive on March 20, 1942, despite the losses suffered. The 190th assault gun division also received new equipment - 6 self-propelled guns with a 75-mm long-barreled gun. In general, the XXX AK assembled a fairly strong armored “fist” (as of May 7, 1942):

- The 132nd Infantry Division was assigned the 249th battalion of assault guns and the battery of the 197th battalion (22 Sturmgeschutz in total);

– The 28th infantry division was assigned the 190th battalion of assault guns (15 self-propelled guns with a short barrel and 6 with a long one), as well as the 223rd company of captured tanks consisting of 16 light and 2 medium tanks;

- The 50th Infantry Division was assigned to the 197th assault gun battalion (14 “Sturmgeschüts”).

At the beginning of April 1942, Ion Antonescu inspected his troops in Crimea. Taking this opportunity, Manstein asked the Romanian dictator for Romanian units, and the marshal soon sent the VII Romanian Corps to Crimea, consisting of two divisions (19th Infantry Division and 8th CD). The commander of the 11th Army placed this corps on his left flank, in the zone of the Soviet 51st Army. There was a certain risk of a collapse of the front in the event of a Soviet offensive, similar to what happened on February 27, 1942.

Self-propelled gun "Marder" of early production series with a 76.2 mm gun. These self-propelled guns became one of the Germans' answers to the new Soviet armored vehicles.

The High Command turned a deaf ear to all of Manstein’s requests for a second tank division (“headquarters of a tank corps with another tank division from the 1st TA”), which he requested in his reports in January and February 1942. As a tank commander who had driving experience motorized corps in the summer of 1941, Manstein realized the need to use exactly two mechanized formations on the Kerch Peninsula: one to encircle Soviet troops, and the second to strike in depth, on Kerch. Drawing on his experience in the Crimea in 1941, Manstein formed a battle group similar in tasks to the Ziegler brigade, but larger and better armed. It included the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd Infantry Division, the battalion of the 391st Infantry Division, the 560th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 154th Division (twelve 150-mm sFH37(t)), a battery of 10-cm K18 guns (4 guns), a battery of assault guns of the 197th battalion, a company of Brandenburg saboteurs, a battery of rocket mortars, anti-aircraft guns, sappers and the Romanian 3rd motorized cavalry regiment Cornet. The battle group was headed by Colonel K. von Groddeck. In addition to Groddeck's brigade, Müller's battle group was formed from truck-mounted infantry of the 401st Infantry and a battalion of the 105th Regiment, reinforced by the 223rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, a battery of assault guns and Romanian artillery. As a result, the mobile forces of the 11th Army (in addition to the 22nd TD) grew to five infantry battalions reinforced with artillery, which was already quite close to a tank division. R. Forzik claims that Muller's group was subordinate to Groddeck, but this fact is not traced according to the documents of the 11th Army. Rather, we can talk about two independently operating combat groups with a common task.

Remembering the negative experience of the counterattack of the 22nd TD on March 20, for the operation “Hunt for Bustards” the Germans undertook a thorough study of the anti-tank ditch of the Ak-Monai positions, both with the help of aerial reconnaissance and through a targeted interview of prisoners. It really was a serious engineering structure, 2–3 meters deep, 4–4.5 meters wide on the surface, and 3 meters wide at the bottom. Particular attention was paid to the study of crossings across the ditch (which were needed by Soviet troops to supply troops and supplies from the depths). However, these crossings were so seriously protected with mining of the approaches to them that the conclusion was made: “The anti-tank ditch should therefore be crossed away from these crossings.” It is not surprising, since the prominent Soviet engineer I.P. had a hand in improving the defense of the Ak-Monai positions. Galitsky, who worked on the Crimean Front from February to April 1942.

To manage the artillery collected for Operation Bustard Hunt, the 306th Artillery Command was allocated, headed by Lieutenant General J. Zukertort. It must be said that the Germans generally rated the artillery of the Crimean Front quite highly. One of the reports written following the operation directly admits: “Due to the constant change of positions by enemy artillery and the large number of these positions, we could only talk about containing enemy artillery by setting up smoke screens and firing explosive shells in areas.” That is, the emphasis was placed on blinding observation posts in order to reduce the effectiveness of artillery counteraction. J. Zukertort also noted one feature of the actions of the Soviet artillery, which it was decided to take advantage of: “The Russians always open fire from the bulk of their guns about half an hour after the start of the attack; thanks to this, it is possible to first support the infantry attack with all our artillery.” Artillery activity also became a means for the 11th Army to mislead the Soviet command regarding the direction of the main attack. In the XXX AK zone there was no artillery preparation, counter-battery fire, shooting at fortifications, or sighting. On the contrary, in the XXXXII AK zone, already 10 days before the start of the offensive, there was a systematic counter-battery fight and shooting at various targets.

Apparently, this disinformation campaign had a certain impact on the Soviet command's assessment of the situation. According to available data, a German offensive was expected against "the center and right wing of the armies of the Crimean Front." It cannot be emphasized enough here that the task of determining the direction of the enemy’s attack is in itself very difficult. Even in a classic example of successful deliberate defense of the Central Front in the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge, the Germans struck the weakest 15th Infantry Division V.N. The Jangavs broke through its defenses on the first day of the battle. It was difficult to expect a better solution from the Crimean Front in May 1942 than that of K.K. Rokossovsky in the summer of 1943

Tank Pz.IV with a 75-mm long-barreled gun in Crimea. May 1942 Crimea became a testing ground for new German armored vehicles.

In general, there is no doubt that the command of the Crimean Front considered the possibility of the enemy going on the offensive. They waited for the German attack, paying attention to the delivery of all types of supplies and the activation of the Air Force. The ZhBD of the Crimean Front at the beginning of May 1942 recorded the conclusion that the enemy was preparing “for active operations in the Kerch direction.” Moreover, the first, still false, alarm arose literally in the first days of the month. During the negotiations S.I. Chernyak with D.T. Kozlov, on the night of May 3, mentioned the Germans cutting the wire, and concluded: “at dawn he can move on to active action.” In the same conversation, the front commander reminded us of the need to be ready to switch to radio communications.

One of the last “bells” about the impending German offensive was the flight to the Soviet side of the Croatian pilot Nikolai Vucina on the morning of May 4, 1942, who was personally interrogated by Marshal S.M. in the evening of the same day. Budyonny. N. Vuchina directly said that in Crimea “the Germans are thinking of attacking between May 10–15.”

One of the first to move forward to attack Soviet positions on the Parpach Isthmus was the reinforced company of the 436th Infantry Division, intended for a tactical landing in the rear of Soviet positions, behind the anti-tank ditch. Traditionally, this landing is called “boat landing,” but it was landed with the help of engineer assault boats with an internal combustion engine. They were originally intended for crossing rivers. The landing was carried out, accordingly, by the forces of an engineering unit: the 902nd assault boat team. The difference between such boats and lifeboats was their high speed of movement.

Since the harbor of Feodosia was filled with mines, landing infantrymen were boarded on boats from 20.30 on May 7 at Cape Ilya (empty boats with a shallow draft could pass through the harbor without interference). The landing was almost disrupted due to the appearance of the silhouette of a ship, identified by the Germans as a torpedo boat. However, this had no consequences; at 1.45 a.m. on May 8, the silhouette disappeared and at 2.30 a.m. the assault boats began moving in conditions of seas of 3 points (which forced two people to hold the engine). The disruption of this enterprise, bordering on an adventure, could have been carried out by the weakest forces of the Black Sea Fleet boats, but the Germans did not encounter any interference from the Soviet fleet. The landing was covered from the air by fighters; they are mentioned in the German report.

At 4.00 am Berlin time on May 8, the boats leave for the designated area and at 4.15 am in deployed formation at a speed of 25 km/h they go on the attack. 1 km from the shore, the boats with the landing force come under Soviet artillery fire, but overcome it, and 500 meters from the shore they begin to be hit with infantry weapons. As a result, 11 boats are disabled, another 4 capsize, and the landing is carried out from 28 boats. On the shore, the landing party encounters a field of FOGs (high-explosive flamethrowers), but according to the German report on the actions, losses from flamethrowers were insignificant and the minefield of FOGs was quickly neutralized. The landing was an unpleasant surprise, aggravating the situation on the left flank of the 44th Army. As stated in the report of the reconnaissance department of the 44th Army, the landing force occupied the bunker, “cutting off our units defending to the west. slopes of the city of As-Chalule." It must be said that in the report, hot on the heels of the events, the estimate of the number of troops was quite realistic - 150 people.

Even at eight in the evening on May 7, 1942, when several hours remained before the German offensive, the artillery headquarters of the Crimean Front had strong data about the upcoming German offensive. With the approval of the front command, a decision was made at 4.00 on May 8 to conduct counter-preparations and an order was given for counter-preparations. The beginning of counterpreparation actually coincides with the enemy's artillery strike. The author was unable to find any mention of Soviet counter-preparation and the effect it produced in German operational documents. There is only the phrase “Russian artillery fire is weak” in the ZhBD of the 11th Army, but it is unclear what time interval it refers to.

