I strongly welcome you! Igor Vasilievich, good afternoon. Good afternoon. What is today about? Today we will talk about the role of Poland in the Second World War, because this topic is interesting because a whole garland of myths is piled up around it, and such myths that have already become part of the consciousness of our handshake public, i.e. they are no longer discussed, perceived... Really, right? Yes, that is this is all true, and a terrible truth, or, on the contrary, a heroic one. Meanwhile, all this, in general, was not entirely true. But before I tell everyone about it, I’ll tell you this, one might say, good news. Naturally, it is not joyful for everyone, but I think it will make us happy. The fact is that, as we remember, a year ago, more precisely, even more than a year ago, we have such a lover of Vlasov, Kirill Alexandrov, he defended his doctoral dissertation in our town, on March 1, if I’m not mistaken, last year. So, it looks like his dissertation will be scrapped. Wow. Suddenly. Well, that is. It’s just that the situation is such that when defending him there, they voted 17 for, 1 against, i.e. Naturally, his colleagues decided to support this study of the phenomenon of resistance, so to speak. But in the end, the Higher Attestation Commission under the Ministry of Education decided to send this case for additional consideration. This dissertation was considered in March of this year by the dissertation council at the Academy of the General Staff, and there, oddly enough, the voting results were exactly the opposite. That is, 17 against, 1 for. Those. our military is not ready to joyfully... Yes, the military did not appreciate this matter. And now, just recently, at the end of May, this was already considered by the expert council of the Higher Attestation Commission, and there the conclusion was also negative. What are you going to do? Those. now only the presidium of the Higher Attestation Commission remains, and if they already make a decision, then the comrade, or rather the gentleman, will not be able to become a doctor of science. I would say citizen. Well, let's wait and see. So, what about our Poles? So, we need to start from where. Actually, when we talk about Poland, we must understand that, of course, on the one hand, these are not only our neighbors, but, in general, one might say, our cousins, i.e. We even have a common history in many ways, we are similar in language, in origin, i.e. also a Slavic people. But, on the other hand, our relations over the past 1000-plus years have been, so to speak, very difficult. Those. As a rule, in general, we were hostile to the Polish state. And, in fact, we were non-hostile only in 2 cases - either when Poland was part of our country, as was the Kingdom of Poland there; or if it was controlled by us with the help of some kind of puppet leadership, as it was, in fact, before the partitions of Poland for about half a century. Well, then, during the Soviet period, after the Great Patriotic War. Well, the Soviet period cannot be called a puppet period. In fact, let's say that they were friendly, but, nevertheless, thanks, so to speak, to our support, they were able to maintain their power. When the Soviet Union began to be destroyed, naturally, we lost our position there quite quickly. Naturally, this does not mean that the Polish people themselves are hostile to us, i.e. We have many friends there and many worthy people from there, they simply live with us and served our country at different times. But, nevertheless, these are rather, after all, precisely our, let’s say, enemies, our rivals. In principle, this is mainly caused historically by the fact that both Russia, then still Rus', and Poland, they laid claim to hegemony in this part of the world, i.e. in Eastern Europe. But today this may seem strange to someone, because now Russia is still a superpower, despite all these events a quarter of a century ago. Well, Poland, let’s say, is also a power, but by no means more. But, in general, in the old days, somewhere in the Middle Ages, in fact, even, in general, not only that Poland was larger and stronger than our state, but even the same Lithuania, i.e. Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This has happened, yes. And then they united, there was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and, in general, then the border with Lithuania passed through the present-day Moscow region, i.e. all sorts of Vyazma, Belev, it was all Lithuanian territory already, but, nevertheless, this rivalry, despite the fact that we were in a less advantageous position, we were able to win. Accordingly, many Poles are offended by this, and from time to time they have all sorts of ideas for revenge. And so, in fact, if we return to the situation that was before the Second World War, then when we are instilled with all sorts of ideas that we betrayed Poland when we concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, that, they say, this is impossible, then you just need to remember that at that moment Poland was in no way a friend to us, was not an ally, but on the contrary, it was a country that was, in general, seriously hostile to us. Moreover, this choice in favor of hostility was not made by us, it was made by the Polish leadership during our Civil War. Because it was Poland that attacked Soviet Russia, and not vice versa, and before our troops came to Warsaw, the Poles had visited Kiev before that. Well, then, in fact, again, due to the fact that our future Marshal Tukhachevsky, so to speak, was an innocent victim of illegal repression, he distinguished himself there near Warsaw, in fact, then it turned out that we were defeated and were forced to give up such vast territories western Ukraine, western Belarus, whose population was mainly non-Polish, and which was then, as part of this revived Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, quite harshly oppressed. But at the same time, in fact, this was not enough for the then Polish leadership, and they hoped that they would continue to be able to profit at the expense of our country. Actually, this is not surprising, since if we remember that in the fall of 1938, when this Munich agreement took place, then Poland, together with Germany, destroyed Czechoslovakia, biting off a very tasty piece from it, the Cieszyn region. In principle, after this they quite seriously hoped that, again, together with Germany they would be able to tear apart our country too. Actually, here I have already quoted a report from the intelligence department of the main headquarters of the Polish army dated December 38. There, in general, firstly, the document itself begins with a reference to the by that time deceased Józef Pilsudski, the head of the Polish state, as he was called, that “the dismemberment of Russia lies at the basis of Polish state interests in the east.” Well, then, according to the authors of this document, it is at that moment that the good time is already coming. “Today, during the deepening general crisis in Soviet Russia and the growing interest in the Russian question on the part of dynamic states, especially Germany, seeking changes in the current situation, Poland can again pursue its line in the big Eastern policy.” Well, it goes on to say that “therefore, our position boils down to the following formula - who will take part in the division” - meaning our country. “Poland cannot remain passive at this significant historical moment. We must prepare for it in advance, both physically and emotionally.” Well, here they can say that this is generally an internal document, i.e. this is a report from Polish intelligence to its leadership, so it means you never know what plans are being made there. But the fact is that there are, as it were, external documents, i.e. It was precisely at this time that Polish diplomats were quite actively testing the waters with a view to dividing our country, so to speak, together with Hitler. For example, again, December 1938, and just on December 28 of the same year, a conversation took place between the adviser of the German embassy in Poland, Rudolf von Schelia, and the Polish envoy to Iran, Karsho-Sedlevsky. This means that Karsho-Sedlevsky told his colleague what happened to him. The political outlook for the European East is clear. In a few years, Germany will be at war with the Soviet Union, and Poland will support Germany, voluntarily or forcedly, in this war. For Poland, it is better to definitely take the side of Germany before the conflict, since the territorial interests of Poland in the West and the political goals of Poland in the East, especially in Ukraine, can only be ensured through a previously reached Polish-German agreement. He, Karsho-Sedlewski, would subordinate his activities as the Polish envoy in Tehran to the implementation of this great Eastern concept, since it was necessary in the end to convince and encourage also the Persians and Afghans to play an active role in the future war against the Soviets. He will devote his activities to this task in the coming years in Tehran.” What a bastard. Only Stalin knew nothing about the war, everyone else knew, and only Stalin knew nothing. Well, actually, the fact that after a little over 2 years we had to send troops into Iran and, in fact, take Tehran by storm, is largely due to the fact that our well-wishers were actively acting there, pitting the Iranian leadership against us. Actually, again, they can say that this is a small fry, but, in fact, even when the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop talked with his colleague, i.e. Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck about a month after this, i.e. at the end of January 1939, then, again, as it was noted in the German notes, that “Mr. Beck did not hide the fact that Poland lays claim to Soviet Ukraine and access to the Black Sea.” Those. in fact, it turns out that we have an enemy in front of us. Accordingly, it is impossible to betray the enemy. And therefore, the events of World War II that began, from our point of view, from the point of view of our country, can be interpreted unambiguously that one of our enemies beat another enemy. And therefore there is absolutely nothing to be ashamed of. And, in fact, what happened then, again, on September 17, 1939, when we brought our troops into the territory of western Ukraine, western Belarus. But in fact, firstly, at that time, it was precisely on that day that the Polish leadership fled the country, and it must be said that almost from the very beginning of hostilities, they first fled from Warsaw to the border area, then crossed the Romanian border on September 17th. And, in general, in reality, at that time, the main forces of the Polish army were already either defeated or surrounded, but, in fact, here it is enough to simply estimate the ratio of losses, which means the losses of the Poles against the Germans and against us, because if there, in fact, against the Germans the Polish army then lost about 66,000 killed and about 133,000 wounded; against the Red Army it was, respectively, 3,500 killed and about 20,000 wounded. Those. in fact, not even several times, but tens of times less. Those. in fact, we mostly occupied this territory without much fighting, although there were clashes there. Well, in fact, they have already cleaned up, as they say, what was left ownerless. Regarding the fact that someone here can speak out, they say that this is immoral and all the rest. Here, in general, our... the logic of our liberal intelligentsia, and, in fact, the intelligentsia in general, is touching, because we are distinguished by intelligence and intelligence. Those. if, say, someone beats our country and takes away some territories from it, or we, out of our stupidity, conclude some unfavorable agreement, then that’s it, that’s it, it’s for centuries, it can’t be revised. But going back is unacceptable. Those. if, therefore, it turns out that in 20, when our country was weak, Poland could take these territories from us, i.e. that's all... Fair. Yes, this is fair, this is all forever and cannot be revised. The fact that we decided, about 19 years later, taking advantage, again, of the situation, to return it back, that’s all, it’s unacceptable, it’s a violation of Leninist norms of foreign policy or universal human values, you can come up with some plausible, beautiful-sounding excuse . Actually, this is all constantly observed. Even now, let’s say, the same Crimea, the fact that Khrushchev handed it over, it’s all, as it were, it doesn’t matter, it’s legal or not legal, it’s already a fait accompli, it’s all forever. The fact that they took it back, despite the fact that there was a referendum, they gave it back without a referendum, is of no interest to anyone. Again, the same issue with the Kuril Islands, when in 1956, if I’m not mistaken, Khrushchev also announced a declaration that we would hand over a couple of islands, more precisely, there is 1 small island, in the event of a conclusion peace treaty. But this is all considered to be impossible in any other way. Such government minds cannot be deceived. But that means, from the point of view of normal logic, here, in general, politics is, in general, in fact, it reflects the real balance of forces, so if a country is weak, then it is natural that, despite any agreements that it managed to conclude , unions, in the end it’s just... They’ll tear it apart. Yes, they will either tear her apart or put her in the place that corresponds to her real strength. If a country, on the contrary, becomes stronger, then, in general, again, sooner or later it will take a more worthy place in the world, so to speak, concert of powers. And therefore, there, again, we have absolutely nothing to be ashamed of, especially since, again, when we make up all sorts of fairy tales about the fact that there was a joint parade in Brest, or rather, our most gifted individuals, they even say, that there were a bunch of these parades. Well, in