Many have probably already seen it, but let it be here.
Rudolf Volker, chief sergeant of the headquarters company of the 35th tank regiment [ Quoted by Hans Scheufler. Tank aces of the Wehrmacht. Memoirs of officers of the 35th Tank Regiment. 1939–1945]:
“The situation with tanks that evening was catastrophic. The number of combat-ready tanks in the 2nd battalion of the 35th tank regiment deployed in Krichev was 8 Pz III and 5 Pz II. The battalion entered the war on June 22, 1941 with 90 tanks. Now it combat strength did not exceed a full company.
Although the battle group inflicted significant losses on the Russians, it failed to gain control of supply lines. Even the division headquarters was attacked by Russians breaking out from encirclement.
The Russians appeared at the division command post at 17:00, trying to break through the north-south supply line. All available forces at headquarters, including the communications battalion, the anti-aircraft battalion and the newly arrived advance group of the reconnaissance battalion, rallied in order to repel the attack.
After a long firefight, the Russians pushed forward two 122-mm artillery pieces across the forest terrain. Reconnaissance from the communications battalion managed to disable one of these guns. But the other one took a position right next to the road and began hitting the division headquarters vehicles and the empty vehicles of the involved forces from a distance of just over 100 meters.
In the ensuing confusion, several hundred Russians managed to break through to the south. The gun that caused the massacre was eventually neutralized just at that moment by light anti-aircraft guns and a tank passing along the road.”
“The battles in the forest cost heavy losses. Losses were suffered by the 1st battalion of the 394th infantry regiment, attached from the 3rd tank division. During the battle, the Russians wedged themselves between the 2nd battalion of the 12th infantry regiment and the 1st battalion of the 394th th infantry regiment, reaching the main supply route in Aleksandrovka.
Tanks were then ordered to be deployed along the road to correct the situation. During this operation, the Russians managed to completely disable 6 tanks in rough forest terrain using Molotov cocktails.
The Molotov cocktail was a mixture of phosphorus, oil and gasoline poured into an empty vodka bottle. Upon contact with oxygen, when the bottles broke, the mixture ignited and produced a powerful flame.
From the point of view of the tank situation, the loss of another 6 tanks was a heavy blow. The position of the tank division could only be described as catastrophic."
"The combat strength of an armored division is based mainly on the number of combat-ready tanks. This list speaks for itself. After four weeks of fighting, the regiment had irretrievably lost 42 tanks, most of them Pz III. 40 of the 143 remaining tanks - including five valuable Pz IV - at that moment they were not combat-ready. And there was also a shortage of spare parts! In addition, there were not enough replacement engines and transmissions.
In order to finally cope with the shortage, the regiment, with the permission of the division, sent Major von Jungenfeld to Germany to “get” spare parts from the relevant organizations. It was simply impossible to get anything through normal delivery channels. And not at all because of a lack of transport. This happened only because spare parts accumulated in warehouses, and at the behest of the higher command.
At that time, a tank regiment was equal in combat power to half a tank battalion. The complete write-off of combat vehicles occurred as a result of combat losses incurred."
Broken German tanks. A Red Army soldier with a rifle stands nearby
Broken German medium tank Pz.IV. In the background, behind the Red Army soldiers, it looks like a light Soviet T-50 - a rather rare machine
Broken Pz.III and Sd.Kfz.250 armored personnel carrier
Red Army soldiers examine a battered "Panzer"
PS On the topic of 1941.
Heinz Guderian "Memoirs of a Soldier":
“The severity of the fighting gradually had its impact on our officers and soldiers. General von Geyer again asked me to speed up the delivery of winter uniforms. First of all, there were not enough boots, underwear and socks. The seriousness of this message made me think. Therefore, I decided immediately go to the 4th Panzer Division and personally familiarize yourself with the state of affairs. On the battlefield, the division commander showed me the results of the battles on October 6 and 7, in which his battle group carried out important tasks. The tanks knocked out on both sides were still in place. Russian losses were significantly less than our losses."