Tanks of the 22nd TD in Crimea. On the right side of the photo you can clearly see the pear-shaped muzzle brake of 75 mm long-barreled guns of the early type.

The German artillery barrage begins at 3.15 Berlin time on May 8 with a powerful, but very short, only 3 minutes, fire strike. One of the means of achieving success for the Germans was 150-mm rocket mortars, which made a strong impression on the 77th Infantry Division back in March 1942. On the morning of May 8, they operated with highly concentrated fire, which was provided by six batteries at once. Also on May 8, the attack of 150 mm mortars was reinforced by 280 mm and 320 mm rockets. Anti-tanker G. Biderman from the 132nd Infantry Division later wrote in his memoirs:

“A battery of six rocket launchers could fire 26 shells, flying with a nervous system-destroying roar, producing a terrible effect. The fragments from these shells did not produce the same impact as the fragments from artillery shells, but the explosion of the shell when detonated in a confined space or at close range caused the blood vessels to rupture from the shock wave. Enemy soldiers in the immediate vicinity of the explosion were soon demoralized by the eardrum-rupturing explosions, and normal, instinctive fear quickly gave way to horror and panic. The stoic Russian soldiers, usually insensitive even to Stuka raids, often became helpless under such attacks."

It is not surprising that this weapon made a strong impression on the not-so-strong division of the Crimean Front, i.e., the 63rd State Division. As stated in the report on the use of rocket mortars: “The breakthrough of the 49th regiment at 6.00 in the morning into the anti-tank ditch was facilitated (perhaps, in principle, ensured) by the moral impact on the enemy (the direct physical impact on the enemy who was in deep trenches was significantly less).” Indeed, the infantrymen of the 28th infantry division reached the anti-tank ditch already at 4.00 in the morning.

The key role in the success of the German offensive was played by the speed of action and powerful artillery and air strikes in the first hours of the operation. The report on the actions of the 28th Infantry Division stated: “Soon after this [reaching the line of the ditch. – Auto.] the pre-agreed strike of the “pieces” begins, which occurs in a timely manner. The enemy on the main line of defense receives a blow just at the moment when the advancing infantry reached the anti-tank ditch. At the same time, the artillery opens heavy fire from all available barrels at the designated breakthrough site.” As a result, the advanced companies of the 28th Infantry Division manage to break into the anti-tank ditch south of the road. As a result, already in the first hours of the operation, the 132nd Infantry Division and the 28th Infantry Division formed bridgeheads east of the anti-tank ditch. Moreover, the 132nd Infantry Division is advancing 3 km east of the ditch. Not only were units of the 63rd Civil Guard Division crushed, but also the left-flank 343rd detachment of the 151st UR, its commander, Captain Mikhailov, was seriously wounded.

To be fair, it should be noted that it was not possible to make a strong impression on the Soviet infantry everywhere. The 50th Infantry Division on the left wing of XXX AK was not successful. The same report on the actions of rocket mortars said: “Two fire strikes (117 explosive and 54 incendiary shells) failed to destroy the enemy, who had dug in at a narrow height of 69.4, 1.5 km east of Koi-Asan in a trench up to half a meter wide and deep up to 3 meters (powerful attacks of the “things” also turned out to be ineffective).” The more experienced 302nd Infantry Division of the 51st Army defended here. The 276th Infantry Division of the 44th Army also initially held its position.

It should be noted that the ammunition consumption of the 11th Army on the first day of the “Hunting for Bustards” was very high: 1718 tons. For comparison, even in the most intense days of the assault on Stalingrad, Paulus’s army did not shoot more than 1000–1300 tons. Considering the small space over which the 306th Command's artillery fired, the effect of the German artillery bombardment was obviously above average.

The scheme of counteraction to Soviet artillery by the 306th command was based on blinding observation posts. Also, the shelling of observation post areas led to wire ruptures and loss of control. As the 11th Army’s report on the breakthrough of the Parpach positions later noted: “According to the prisoners, the enemy’s telephone network was damaged so badly that the Russian command was in chaos.” This was generally a fairly typical phenomenon, loss of communication due to massive artillery strikes. Also, the report of the 306th command stated: “The enemy fired little (from individual guns or platoons, rarely batteries) and completely chaotically and at random.”

However, this assessment does not fully reflect the impact of Soviet artillery on the course of the battle, at least in the first half of the day on May 8. The construction of bridges across the ditch took place under fire from the 457th and 53rd artillery regiments of the RGK, and the artillery of the 276th Infantry Division also worked on targets in the zone of the 63rd State Duma. Soviet rocket artillery took part in repelling the enemy offensive from 4.42 with one division of the 25th GMP, and from 5.30 - with the entire regiment. This impact has not gone unnoticed. The report on the actions of the 28th Infantry Division stated:

“After the penetration, enemy infantry fire in the immediate vicinity of the penetration area is not very strong, but Russian artillery is becoming more and more active. Small and medium caliber batteries are shelling the area on both sides of the anti-tank ditch. One or more multiple launch rocket batteries take aim and begin to fire at the crossing of the ditch.”

Soviet heavy tank KV, destroyed on the Kerch Peninsula. May 1942

Moreover, the report of the 28th Infantry Division directly indicates the rather serious impact of Soviet artillery regiments on the course of hostilities: “Under heavy enemy artillery fire, the commander of the regimental short-range artillery group supporting the advancing regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Klose and his adjutant, were killed. For some time, the artillery leadership was decapitated, valuable time was lost and was not used to continue the offensive.”

However, soon a turning point came in the fighting, not in favor of the Soviet troops. By approximately 10.00 on May 8, the artillery of the 63rd Guards Division east of the ditch was suppressed. The 53rd artillery regiment, having expended ammunition, at about 11.00 retreats to reserve outposts in the area of ​​​​Kabush-Ube. Meanwhile, by noon, German sappers complete the construction of a bridge over the ditch, assault guns are transported across it, and the regrouping of artillery is completed. The task of the attackers was made easier by preserving some of the existing crossings. The report on the actions of the 197th assault gun battalion directly states: “A part of the ditch crossings built by the enemy fell into our hands unharmed.” However, in addition to this, the walls of the ditch were undermined to allow self-propelled guns to pass through. This gives new impetus to continue the offensive. As noted in the report on the actions of the 28th Infantry Division: “The Russians soon lose their stability and begin to retreat everywhere.”

Another angle of the same car. Note the two holes in the rear of the tank. Presumably these are holes from 75-mm armor-piercing shells.

In general, a breakthrough of the first line of Soviet defense became possible due to the smooth interaction of infantry, artillery and sappers. A report from the 197th Assault Gun Battalion states: “Cooperation with the infantry and engineers was excellent. Despite heavy mining and active enemy defense (artillery, anti-tank missiles, mortars, anti-tank guns, snipers), the Parpach ditch was overcome by noon on the first day of the offensive.” The battalion later even starred in the OKH training film “Assault Guns and Sappers.”

The Soviet artillery, located west of the anti-tank ditch of the Ak-Monai positions, during the battle from 5.00 to 14.00 on May 8, almost all were out of action with the exception of four guns of the 766th ap. The front-line report on the activities of the artillery especially emphasized: “The means of traction were overwhelmingly destroyed by aviation fire.” A long operational pause at the front allowed the Germans to prepare well for an attack on the Parpach positions.

The attempt to bring tanks of the 44th Army into battle for a counterattack was carried out very late. The first to enter the battle at about 11.00 was the 126th OTB on T-26 tanks in the 276th Infantry Division, counterattacking from the Arma-Eli state farm to the southwest. The battalion lost 4 T-26s burned out and 8 T-26s shot down. It was impossible to break up the bridgeheads east of the ditch occupied by German infantry with a small group of light tanks.

The main forces of the tank forces of the 44th Army entered the battle only after noon. That is, when the Germans had already transported assault guns across the ditch. Having been alerted at 4.15 am, the 39th Tank Brigade was inactive until 12.00 on May 8, which gave the enemy the opportunity to break deep enough into the formation of S.I.’s army. Chernyak. Only in the afternoon the brigade, consisting of 2 KV, 1 T-34 and 14 T-60, began to move forward and encountered the enemy on the march at the heights. 50, 6 east of Ak-Monai positions. In a few hours of battle, the 39th Tank Brigade lost both of its KVs and 5 T-60s, 1 T-34 was damaged (it was in service until May 16).

Expanding the bridgehead, building crossings and repelling tank counterattacks allows the 28th infantry division to introduce the 83rd infantry unit in the wake of the advancing vanguard and use them against height 63.8. From this height, as indicated in the report of the 28th Infantry Division, “the enemy is again conducting strong flanking fire.” The height was held by the 819th Regiment of the 396th Infantry Division, which was knocked down from its positions at approximately 16.00, which forced the 276th Infantry Division to begin retreating to the height. 63, 2, Mount Mezarlyk-Oba. This retreat, in turn, forces the artillery of the northern sector, which occupied positions on the heights, to withdraw. 63, 8, further to the northeast, also in the high area. 63, 2 and Mezarlyk-Oba mountains.