reality, how can I say, we did not have an alliance with the Germans, we had, according to this pact, the delimitation of spheres of influence was previously agreed upon. And it’s not that we are already dividing everything, but simply that up to this line is the sphere of influence of the USSR, there, that means, the sphere of influence of Germany. Accordingly, since the Germans entered our zone a little, accordingly, they had to partially return something, the same Brest. And there was simply the withdrawal of German troops and the entry of Soviet troops. But at the same time, this is arranged, accordingly, in accordance with the rules of military politeness, i.e. that there German troops solemnly come out, ours wave and greet them with flags, then, accordingly, our troops enter. Again, this issue is discussed in detail, i.e. Anyone can look it up on the Internet, there are a bunch of photographs from this event, that’s all, again, if you want to figure it out, then you can figure it out, and there is no joint parade there. Well, from the point of view of our idiots, this is, naturally, a solemn march on the occasion of the final illegal division of Europe, a secret conspiracy, or something else. By the way, I recently came across photographs of American fascists gathering in New York at Madison Square Garden, maybe I’m naming it incorrectly, but, in short, some kind of huge indoor stadium, everyone is shouting “Sieg Heil”, making famous greetings with their hands . And what, what does this mean? It is probably quite obvious that America was a fascist, Nazi state. What nonsense is this anyway? It was like that, yes. Here. What actually happens next? At the same time, again, when we occupied these territories, as I already said, there were actually clashes there, but there were few of them, i.e. we, in fact, caused quite a bit of bloody damage to the Polish army. But there were many prisoners. Those. here we even actually surpassed the Germans, i.e. if about 400 thousand people surrendered to the Germans there, and 457,000 surrendered to us. But what was this connected with - in general, with the fact that we actually occupied these western Ukraine and western Belarus, which had previously been captured by Poland, respectively , in the military units that were located here, a very large number of military personnel were from local natives, who, naturally, for the most part did not feel any desire to fight for this Polish state, which mocked them for these 20 years, and accordingly they were happy to us gave up. And, in fact, again, contrary to these ideas about the bloody KGB, which should immediately, if not shoot everyone, then at least drive them into the Gulag, their fate was, in general, quite normal. Those. of these 450-odd thousand people, in fact, more than 2/3, they were immediately released to their homes. And about 125,000 people were handed over into the hands of the bloody KGB, so to speak. But, again, over the next month, about 1/3 of this amount will be somewhere else, i.e. Some 40-odd thousand people were, again, released to go home, apparently after some kind of check. Those who remained were indeed in camps, but this is necessary, firstly, to some extent they should thank their own Polish government in exile, which was created precisely on September 30, 1939, they were in Paris, this is the Sikorsky government. Then later they will come to London, when, accordingly, Paris falls. They came up with the idea of declaring war on us. Those. despite the fact that the Polish allies and patrons, the same England and France, they generally said that they perceived the fact that we occupied the territories as completely normal. Those. At the same time, Churchill in general, he even cynically remarked something like this: yes, of course, the Soviets acted badly, but now there is still a line of Soviet-German contact, which, apparently, as he hoped, and not without reason, then someday will become the front line. Well, then, again, all, in general, sober-minded politicians, they understood that we had taken our toll. But the Poles, they had their own special opinion, and therefore, accordingly, these people who remained in our camps, they, thus, could already be considered as prisoners of war. Moreover, here it should be noted separately that, in general, from this Polish officer corps, and there mostly remained, in many ways, these were officer cadres, there were, in general, those who were noted among us during the Soviet-Polish War. Then, as you know, there was a mass extermination of captured Red Army soldiers, there was a mass extermination and mockery of the civilian population, but still, during the time of Stalin, the Soviet government was vindictive, and there they could well, even after 20 years, or even more, remember and, accordingly, there... Bring to justice. Yes, and really attract. And indeed, in general, they were even found, tried and shot. Actually, this also happened in the post-war period. In our country, in general, Nazi criminals were caught, in fact, until the very moment the existence of the USSR ended. But then, again, according to the beliefs of our handshake public, we committed this terrible crime in Katyn. When there, however, again, we are now already saying that supposedly 21,000 officers were shot there, but even according to this official version, it actually says that 21,000 in total were shot, of which about half were officers, the rest - all sorts of representatives, let’s say, of the police, the gendarmerie, and also of all the propertied classes, i.e. local bourgeoisie, etc. But the fact is that this whole story with Katyn, in general, is clearly sewn with white thread. Even... naturally, all this deserves a separate discussion. I'll just touch on the point that amuses me the most. This is the same notorious “Walter” suitcase from which these Poles were allegedly shot then, in the spring of 1940. The fact is that, of course, yes, it would be possible to assume that if the death penalty were a novelty in our country, that this would require some special devices, special equipment, etc. Well, that means I don’t know anymore, including purchasing these German pistols. But the fact is that literally a couple of years before this, unfortunately, we had the so-called great purge, when over 600,000 people were executed in a couple of years. That is, in principle, the executions were even more massive than those that allegedly took place with these Poles. And at the same time, for some reason, we did not buy these “Walters”, and somehow made do with our domestic revolvers, apparently, i.e. the same revolver, and other, in general, weapons. Then the next moment is like this. As you know, at that time the USSR was a state with a planned economy, which means that in general... yes, we had a foreign trade monopoly, introduced, by the way, under Lenin. Accordingly, any purchase from outside us was documented, and with multiple reserves, because there should have been such, in general, quite extensive bureaucratic correspondence between departments regarding this purchase of this “Walter” suitcase. Those. first at the procurement stage, and then, since this is still a suitcase of pistols, and, sorry, not a suitcase of condoms, then when they enter the country there are also weapons, they have a certain accounting, there should, again, be a bunch of papers, and numbers too, by the way. The bullet casings, if there were any then, shoot them. Here. The question arises, where is all this? That is, in principle, it is clear that we have a bloody KGB then, covering their tracks, they could clear out some documents directly related to the execution, if it was carried out by us. But these... Why? I would like to know, why? This was all done according to the law. Why, if there is a resolution, if there are specific perpetrators, there should be reporting, a doctor should be present at the execution of the sentence, feel everyone, that they are dead. There must be acts, all this is surrounded by a monstrous amount of paperwork. It is not clear what the meaning of destruction is. They did not commit a crime, but carried out sentences. That is, in principle, here, in general, and on other points, documentation should also be postponed. Because, well, for example, even roughly speaking, if you take, for example, if you don’t go beyond the topic of the Gulag and the Gebni, in the end it is clear that we now have extensive documentation directly on this contingent held in places of detention, I, by the way . I worked with her in the archives. But roughly speaking, let’s even assume that if it disappears, then there is documentation, roughly speaking, indirect. About the allocation of rations for this whole matter, for other things, i.e. this, again... Feeding, clothing, production. Yes, that is There is a huge flow of documents, and all this can be compared, compared, and discovered. And here in this Katyn story the white threads come out quite clearly. Well, in fact, one can only sympathize with the leadership of our country, which, on the one hand, since we have Gorbachev there, among all his other exploits, he managed to admit responsibility for Katyn, and then it turns out that playing back is somehow uncomfortable. On the other hand, I think that sooner or later we will have to win back, because here we are taking on this uncommitted crime, or rather not even a crime, but in general, we still have to say that even if we would have shot them there , we would be in our right, because all this can be considered as retribution for the same 50-odd thousand captured Red Army soldiers who were destroyed in 20-21. But apparently we didn't do that. Although a separate, that means, part of these captured Poles were indeed convicted by us and were executed, including, i.e. there are such moments. But these are far from the same numbers and, in general, it is people who are specifically guilty. Those. and what else is there... I'm sorry, I'll interrupt. There seem to be 4 places, yes, where the Poles were shot, there is Lake Mednoye, all sorts of things. Moreover, again, in general, it is such an interesting coincidence that for some reason all these places, they are all... In German-occupied territory. Yes, they find themselves in occupied territory. There was even such doubt about one of these places, i.e. there, these liberals beat themselves in the chest with their heels that there were no Germans here, then, upon closer examination, it turned out that there were. That is, apparently... And why, by the way, I apologize, why haven’t they been exhumed yet, i.e. if this is, I don’t know, some kind of mass grave there is excellent, our probably mutual friend Yuri Gennadievich Mukhin wrote a good book at one time about the Katyn syndrome, the execution, I don’t remember what it was called correctly, the Katyn tragedy, I don’t remember . Well, it was republished several times with different titles; our publishers often do this. There’s Burdenko’s commission, when first the Germans dug it up, then ours dug it up, there were people there with documents in their pockets, the documents of one person were put in the pockets of different corpses. Some of the citizens turned out to be alive, i.e. despite the fact that they were shot and buried, for some reason they are alive. Then why not dig up everything else and see what’s there? By the way, right now, literally somewhere... And there are some other newspapers there, newspapers with dates later than the date when the Soviet troops left, how does this happen? Well, at least it's interesting to see what's there. By the way, it continues to grow, because about just a little over a year ago there was also such an incident that there, on one of these monuments, there is a list of these Poles allegedly shot here, and there suddenly appeared 2 characters from this list, that they were buried at the site of a German execution somewhere in the Lviv region. Moreover, it is already quite clearly documented that it was here that the Germans destroyed, accordingly, the local population. They were identified by their badges, because, in my opinion, they were police officers, their badges ended up in the grave there. And Mikhail Sergeevich seemed to give them 49 volumes, but they lost them all, the Poles, they lost all the documents. Something is wrong there. No, of course, there, by and large, it was necessary to conduct a normal investigation, i.e. with exhumation, and here, again, one cannot proceed from such a presumption of trust, because there... Of course. They can throw all sorts of crap in there. If you say that 20,000 people were killed there, and 4 burials were excavated, something is wrong here, at least count the skulls. Strange. I thought that we needed this for some political purposes - to lay a pipeline through Polish waters in the Baltic Sea, so there would be some concessions there, something would be recognized. And then I thought - nothing is needed there for anything. They could lose all the documents only in one case, that is, if they firmly understand that these documents are fake and it is better not to show them at all. Someone cheated someone here, I suspect. Unfortunately, at the initial stage they cheated us there. But on the other hand, again, if we look at these seemingly documents, indeed, forgeries were clearly made there, but, in fact, then we can, as it were, about this... Boris Vitalievich and I discussed some stupid scribble by Shelepin or someone... Yes -yes, where the Central Committee and the Politburo are confused, in general, and this is confused by a party official. There’s nothing else, we just have this piece of paper. Cool. But let's continue like this. What happened next is... Despite this alleged Katyn execution, nevertheless, we had quite a lot of Poles from among these former military personnel in, let’s say, the system of places of detention. And therefore, when, after Hitler’s attack on our country, England became our