“On October 11, Russian troops attempted to break out of the Trubchevsky cauldron, advancing along both banks of the Navlya River. The enemy rushed into the gap formed between the 29th and 25th motorized divisions and occupied only by the 5th machine gun battalion. At the same time, in the area of operation The 24th Tank Corps near Mtsensk north-eastern Oryol began fierce local battles, in which the 4th Tank Division was drawn into, but due to muddy conditions it could not receive sufficient support.A large number of Russian T-34 tanks were thrown into the battle, causing great losses to our tanks. The superiority of the material part of our tank forces, which had existed until now, was henceforth lost and now passed to the enemy. Thus, the prospects for quick and continuous success disappeared. I wrote about this new situation for us in my report to the command Army Group, in which I detailed the advantage of the T-34 tank compared to our T-IV tank, pointing out the need to change the design of our tanks in the future.
I ended my report with a proposal to immediately send a commission to our front, which should include representatives from the armaments department, from the Ministry of Armaments, tank designers and representatives of tank-building companies. Together with this commission, we were to inspect the tanks destroyed on the battlefield on the spot and discuss the issue of the design of new tanks. I also demanded that the production of larger anti-tank guns capable of penetrating the armor of the T-34 tank be accelerated. The commission arrived at the 2nd Tank Army on November 20."
German self-propelled gun Stug III
Saw at uv.
3rd Panzer Group. Alytus
The location of Soviet units in the Vilnius-Kaunas direction on the morning of June 22 was typical for border armies. Of the four rifle divisions of the 11th Army, there was one regiment each on the border, and two battalions from the fifth rifle division. This screen was opposed by five army corps of the German 16th and 9th armies, as well as two motorized corps of the 3rd Panzer Group. The Soviet rifle regiments stationed on the border were attacked by at least two infantry divisions each. In this regard, the general “dumbness” of Soviet artillery in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Group was, perhaps, most pronounced. The group’s report on the results of the battles stated: “On all sectors of the front, the enemy offered weak resistance, and enemy artillery actions were not noted anywhere.”
The offensive technique of German tank groups in the first days of the war with the USSR resembled the principle of operation of a tunneling shield. When laying tunnels, the blade ring of the shield is pressed into the ground, and then a cylinder of soil limited by the ring is selected. German tank groups advanced with two motorized corps on the flanks of their formation and an army corps in the center. Tank formations made their way into the depths of the defense, and the infantry advancing in the center crushed the enemy caught between two deep wedges. This construction made it possible to rationally use the road network and increased resistance to counterattacks - the outer flanks of the motorized corps were separated by a decent distance. Cutting through the “tunneling shield” with flank attacks was a non-trivial task.
In the limited space in the Baltic states, the “tunneling shield” formation was not used, and all other tank groups (3, 2 and 1) were built this way. The outer flanks of the 3rd Panzer Group were formed by the XXXIX and LVII Motorized Corps, and the center was the infantry of the V Army Corps. On the northern flank, the junction with Army Group North was provided by the VI Army Corps. The spearhead of the attack of the XXXIX Motorized Corps was aimed at crossing the Neman at Alytus, and the 12th Panzer Division of the LVII Corps was moving towards crossing the same river at Merkine. An important advantage of the Hoth tank group was the absence of water barriers right on the border. The tank groups of Guderian and Kleist needed to cross the Bug, but there was no such obstacle on the way of 3 TGr.
The absence of the need to cross the water barrier already in the first hours of hostilities made the advance of Hoth's tanks and infantry especially rapid. The border fortifications were taken on the move. Concern was caused only by aerial reconnaissance reports about small groups of Soviet troops retreating to the Neman.
The task of the tank divisions becomes to make a quick breakthrough to the river before it becomes a stable line of defense.