At this moment, hopelessly late for the turning point of the battle, the 56th Tank Brigade of the 44th Army entered the battle. For unknown reasons, the order for the brigade to move was given even more late than other units, only at 16.00 on May 8. The brigade was ordered to act according to option No. 2 in two groups, a pinning group and a shock group. The 13th MCP acted with the brigade. She set out at 17.00 and until 23.00 fought in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 63.8 and the Feodosiya highway. However, the opposition from the attackers turned out to be stronger than expected. The enemy of the Soviet tankers was assault guns, including a new model. As a result, all 7 tanks of the KV brigade were disabled, and in total it lost 17 vehicles. In fact, the process of the enemy gradually grinding down the KVs and T-34s of the Crimean Front, capable of countering the enemy’s tank attack, began.

It should be noted that the Germans also have considerations regarding unrealized opportunities. The report of the 28th infantry division following the battles stated: “In order to take advantage of the favorable situation, the division command proposes to the corps command to bring into battle at least part of the forces of the tank division in order to make the enemy’s confusion complete and prevent him from equipping a new line of defense in depth. However, due to lack of time, it is no longer possible to bring the tank division into battle.” A certain reinsurance with the introduction of the 22nd TD following the failure on March 20 somewhat slowed down the pace of development of the 11th Army's success. The situation for introducing a tank division into battle was indeed quite favorable.

By the end of the day on May 8, a huge gap gaped in the formation of the 44th Army. The 63rd State Duma was overturned, the 276th Infantry Division retreated to the northeast, and there was practically no continuous front. One of the first in the direction of the breakthrough was the 72nd Cavalry Division of the hero of the Civil War, Major General V.I. Books (4684 people, 7 BA-10, 12 BA-20, 12 76 mm and 18 45 mm guns). It was alerted on the morning of May 8, and at 20.00 an order was received to take up defensive positions in the rear of the 44th Army. Division V.I. Knigi set out at midnight and reached the line in the Uzun-Ayak area by 5.00. Of course, this was a rather weak barrier. Nevertheless, at that time the front command still had a fairly strong tank “fist” (see Table 3).

A brief report on the actions of the 44th Army, prepared in June 1942 based on the results of the battles by Major A. Zhitnik, indicated that the front order on a new detachment of forces was indeed received and deciphered at 4.30 in the morning on May 9, 1942. It stated that The 390th Infantry Division, 83rd Infantry Brigade and 56th Tank Brigade are not included in the 44th Army, but are transferred to the commander of the 51st Army for a counterattack. At this moment S.I. Chernyak showed arbitrariness and decided not to give up the 390th Infantry Division, but to use it for the planned counterattack (notifying V.N. Lvov in encryption). However, as A. Zhitnik writes, the 390th Infantry Division at 6.00 began to withdraw without warning to the 51st A zone. In turn, this withdrawal led to the retreat of neighboring divisions.

Information about the withdrawal is indirectly confirmed by the report of the 229th detachment. The KV battalion concentrated for an attack together with the 390th Infantry Division, but at 5.30 a representative of the 51st Army arrived at the battalion’s location and as a result, the tank fist from 8 KV was... withdrawn back to the Kiyata area, where it remained throughout the first half of the day on May 9 . It is impossible not to recognize the rather serious disorganization of the already practically prepared counterattack.

Commander of the 72nd Cavalry Division, hero of the Civil War, Major General V.I. Book.

The Germans actually had several hours to pull up artillery through the passage in the ditch and systematically bring the 22nd Panzer Division into battle. It must be said that in comparison with the dynamically developing events of May 8, the next day the parties moved rather slowly to active action. The 28th Infantry Division, which had overcome the ditch, meanwhile turned its front to the north, covering the eastern flank with a bicycle battalion. It was counterattacked by tanks around 8.00–9.00; it was a fresh 124th detachment with T-26s, which lost 5 tanks in the attack. However, a general counterattack did not take place in the first half of the day. The 40th Tank Brigade, having entered the area east of Parpach on the morning of May 9, stood in place all day. The 56th Tank Brigade and the 13th MtsP also remained in place.

In the morning of May 9, V.N. Lvov is trying to organize a counterattack against the enemy group advancing from Arma-Eli to the north, to the rear of his army. The slow gathering of forces can be explained by the desire of the Soviet command to deliver a strong enough counterattack to influence not only the Arma-Eli region, but also the enemy troops that had broken through to the west in the 44th Army zone. According to V.N.’s plan Lvov, outlined in order No. 0025/OP dated 0.10 on May 9, was supposed to strike in the direction of the city of Mezarlyk-Oba, high. 63, 8, As-Chalule, i.e. to the seashore. However, time certainly worked against the Crimean Front. Any delay only made the situation worse.

Around noon, after bringing up artillery, the 28th Infantry Division resumed the offensive and captured Arma-Eli. It must be said that the unit’s report does not regard the resistance of the Soviet troops at this moment as weak: “Powerful artillery fire, including multiple launch rocket systems, is being conducted by the enemy from the north and north-west. It is impossible to avoid losses." According to Soviet data, the 456th and 457th AP RGK operated here. The enemy's advance in Arma-Eli forces the Soviet artillery to withdraw further north in echelon from 14.00 to the area of ​​Mount Keyman and the Syuruk-Oba mound.

On the afternoon of May 9, rain poured down, which washed away the soil and worsened the conditions for the movement of troops. It should be noted here that during the May offensive, the changeable Crimean weather was on the side of the Germans. They managed to achieve a turning point in their favor before the rains began to fall. As stated in the report on the actions of the 28th Infantry Division: “If the period of bad weather had begun a day earlier, the success of the breakthrough - a prerequisite for the success of the entire operation - would have been in question. The transfer of artillery and heavy weapons, their effective and necessary support for the advancing infantry, would become impossible.”

As the weather worsens, the 22nd Panzer Division joins the German offensive. It should be noted that the first entry for May 9 in the ZhBD 22nd TD reports the shelling of the formation’s advance route at 2.20–2.30 a.m. by a “Russian warship.” However, nothing is said about the effect of the shelling. The advance of the tank division occurs through the strip of the 132nd Infantry Division.

Given the general slowness of gathering forces on both sides, it was the Germans who made the first move, bringing the 22nd Tank Division into battle around 16.00–17.00. As indicated in the report of the 229th Regiment, the commander of the 51st Army personally (General Lvov was true to himself and controlled from the front line) sets the battalion the task of counterattacking the enemy moving from Arma-Eli to the Kara-Oba and Syuruk-Oba mounds. These were already two columns of tanks from the 22nd TD. At that moment, the 229th detachment numbered 8 kV in service. The infantry of the 236th Infantry Division began to retreat under attacks from enemy tanks. The situation as a whole was similar to the German offensive on March 20, but with regard to technology, the balance of power changed fundamentally.

In the tank battle that began at approximately 16.45 at Arma-Eli on May 9, 1942, the 229th Regiment immediately lost 5 KV. At the same time, the tankers of the battalion claimed to destroy 28 enemy tanks, including 6 tanks destroyed by the company commander, Lieutenant Timofeev, who died in this battle. The actions of the tanks managed to somewhat stabilize the situation, but only in the form of containing the enemy’s advance. The non-simultaneous entry of Soviet tank units into battle also played a negative role. Later, the 40th Tank Brigade was reproached for its passive actions in the afternoon of May 9. The brigade's report indicates its participation in the counterattack after 19.30, without its losses, but this was already a few hours after the 22nd TD entered the battle.

The Germans managed to knock out the Soviet heavy tanks that found themselves on the battlefield with much greater efficiency than on March 20. As stated in the report of the 11th Army headquarters following the breakthrough of the Parpach positions: “The successes of the 22nd TD in breaking through the Parpach position and advancing through Arma-Eli to the north were largely determined by the presence of new weapons. Thanks to these weapons, the soldiers had a feeling of superiority over Russian heavy tanks." Soviet sources confirm a qualitative change in the situation: “Of the new means used by the enemy, the presence of shells that pierce the armor of the KV and set it on fire is noteworthy.” Therefore, it was not possible to put the units of the 22nd TD to flight with a KV strike.

As reported by the headquarters of the Crimean Front S.M. Budyonny at 5.00 on May 10, the enemy forestalled the strike group of the 51st Army in the timing of the start of the offensive, the 390th Infantry Division was thrown back, and the front was opened. It should be noted that the front command personally observed what was happening. During negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky D.T. Kozlov said that together with L.Z. Mehlis on the 9th “observed a fierce battle between our infantry, artillery and enemy tanks.” The advancing 236th Infantry Division and 157th Infantry Division were forced to engage in battle until they were fully concentrated. At the same time, the advance of the 22nd TD and 28th LPD on the evening of May 9 was limited to an area approximately 3 km north of Arma-Eli. The slow pace of the German offensive so far made it possible to maintain relative order and retreat in an organized manner. Several artillery regiments operating in the Arma-Eli area withdrew to the Kiyat area on the night of May 11.