ally, accordingly, they negotiated with us and, accordingly, put pressure on this Polish government in exile, which by that time was already sitting in London, and in As a result, on July 30, 1941, an agreement was concluded between the USSR and this Sikorsky government that we recognize this government in exile, enter into a military alliance with it, and paragraph 4 there read as follows - the USSR Government expresses its consent to the creation of a Polish government on the territory of the USSR army under a command appointed by the Polish government, with the consent of the Soviet government. The Polish army on the territory of the USSR will operate operationally under the leadership of the USSR Supreme Command, which will include a representative of the Polish army. Those. We are creating a Polish army on our territory, and what is important here is that this army must operate operationally under our command. Those. in a political sense they are subordinate to their government, but in a military sense they must fight under our command where we say, that is, in general, on our front. Accordingly, a week after this, General Wladyslaw Anders was appointed commander of this Polish army. And on August 12, i.e. about 6 days later, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree granting an amnesty to Polish citizens and, accordingly, they began to release these unfortunate Polish military personnel from the camps and form that army from them. Let's just say, not only from them, because after all, we had enough Polish population in the country, both, in general, native ones and from among the citizens of the former Poland, who, therefore, ended up on our territory. Accordingly, by August 31, i.e. within a month, about 20,000 people were recruited into this Polish army, and by the end of October there were already more than 40 thousand. Moreover, it means here, again, as the Poles themselves noted, that, as their ambassador in Moscow reported in reports to London, “The military admits that the Soviet authorities are counting the food, weapons, and equipment they supply at extremely low prices. The Soviet military authorities greatly facilitate the organization of the Polish Army; in practice, they fully meet Polish demands, giving the Army soldiers who had already been mobilized into the Red Army in the lands of Eastern Poland.” Those. it turns out that these are people who were already drafted into the Red Army, but of Polish nationality, they were transferred there, and even to structures that are not even formally subordinate to us. How was this army supplied in general? We then provided this emigrant government with a loan of 65 million rubles. Not bad. With the condition that it will be repaid within 10 years after the end of the war. Since we later fell out with this government, then we created our own government in Poland. Naturally, no one returned it to us. By the way, speaking of an important point, it was 65 million in 1941, and in the next year, 1942, they gave another 300 million. 300? Yes, rubles. So, that is, in principle, the amount is sufficient, although not too large, but, in general, not small. And now it turns out that since now in Poland they believe that, they say, the post-war period until the end of the 80s, all this does not count, it was the Soviet occupation, they are now the legal successors of this London government, that it was legal. Then it would be nice to return the loan. In general, yes, it’s healthy. For some reason, again, in all these games, everything always ends with the same goal. Those. if we gave something away, then it’s all over, you can’t demand for it, that means they refused and refused. But on their part, they can remember all sorts of debts that are supposedly outstanding, damage from the occupation, and count something else. Here, again, it probably somehow makes sense, too, in general, when, so to speak, a partner begins to become too impudent, it means that they should be pulled back somehow, and, in general, reminded like this moments. Then, again, what’s interesting is that those prisoners of war who were released from our camps, they all received monetary compensation. And how did it happen that the rank and file were given compensation in the amount of 500 rubles. In order to understand what it is - at that time, it was, let’s say, a good salary for a worker, for an employee. That is, for example, my grandmother, towards the end of the 30s, she received 300 rubles a month, and, in general, she lived quite well. Those. this is a private. Officers received, naturally, much more, i.e. there, for example, lieutenant colonels and majors received 3,000, colonels - 5,000, respectively, generals - 10,000. Not bad. Well, personally, General Anders, he received 25,000 rubles - compensation for the very suffering that he endured, one might say, in our camps. That is, again, in general, it turns out that they were treated quite generously with them, but they were in absolutely no hurry to return the favor and somehow repay good for good, because sending this army to the front by this Polish command in every possible way sabotaged. That is, for example, when Sikorsky personally came to Moscow on December 3, 1941, i.e. the head of the exile government, then during negotiations with Stalin he began to insist that in general the Polish army should be sent to Iran, because there, apparently, would be the main front of the struggle, somewhere in the Middle East. Accordingly, then, apparently, Stalin either flared up, or simply decided to reassure his interlocutor, and said that we can do without you, we can give everyone up, we can handle it ourselves, we will reconquer Poland, then we will give it to you. But what will people say to this? Actually, if this was an attempt to cool things down, then she was clearly, so to speak, too naive, and here, as they say, even if you spit in your eyes, it’s all God’s dew. Maybe he could see that it was useless to talk; in his heart he at least said something. And in the end, just when, by the end of the summer of 42, when the Battle of Stalingrad began, when really any armed assistance would have been in place, after all, this Polish army, it was at the insistence of the Polish government and, accordingly, their Western patrons , was withdrawn to Iran at the disposal of the British command. Those. by that time there were already 80,000 military personnel there, respectively, and another plus 37,000, respectively, members of their families, i.e. civilian Polish population. By the way, again, indeed, as I said, which means I already said the quote, it is indeed the Polish Commander-in-Chief Anders, he stated that the strategic center of gravity of the war is currently moving to the Near and Middle East. Those. it is clear that there, apparently, the decisive battles of the Second World War took place somewhere near Alamein, while here some are holed up in the trenches of Stalingrad, and that was where the main thing was. 3 tanks caught, right? Yes. Moreover, again, on the other hand, maybe it was right that these people were released there, because the personnel were still the same. Since it is still clear that when such an armed formation exists, even if it has its own army, then naturally there is a security service, there is a certain agency that, in modern terms, carries out monitoring. And here, then, judging by the intelligence data, there were conversations among the command staff of the Polish army on the topic that after we defeat Germany, then there will be a war with the Soviet Union, because it took western Ukraine and western Belarus from us. So, for example, a certain Lieutenant Korabelsky, he stated the following: “We, the Poles, will direct our weapons at the Soviets. We, together with America, will exploit the weakness of the Red Army and will dominate Soviet territory.” And in the army newspaper “White Eagle” published by the Polish army, an article by Captain Rudkovsky was published, which, among other things, said the following: “The Bolsheviks are on the verge of death. We Poles are just waiting for them to give us weapons, then we will finish them off.” But yes, indeed, on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, our situation is very difficult, and, accordingly, some people are having such bad thoughts that it’s impossible to take advantage of this somehow. Together with the Nazis, yes. Here, again, we can once again recall Churchill’s words regarding the Poles, that there are still 2 Polands there, i.e. one of them performs miracles of courage, and the other grovels in vileness. In this case, one might say, this was the vile part of Polish society, but not everyone was like that, because in the same army of Anders, there were a number of officers who were still ready to fight on our side. Accordingly, among them, in general, some work was carried out, and as a result, we actually had 2 attempts to create a Polish army on our territory, but at the beginning, naturally, we created a division called the First Polish Infantry Division named Tadeusha Kosciuszko. Accordingly, Colonel Sigmund Berling was appointed to command it; he held the position of deputy commander of the 5th division in Anders' army. Well, accordingly, he, along with his like-minded people, refused to travel to Iran, i.e. stayed here. Well, in the end, indeed, oddly enough, there were still a sufficient number of Polish officers who apparently had not lost their conscience, because this division, it began to form somewhere in the spring of 1943, and already in early October it entered the battle. And then, accordingly, later, there, on its basis, first the First Polish Army was formed, then the Second. There, in principle, there was a third in the plans, but it didn’t work out there anymore. Those. such fairly numerous forces that, in general, actually fought on our side, i.e. on the Soviet-German front. In short, did more people fight for us than in Anders’ army, or not? Probably not, because it means that the results were approximately comparable. But at the same time, you still need to keep in mind that here, although not, I’m lying. Because it happened there - after we entered Polish territory, this Polish army was also joined by the army of the People, which was created by local communists. There were also about 60 thousand there. Then, yes, it turned out more on our side. But, again, unfortunately, this is to a fair extent compensated by the fact that on the German side there were also, as they say, a lot of Poles and more. That is, that means... again, by the way, I remember when we had one of the intelligence interviews on the topic of these European allies of Hitler, someone wrote in the comments about how so many Poles ended up there in German service, I gave a figure of about half a million. This is indeed true, in general. There, of course, this figure also includes those people who were, let’s say, of an intermediate nationality. It is clear that if a person, for example, is half-German, half-Pole, depending on the circumstances, he can be assigned either there or here, depending on how it is advantageous. But, in general, there were also ethnic Poles. Actually, there is such a wonderful book by a Polish author... “Poles in the Wehrmacht.” Richard Kaczmarek. Kaczmarek, yes. The book is so big, thorough, with illustrations. So, how did they serve there? How to say. They complained that, again, judging by the survey of prisoners who came to us during the war, especially in 41-42, it means that they complained that the Germans did not treat them in a comradely way, i.e. are considered as some kind of Untermensch, but, nevertheless, there really is, we had a number of divisions on our front with a fair share of the Polish contingent. That is, for example, in the 96th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht in 1942, Poles made up approximately 40-45% of the personnel, in the 11th Infantry Division, together with the Czechs, about 30%, in the 57th Infantry Division, also about 30%. Well, there were a lot of Poles there and in a number of other such formations. At the same time, again, as I already said, this means that the attitude of the Germans towards them was not very good. And, for example, a certain Pole Ernst Bichkowski during interrogation, this happened somewhere in August 1942, means he showed the following. “The replenishment that arrived to us at the end of July and early August, approximately 8-10 people per company, consisted exclusively of Poles, all of them knew absolutely no German, and complained about the rude and unfriendly attitude of the Germans.” Actually, here it’s like saying that a non-comradely attitude is understandable, because from a German racial point of view, these are Untermensch. Nobody, yes. Well, finally, here we need to remember one more component, let’s say, of the Polish, but not the armed forces, but, let’s say, the armed people who participated in the war, this is, naturally, the famous Home Army, which is now highly glorified in Poland . In Soviet times, by the way, we, in general, were also quite aware of it, i.e. they were written about in textbooks, i.e. this was not hushed up. But naturally the attitude was no longer very positive, because how did it happen that, in principle, these people, i.e. this Home Army, it was created in February 1942, formally it was a very large structure, i.e. there were about 300,000 people there. But at the same time, in general, they conducted the partisan struggle very sluggishly. Well, here, again, so that I will not be accused of using Soviet propaganda, I will quote our compatriot, a white emigrant, with a surname like Trubetskoy, who, therefore, being a migrant, just ended up in the partisan detachment of the Craiova Army. This is what he describes there: “The detachment lived the peaceful, measured life of a small military unit. Occasionally classes were held with “recruits”. It was felt that there was no constant intense struggle with the Germans