The first to break through to the Neman was the 7th Panzer Division of the XXXIX Corps. At about one o'clock in the afternoon on June 22, it entered the western part of Alytus and captured both bridges over the Neman intact. Even in the document that is not conducive to emotions, the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group, regarding the capture of the bridges, it is said: “No one counted on this.” Later, the Germans wrote that an order was found on a captured Soviet sapper officer ordering the bridges to be blown up at 19.00 on June 22. This allowed them to start arguing that “not a single Soviet military commander made an independent decision to destroy crossings and bridges.” However, let's put ourselves in the shoes of this officer. Molotov’s speech was literally just heard on the radio. The first impression is shock. Deciding to blow up a bridge quite far from the border a few hours after the start of the war was not so easy. We still had to get used to deep enemy breakthroughs. In addition, Soviet units retreating from the border departed through the bridges. Blowing up bridges in their faces would be a bad idea. Two hours after the successful breakthrough to Alytus, luck smiles on the neighboring LVII Corps: motorcyclists seize the crossing in Merkina. All plans carefully developed at Hoth's headquarters for the construction of crossings to replace those blown up are put aside with relief. It might seem that the war with the USSR would become another blitzkrieg.
It must be said that the Soviet version of the battle near Alytus differs significantly from the picture of the rapid capture of bridges painted by the Germans. So, according to an article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor M.V. Yezhov’s “Tank battle of the first day of the war”, the Germans were met with fire on the approaches to Alytus: “...by order of the command of the 11th Army, the 5th Panzer Division moved to the western bank of the Neman to defend the bridgehead positions...” Accordingly, the bridges, according to this version , were taken in battle, with intensive air support: “... the enemies rained bombs and artillery fire on the positions occupied by Soviet tankers on the western bank of the Neman. They suffered heavy losses. Enemy tanks managed to break through the bridge to the eastern bank of the Neman south of Alytus. But they were immediately counterattacked by units of the 5th Panzer Division, which crushed the German tanks and burst into the city.” This scenario did not really fit with the subsequent advance of the Germans further towards Minsk. Therefore, Comrade Yezhov was again forced to throw the long-suffering Luftwaffe into battle: “The outcome of the battle was decided by enemy aircraft, which continuously attacked our tank units. Lacking air cover, they suffered heavy losses and by the end of the day were forced to retreat again to the eastern bank of the Neman.” Thus, the German Air Force becomes a miracle weapon, scattering Red Army tank formations with hundreds of tanks. Refusal to admit the obvious, the loss of the crossing under a sudden attack, gives rise to the need for additional explanations. All these explanations begin to sound especially unconvincing against the backdrop of the fifty T-34 tanks that the 5th Tank Division had at the beginning of the war. People ask themselves: “Okay, senseless counterattacks, but is it the Germans themselves who are in trouble?! Stop and shoot them on the spot!” On the move, another explanation for the general failure appears - the lack of armor-piercing shells in the T-34. This whole hastily constructed building collapses when trying to figure out where the Luftwaffe got such inhuman efficiency? Then, based on such omissions and exaggerations, conspiracy theories flourish.
Chief of Staff of the 3rd Mechanized Corps P.A. Rotmistrov, to whom Yezhov refers in his article, does not build any intricate cause-and-effect relationships for failure. In his memoirs there is not a word about the battles on the outskirts of Alytus, on the western bank of the Neman. In “Steel Guard” Rotmistrov writes the following: “Division commander Colonel F.F. Fedorov managed to advance to the bridge at Alytus only the artillery of the 5th motorized rifle regiment, a separate anti-aircraft artillery division and the 2nd battalion of the 9th tank regiment. The artillerymen and tank crews, having brought the enemy tanks within 200–300 meters, opened direct fire. In 30–40 minutes of battle, they knocked out 16 enemy vehicles and temporarily detained a tank column of the Nazi 39th Motorized Corps.” In this version, there is no longer a contradiction with the documents of the 3rd TGr. The listed units of Colonel Fedorov's division advance to the bridge after its capture and delay the development of the offensive from the bridgehead on the eastern bank, knocking out a number of enemy tanks. Despite all the complaints against Rotmistrov as a memoirist in general, here he gives no reason to doubt his words.