The actions of the Germans in the zone of the 44th Army were much more like a “blitzkrieg”. As indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army, Groddeck’s brigade, without encountering resistance (and shelling from the Black Sea Fleet from the sea), advanced along the coast into the depths of the Kerch Peninsula. Already in the morning of 8.30 on May 9, she passed Seitdzheut. As noted in the ZhBD of Manstein’s army, the surviving artillery of the 44th Army fell victim to the offensive: “Groddeck’s advanced formation destroyed several enemy batteries.” In the conditions of the collapse of the front, even infantry formations quickly moved forward. At 17.30 on May 9, the headquarters of the 44th Army in the Uzun-Ayak area was attacked by units of the 132nd Infantry Division, “forcing the headquarters to destroy documents and retreat under direct fire from tanks and submachine gunners.” As a result, the already extremely difficult situation was aggravated by the loss of control.

In one of the orders issued on the evening of May 9, P.P. Eternal wrote: “Military council of the front near Lvov. I have no connection with him." On the one hand, the practice of management from the forefront had unconditional positive features. It was used by such recognized masters of their craft as G.K. Zhukov, V. Model, E. Rommel. On the one hand, D.T. Kozlova and L.Z. Mehlis can be understood; the counterattack of the 51st Army decided a lot. On the other hand, in conditions of unstable communication, this led to untimely decisions in other areas.

"Road of Death" Soviet cars abandoned on the road leading to Kerch.

To the chief of staff of the front, Major General P.P. On the eternal day of May 9, a great burden and responsibility lay in making decisions. He was by no means sitting idle. It was on May 9 that he attempted to restore the integrity of the left wing of the front. So, in the middle of the day, the 12th and 143rd Brigades are transferred from the reserve to the 44th Army. Moreover, the first one was subordinate to S.I. Chernyak right at its location, in the Agibel area, Kr. Shar, and the second made a march to the Adyk area with access to the designated area by 4.00 on May 10. The strength of the brigade, however, left much to be desired; on April 23, the 143rd brigade numbered 2,208 people, significantly less than the staff. To the south, in the Bash-Kirgiz region, Mavlyush, the 72nd cavalry division advanced. However, these forces failed to build a continuous line of defense. The front from the Parpach positions expanded like a funnel. As a result, from the left flank of the 72nd cavalry division near Mamlush to the sea, there was a space covered only by the remnants of the 404th infantry division and the 63rd civil division, the 54th motorized rifle regiment and junior lieutenant courses. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the German command also brought reserves into battle, in this case the 170th Infantry Division XXX AK. She targeted Agibel, pinning down the collected P.P. Eternal reserves. Moreover, Groddeck’s brigade, moving along the seaside road, encountering weak resistance, reached the area of ​​the Kenegez state farm by the evening of May 9. That is, it turned out to be literally two steps from the Turkish Wall. Only the front, which was still being built by the command, was deeply outflanked.

"Abkhazia" in Sevastopol. May 1942

On the evening of May 9, an order followed from S.M. Budyonny on the “attack of the Lvov group in the direction of the Peschanaya beam.” However, at the negotiations that took place at 3.00 am on May 10, L.Z. Mehlis and D.T. Kozlova with I.V. Stalin traces his refusal to try to turn the situation in his favor by decisive actions in favor of retreating to a new line of defense. The command of the Crimean Front already doubted the advisability of continuing the offensive: “the tanks will not get through.” As a result, Stalin said directly: “If you are able and manage to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement.”

By that time, measures had already been taken to fill the defensive line of the Turkish Wall. By order of the headquarters of the Crimean Front, the 156th Infantry Division moved from the reserve to the Turkish Wall, which was ordered to “finish the exit for the defense of the line of the Turkish Wall [on] the Natashino, Bikech front by the end of 10.5.” This front was about 20 km and did not completely cover the Turkish Wall. As of April 23, the 156th Infantry Division consisted of 10,603 personnel and had 131 light and 59 heavy machine guns. These were good indicators, but the 20 km front was twice the statutory norm. The right flank of the 156th Infantry Division, adjacent to the Sea of ​​Azov, was supposed to cover the retreating units, and prefabricated units from the front reserve were advanced to the left from Bikech to Uzunlar. These were four reserve rifle regiments, courses for junior lieutenants, and two battalions of front-line courses. During negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the night of May 11 D.T. Kozlov expressed concern that the 156th Infantry Division is “almost 50% staffed by Dagestanis.” Looking ahead, it must be said that the division performed well considering the situation.

Manstein later wrote in his memoirs: “If the enemy had managed, after leaving the Parpach position, to take up defense somewhere again, our offensive would have foundered.” On the one hand, there was an element of dramatization of the situation. On the other hand, it was precisely to pre-empt the occupation of intermediate positions that the commander of the 11th Army sent Groddeck’s brigade to the Turkish Wall. It was, rather, about carrying out the operation “Hunting for Bustards” at the highest possible pace. Moreover, it should be noted that it was on May 10 that Manstein gave a certain head start to his opponents by sending Groddeck’s brigade to the north “to block the roads leading through Marfovka and Sultanovka as soon as possible.” In a sense, such a turn can be justified by the desire to prevent the occupation of the Turkish Wall by retreating Soviet units.

The turn of the Groddeck brigade to Marfovka on May 10 was traditionally described in domestic works as an airborne assault followed by a landing. He was designated as such in a report from front headquarters on May 12. V.S. Abramov rightly noted that the parachutes of the supply containers could have been mistaken for the landing.

Despite the rather skeptical attitude of the front command towards the counterattack of the 51st Army, it continued on the afternoon of May 10. Essentially, it became a means of withdrawing the troops of the 51st and 47th armies from the emerging encirclement. Realizing the growing crisis, the front command throws its last reserve into battle - the 55th Tank Brigade M.D. Sinenko, taken from the right flank of the front. She received an order at 20.00 on May 9 (still from K.S. Kolganov) to concentrate in the Oguz-Tobe area. Due to the muddy roads, the advance was slow and ended only at 8.00 on May 10th. The 77th State Guards Division, Colonel M.V., is being deployed here, to Oguz-Tobe. Volkova. Order for a counterattack by M.D. Sinenko received it late, and as a result, the counterattack scheduled for 11.00 followed only in the afternoon of May 10.

The chaos of the disaster. Abandoned equipment on the shore in Kerch. May 1942

As a result, the counterattack of the 51st Army began with attacks from the 40th Tank Brigade, which had been inactive the previous day, with the 650th Infantry Division of the 138th Infantry Division. Due to the muddy ground, 6 KV and 3 T-34s from the brigade go into battle, met by heavy fire on the southern slopes of the Syuruk-Oba mound. As a result, 3 KV and 1 T-34 were burned. The report on the actions of the 28th Infantry Division notes “the strongest fire impact of the enemy from the western flank” and writes about the need to “repel several strong enemy attacks, including with tank support.” However, in the direction of the main attack, the Germans manage to take the high ground by 14.30. 66, 2. Only after 16.00 the M.D. brigade. Sinenko went into battle and collided with the 22nd TD in the Oguz-Tobe area, when the encirclement was almost closed. The counterattack was not successful, 5 KV tanks of the 55th brigade were burned and 2 were knocked out, 2 more were out of action for technical reasons. The fact of a tank battle is confirmed by the ZhBD 22nd TD; the Germans laid claim to 20 destroyed Soviet tanks. Indeed, the 55th Tank Brigade also lost 11 T-26s and T-60s. After 19.00, the 229th detachment took part in the battle, losing one KV. According to the front-line report, this was the only operational KV at that time. Thus, quite in the spirit of the scattered attacks of the previous days, the Soviet tank units attacked sequentially, allowing the enemy to gradually knock out the most dangerous KVs and T-34s for them. The ZhBD of the 11th Army stated: “Attempts by enemy tanks to prevent encirclement by counterattacks from the north on Oguz-Tobe were thwarted by the actions of the 22nd Tank Division and the VIII Air Corps. Many enemy tanks were destroyed."

Reports from tank units and formations almost unanimously note the emergence of new highly effective weapons from the enemy. The report of the 55th Tank Brigade reports: “The enemy is using a new anti-tank gun system mounted on a tank or attached to a tank, which, in the presence of a high initial velocity of the projectile, pierced 140 mm thick armor in the frontal part of the KV tank.” Moreover, it should be noted that the document states: “The hole size is up to 80 mm.” This indicates a hit from a caliber armor-piercing projectile. Subsequently, with the widespread use of the latest 75-mm guns on the Soviet-German front, until 1943 they were more often used by the Germans with cumulative shells (as they were called in the Red Army, “thermite”). In Crimea, the latest Wehrmacht equipment used the most effective caliber armor-piercing shells, which pierced the armor and exploded inside the tank. The report of the 229th brigade reads: “The enemy fired shells against our KV tanks that penetrated the KV tanks with 4-5 shots. When the armor is penetrated, the KV tank ignites inside.” The phrase “with 4-5 shots” probably refers to shooting at long distances; according to German sources, KV shooting is noted from a distance of up to 1800 meters with a defeat from the 4th shot.