here, but still, every day, while it was still dark, patrols were sent out in different directions to see if the Germans were setting up the forest for a raid. Sometimes a group of partisans went on an “action”, mainly to buy food, or to make a “suggestion”, mainly with a whip, to some informer or Volksdeutsch. As far as I know, other Polish detachments lived the same measured life, maintaining their strength and especially not bothering the Germans. But there were no hostilities with me. But to say that there were none at all is incorrect. There were also attacks on German posts. But all these are limited actions. And this is understandable. The Germans cruelly took revenge for active actions, shooting and hanging hostages, destroying villages. How, knowing all this, can you attack if your loved ones get hurt?” Well, I’ll note here that, in general, on our territory the Germans behaved in exactly the same way, and even much harsher. Cooler, yes. Those. yes, there they had punishments for attacks on German garrisons, for all sorts of actions. There, yes, they carried out repressions, destroyed the civilian population, but, nevertheless, in general, the fight must be waged, because if there, then, as if then, if we talk from the point of view, let’s say, so that no one would get hurt , then you just have to give up, voluntarily go into slavery, then, in general, it’s definitely already... More precisely, how to say - then they can still kill you, but, more precisely, they will easily kill you like a sheep, but not resisting. Therefore, this, of course, is actually an excuse, since, in this way, it simply turns out that this structure either did not want or could not fight against the Germans. And what’s also interesting is that when, in fact, our troops reached the state border line and entered the territory of Poland, it was then that the London government and the Home Army subordinate to it decided to play their game. This means that they organized the so-called Operation Storm. So, what was the essence of it? They decided to take advantage of the moment when the Germans were retreating, the Russians were just entering the territory of Poland, and according to their plan, it would be very cool to now capture a number of settlements, and, naturally, preferably such iconic ones as the same capital, i.e. Warsaw, the same as Vilna, present-day Vilnius, which, in general, was once the capital of the Lithuanian component of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Let's say, the same Lvov, and in these, let's say, cities captured in this way, the power of the Polish emigrant government should be proclaimed there. Moreover, this means that what they were counting on here was that, accordingly, the Red Army would not dare to attack them, because they seemed to be allies after all, although they had already spat with them about Katyn. And the Germans will also accept this with gratitude, because in this way a kind of barrier is created, i.e. between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, which by that time was already suffering defeats with all its might, a strip of Polish territory appeared under the rule of the emigrant government. Accordingly, the Germans will be happy about this, and there will be no special obstacles on their part. Those. That was the idea. Accordingly, the plan for Operation Storm was developed back at the end of 1943, but it actually began to be implemented in the summer of 1944, when units of the Red Army formations approached these cities I named. Moreover, it means that what happened there was that, in general, there were 3 iconic places, and, let’s say, in 2 cases it turned out to be a farce, and in one case a tragedy. Well, then by tragedy I mean Warsaw. And the farce, it took place, firstly, in the city of Vilna, because that means what the situation was there - our troops are approaching there, and there a certain, as he introduced himself, Colonel Vilk, gets in touch with our command, i.e. e. Wolf, translated from Polish, who announces that he has a partisan division here, they are ready to liberate the city. Well, our people believed, in the end the Poles showed up there, received lyuli from the Germans, in the end they fled, and then did not take part in the further assault on the city. Well, after our troops had already entered there and liberated Vilnius, it means that the Poles immediately entered after them, and as they further reported to the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the following began in the city: “the Poles are outrageous, taking away food by force, horned cattle and horses from local residents, declaring that this was for the Polish army. There are also threats that if the local residents of Lithuania hand over food to the Red Army, the Poles will punish them for this.” Those. in fact, it turns out that they were unable to prove themselves in battle, but actually began looting and establishing their own rules. As a result, in order to stop these outrages, the command of the Polish partisan brigade was arrested, and, accordingly, then sent to our rear, i.e. became, one might say, innocent victims of illegal repression. By the way, they then blame us for this, saying that these are our allies, and we treated them treacherously. Well, further, in the city of Lvov, something even more interesting happened there. Those. if here, at least among the Poles, some kind of armed formation showed itself, then there, in Lvov, they acted even cooler, there they have the town hall building, what was the situation there, that ours raised a red flag, but since there is a staircase inside the building was destroyed, then, accordingly, our soldiers did not dare to go up there, they hung out of a 2nd floor window somewhere there. But these same Polish patriots, they were able to climb onto the very spire, and the Polish flag was hung there and, accordingly, it was there for several days, thereby symbolizing this, that yes, this is the Polish power here. There were no other actions taken there. Here, by the way, again, it is interesting to note that when the process took place, I will simply quote one of the Polish leaflets that was distributed to the local population. It sounded like this: “the enemy himself left the Lublin land. We take the role of a resurgent state into our own hands, because no one can replace us in exercising power in our homeland.” Those. the fact that the Red Army is present somewhere nearby does not, apparently, count, i.e. it's just... Left. Yes, the Germans decided that that’s enough, that’s enough, we need to leave... To our huts, to our homes. Accordingly, no one except these Home Army and their London leadership can take on the mission of managing this territory. But, unfortunately, a real tragedy happened in Warsaw. Those. there, that means... True, again, here, in this case, there really are different versions, i.e. including the fact that there was simply betrayal on the part of the same local Polish command, that they simply, roughly speaking, set up their people in fact, threw them into a meat grinder. But rather, it’s invariably just stupidity here. Those. What was the situation like, that just at this time our troops, i.e. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky, by the way, they waged a deep offensive. And so they came just to the Polish capital, and there, as you know, Warsaw has a suburb called Prague, which is located just on our side of the Vistula. By the way, it was stormed back in the time of Suvorov, for which Western propaganda accused us of carrying out a massacre of civilians there. And it just happened there that the advanced units of the Red Army reached Prague, respectively, the local Polish leadership led by General Komarovsky, who is known under the pseudonym “Bur”, which means they decided that the Red Army was approaching, it was time to implement this plan to take authorities. And it just turns out that August 1 means, i.e. how it turns out, more precisely, that on July 25 the decision was made to uprising, and, accordingly, on August 1 it began. And then literally the next day the Germans launched a counterattack and threw us back from there. Those. Moreover, we need to understand something else - in our country, again, only the lazy do not reproach us about this, especially our intelligentsia likes to tear their underwear, that, they say, they betrayed them, left Warsaw to bleed, and the like. Firstly, it should be noted that those people who carried out this uprising are, in general, not our friends. The uprising was organized by this London government, which is hostile to us, and, in fact, organized with the aim of preventing us from entering the Polish capital in order to establish our power there. Those. by and large... And we had to help this, right? Yes. Those. this, in general, even if we really decided to carry out such a combination that - even if the Germans cut them out, then we would be within our rights, because, I repeat once again, you can only betray your friends. But one cannot betray one’s enemies, one can deceive an enemy, outwit one, and ultimately destroy one, but one cannot betray one. And the second point is that, in fact, we really, in general, did not have the opportunity to enter Warsaw right then, since, in general, our formations were very exhausted, especially since the Germans launched a counterattack there, they It was the SS divisions “Viking” and “Totenkopf” who pulled up. Those. in fact, it was only by September 14 that we were able to occupy Prague, a suburb of Warsaw, and reach the Vistula. Then, again, this uprising was completely not coordinated with our command, and, again, it would seem that if you are counting on some real help from the Red Army, then you must at least try to get through to the Vistula, and there, that means , ensure the possibility of crossing there. Well, this, too, in general, was not done, although, again, after Prague was occupied, then by mid-September, it turned out somewhere around September 15, we made an attempt to force Vistula, to directly break through to Warsaw, to the rebels, but at the same time, again, we must still pay tribute to the fact that for this we used just this formation from the Polish army, i.e. this is the 3rd Polish division. In the end, no matter how cynical it may be, the Polish capital should probably be liberated, first of all, by the Poles. It would be nice, yes. So that they later have something to be proud of. Well, really, I won’t say anything bad about these people, i.e. They really heroically tried to break through, but in the end they suffered very significant losses there, and were forced to withdraw from this bridgehead a week later. Well, accordingly, the uprising was soon suppressed. Germans, right? Yes. Moreover, in fact, what happened was that the leader of the rebels, General “Bur” Komarovsky, he was there, which means he negotiated fairly decent conditions of detention for himself. Moreover, by the way, it is interesting that on the German side, the suppression of the uprising was led, if I am not mistaken, by an SS officer with the Polonized surname Bakzilevski. Here, by the way, is a famous photograph where he and Komarovsky shake hands after the surrender. Actually, as they found out in a heart-to-heart conversation, it turns out that at one time they actually both came from noble families, and, accordingly, the founders of their families, they were granted noble dignity by Jan Sobieski, the famous Polish monarch, after the battle of Vienna, those. such kindred spirits. Well, the fact that there, in general, there were colossal losses among the people who trusted them, who were there, the people who trusted the London government, who rebelled there, and the fact that there, in general, Warsaw was smashed into rubble, Apparently this doesn't count. And how did they, such a practical question, accumulate a sufficient amount of weapons, ammunition, or whatever they call it? There was a certain amount of weapons accumulated, but it was not enough, which means that, in principle, we supplied them. But here, again, what kind of situation is it that at the beginning the Americans tried to supply the uprising there, making shuttle raids actually across the front line, i.e. We then provided the Americans with an airfield near Poltava for their bombers, they flew from there to bomb Germany, and, in fact, the Americans turned to our command with a request to allow them to supply the Poles in Warsaw. But then what happened was that these same Americans dropped the container from a great height, because it is clear that when a strategic bomber flies, it is undesirable for it to descend. And the wind carried everything to the Germans? Yes, that is It turned out that, yes, there was such a massive sortie there on September 18, about 1,300 containers were dropped there, of which 228 actually reached the rebels. Not bad. The rest either went somewhere to the Germans or was broken and lost. Therefore, after this, we simply refused to allow the allies to carry out further such operations, which we are now again accused of as some kind of malicious betrayal. But at the same time, again, it must be said that for the last half month we ourselves have been flying there using front-line aviation, mainly the same U-2, the famous night bombers. Accordingly, naturally, they dropped the cargo there from a height of about 200 meters or even less. Accordingly, quite a modest, of course, but still very necessary weapon was dropped there, i.e. there are about 150 mortars, 500 anti-tank rifles... Not bad. Something from the Strelkov rifles. Also about 120 tons of food. But, again, unfortunately, this was not enough there. Actually, it is clear that the rebels, what did they count on, that everything, as if the Germans were leaving, i.e. because, naturally, according to propaganda, because they themselves, apparently, decided, i.e. a natural phenomenon, and so, naturally, it is clear that the Red Army is chasing