If the Soviet 5th Panzer Division had managed to reach the bridges at Alytus earlier, crossing the Neman would have become a difficult task for the advanced formations of the 3rd Panzer Group. They would have had to wade through a certain number of different-sized tanks, and it was unlikely that she would have won the yellow jersey of the leader. However, Soviet tanks approached the bridges already when they were occupied by the Germans. Therefore, for the Soviet troops, the battle developed according to the scenario of “attack on the bridgehead”, and not “defense of the bridgehead position”. In the afternoon of June 22, tankers of the division F.F. Fedorov launched a series of attacks on enemy bridgeheads, but all of them were ineffective. Attacking T-34s were, of course, much more vulnerable than those occupying static positions, i.e. the answer to the question “What happened to 50 T-34s?” acquires a simpler and more obvious answer.
On the other hand, the Germans' attempts to break out of the bridgeheads were also initially unsuccessful. The installation from above was appropriate; the command of the tank group planned “to advance as far east of the Neman as possible on the first day.” However, Soviet tankers took advantageous positions on the reverse slopes of the heights on the approaches to Alytus. As 7th Panzer Division tanker Horst Orlov recalled, an attempt to advance east from the southern bridgehead immediately led to the loss of six tanks. They became victims of a Soviet tank ambush. Hoth continued to demand that all his corps “move further east, without waiting for the lagging divisions. On the evening of June 22 - offensive to the last opportunity." The XXXIX Corps was ordered to break through to Vilnius before the end of the day. But there was no talk yet of any breakthrough from the two successfully captured crossings. The situation has reached a state of stable equilibrium. The Soviet side could not eliminate the bridgeheads, the Germans could not “open” them. It was especially humiliating that the neighboring LVII Motorized Corps advanced further from the Neman to the east, reaching Varena late in the evening, having completed the task of the day.
In the evening, tanks of the 20th Panzer Division approached Alytus. They were sent to the northern bridgehead. At the same time, the approaching tank units transferred part of their ammunition to the tankers of Mainteufel’s division - as a result of a heavy daytime battle, they shot most of the ammunition. The approach of reinforcements changed the balance of forces. It was decided to take advantage of this, and immediately. The capture by the Germans of two bridgeheads on the Neman at once gave them a certain freedom to choose the direction of the main attack. At about 21.00 on June 22, the northern bridgehead was “opened.” The Soviet 5th Tank Division was under threat of attack on its flank and rear. The idea of eliminating the German bridgehead on the Neman had to be abandoned. The battered units of Fedorov's division began to retreat from Alytus to the northeast. However, the Germans no longer had time to take advantage of the opened opportunities for further advancement to the east. With the onset of darkness, the fighting ceases.
An evening report from the 3rd Panzer Group assessed the battle of Alytus as "the largest tank battle of the war" for the 7th Panzer Division. This means, obviously, not the war with the USSR, but the Second World War, which began on September 1, 1939. The losses of the Soviet 5th Tank Division in the battle report to the headquarters of Army Group Center were estimated at 70 tanks, in the ZhBD 3- th TGr - 80 tanks. Accordingly, its own losses before the 3rd TGr reported amounted to 11 tanks, including 4 “heavy” ones (apparently, we are talking about Pz.IV). It is not entirely clear what losses are meant. Most likely - irrevocable. Accordingly, the total losses should be at least two to three times greater. According to Soviet data, out of 24 T-28 tanks that participated in the battle, 16 were lost, out of 44 T-34 - 27, out of 45 BT-7 - 30. A total of 73 vehicles, which is quite consistent with German data.
It cannot be said that Goth was completely satisfied with the results of the day. The point was not even that it was not possible to immediately break through from the bridgeheads at Alytus to the east. At the end of the day, the combat log of the 3rd TGr recorded the following: “One can doubt whether it was even necessary and advisable to introduce infantry divisions into battle in view of the enemy’s actual position that has now become clear.” Due to some overestimation by German intelligence of the Red Army forces opposing the 3rd TGr, its formation as a “tunneling shield” was not optimal from the point of view of the situation.