The battlefield remained with the Germans, and they had the opportunity to inspect the damaged vehicles. The conclusion was expected: “The bulk of the KV and T-34 were definitely destroyed by 7.62 and 7.5 cm shells.” Accordingly, the 140th anti-tank division of the 22nd TD, re-equipped with 76.2 mm self-propelled guns on a 38(t) tank chassis, announced the destruction of 24 Soviet tanks, including about 10 KV and 2-3 T-34s, and The 204th TP of the 22nd TD (12 Pz.IV with KwK40, 20 Pz.III with KwK39) claimed to destroy “about 50 Russian” tanks, including 12 KV and 2–3 T-34. Regarding the 6 new assault guns, it was indicated that they “destroyed an average of 3 Russian tanks” (without specifying the type, 15–20 vehicles, some, obviously, KV or T-34). According to Soviet data, 27 KVs and 3 T-34s were lost in the May battles, hit by enemy artillery fire. In this regard, Soviet and German data agree quite well - most of the KV and T-34 fell victim to new types of guns. Of course, the battles did not take place with a “dry score” - the Germans admit the irretrievable loss of 21 tanks from the 22nd TD in the May battles, including 2-3 Pz.IV with KwK40, 2-3 Pz.III. The total losses can be estimated from the division's report dated May 28, 1942, according to which there were 10 Pz.II, 50 Pz.38(t), 6 Pz.III, 6 Pz.IV (with a short 75-mm cannon) and 4 Pz.IV (with a long-barreled gun), i.e. there were 76 vehicles in service out of 212 available on May 1, 1942.

As for the impact on Soviet tanks from the air, Soviet data does not confirm the great success of the Khsh-129 anti-tank attack aircraft. According to the documents of the BT and MV of the Crimean Front, only 15 tanks fell victim to airstrikes, mostly T-26 from 126 detachments. In his report and actions of the 55th Tank Brigade M.D. Sinenko directly denied significant impact from the air; according to him, his units reached Oguz-Tobe “without losses in personnel and equipment from the bombing.”

The light cruiser Molotov enters the Northern Bay of Sevastopol. 1942

As a result of tank battles that were unsuccessful for the Soviet side on the afternoon of May 10, 1942, the encirclement ring of the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies was actually closed. Only a narrow corridor along the shore of the Arabat Gulf remained at the disposal of the Soviet units. The report on the actions of the 28th infantry division admitted: “Only in the very north by the sea, north of the heights of Oguz-Tobe, where the tank division was unable to quickly break through, large enemy units are withdrawing. However, they are forced to leave their heavy equipment and weapons stuck in the muddy soil.” Typical of military disasters was the transformation of important highways into “roads of death.” The Parpach-Sultanova-Kerch road was packed in four rows and was subject to devastating enemy air raids.

Early in the morning, at 4.30–5.00 on May 11, the German offensive continued northward from Arma-Eli. The 138th and 77th State Guards Divisions and partly the 236th Infantry Division came under attack. The Germans managed to capture the village of Oguz-Tobe and the slopes of Mount Oguz-Tobe. Thus, they were able to control the breakthrough along the coast with fire.

That same morning, at 11.30, the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N., was killed by a German plane raid on a command post located on Mount Konchi. Lviv. The army was led by Chief of Staff Colonel G.I. Kotov. Despite the growing chaos, the body of V.N. Lvov was taken out and sent on a PS-84 plane to Tbilisi on May 13, 1942. General Lvov enjoyed great respect and authority, and was an active and energetic commander.

The death of the commander certainly worsened the situation of the 51st Army. There was also another unfavorable operating factor. In his report, L.Z. Mehlis from 13.40 May 11 acting The commander of the 51st Army, Kotov, wrote: “The Army Military Council does not have a plan or instructions from the front on the further actions of units of 51A.” At the same time, there is an order signed by the chief of staff of the front P.P. Eternal, dated May 10 and instructing the 51st Army: “The withdrawal begins on the night of 11.5.” The withdrawal was supposed to be beyond the line of the Turkish Wall. Orders of similar content existed to the 44th and 47th armies. Moreover, neither in the description of the actions of the 44th Army by A. Zhitnik, nor in the acquittal letter of S.I. Chernyak does not mention such an order. All the mentioned orders are handwritten on the letterhead of the front chief of staff (apparently, personally by P.P. Eternal), but have neither numbers, nor signatures of the front Military Council, nor dispatch marks. This leads to the conclusion that the orders were not formalized and sent to the troops. Thus, almost a day of precious time was lost.

The command of the 51st Army saw the main task of May 11 as the withdrawal of the 138th, 302nd and 77th Infantry Divisions from the semi-encirclement. As reported by the acting Commander of the 51st Army Kotov Mehlis, this was achieved “thanks to the exceptional heroism of the 77th Infantry Division.” The remnants of the 55th Tank Brigade also took part in the battle, including immobilized KV tanks that fired from the spot. All this together allowed the 138th and 304th divisions to escape from the “cauldron”. Accordingly, the 236th and 390th Rifle Divisions and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Brigade remained on the outer front of the encirclement, awaiting a breakthrough. As Kotov noted in the same report, a systematic withdrawal was possible, “but the 390th Infantry Division failed once again. Her two regiments fled from the front."

The fate of those left surrounded was unenviable. One of the last means of influencing the encircled was volleys of rocket-propelled mortars; the report on their actions emphasizes “the decisive importance of May 11 in striking the enemy huddled at the Ak-Monai station.” According to documents from the opposite side, the situation in the “cauldron” by the evening of May 11 was already close to collapse and defeat. As noted in the ZhBD of the 11th Army, “enemy resistance is weakening.” When summing up the results of the day, the ZhBD of Manstein’s army stated: “According to incomplete data, so far 26,710 people have been captured, 223 guns, 14 anti-aircraft guns, 2 multiple rocket launchers, 88 anti-tank guns, 137 mortars, 173 tanks, 66 aircraft and a huge mass of hand weapons, equipment and stocks of various property.”

V.S. Abramov in his book expresses doubts about the size of the “cauldron” near Ak-Monay. However, the encirclement of large forces of the Crimean Front did take place. The Germans announced already in a report at 0.20 on May 12 (apparently, after clarification) about 40,260 prisoners, 402 guns, 41 anti-aircraft guns, 197 tanks, 153 anti-tank guns, 210 mortars, 66 aircraft, 2000 vehicles of all types captured as trophies. This, of course, is not the highest figure in the series of “boilers” of 1941–1942. In 1941, at least 2–2.5 times more prisoners were reported in encirclements near Uman and Melitopol. Nevertheless, this was a serious blow for the Crimean Front.

Heavy artillery is moving toward Sevastopol. On the march is a 420-mm Czech-made mortar carriage.

Meanwhile, S.I. Chernyak discovered the fact of deep coverage of the flank of the newly restored front of his army. On May 11, he tries to organize a counterattack on the flank and rear of the “Kenegez pr-ka group” (i.e., Groddeck’s brigade) from the Kara region with the forces of the remnants of the 404th Infantry Division, withdrawn from the second echelon of the 276th Infantry Division and the 190th Cavalry Regiment of the 72nd y kd . However, the 276th Infantry Division did not reach Kary at the appointed time, and the attacks by the units of the 404th Infantry Division were not successful. The remaining units of the 44th Army were pinned down from the front by XXX AK infantry.

In the ZhBD of the 11th Army there is an entry relating to the evening of May 11: “The Groddeck brigade, after breaking through the enemy positions on the Tatar Ditch, is fighting with large enemy forces just southwest of Saraimin.” The fact that the enemy overcame the Turkish Wall line on May 11 is confirmed by Soviet documents. The evening operational report of the 156th Infantry Division indicates that its 530th Infantry Division is fighting in the area southwest of Sayramin. This sharply worsened the position of the Crimean Front. While the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies were still fighting surrounded in the Ak-Monaya area, the saving line of the Turkish Wall had already been broken through by the advancing enemy.

The carriage of a 210-mm mortar on the march in Crimea. Heavy artillery systems were handled disassembled and brought into position for firing already in position.

It is impossible not to emphasize the curious, from the point of view of a historian, fact that the orders of L.Z. Mekhlis from the last days of the Kerch disaster were preserved in the personal belongings of the headquarters officer of the 10th Infantry Corps, Major Pashchenko, who died already in 1944, and were transferred to the archive after his death. At 5.20 on May 12, the Military Council of the Crimean Front orders the 51st Army (in fact, again) to “withdraw units by the end of 13.5.42 beyond the defensive line of the Turkish Wall to the Sultanovka area and to the north.” It was ordered “not to get involved in major battles with the enemy west of the Turkish Wall line.” Following the order of the front headquarters at 6.00 on May 12, L.Z. Mehlis hurries Kotov (who became the commander of the 51st A) with a separate note, in which he emphasizes the significance of his actions: “The main thing is to preserve manpower and equipment and arrive on time at the Turkish Wall.” The 51st Army was ordered to go to the Alekseevka-Sultanovka area. This was precisely what became one of the main complaints against the front command: two days late with orders for the withdrawal of troops to the Turkish Wall (the conversation with I.V. Stalin took place on the night of May 10, and the listed orders were given in the early morning of May 12).