them, and that quietly it will be possible to occupy the capital without a fight. And then we had to fight in the streets... Well, we had to fight. And, in fact, again, what’s interesting is that even Komarovsky’s successor as commander of the Home Army, General Leopold Okulicki, if I’m not mistaken, later even became a victim of Stalin’s repressions. In a special closed report addressed to the London government, he wrote the following. “The fate of the battle for Warsaw was predetermined in the Soviet-German battle on August 4 and 5... It is incorrect to assume that Soviet troops did not occupy Warsaw because they wanted the stronghold of Polish independence to perish. The truth is that on August 4th and 5th the Soviets lost their own battle for Warsaw.” in this case, they all understood perfectly well that there was really no malicious intent on our part. Those. it’s just that a situation arose, and the situation arose, again, not through our fault, because, I repeat once again, this uprising was completely not coordinated with our command, and accordingly, it means, apparently, who it is started, he bears moral responsibility for its outcome. There’s one of two things here - either they planned it completely, not understanding what to do, or they had to do it that way. Well, yes. Those. This, again, is either stupidity or treason. But, again, if we take into account that in such a situation it was probably not one person who decided, but a group of people, then it is possible that it was both. Yes. Wonderful country, wonderful leadership. It's true. By the way, again, here at the same time you can also make out one such moment, also fairly mythologized, although not directly related, one might say, to ours, to the Soviet-German front. This is the same assault on Monte Cassino. Monte Cassino is an abbey in Italy, there was a line of German defense, which our allies, in general, hammered for a very long time, trying to break through it, and, accordingly, the road to Rome already opened from there, i.e. to the capital of Italy. There, in fact, 4 assaults were launched there, starting in early 1944. And who stormed? The British? And there was such a hodgepodge of things there. They checked in, basically... whoever was there. There were the French from those formations that were part of the De-Gaullevites, and the Americans, and all sorts of residents of the colonies, even in the end, oddly enough, one might say, the Moroccan Arabs played a decisive role. But it is natural that the Poles attribute to themselves a decisive role, because how did it happen that there were no Poles there until about May 12, 1944, and therefore they could not take Monte Cassino. Accordingly, on May 12, Anders’ army enters the battle, and, therefore, immediately after 3 days, the Germans, accordingly, left, the defense line was broken through. I immediately remember a joke about how 2 alcoholics are sitting, vodka has been poured, they have been drinking all evening, and there is only 1 small cucumber left in a jar of cucumbers. And one of them, in short, pokes and pokes him with a fork, pokes, pokes, pokes, pokes, pokes, pokes... The other says - give it here, puts his hand in, grab the cucumber, and he says - if I hadn’t tortured him, why the hell would you caught. Here. Actually, there, in fact, the situation is, i.e. how to say, they really went into battle, but in reality, in general, the attempted assault with the participation of the Poles was also repulsed, and with heavy losses, i.e. there they lost approximately 4,000 people. Wow. Including about 900 killed. No, but there, indeed, our allies washed themselves with blood there, i.e. it really is... The Germans are fierce. The Germans, yes, they held up very well. But just then those same Arabs I mentioned came into action, because they may not be very good warriors, but they were able to simply bypass the German positions there in terrain that was considered impassable. After that, when the Germans discovered that there was a detour, they were forced to leave this position, well, formally, yes, it turns out that the Poles took part, the Germans, accordingly, were forced to retreat. Moreover, by the way, it is interesting that in this book, one funny episode is described, that there was a citizen of Polish nationality who fought in the German army just near Monte Cassino, who was drafted there back in 1943. Accordingly, when he, again, realized that he smelled something fried, it meant that he was hiding there somewhere, and then, when the Allied soldiers appeared, and he discovered that they were his compatriots, he leaned out there and shouted - don’t shoot, I am Polish. And, accordingly, he was joyfully welcomed, and he found himself on the side of the Allies. That is, in principle, here we can say that history, of course, in general, is ambiguous, and indeed, in general, Poland initially fought against Hitler, i.e. and in September 1939, and there were Polish formations that fought, in fact, in the British army, there were pilots there, they even had sailors there. It’s interesting that it was precisely in September 1939 that the Polish submarine “Eagle” was there, so they fled to Tallinn, i.e. the capital of the then independent Estonia, and there the Estonian authorities tried to intern this boat. But in the end, what happened was that the Polish sailors simply disarmed the Estonian guards and, accordingly, fled to Sweden, and then further to England. In this case, they are naturally in their own right, i.e. If they believe that they must continue the armed struggle, then, in general, this kind of step can only be welcomed. But in general, in general, we must, again, remember that there were still many, let’s say, residents of Poland, including those of Polish nationality, who served our opponents, i.e. directly served the Germans, but there, in general, yes... The thickness of the book speaks volumes. Yes. By the way, again, even here, in the Leningrad region, there, according to the recollections of the partisans, at some point some strange formations appeared that spoke Polish, i.e. these are apparently some kind of police battalions there. The same Home Army was, in general, significantly hostile, and it took quite a long time to catch them, and, accordingly, to clear our rear. But on the whole, in general, there seemed to be a lot of those who were on our side quite sincerely. Well, here the story is not over yet, so we’ll see how our relations with this people, with this state will develop further. One thing I want to say is that when you look at our Duma, where, to put it mildly, some characters act very strangely, your soul becomes bitter. And then you look at the Ukrainian Rada, and you clearly understand that our people, in general, are extremely well-educated, far from stupid. Yes, there are some cockroaches, but it depends on what you compare it to. Well, these places are even cooler than our former Ukrainian brothers. Well done, well done. Yes. I didn’t know about the uprising. I couldn’t understand what was happening there, what we were always being accused of, what we did so wrong there. It turns out that just the opposite is true. By the way, regarding more uprisings, as an additional finishing touch. Here, again, what happens interestingly is the same as with the division of Poland, which was preceded by the division of Czechoslovakia, in which Poland took part, and with this supposedly betrayed uprising. Just about a year before, in 1943, there was an uprising in the Jewish ghetto of Warsaw. There, accordingly, the Jews rebelled, whom the Germans actually purged there. And at the same time, in general, no one from the Home Army lifted a finger to help these rebel Jews. Schindler's List begins with this. Yes, the communists helped them, but the nationalists did not. Therefore, in fact, the question is that if you yourself betrayed there, that means... How can a nationalist help someone? He won’t help everyone of his own, because you are right or wrong, and strangers are definitely all wrong, especially Jews. I remember back in the 70s, during the census in the GDR and Poland, there were no Jews there at all, i.e. they just took everyone out there, killed everyone they could. You can also recall the remarkable escape from the Sobibor camp, where the local population caught the runaway prisoners, killed them, and handed them over to the Germans. There are a lot of heroic deeds there. Thank you, Igor Vasilievich. Let's look further into these wonderful historical events. That's all for today. Until next time.
The Polish Army during the Second World War
Assuming the possibility of a joint struggle against Germany, on July 12, 1941, the Soviet leadership announced the 1st amnesty for Poles living in settlements in various regions of the USSR.
On August 12, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree granting an amnesty to all Polish citizens held in custody on Soviet territory as prisoners of war or on other grounds. On the same day, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the joint resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the procedure for the release and dispatch of Polish citizens amnestied in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,” which established points for the formation of Polish military units of the first stage.
According to the NKVD of the USSR, set out in the “Certificate on the number of resettled special settlers, refugees and repressed families (expelled from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and BSSR) as of August 1, 1941” on the territory of the USSR there were:
1. Former prisoners of war - 26,160.
2. Settlers and foresters - 132.463.
3. Convicts and investigators - 46,597.
4. Refugees and families of repressed people -176,000.
Total 381,220.
1. Army of General Anders (1941 - 1943)
On July 30, 1941, through the mediation of Great Britain, the USSR and the Polish government in exile signed an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and begin the formation of Polish military units on Soviet territory.
signing an agreement
On August 1, 1941, the number of prisoners of war and exiled citizens of Poland in the USSR was 381,220 people. The Polish army was to be formed both through compulsory conscription and on a voluntary basis. First of all, two light infantry divisions of 7-8 thousand people each and a reserve unit were formed. In the Gryazovets, Suzdal, Yuzhsky and Starobelsky NKVD camps, draft commissions were created for Polish prisoners of war, which included representatives of the Polish command, the Red Army and the NKVD.
On August 6, the former commander of the Novogrudov cavalry brigade (1937 - 1939), General Wladyslaw Anders, who was in Soviet captivity, was appointed commander of the Polish formations in the USSR.
On August 19, it was decided to deploy Polish units in the Totsky and Tatishchevsky camps (in the Chkalov, now Orenburg, and Saratov regions, respectively), with headquarters in Buzuluk (Chkalov region).
By November 30, 1941, the Polish army in the USSR consisted of 40,961 people: 1,965 officers, 11,919 non-commissioned officers and 27,077 soldiers. The 5th Infantry Division (14,703 men), the 6th Infantry Division (12,480 men), a reserve regiment (8,764 men), an army headquarters, a construction unit and a collection point were formed. When formed, these units experienced an acute shortage of weapons and food.
In December 1941, the relocation of Polish formations and rear units from the Volga region to Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) began. Polish military personnel were supposed to be sent to the front on June 1, 1942. However, a lack of equipment (40% of the soldiers did not have shoes) and food did not allow the planned number of formations (6 divisions) and personnel (96,000 people) to be prepared on time. The number of rations for the Polish army was reduced from 96,000 to 40,000 with 70,000 Polish troops. The Poles began to openly accuse the Soviet side of opposing the formation of their units. In particular, they were outraged by the denial of the right to enlist in their army Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews who had Polish citizenship before 1939 and lived in Polish territories seized in favor of the USSR. Quite often this prohibition was violated. In response, the Soviet government began to accuse the command of the Polish army in the USSR of unwillingness to fight against Germany on the Eastern Front.
The Polish government in exile insisted that Polish units would participate in the fighting only as a single Polish army, and not as separate units included in the Red Army.
Prime Minister Wladislav Sikorsky
On March 18, 1942, the Soviet government agreed to the proposal of the Polish side, supported by Great Britain, to withdraw Polish units through Iran to the Middle East for further formation based on supplies from their Western allies.
During 1942, 115,000 Polish military personnel and 37,000 members of their families left the USSR for the Middle East.
2. Polish Army (1943 - 1945)
After the units subordinate to the Polish government in exile were evacuated outside the USSR, the Soviet government began to form new Polish units. The decision was made in February 1943. There were still a significant number of Polish recruits at the recruiting stations. Polish officers who remained in the USSR and joined the Union of Polish Patriots (Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich) led by Wanda Wasilewska on March 15, 1943 were appointed commanders.
On April 25, 1943, the USSR government announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile, which accused the USSR of shooting Polish officers in Katyn.
On May 6, 1943, a decree of the State Defense Committee (GKO) was issued “On the formation of the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko.” Colonel Zygmunt Henryk Berling, the former head of a military camp for Polish soldiers in Krasnovodsk, was appointed division commander.