Hoth's motorized corps on June 22 were squeezed between the army corps and deeply echeloned in depth. The undeniable advantage of this situation was peace of mind in the rear, where scattered Soviet units still remained. Otherwise, the narrowing of the hull stripes contained a lot of disadvantages. It slowed down the advance of the group, and also deprived the vanguards that encountered enemy resistance of the support of artillery that was far behind. In addition, the strict division of offensive zones excluded legitimate tank targets from the control of motorized corps. Thus, the slow advance of the VI AK to Prienay (it reached the river only on June 23) led to the explosion of the only bridge across the Neman there. If a tank division had reached Prienay, the bridge would have been captured already in the first hours of the war, when the Red Army was still in the stupor of transition from a state of peace to a state of war. The best option for the 3rd TGr would be a breakthrough on a wide front to the Neman with motorized corps, with a quick capture of all crossings. We have to admit once again that what we are facing is far from a “perfect storm.”
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Death of the fronts Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich
Composition of the group and plans of the German command (Army Group Center)
Composition of the group and plans of the German command
(Army Group Center)
Combat operations on the territory of Belarus and Lithuania were to be carried out by formations and units of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal von Bock.
Army Group Center consisted of 31 infantry divisions, 7 motorized, 1 cavalry and 9 tank divisions and was the most powerful of all Wehrmacht army groups.
Organizationally, Army Group Center included 2 field armies and 2 tank groups.
The 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, subordinate to the operational commander of the 9th Army (until June 25, it operated against the troops of the North-Western Front. - Note auto), consisted of the 5th (5, 35 infantry) and 6th (6, 26 infantry) army corps attached to the tank group, as well as the 39th (14, 20 md and 7, 20 td) and 57th ( 18 md and 12, 19 td) motorized corps.
| Tank division | Pz.Kpfw.I | Pz.Kpfw.II | Pz.Kpfw.III | Pz.Kpfw.IV | Pz.Kpfw.38(t) | Team tanks | By fire. tanks | Note |
| 7 td | - | 53 | - | 30 | 167 | 8 | - | Com. tanks based on German-made vehicles |
| 12 td | 40 | 33 | - | 30 | 109 | 8 | - | Com. tanks based on 38(t) |
| 19 td | 42 | 35 | - | 30 | 110 | 11 | - | Com. tanks based on 38(t) |
| 20 td* | 44 | - | - | 31 | 121 | 2 | - | Com. tanks based on 38(t) |
| 101 | - | 25 | 5 | - | - | 1 | 42 | Flamethrower Pz.Kpfw.II(F) tanks |
* The 20th Panzer Division was promptly subordinated to the 643rd Tank Destroyer Division, consisting of 18 47-mm Panzerjaeger I self-propelled guns and 4 Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B or command tanks at its base.
The 9th Army of the Wehrmacht consisted of the 8th (8, 28,161 Infantry), 20th (162, 256 Infantry) and 42nd (87, 102, 129 Infantry) army corps, as well as the 900th separate brigade and 403 1st security division of army subordination. The 5th and 6th Army Corps were transferred to the operational subordination of the 3rd Panzer Group. In the period from June 23 to July 27, 1941, the 102nd battalion of two-company flamethrower tanks (12 flamethrower (F) and 3 regular Pz.Kpfw.B2 in each company) was subordinate to the command of the 9th Army and throughout the entire operation - 561st Tank Destroyer Division (27 47-mm self-propelled guns and 4 command vehicles based on captured French R-35 tanks, as well as a platoon of SPz.41 towed anti-tank rifles).