From these instructions it is clear that the front headquarters already had a very rough idea of ​​the real state of the units pressed to the sea in the “cauldron” at the front headquarters. On the morning of May 12, the ZhBD of the 11th Army recorded: “The battles to clear the cauldron around Ak-Monaya, which were fought jointly by the XXXXII AK and the VII Romanian AK, have been completed.” That is, the defeat of the encircled troops of the two armies of the Crimean Front has already become a fait accompli.

The reaction of the front command to Groddeck’s breakthrough was the directive No. 022/OP issued at 23.30 on May 11 to the troops of the 44th Army “to continue the retreat in the direction of Sultanovka.” The report on the actions of the 44th Army does not mention it; moreover, attention is drawn to the fact that there was no communication with the front headquarters. At the same time, one cannot help but pay attention to the phrase “continue retreat.” In fact, the troops of the 44th Army were indeed already withdrawing. Already at 18.00 on May 11, the 72nd CD received the order to withdraw and reach the line adjacent to the Turkish Wall in the Marfovka area. Also in the report of the commander of the 72nd CD V.I. The book indicates that at 3.45 on May 12 he received an order from the headquarters of the 44th A to withdraw to the line from the Turkish Wall to Sayramin and Orta-Eli. That is, essentially a line was built from the shaft to the lake. Tabechikskoe, covering Kerch.

Nevertheless, the headquarters of the 44th A actually departs to Sultanovka, where at 6.00 on May 12 S.I. Chernyak is dating D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mehlis at the headquarters of the 156th Infantry Division (i.e., after the order was given to the 72nd Infantry Division to retreat beyond the Turkish Wall). Here the commander of the 44th Army personally receives an order for the “immediate withdrawal of all army units beyond the Turkish Wall.” At the same time, the 157th Infantry Division, the 72nd Infantry Division and the 12th Infantry Brigade were withdrawn from him into the front reserve, leaving the 143rd Infantry Brigade and the remnants of the 404th, 276th and 396th Infantry Division subordinate to the 44th Army. Accordingly, during the day of May 12 and on the night of May 13, units of the 44th Army retreated to the Turkish Wall and beyond it. By 15.00 on May 12, the 72nd cavalry division reached the area from Sayramin to Orta-Eli, setting up a barrier for the spread of Groddeck’s group further to Kerch.

Meanwhile, the German command is deploying the forces released after the liquidation of the “cauldron” to the east and the mobile units are attacking in the direction of Sultanovka. The defense on the Turkish Wall receives another gap, this time at Sultanovka, where units of the 22nd Tank Division (excluding the tank regiment) and Müller’s advance detachment break through. Mehlis even considered it necessary to report to S.M. about this event (the 143rd brigade “left the occupied line”). Budyonny.

A few units of combat vehicles of brigades and battalions have already retreated to Kerch. The 229th Regiment lost its last 2 HF on the Turkish Val in an unsuccessful attempt to hold on to it. According to inaccurate data, by the evening of May 12, 1942, 1 T-34, 27 T-26, 7 HT-133 and 10 T-60 remained on the move.

At 2.00 a.m. on May 14, Directive No. 01051 from the headquarters of the Crimean Front followed with an order to take up the defense of the Kerch bypass. The flanks of the contour rested on the lake. Chokrakskoye, lake Churubashskoe and Kamysh-Burun, and it passed through Bagerovo and the dominant heights west of Kerch. As A. Zhitnik later wrote in his report on the actions of the 44th Army: “This line did not have any pre-prepared defensive structures.” The army also lost a significant part of its artillery. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of May 14, German troops reached the approaches to Kerch and broke through the city’s defenses. The ZhBD of the 11th Army noted: “The enemy defended desperately with the support of numerous tanks, but our soldiers broke through the inner defensive belt of the city.” It is not entirely clear what numerous tanks we are talking about, because, according to Soviet data, Kerch was defended by the remnants of the 39th Tank Brigade represented by 5 T-60 and 1 T-26 and an armored division (armored vehicles) of the 72nd CD.

600-mm "Karl" on the march. The self-propelled carriage set the Karl apart from the line of archaic heavy guns from the First World War.

In addition to tanks, from May 14 to May 18, 1942, armored train No. 74, built at the plant named after. Voikova. He operated in the area from the plant to the Kerch station. On May 18, the railway track was destroyed and the armored train was destroyed. At that moment, battles were already taking place on the territory of the plant named after. Voikova.

On the night of May 15, the Supreme Command Headquarters directive No. 170385 addressed to D.T. Kozlov, which began with the words: “Don’t surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol.” However, given the events of the past day, this instruction was hopelessly late - the Germans were already on the territory of Kerch.

Officially, the evacuation of the Crimean Front troops began on May 14 in accordance with the order of I.V. Stalin at 3.40 at night: “Start the withdrawal of the troops of the Crimean Front to the Taman Peninsula...” The evacuation was carried out from the port of Kerch, from the piers of the KVMB, the plant named after. Voikova, Kapkany, Yenikale, Zhukovka. At first, according to the order, only the wounded, secret materiel (guards mortars), and RGK artillery were transported. There was no talk of any evacuation of tanks, tractors and even cars from Kerch and Yenikale. About 300 cars, tractors and motorcycles were burned at the crossing; people were rescued first. Of the 6,789 personnel of tank units and formations of the Crimean Front, 3,022 people, 44.5%, were evacuated from the Kerch Peninsula. According to the report of the head of the front sanitary department, military doctor 1st rank N.P. Ustinov managed to bring out 42,324 wounded people, of which 4,919 were seriously wounded. Ustinov emphasizes “all the wounded,” but, apparently, he means the wounded who managed to be admitted to hospitals.

To cross the Kerch Strait, only the so-called “bolinder” was used, which was inactive at night, as a result of which the chance to save a significant part of the artillery that had retreated to the Kerch area was missed. As a result, only 7 guns and 7 tractors of the 457th AP RGK and 29 GMC units (according to other sources) were transported to the Chushka Spit. According to the report of the SCF artillery headquarters, compiled in hot pursuit of the events in June 1942, the Crimean Front lost 157 76.2 mm mountain guns, 67 76 mm guns 02/30, 210 76 mm divisional guns 39, 25 107 mm 10/30 guns, 24 122 mm guns mod. 31 and 31/37, 257 122-mm howitzers of various types, 21 152-mm howitzers and 103 152-mm howitzer guns mod. '37 In this regard, it is interesting to note that when the Germans counted trophies following the defeat of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula, they especially noted the lack of optics on 98% of the guns, although they got 15% of the guns in good condition. In total, the Germans claimed to capture or destroy 1,450 vehicles, 154 tanks, and almost 800 guns.

To cover the evacuation, defense is organized based on advantageous positions. The offensive of units of the 28th Infantry Division on the western tip of the Yenikalsky Peninsula encounters in the middle of the day on May 16 at an altitude of 175.0 (Mount Khroneva on the maps of that time) “with very dense and accurate fire from the defenders, entrenched in rocky shelters and firing from rifles and machine guns.” The German infantry lie under fire, despite the energetic support of the assault guns, which shot all the ammunition, the attacks were unsuccessful.

In the last days of fighting on the Kerch Peninsula, the defense of the remnants of the Crimean Front broke up into several pockets of resistance pressed to the shore. At Gleika, Mayak and the lighthouse itself (Yenikalsky lighthouse), Soviet soldiers and commanders took up defensive positions on the steep bank. As a result, the German artillery strike on May 18 in the lighthouse area hit an empty spot, and the subsequent attack was met with a barrage of fire. As noted in the report on the actions of the 28th Infantry Division: “The artillery is not able to support the attack due to the short distance separating our attacking units from the enemy. In addition, the flight path of the shells does not allow covering enemy positions located on a steep bank.” The support of assault guns and the use of flamethrowers also did not bring results to the attackers. The Germans managed to turn the situation around with the massive use of mortars (judging by the context and the report on the use of Nebelwerfers - 280-mm jets) on the morning of May 19. As the report of the 28th Infantry Division emphasizes: “In stubborn hand-to-hand combat, one has to capture heavily rugged rocky terrain.” The Germans announced the capture of 8,250 prisoners, a third of whom were wounded, and the discovery of about 1,400 killed.