S.H. Burling
On May 14, in the Seletsky military camps near Ryazan, the formation of the 1st Polish Infantry Division began (three infantry regiments, one light artillery regiment, one separate anti-tank fighter battalion; separate companies - reconnaissance and communications, a mortar division, anti-aircraft artillery units and rear units) .
On July 15, 1943, the Soviet command sent 325 Soviet officers to the 1st Polish Infantry Division.
On July 25, 1943, the military court of the Polish government in exile declared Colonel Berling a deserter and sentenced him to death.
In August 1943, the 1st Polish Infantry Division, together with the 1st Polish Tank Regiment. Heroes of Westerplatte and the 1st Fighter Aviation Regiment "Warsaw" (32 Yak-1 aircraft) made up the 1st Polish Corps (12,000 people) led by the now Major General Sigismund Berling.
1. Private of the 1st Infantry Division. T. Kosciuszko, 1945
2. Tanker of the 1st Polish armored brigade “Heroes of Westerplatte”, Polish Army, 1944-1945.
3. Private of the 1st Infantry Division. T. Kosciuszko, 1945
On October 12 - 13, 1943, the first battle of the 1st Polish division took place near Lenino, Mogilev region, as part of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. Division losses reached 25% of personnel (502 killed, 1,776 wounded and 663 missing). On October 14, the Polish division was withdrawn for reorganization.
Polish Cross for the Battle of Lenino
In March 1944, Polish units were deployed to the 1st Polish Army (90,000 people), which included not only former Polish citizens, but also Soviet citizens of Polish (and not only) origin.
In the spring of 1944, about 600 Polish cadets studied at Soviet flight and aviation technical schools.
In July 1944, the Polish 1st Army began hostilities. Operationally, it was subordinate to the 8th Soviet Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and participated in the crossing of the Bug. The army became the first Polish unit to cross the borders of Poland.
On July 21, 1944, the 1st Polish Army was united with the partisan Army Ludowa (18 brigades, 13 battalions and 202 detachments) into a single Polish Army.
partisans of Ludova's army
On July 26, the Polish 1st Tank Corps was formed under the command of Colonel Jan Rupasov (later Brigadier General Jozef Kimbar).
At the end of July - beginning of August, the Polish 1st Army took part in the liberation of Deblin and Pulawy. The 1st Polish Armored Brigade took part in the defense of the Studzian bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula south of Warsaw. It consisted of three fighter aviation regiments.
On September 14, 1944, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, together with the 1st Army of the Polish Army, liberated the Warsaw suburb of Prague. On September 15, all 15 divisions of the Polish Army were redeployed here.
At the end of October 1944, 11,513 Soviet officers served in the Polish Army. About 40% of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Polish Army were Soviet military personnel of non-Polish nationality.
During the winter, the Polish 1st Army remained focused on Prague, and in January 1945 it took part in the liberation of Warsaw.
The Polish army took part in the breakthrough through central Poland, liberating Bydgoszcz on January 28. The Polish 1st Army was then moved north and took part in the fighting as it advanced along the Baltic coast. The main forces of the army took part in the assault on Kolberg, and the 1st Polish armored brigade advanced on Gdansk. In Szczecin, the Polish 1st Army stopped to regroup, as its losses amounted to 5,400 killed and 2,800 missing.
By the beginning of the spring offensive of 1945, the 2nd Polish Army was formed under the command of Lieutenant General of the Soviet Army, and then the Polish Army Karol Wacław Świerczewski.
K.K. Sverchevsky
The army consisted of the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Polish Armored Corps. The Polish 2nd Army was part of the 1st Ukrainian Front and operated north of the Czechoslovak border.
In 1945, the role of the Polish army increased noticeably, as the number of Polish formations reached 200,000 people (1st and 2nd Polish armies, 1st Tank Corps, 1st Air Corps and other units), amounting to approximately 10% of the total number of Soviet army forces that stormed Berlin.
The 1st Polish Army crossed the Oder and the Hohenzollern Canal.
On March 1, 1945, the 1st Independent Warsaw Cavalry Brigade, in the last Polish cavalry attack in World War II, stormed German positions in the Schonfeld area
During the last days of the war, the 1st Infantry Division was involved in street fighting in Berlin, particularly in the area of the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery.
The losses of the Polish Army during the Berlin operation amounted to 7,200 killed and 3,800 missing.
The 2nd Polish Army advanced in a southern direction and reached the outskirts of the capital of Czechoslovakia, Prague.
Total for 1943 - 1945 On the Eastern Front, the Polish Army lost 24,707 people killed and 44,223 wounded.
By June 1945, the Polish Army numbered about 400,000 people. The Polish army in the east was the largest regular military force that fought alongside the Soviet army, and in the future formed the basis of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic.
Monument to the Polish Army in Sandau
badge of veterans of the Polish Army
A group of patriotic Polish officers and soldiers, including Lieutenant Colonel Sigmund Berling, left the Anders Army and remained in the Soviet Union. They initiated the formation of the 1st Polish Infantry Division. Tadeusha Kosciuszko. The Poles living on the territory of the USSR were determined to join the armed struggle against the Nazis on the side of the Red Army. At the request of the anti-fascist Union of Polish Patriots, on May 14, 1943, the Tadeusz Kosciuszko Infantry Division began to be formed from Polish volunteers in the village camps near Ryazan. This work was led by Lieutenant Colonel Sigmund Berling. In August 1943 - March 1944, the 1st Polish Corps was created, under the command of the same Major General Sigmund Berling. In April 1944, the corps was transferred to the 1st Polish Army. Since October 1944, Lieutenant General V. Korchits took command of the army, and since December, Lieutenant General S.G. Poplavsky. By mid-1944, the 1st Polish Army united 4 infantry divisions, a cavalry regiment, 5 artillery brigades, a mortar regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a tank and engineer brigade, 2 air regiments and other units.
By the Decree of the Home Rada of the People, the highest executive body of the fighting Poland, dated July 21, 1944, the 1st Polish Army and the Army of Ludowa were united into the Polish People's Army, commanded by General of Armor M. Zhimierski. With the help of the USSR, in the second half of 1944, the 2nd Army of the Polish Army was created, commanded by Lieutenant General K. Swierchevsky, and from September 1944 - by Lieutenant General S. Poplavsky. In December of the same year, he handed over command again to K. Sverchevsky. By the end of 1944, the Polish Army numbered 300 thousand people, and by May 1945 - 400 thousand. It consisted of 14 infantry, 40 artillery and anti-aircraft divisions, 7 artillery, 4 tank, 2 defensive, 1 cavalry, 1 motorized rifle, 1 mortar, 5 engineer brigades, 4 air divisions, dozens of rifle units and units of various branches of the military and services . At the request of the Polish command, Soviet officers were sent to command positions or as instructors in the Polish Army.
Polish patriots, in military cooperation with Soviet troops, made a worthy contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. On October 12, 1943, near the village of Lenino, southeast of Orsha, as part of the 33rd Army of the Western Front, the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after. Kosciuszko. For heroism and courage in battles with the Nazi invaders, 239 soldiers of the division were awarded Soviet military orders. Captain Y. Hibner, Captain V. Vysotsky (posthumously), Private A. Kishvon (posthumously) were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
In the spring of 1944, under the command of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Polish Partisan Headquarters was formed, which played an important role in supplying the Ludowa Army with weapons and other military equipment. There were 7 Soviet partisan formations and 26 separate partisan detachments operating on Polish territory, with a total of 12 thousand people. In turn, more than 7 thousand Poles fought in the partisan detachments of Ukraine and Belarus.
At the end of February 1944, the 1st Polish Army came under the operational command of the 1st Belorussian Front and, being in the second echelon of the front, occupied defense along the eastern bank of the Styr River. On July 22-23, 1944, during the Lublin-Brest operation, Polish troops entered Polish territory. Together with Soviet troops, they fought fierce battles to capture, hold and expand the bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula.
On August 23, 1944, in the area of the Mangushevsky bridgehead, Polish pilots made their first combat missions. The 1st Polish Army took part in the offensive launched on September 10 in the central sector of the 1st Belorussian Front in order to assist the rebels in Warsaw. On September 13, Soviet and Polish aviation dropped weapons, ammunition, food and medicine to the rebels, and covered their air strikes. September 14 1st Polish Infantry Division named after. T. Kosciuszko and the 1st Tank Brigade named after. The heroes of Westerplatte successfully conducted military operations to eliminate the bridgehead of the Nazi troops between the Vistula and Western Bug rivers. During the Warsaw-Poznan operation of 1945, troops of the 47th Army and the 61st Soviet Army, together with formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, liberated Warsaw on January 17, 1945. Eleven units and formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army received the honorary name of Warsaw. Together with Soviet troops, this army took part in breaking through the Pomeranian Wall, pursuing the enemy to the Baltic coast, and liberating the city of Kolobterg (Kolberg). During the assault on Gdansk and Gdynia, the 1st Polish Tank Brigade named after them distinguished themselves. Heroes of Western, which operated as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front. The 1st (as part of the 1st Belorussian Front) and 2nd (as part of the 2nd Belorussian Front) armies of the Polish Army, the 1st Polish Infantry Division. Kosciuszko, 1st mortar, 2nd howitzer brigade and 6th separate pontoon-bridge battalion. They, together with the Red Army troops, fought directly on the streets of Berlin. The 2nd Army of the Polish Army then took part in the Prague operation.
During the war years, the Soviet Union donated to the Polish armed forces over 400 thousand rifles and machine guns, 18,800 machine guns, 3,500 guns, 4,800 mortars, 670 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,200 aircraft. 20 thousand Soviet generals and officers were sent to command positions in the Polish troops. During the war years, 29 Polish military units and formations, as well as 5 thousand Polish soldiers, were awarded Soviet military orders. The Polish troops were thanked 13 times in orders of the Supreme High Command. In the battles for their homeland Poland, the Polish Army lost about 18 thousand killed. The Soviet Armed Forces lost about 600 thousand people in the battles for the liberation of Poland.
The complex and contradictory history of Soviet-Polish relations during the Great Patriotic War. But even in those years, governments and peoples found a way to close cooperation in the fight against a common enemy - Nazi Germany. This is history that we must remember so that its tragic pages are never repeated.
Statement by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky to representatives of the Anglo-American press in Moscow regarding Polish-Soviet relations, May 6, 1943.
In view of the requests received from some representatives of the Anglo-American press regarding Soviet-Polish relations, I, on behalf of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, consider it necessary to acquaint you with some facts and points relating to this issue.
This is all the more necessary at this time because the current Polish government, under the influence of pro-Hitler elements in it and in the Polish press, has caused the well-known decision of the Soviet government to break off relations with the Polish government, and Polish officials, the Polish press and Polish radio continue to disseminate numerous false statements on the issue of Soviet-Polish relations. At the same time, they often take advantage of the ignorance of wide public circles about the actual facts in the area of these relations.