The 4th Army of the Wehrmacht consisted of the 7th (7, 23, 258, 268 infantry), 9th (137, 263, 292 infantry), 13th (17, 78 infantry) and 43rd (131, 134 , 252nd Infantry) army corps, as well as the 221st and 286th security divisions. The 12th (31, 34, 45 Infantry) Army Corps, as well as the 167th, 267th, 255th and, presumably, 293rd Infantry Divisions were operationally subordinated to headquarters and formations (167 Infantry - 47 Infantry, 267 Infantry - 24 Infantry , 255 Infantry Division - to the headquarters of the 2nd TGr) of the 2nd Panzer Group of General Guderian. In addition to the tanks of the 2nd TGr, the 7th Corps of the 4th Army included the 529th Tank Destroyer Division, consisting of 27 47-mm self-propelled guns and 4 command vehicles built on the basis of French captured R-35 tanks.
The actions of formations and units of the Wehrmacht field armies, along with tank destroyer divisions, were supported by separate divisions of assault guns.
The assault gun division in 1941 consisted of 18 StuG III self-propelled guns in three batteries and the unit commander's vehicle.
As part of Army Group Center at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the 189th, 191st, 192nd, 201st, 203rd, 210th, 226th and 243rd assault gun divisions operated.
The 2nd Panzer Group, operationally subordinate to the commander of the 4th Army of the Wehrmacht, consisted of the 12th (31, 34, 45 infantry divisions), 24th (3, 4 TD, 1 cd, 10 md), 47th (17 , 18 TD, 29 MD) and 46th (10 TD, motorized regiment of the Wehrmacht "Greater Germany", motorized division of the SS troops "Reich") motorized corps.
The composition of the material part of the tank divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group* of the Wehrmacht on June 22, 1941
| Tank division | Pz.Kpfw.I | Pz.Kpfw.II | Pz.Kpfw.III with 37 mm cannon | Pz.Kpfw.III with 50 mm cannon | Pz.Kpfw.IV | Team tanks | By fire. Pz.Kpfw.II(F) tanks |
| 3 td** | - | 58 | - | 29 | 32 | 15 | - |
| 4 td** | - | 44 | 31 | 74 | 20 | 8 | - |
| 10 td*** | - | 45 | - | 105 | 20 | 12 | - |
| 17 td | 12 | 44 | - | 106 | 30 | 10 | - |
| 18 td** | 6 | 50 | - | 99 | 15 | 12 | - |
| 100 fire baht (as of 06/18/41) | - | 24 | - | 5 | - | 1 | 42 |
* The 24th motorized corps included the 521st and 543rd tank destroyer divisions (27 self-propelled guns and 4 command tanks based on the Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B in each), and the 47th motorized corps included 611 1st tank destroyer division (27 47-mm self-propelled guns and 4 command vehicles based on French captured R-35 tanks).
** In addition to conventional armored vehicles, the 3rd battalion 6 tp 3 td, 18 tp 18 td and 35 tp 4 td had underwater tanks (Tauchpanzer), capable of overcoming significant water obstacles and equipped with special equipment. The first such vehicles, created on the basis of the Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.G or Ausf.H tanks, as well as the Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.E, entered service with the troops in 1940.
*** In addition to the 10 TD tanks, the 46th Motorized Corps in the motorized regiment "Gross Germany" had a separate battery of StuG III assault guns.
The total number of troops of Army Group Center without the 3rd Tank Group, which until June 25 operated in the defense zone of the North-Western Front, was 634,900 people. German formations and units had 12,500 guns (without 50 mm mortars), 810 tanks and 1,677 aircraft.
The border line, arching towards Warsaw, created especially favorable conditions for German troops. They were given broad tasks. With strikes from strong groupings of both wings, this army group was supposed to defeat the enemy in Belarus, move out with mobile formations south and north of Minsk and capture Smolensk with them as quickly as possible. After achieving this goal, large mobile formations, in cooperation with Army Group North, were supposed to destroy enemy forces fighting in the Baltic states and in the Leningrad region.
Army Group Center, using the outline of the border, placed one field army on the flanks, each of which interacted with one of the tank groups.