During the same period, on May 18–19, an intense struggle for the Yenikale region unfolded. Combined detachments from the remnants of the 77th State Guards Division, the 302nd, 404th SD and the 95th Border Regiment ensured the evacuation of the remnants of the Crimean Front troops. The defense here is on the Dangerous front, high. 102, 0 (dominant on the approaches to Yenikale), Kapkans held approximately 3,500 people armed only with rifles, PPSh, light machine guns and grenades. They no longer had mortars and artillery. The detachments were commanded by Colonels M.V. Volkov, M.K. Zubkov, N.I. Ludwig. Stubborn defense made it possible to transport 18–20 thousand people across the strait to the Taman Peninsula during the night of May 18–19. It was here, in the Yenikale region, that L.Z. stayed. Mehlis, who returned back from Taman. Those who saw Mehlis in Yenikal said that he persistently sought death. In the middle of the day on May 19, he left the Kerch Peninsula.

On May 19, the 132nd Infantry Division attacked Fort Totleben with the support of 280-mm rocket launchers (440 shells were fired). Cumbersome installations with a short firing range required special conditions of use, and here they were: the defenders of the plant had no artillery left. According to German data, after a rocket mortar attack, Fort Totleben was occupied by the 132nd Infantry Division with the loss of 5 people. It should be noted that the ammunition consumption of the 11th Army on May 19 was the maximum for the entire period of the struggle from May 11 to the end of the operation - 536 tons. Despite this, as emphasized in the ZhBD of the 11th Army: “The enemy only manages to recapture every inch of land with great effort.”

“Self-propelled mine” - a Goliath wedge, controlled by wire.

Another representative of the “miracle weapon”: the radio-controlled wedge “Borgward” B.IV. Their use in the conditions of Sevastopol was not very successful. Normally, the tankette drove up to the target and unloaded a box of explosives in front of it.

At 3.45 am on May 20, 1942, the crossing from the Kerch Peninsula ended. However, fighting continued throughout the day on May 20. One of the centers of resistance of Soviet troops in the Kerch region remained the metallurgical plant named after. Voikov, which unsuccessfully stormed the 170th Infantry Division. As a last resort, 580 280mm rockets were fired into the ruins of the plant. The impact of the rockets broke the resistance of the plant garrison. However, the combing of the plant territory continued until the evening of May 20. According to German data, the losses of Soviet units at the plant named after. Voikov, 1,800 people were killed, and 4,400 soldiers and commanders were captured here.

Early in the morning of May 20, the 46th Infantry captured the fort and the village of Yenikale, and then advanced from east to west of the peninsula. According to German data, in the area of ​​Yenikale and Dangerous, the Red Army's losses amounted to 3,000 killed and 5,440 captured. The losses of the 28th Infantry Division, 46th and 170th Infantry Divisions on May 20 amounted to 186 killed, 17 missing and 522 wounded. In total, in the period from May 8 to May 19, 1942, the Crimean Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Air Force lost 162,282 people permanently and 14,284 people wounded, for a total of 176,566 people.

The total losses of Manstein's army in Operation "Hunting for Bustards" are shown in table. 4. According to the data presented, it is clear that the greatest losses were suffered by the 28th infantry division, which advanced in the direction of the main attack during the breakthrough of the Parpach positions and ensured the introduction of the 22nd tank division into the breakthrough. In second place in terms of losses was the 132nd Infantry Division, which also participated in the breakthrough of the Parpach positions and intense battles in the east of the Kerch Peninsula. It should be noted that the data from the medical service differ somewhat from the figures given in Division IIa. The 11th Army Medical Service reported 1,412 killed, 291 missing, and 5,885 wounded for the time interval May 8–22, 1942, excluding Romanian units. However, these data appear to be incomplete due to poor matching of medical service reports with personal records of dead and wounded officers. In general, the losses of the 11th Army in Operation “Hunting for Bustards” must be considered sensitive, but moderate.

TABLE 4

After the Germans occupied the smoking area of ​​Kerch and Yenikale, soldiers and commanders of the Red Army still remained to fight in the Adzhimushkai quarries on the peninsula. The defeat of the Crimean Front was the first of a series of disasters in the spring and summer of 1942. One of the most difficult periods of the war began for the Soviet troops. There was a long year and a half left before the liberation of the peninsula began.

Summing up the results of the confrontation between the Crimean Front and the German 11th Army, it is advisable to provide data on the consumption of ammunition of the parties. According to the GAU KA statements, in the first half of 1942 the Crimean Front expended 258.6 thousand rounds of 76-mm divisional cannons, 211.9 thousand rounds of 76-mm mountain cannons, 49.0 - 107-mm cannons, 33.3 thousand - 122-mm cannon, 216.6 thousand - 122-mm howitzer, 30.7 thousand - 152-mm howitzer and 92.2 thousand rounds for 152-mm howitzer guns. The Crimean Front was the absolute leader in the consumption of 107-mm rounds - it accounted for almost a quarter of the total consumption of shots of this type by the Red Army. For 152-mm rounds for howitzer guns, the Crimean Front accounts for 13.7%. In total, the Crimean Front accounted for 10.7% of the consumption of all ground artillery shots of the entire Red Army in January - June 1942 (although in June 1942 the Crimean Front had already ceased to exist).

Also, during its existence in 1942, the Crimean Front spent 758.5 ​​thousand 82-mm mortar mines, 37.8 thousand 107-mm mortar mines and 46.9 120-mm mortar mines. At the same time, the Crimean Front accounts for 17.4% of the consumption of 82-mm mines by the entire Red Army. He was the absolute leader in the use of this type of weapon, and by a large margin.

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, with an analysis of the defeat of the Crimean Front, simultaneously determined the punishment of its command, including the representative of the Headquarters. Army Commissar 1st Rank L.Z. Mekhlis was removed from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Kaliningrad Army with a reduction in rank to corps commissar. The command of the front and armies was removed from their posts and demoted in rank with the wording “test him in another, less complex military job.” D.T. Kozlov was demoted to the rank of major general. Army commanders S.I. Chernyak and K.S. Kolganov was demoted to the rank of colonel. The exception was P.P. Eternal, sent to the disposal of the Chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft. This became a kind of recognition of his efforts to stabilize the situation in the last days of the Crimean Front.

Romanian infantry on the march. Crimea, 1942

Conclusions. The first analysis of the defeat of the Crimean Front was carried out by Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 155452 dated June 4, 1942, signed by I.V. Stalin and A.M. Vasilevsky. However, in this document, written hot on the heels of the events, the analysis of what was happening is given hastily and without taking into account the enemy’s data. Nevertheless, this directive from Headquarters remains the basis for criticism of the command of the Crimean Front to this day. Therefore, it is advisable to discuss what happened in May 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula, starting from the claims formulated in it. The thesis expressed at the beginning of the directive, “The Crimean Front had a great superiority over the enemy in infantry and artillery,” was discussed at the beginning of the section; this statement is not confirmed by the documents of the parties.

The directive further sets out the facts with reference to the “experience of modern war.” First of all, it is stated that “the command of the Crimean Front stretched its divisions in one line” and “one division accounted for no more than two kilometers at the front.” Operational documents of the Crimean Front show that this is not so and not even so at all. Firstly, one division in the first line accounted for 3.1 km of front. Secondly, two divisions of the second line occupied the Ak-Monai positions. Thirdly, the armies had a second echelon whose task was to carry out counterattacks. In addition, there were formations in the depths of the formation of the front troops, which were in reserve, which could be used to restore its integrity and launch counterattacks. These are the 72nd cavalry division, the 390th infantry division (formally of army subordination), the 12th and 143rd brigade, the 83rd mechanized brigade. Actually, they were used during a defensive battle, actually building a new defensive front, but they were pinned down by enemy infantry from the front and outflanked by Groddeck’s brigade. The command of the Crimean Front can be reproached for relying on counterattacks, which involved the deployment of reserves and their use outside equipped positions. In conditions of massive use of the enemy's air force, this became almost impossible.

The second reproach from the Headquarters was the statement: “the command of the Crimean Front in the very first hours of the enemy’s offensive lost control of the troops.” On the one hand, there was certainly a loss of command and control. Radio communications, despite all the admonitions of the front headquarters, was not a strong point of command and control in the Crimea. However, the statement “in the very first hours” is still not entirely true. Really serious problems arose as chaos and destruction grew.

Another complaint of the Headquarters was the reproach for the “bureaucratic and paper-based method of leading troops on the part of the front command and comrade. Mehlis". It was alleged that “instead of personally influencing the course of the operation, time was spent at many hours of fruitless meetings of the Military Council.” This reproach looks doubly strange in view of the fact that I.V. Stalin personally prohibited D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mehlis is located at the headquarters of V.N. Lviv May 10. The front commander, and this is documented, went to the troops with the aim of influencing the course of the counterattack of the 51st Army. This counterattack really decided the fate of the main forces of the troops entrusted to him. Personal presence at the venue seems more than justified. A recommendation at the end of the directive to visit “the troops, armies, divisions more often” in relation to D.T. Kozlova and L.Z. Mekhlis, and even more so V.N. Lviv looks ridiculous. However, this did not help the Crimean Front.