I. About Polish military units formed in the USSR
Following the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet agreement on July 30, 1941, the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the Soviet Union began in accordance with the military agreement concluded between the Soviet and Polish command on August 14 of the same year. At the same time, by agreement between the Soviet and Polish commands, the total strength of the Polish army was determined at 30 thousand people, and in accordance with the proposal of General Anders, it was also considered advisable, as soon as one or another division was ready, to immediately send it to the Soviet- German front.
The Soviet military authorities, at the direction of the Soviet government, fully assisting the Polish command in the most rapid resolution of all issues related to the accelerated formation of Polish units, fully equated the supply of the Polish army with the supply of the Red Army units being formed. To finance activities related to the formation and maintenance of the Polish army, the Soviet government provided the Polish government with an interest-free loan in the amount of 65 million rubles, which was subsequently, after January 1, 1942, increased to 300 million rubles. In addition to these amounts allocated by the Soviet government, more than 15 million rubles of non-refundable benefits were issued to the officers of the newly formed Polish military units.
It should be noted that despite the initially established strength of the Polish army at 30 thousand people, on October 25, 1941, the Polish army already numbered 41,561 people, of which 2,630 were officers. The Soviet government reacted favorably to the proposal of the Polish government, made in December 1941 by General Sikorski, to further expand the contingent of the Polish army to 96 thousand people. As a result of this decision, the Polish army was deployed in 6 divisions and, in addition, the initially determined composition of the officer school, spare parts and army reinforcement units of 3 thousand people, it was decided to increase to 30 thousand people. The entire army, in accordance with the wishes of the Polish government, was transferred to the southern regions of the USSR - which was dictated mainly by climatic conditions - where the construction of camps was launched and headquarters, military schools, sanitary institutions, etc. were located.
Despite the difficult wartime conditions, in February 1942 the Polish army deployed as part of the planned divisions and numbered 73,415 people. However, despite the repeated assurances of the Polish command about their determination to put their units into action as soon as possible, the actual date for these units to go to the front was invariably postponed. At the beginning of the formation of the Polish army, the deadline for its readiness was set at October 1, 1941, and the Polish command stated that it considered it advisable to send individual divisions to the front as their formation was completed. Although the preparation of individual units was late, nevertheless, if not on October 1, then somewhat later, there was every opportunity to fulfill this intention. Meanwhile, it was not implemented and the Polish command never even raised the question of sending the formed Polish divisions to the Soviet-German front. The Soviet government did not consider it possible to rush the Polish command with this matter, but still, 5 months after the start of the formation of Polish units, namely in February 1942, the Soviet government asked when the Polish units would begin to fight against the Nazis. At the same time, the 5th division was named as having already completed its preparation. In raising this question, the Soviet government proceeded, first of all, from the direct and clear provisions of the Soviet-Polish military agreement of August 14, 1941, paragraph 7 of which stated: “Polish army units will be moved to the front upon reaching full combat readiness. They will act, as a rule, in formations no smaller than a division and will be used in accordance with the operational plans of the USSR Supreme Command.”
Despite such a categorical indication of the military agreement, General Anders, on behalf of the Polish government, subsequently stated that he considered it undesirable to introduce individual divisions into battle, although on other fronts the Poles even fought in brigades. General Anders made a promise that the entire Polish army would be ready to take part in hostilities with the Germans by June 1, 1942. It is known that neither on June 1, nor much later, the Polish command and the Polish government were ready to send the Polish army to fight against the Soviet-German the front did not show. Moreover, the Polish government formally refused to send its units to the Soviet-German front, with the reasoning that “the use of individual divisions will yield nothing” and that “the possible combat training of one division will not meet our expectations” (Telegram from General Sikorski dated February 7 1942).
Meanwhile, the shortage of food in the USSR as a result of the outbreak of the war in the Pacific Ocean led to the need to reduce the number of rations issued to non-combatant military units in the interests of ensuring supplies for the warring troops. Since the Polish command did not show any desire to send any Polish military units to the Soviet-German front and continued to keep them in the rear, the Soviet government was naturally forced to consider these units as non-combatant troops, as a result of which the decision to reduction of food rations for non-combatant military units.
Because of this, the Soviet government decided to reduce the number of food rations to 44 thousand from April 1, 1942 and allow, in accordance with the wishes of the Polish government, the evacuation of Polish units to Iran in excess of the 44 thousand remaining in the Soviet Union. This evacuation was carried out in March 1942, when 31,488 military personnel left the USSR. 12,455 people were allowed to leave with them. family members of Polish military personnel.
Refusing to withdraw its army to the Soviet-German front, the Polish government at the same time sought the consent of the Soviet government to conduct additional recruitment into the Polish army on the territory of the USSR. Simultaneously with the proposal for additional recruitment, the Polish government addressed the Soviet government with a note in which it spoke about such a use of Polish military units, which meant nothing more than a refusal to use them on the Soviet-German front. In response to this note (dated June 10, 1942), the Soviet government notified the Polish government that, since, contrary to the agreement between the USSR and Poland, the Polish government does not consider it possible to use Polish units formed in the USSR on the Soviet-German front, the Soviet government did not may allow the further formation of Polish units in the USSR.
Then the question was raised about the complete evacuation of the Polish army from the USSR to the Middle East, and in August 1942 an additional 44,000 Polish military personnel were evacuated.
Thus, the question of the participation of Polish troops in the common struggle with Soviet troops against Nazi Germany was removed from the agenda by the Polish government. The Polish government decided this issue negatively, contrary to its initial assurances, contrary to the solemn statement made in the Declaration on December 4, 1941 that “the troops of the Polish Republic located on the territory of the Soviet Union will wage war against German bandits hand in hand with Soviet troops "
Before the second evacuation, the command of the Polish army asked for 20-25 thousand family members of Polish military personnel to leave with units of the Polish army. The Soviet government granted this request. In fact, by September 1, 1942, 25,301 people had already been evacuated. family members of Polish military personnel. In total, therefore, all but 75,491 people left the USSR back in 1942. Polish military personnel, 37,756 people. members of their families.
Recently, the Polish Ambassador Mr. Romer raised the issue of an additional 10 people leaving the USSR. family members of Polish military personnel who did not have time to arrive at evacuation points by the time of evacuation. The Soviet government resolved this issue positively. Neither the command of the Polish army nor the Polish embassy made any other proposals for the evacuation of the families of Polish military personnel to the Soviet government.
All statements that the Soviet authorities have prevented or are preventing the departure of Polish citizens from the USSR, the number of whom is actually not large, as well as members of the families of Polish military personnel who left the Soviet Union, are false.
All of the above indicates that the Soviet government took all measures to ensure the successful formation and deployment of the Polish army on the territory of the Soviet Union.
The Agreement of July 30, 1941 and the Declaration of December 4, 1941 set before the Soviet government and the Polish government a very specific and clear task - to unite the efforts of the Soviet and Polish peoples in a joint struggle against Hitler’s robbers and occupiers, to create a Polish army inspired by this great idea and give her the opportunity to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army for the independence of her homeland.
The Soviet government did everything necessary to solve this problem. The Polish government took a different path. It did not want to withdraw its divisions to the Soviet-German front, refused to use Polish troops against the Germans on this front, hand in hand with Soviet troops, and thereby avoided fulfilling its obligations.
In connection with the question of the formation of a Polish army on the territory of the USSR, it is also necessary to dwell on the following:
After the reunification by the will of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples of the Western regions of Ukraine and Belarus with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Belarusian Soviet Republic, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council was issued on November 29, 1939, by virtue of which, in accordance with the all-Union legislation on citizenship, residents of these regions acquired Soviet citizenship . As I have already indicated, after the restoration of relations between the Soviet government and the Polish government and the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish military agreement of August 14, 1941, the Soviet government took a number of measures to facilitate the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the USSR. In order to facilitate the formation of this army and provide it with personnel, the Soviet government expressed its readiness, in the form of an exception from the Decree of November 29, 1939, to consider persons of Polish nationality from among the residents of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus as Polish subjects. Despite this manifestation of goodwill and compliance of the Soviet government, the Polish government reacted negatively to this act of the Soviet government and was not satisfied with it, based on its illegal claims regarding the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Meanwhile, the Polish government back in August 1942, as I said earlier, withdrew its military units from the USSR, and thus there was no need for the further formation of Polish military units on Soviet territory. In view of the above circumstances, there was no longer a need for that exemption in relation to persons of Polish nationality, for which the Soviet government expressed its readiness in December 1941. Therefore, on January 16, 1943, the Soviet government informed the Polish government that its earlier statement about its readiness to allow an exception from the Decree of November 29, 1939 in relation to the above-mentioned persons of Polish nationality should be considered invalid and the question of the possibility of non-extension of the provisions of Soviet legislation on citizenship to them - fallen away.
These are the facts that shed full light on the circumstances of the formation of Polish military units on the territory of the USSR and the withdrawal of these units from the Soviet Union.
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR granted the request of the "Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR" to form a Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko on the territory of the USSR to jointly fight with the Red Army against the German invaders. The formation of the Polish division has already begun.
148. J.V. Stalin’s answer to a question from the chief correspondent of Reuters regarding the dissolution of the Communist International on May 28, 1943.
The Moscow correspondent of the English agency Reuters, Mr. King, addressed the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, J.V. Stalin, with a letter in which he asked to answer a question of interest to the English public.
J.V. Stalin responded to Mr. King with the following letter:
Mister King!
I have received a request from you to answer a question regarding the dissolution of the Communist International. I am sending you my answer.
Question. “British comments on the decision to liquidate the Comintern were very favorable. What is the Soviet point of view on this issue and its impact on the future of international relations?
Answer. The dissolution of the Communist International is correct and timely, since it facilitates the organization of a common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy - Hitlerism.
The dissolution of the Communist International is correct because:
a) He exposes the lies of the Nazis that Moscow allegedly intends to interfere in the lives of other states and “Bolshevisize” them. This lie will now come to an end.
b) He exposes the slander of opponents of communism in the labor movement that the communist parties of various countries allegedly act not in the interests of their own people, but on orders from outside. This slander also comes to an end from now on.
c) It facilitates the work of patriots of freedom-loving countries to unite the progressive forces of their country, regardless of their party affiliation and religious beliefs, into a single national liberation camp - to launch the struggle against fascism.
d) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries to unite all freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp to fight against the threat of world domination of Hitlerism, thereby clearing the way for organizing in the future a commonwealth of peoples on the basis of their equality.
I think that all these circumstances taken together will lead to the further strengthening of the united front of the Allies and other united nations in their struggle for victory over Hitler's tyranny.
I believe that the dissolution of the Communist International is quite timely, since right now, when the fascist beast is straining its last strength, it is necessary to organize a general onslaught of freedom-loving countries in order to finish off this beast and rid the peoples of fascist oppression.
Sincerely, I. Stalin
149. The position of the USSR regarding the plans of European federations. From the editorial article “On the issue of federations of “small” states in Europe,” published in Izvestia on November 18, 1943.
The Soviet point of view fully recognizes that the liberation of small countries and the restoration of their independence and sovereignty is one of the most important tasks of the post-war structure of Europe and the creation of lasting peace. However, the Soviet point of view takes into account the specific situation in which small nations will find themselves immediately after the end of the war. What will this situation actually be like? It is quite obvious that all European relations in the first period after the liquidation of hostilities will be in a state of great fluidity and uncertainty. Small countries will need some time to fully understand the new situation created as a result of the war. It will take time to sort out the newly established relations with neighboring and other states without any outside interference or external pressure aimed at inducing these small countries to join one or another new grouping of states...
At the Moscow Conference, the Soviet delegation, based on the fundamental considerations outlined above, stated with sufficient clarity that the premature and possibly artificial attachment of small countries to theoretically planned groupings would be fraught with dangers both for these countries themselves and for the future peaceful development of Europe. And this is quite understandable, since such an important step as federation with other countries and the possible renunciation of part of one’s sovereignty is permissible only in accordance with the free and well-thought-out expression of the will of peoples.
A number of important conclusions follow from the above.
Firstly, it can be considered that the emigrant governments of small countries occupied by the Germans, as not being tightly connected with their peoples, will not be able to fully ensure the expression of the real will of their peoples in order to resolve such an important issue as the question of federation. Any attempt by emigrant governments, which, as we know, are in a special position, to do something like this may be perceived by their people as the imposition of decisions that do not correspond to their desires and constant aspirations.
Secondly, it is very likely that even the new governments created in the currently occupied countries will not yet be sufficiently authoritative and stable to tackle the issue of federation without the risk of violating the will of the people and thereby causing any complications.
Thirdly, and finally, there can be no doubt that only after the situation after the end of the war has somewhat settled down and the small countries have acquired the necessary calm and confidence in their independence, the discussion on the question of federations can take on a more fruitful character.
The Soviet point of view boils down, in accordance with the above, to the recognition that it would be premature even now to outline and thus artificially encourage the creation of any federations or any other forms of unification of small states...
During the Great Patriotic War, several national military formations fought in the Red Army, going into battle under the flags of other states - France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. The decision to allow the creation of foreign military formations from Czechs, Slovaks, Yugoslavs and Poles on the territory of the USSR was made on July 3, 1941. The first was the 1st Czechoslovak Infantry Battalion, the formation of which began on January 5, 1942. The second is the famous Normandy squadron, whose pilots made their first combat missions in the Oryol bridgehead area on April 1, 1943. Next came the 1st Polish Infantry Division (6 May 1943) and the 1st Romanian Volunteer Infantry Division (4 October 1943). On October 15, soldiers of the former Yugoslav army, who became the backbone of the 1st Separate Yugoslav Infantry Brigade, which entered the battle in the summer of 1944 and fought all the way to the Austrian border, asked for the formation of a national military unit. In September 1944, many military units of the former Bulgarian army went over to the side of the Red Army. And in February 1945, from the soldiers of the Hungarian army who went over to the Soviet side, they formed the “Buda” volunteer regiment, which fought near Budapest.
To train foreign officers at the Ryazan Infantry School - the future airborne school - Polish (August 1, 1943), Romanian (December 1943) and Czech (April 9, 1944) departments of 500 cadets were organized. In total, during the war years in the USSR, two combined arms armies, three army, tank and aviation corps and other foreign military formations with a total number of over 550 thousand people were formed and armed. The most noticeable mark in the history of the Great Patriotic War was left by Polish, Romanian, French and Czechoslovak units. For the courage and heroism shown during battles with German troops, 42 of them - 29 Polish, 11 Czechoslovak, one Romanian and one French - were awarded Soviet orders and given honorary titles.
1st separate fighter air regiment "Normandie-Neman"
Soviet awards: Order of the Red Banner of Battle (awarded on February 19, 1945), Order of Alexander Nevsky (awarded on June 5, 1945) Honorary title: Nemansky (assigned November 28, 1944)
In March 1942, a representative of the military command of “Fighting France,” General Ernest Petit, approached Joseph Stalin with a proposal to form a French regiment within the Red Army on behalf of General Charles de Gaulle. In April 1942, the USSR Ambassador to the Allied Governments in London, Alexander Bogomolov, sent a telegram to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs stating that he “received a note from Dejean (head of the department of political affairs of Fighting France, Professor Maurice Dejean - author’s note). , which contains a proposal to send 30 French pilots and 30 service personnel to the Soviet-German front.” On November 25, 1942, an agreement was signed in Moscow that “the command of Fighting France sends to the USSR an aviation squadron, staffed according to the staff approved by the Commander of the Red Army Air Force, for joint actions with the Red Army Air Force against a common enemy.” The staff consists of 14 pilots and 58 technicians. As Count Roland de la Poype, one of the most famous Normandy pilots and one of the four awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, wrote, “there were only fourteen of us. A drop in the sea. Fourteen French pilots who were thrown into the midst of millions of other people.<…>More a symbol than a war machine."
On March 14, 1943, the squadron completed combat training, and on the 22nd it went to the front as part of the 303rd Air Division of the 1st Air Army of the Western Front. The Normandy pilots won their first victories on April 5, and in total during the war years, French pilots chalked up 273 confirmed and 36 unconfirmed victories. On November 6, 1943, the squadron was transferred to reorganization, and by February 25, 1944 it became a regiment. After the Victory, he returned to France on Yak-3 fighters donated by the USSR government and continues to serve to this day, preparing to celebrate his 75th birthday.
1st Czechoslovak Infantry Brigade
Soviet awards: Order of Suvorov, II degree (awarded on November 6, 1943), Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, I degree (awarded on January 4, 1944) On January 3, 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR issued Resolution No. GKO-1096ss “On the Czechoslovak Brigade on the Territory of the USSR.” Here is a quote from it: “...Allow the Czechoslovak command to form the first stage: a) one motorized battalion - 1,100 people. b) one reserve company - 150 people. Total: 1,250 people The battalion and reserve company are to be deployed in the mountains. Buzuluk. 3. Instruct the NKVD of the USSR to release Czechoslovak citizens currently imprisoned on Soviet territory as prisoners of war, internees or on other sufficient grounds.<…>4. Allow citizens of the USSR of Czechoslovak nationality to join the Czechoslovak brigade on a voluntary basis.” Two days later, the formation of a unit began, led by Lieutenant Colonel Ludwik Svoboda.
On October 28, 1942, the battalion took the oath, and on March 1, 1943, it arrived at the front, near Kharkov. After the first battles, in which the battalion’s soldiers proved their courage and readiness to fight the Nazis, on May 10, the formation of a brigade began, which received the first order for the liberation of Kyiv, and the second for the liberation of Bila Tserkva. Then, on the basis of the brigade, the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps was formed, six of whose soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The corps finished its combat journey in Prague, and after the war it became the basis of the 1st Army of the Czechoslovak People's Army.
1st Tadeusz Kosciuszko Infantry Division
Soviet awards: Order of the Red Banner of Battle (awarded on January 19, 1945), Order of Kutuzov, II degree (awarded on May 4, 1945) Honorary title: Varshavskaya (assigned January 19, 1945)
The first attempt to create Polish units in the USSR failed: the corps assembled by General Vladislav Anders in Krasnovodsk in the spring of 1942 left to join British troops in Iran. But some anti-fascist officers did not follow the commander, but supported the idea of their fellow countrymen to create the “Union of Polish Patriots” in London, which was in no way connected with the emigrant government of Poland. It was he who initiated the formation of the 1st Infantry Division. Resolution No. 3294ss on this matter was adopted by the State Defense Committee of the USSR on May 6, 1943, and the first officers and soldiers arrived at the Seletsk military camps near Ryazan eight days later. The division was named after General Tadeusz Kosciuszko, the leader of the Polish uprising of 1794, and the unique 1st separate women's infantry battalion that fought in it was named after Emilia Plater, a participant in the Polish uprising of 1830–1831.
The division went to the front on September 1, 1943 and took part in its first battle on October 12 near the village of Lenino, Mogilev Region. In January 1945, she liberated Warsaw, for which she was awarded the honorary title “Warsaw” and the Order of the Red Banner, and ended the war in Berlin, fighting as part of the 1st Army of the Polish Army.
1st Tank Brigade named after Heroes of Westerplatte
Soviet awards: Order of the Red Banner of Battle (awarded on May 4, 1945)Honorary title: Varshavskaya (assigned on February 24, 1945)
This military unit is well known from the once popular novel by the writer Janusz Przymanowski (who fought as part of the brigade) and the television series “Four Tankmen and a Dog” based on it. It began with a tank regiment, formed under the 1st Polish Kosciuszko Division, but already on August 19, 1943, after the formation of the Polish army began, it was deployed to a two-regiment brigade: 71 T-34 tanks, 14 T-70 light tanks and more 2000 soldiers and officers.
The brigade entered the battle together with the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko near Lenino, and ended the war in East Prussia, participating in the capture of Danzig - Polish Gdansk. For the fighters of the brigade, this was especially symbolic: it bore the name of the heroes of Westerplatte, that is, the defenders of the peninsula of the same name near Gdansk, the seven-day defense of which became one of the symbols of the courage and perseverance of Polish soldiers during the German attack on Poland in September 1939.
1st Romanian Volunteer Infantry Division named after Tudor Vladimirescu
Soviet awards: Order of the Red Banner of Battle (awarded on November 20, 1944)Honorary title: Debrecen (assigned November 20, 1944)
Romanian prisoners of war held in Soviet camps accepted an appeal for permission to form a national military unit on February 2, 1943. For eight months in Moscow they decided whether soldiers who had recently participated in the siege of Odessa, Sevastopol and Stalingrad and the occupation of Moldova could fight on the side of the Soviet Union. And yet, on October 4, 1943, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted Resolution No. 4227ss “On the formation of a Romanian infantry division from prisoners of war on the territory of the USSR.” The place where the division was formed, which was named after the national hero of Romania - a participant in the Russian-Turkish war of 1806–1812 and the inspirer of the anti-Turkish uprising of 1821, Tudor Vladimirescu, was the Seletsky camps, which were vacated after the departure of the Poles.
Formation ended in March 1944, but the division took its first battle only on August 29. The next day, it entered liberated Bucharest and soon became a kind of model for the creation of a new army of Romania, the basis of which was made up of Romanian units that had defected to the USSR. At the end of 1944, the division participated in the Debrecen operation in eastern Hungary, showing its best side and receiving an honorary name and order. During these battles, it lost almost half of its fighters and went to the rear for reorganization, which dragged on until the end of the war.
Anton Trofimov