Another claim in the Headquarters directive seems more meaningful: “the front command and comrade. The Mehlis did not ensure the execution of the Headquarters order in a timely manner; they began the withdrawal two days late, and the withdrawal took place in a disorganized and disorderly manner.” Indeed, there was a delay in the withdrawal to the Turkish Wall line. The 51st Army did not receive the order to withdraw in time. At the same time, one cannot fail to note the conditions of withdrawal: muddy roads and the impact of enemy aircraft, which complicated the movement of troops during the daytime. In addition, the loss of the tank battle at Arma-Eli predetermined the encirclement and defeat of a considerable part of the forces of the Crimean Front and the technical impossibility of withdrawing them to the Turkish Wall.

E. von Manstein was an experienced military leader who well understood the principles of using mechanized formations. Actually, the Crimean Front had essentially nothing to oppose to the two mobile formations of the 11th Army - the 22nd Tank Division and the Groddeck brigade. The front troops were preempted in reaching the Turkish Wall already on the second day of the “Hunting for Bustards” operation. The “sickle strike” of the 22nd TD and the quick breakthrough of Groddeck’s brigade to the Turkish Wall were almost impossible to parry at the same time.

Essentially, the Supreme Command Headquarters Directive No. 155452 avoided, if not the main, then one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Crimean Front: the lack of a full-fledged independent mechanized formation in its composition in the presence of such a formation in the enemy’s 11th Army. Manstein actually had the equivalent of two such formations, including Groddeck's brigade and Müller's advance detachment. In turn, the fact of the absence of this formation was a direct consequence of the abandonment of tank divisions in August 1941. The restoration of such structures began in May 1942 (formation of tank corps) and did not affect the Crimean Front. It was the tank corps that became the most important means of conducting defensive operations in the Great Bend of the Don in July 1942 and on the Kursk Bulge in July 1943.

420-mm Gamma mortar in position.

Atypical for other areas was the use by the Germans in Crimea of ​​massively new types of anti-tank weapons, including tanks and self-propelled guns with long-barreled guns. It was they who became the decisive factor in May 1942, predetermining the disaster of the Crimean Front and the failure of its tank forces in the defense of the Kerch Peninsula.

In general, the Crimean Front became a victim of the German command's massing of forces and equipment, including the latest types of weapons and equipment. At the same time, the front itself was not in the best position in terms of weapons, and the national factor had a noticeable influence on the combat effectiveness of the formations. In the critical situation of May 1942, the national factor manifested itself to a much greater extent. The need to use formations from the depths led to the introduction of national formations into battle, and they did not always show their best side. This primarily concerns the 390th Infantry Division, as well as the 396th Infantry Division in the Ak-Monai positions. At the same time, in general, the 77th State Duma, with its mixed and diverse national composition, performed well.

The city's land defense system included three defensive lines - forward, main and rear. The forces of the Sevastopol defensive region courageously repelled two enemy attacks on the main base of the Black Sea Fleet: November 11-21 and December 17-31, 1941. Due to the fact that at the end of May 1942, Soviet troops suffered a major defeat on the Kerch Peninsula, the position of the besieged Sevastopol became critical. After many days of intense air raids and artillery shelling, on June 7, 1942, the Germans launched the 3rd assault on Sevastopol. By the end of June, the forces of the city’s defenders were exhausted, and there was a lack of ammunition. The remnants of the troops defending Sevastopol had to be evacuated to Novorossiysk. But only a small part of the city’s defenders were evacuated. According to domestic data, the irretrievable losses of the SOR troops from October 30, 1941 to July 4, 1942 amounted to more than 156 thousand people (killed, captured and missing).

The defense of the city lasted 250 days and became a symbol of the massive courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers. It pinned down large enemy forces on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, which otherwise could have been used in one of the decisive sectors of the German offensive in the summer of 1942. The Germans also suffered very heavy losses during the siege and assault of Sevastopol - up to 300 thousand killed and wounded. To commemorate the heroic defense of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, on December 22, 1942, the medal “For the Defense of Sevastopol” was established. On May 8, 1965, the city of Sevastopol was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

ORDER TO THE TROOPS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CRIMEA No. 1640, November 4, 1941

In connection with the current operational situation on the Crimean Peninsula, carry out the following organization of command and control of the Crimean troops:

1. Organize two defensive areas:

a) Kerch defensive region.

b) Sevastopol defensive region.

2. The composition of the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region should include: all units and subunits of the Primorsky Army, the coastal defense of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, all naval ground units and units of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force on my special instructions.

I entrust the command of all actions of the ground forces and the leadership of the defense of Sevastopol to the commander of the Primorsky Army, Major General Comrade I.E. Petrov. with direct subordination to me.

Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet for land defense of the main base, Rear Admiral G.V. Zhukov to take command of the Sevastopol main base; To the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, allocate the composition of the assets and forces of the Sevastopol main base according to my instructions.

3. The composition of the troops of the Kerch defensive region includes all units, units of the 51st Army, naval ground units and the Kerch naval base.

I entrust the command of all military units operating on the Kerch Peninsula and the leadership of defense to my deputy, Lieutenant General P. I. Batov.

The formation of the operational group of the Kerch defensive region will be carried out on the basis of the headquarters and control of the 51st Army.

4. The chief of staff of the Crimean troops, Major General Ivanov, as having failed in his duties, should be removed from his post and sent to the personnel reserve of the Red Army.

To the post of chief of staff of the Crimean troops, let the chief of staff of the Primorsky Army, Major General Comrade. Shishenina G.D.

5. I appoint deputy chief of staff of the SOR. Chief of Staff of the Primorsky Army, Colonel G.I. Krylov.

6. I appoint deputy military commissar of the Kerch defensive region. Head of PUARMA of the 51st Army, Regimental Commissar Krupin.

Commander of the Armed Forces of Crimea, Vice Admiral Levchenko

Member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar Nikolaev

Chief of Staff Major General Shishenin

TO ALL FIGHTERS, COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL WORKERS, BRAVE DEFENDERS OF THE NATIVE SEVASTOPOL: ADDRESS BY THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET, December 21, 1941

Dear comrades!

The brutal enemy is again advancing on Sevastopol. Defeated in the main direction near Moscow, the enemy is trying to capture our hometown, in order to thereby at least to some extent diminish and weaken the impression of the victories of the Red Army near Moscow, near Rostov and on other fronts.

The enemy is suffering huge losses near Sevastopol. He threw his last reserves into battle, trying to suppress the powerful resistance of our troops.

Comrades Red Navy, Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers!

Beat the enemy the way our comrades beat him near Moscow, as they beat him and drove him away from Rostov, as they crush him at Tikhvin and on other fronts.

Mercilessly exterminate the fascist dogs, repelling with fire and grenades all the enemy’s attempts to get to Sevastopol.

Not a step back in the fight for Sevastopol! Remember that the defeat of the enemy depends on our stamina, courage and ability to fight.

The stronger our resistance to the enemy, the faster the final victory over the fascist invaders will come...

Comrades! Destroy your enemies the way the best defenders of our Sevastopol do. Beat the fascists as political instructor Omelchenko, who destroyed 15 German soldiers and officers in one battle, beats them, as captain Bondarenko, a brave and talented commander who shows his subordinates examples of courage and dedication, beats them.

Exterminate the Nazi scoundrels as the fighter Serbin exterminates them, who destroyed 20 fascist soldiers and officers, as the Red Army soldier Savchuk, snipers Miroshnichenko, Trifonov, Kalyuzhny, Zosimenko and many other glorious warriors of our Motherland exterminate.

Combat defenders of Sevastopol!

Ruthlessly exterminate the fascists, exhaust the enemy's forces, destroy his military equipment.

Be persistent and brave in battle. Be vigilant in any environment! Do not give in to provocations, expose the cowards and alarmists!

Dear comrades! Remember that the attention of the peoples of not only our Motherland, but also the whole world, is focused on Sevastopol.

Defend our native Sevastopol to the last drop of blood!

Our homeland expects us to defeat the enemy. No step back!

Victory will be ours!

Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet

TELEGRAM OF THE RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN FRONT MARSHAL S. BUDENNY ABOUT THE EVACUATION OF FIGHTERS AND COMMANDERS FROM THE SEVASTOPOL DEFENSE REGION (SOR), July 4, 1942.

On the coast of the SOR there are still many separate groups of fighters and commanders who continue to resist the enemy. It is necessary to take all measures to evacuate them, sending small ships and sea planes for this purpose. The motivation of sailors and pilots for the impossibility of approaching the shore due to waves is incorrect. You can pick up people without going to the shore, but taking them on board 500-1000 m from the shore.

I ask you to order not to stop the evacuation and to do everything possible to remove the heroes of Sevastopol.

Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War. General Staff during the Great Patriotic War: Documents and materials. 1942 T. 23 (12-2). M., 1999. P. 205.

The heroic defense of Sevastopol against German troops (11th Army of Colonel General E. Manstein) and Romanian formations lasted from October 30, 1941 to July 4, 1942. Parts of the SOR included formations of the Black Sea Fleet (commander Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) and the Primorsky Army (commander Major General I.E. Petrov)