In the area west and north-west of Brest, the 4th Army of Field Marshal von Kluge and the 2nd Panzer Group of Colonel General Guderian were deployed. The tank group, with the support of the 4th Army, was supposed to break through the Soviet defenses on both sides of Brest and quickly advance to Slutsk and Minsk, in cooperation with the 3rd tank group, advancing towards Minsk from the north-west, to create the preconditions for the encirclement and destruction of Red Army units located between Bialystok and Minsk. After this, both tank groups were to capture the Smolensk area.
It was planned that the 4th Army, after a breakthrough on both sides of Brest, would advance behind the 2nd Tank Group in the direction of Minsk in order to, using the offensive of both tank groups, in cooperation with the 9th Army, destroy Soviet troops in the area between Bialystok and Minsk .
A similar task was assigned to the 9th Army of Colonel-General Strauss and the 3rd Panzer Group of Colonel-General Hoth, located on the left wing of Army Group Center.
Both of these formations were supposed to break through the enemy front in the direction of Grodno and then form the northern half of the “pincers” to encircle Soviet troops between Bialystok and Minsk. The subsequent task of the 3rd Panzer Group was to capture Vitebsk, the 9th Army - Polotsk near the upper reaches of the Western Dvina.
From the book Fatal decisions of the Wehrmacht author Westphal SiegfriedThe Leadership Team of Army Group Center My topic is the Battle of Moscow, and therefore I will limit myself to sketching portraits of the men who were responsible for the capture of the Russian capital. Although the fighting of Army Group Center was closely
From the book SS Division "Reich". History of the Second SS Panzer Division. 1939-1945 author Akunov Wolfgang ViktorovichArmy Group "Center" "A new page of Russian history opened on June 22, on the day of the celebration of the memory of All Saints who shone in the Russian Land. The memory of All Saints who shone in the Russian Land. Isn't this a clear sign, even for the most blind, that events is led by the Supreme
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3rd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht
3.Panzer-Division
3rd Panzer Division was formed on October 15, 1935 in Berlin and Wünsdorf (Military Region III). In March 1939, the 3rd Panzer Division took part in the capture of Czechoslovakia. In September 1939, the division took part in the Polish campaign. Since May 1940, the division fought in the Netherlands and France. From July 1940 she was in Germany, from May 1941 - in Poland. Since June 1941, the division fought on the Eastern Front. From July 1944 she was in Hungary. From January 1945, the 3rd Panzer Division fought in Hungary, then in Austria. The remnants of the division surrendered at the end of April 1945 in the area of Steyr in Austria.
Insignia of the 3rd Panzer Division
1939-1940
The first identification mark of the 3rd Panzer Division was a stylized drawing of the Brandenburg Gate, not far from which the headquarters of the division, which was formed mostly in Berlin, was located. This symbol was later used by the 20th Panzer Division.
1940-1945
An alternative sign based on the runic symbol "Ir" (Yr, Eur, Eihwaz).
A sign of the elm or yew, sacred trees among the Germanic tribes, from which bows were made.
Insignia of the 3rd Armored Division during Operation Citadel
summer 1943
Additional identification mark of the 3rd Panzer Division - bear
- symbol of Berlin.
Additional identification mark of the 3rd Panzer Division -
coat of arms of Berlin on the heraldic shield.
Medium tank Pz Kpfw III J
2nd tank of the 2nd platoon of the 1st company of the 6th tank regiment
Rice. J. Rosado.
The division's nickname is Berlin Bear Division.
1939: September-November – Pomerania, Poland (
XIX MK 4th A Gr.A “North”), December – Lower Rhine (reserve 6th A Gr.A “B”).1940: January-April - Lower Rhine (reserve 6th A Gr.A "B"), May - Holland, Belgium (XLVII mk 6th A Gr.A "South"), June - France (XXIV mk 6th A Gr.A “South”), July-November – Germany, III Military District (OKH reserve), from November 15 – Germany, III Military District (XLVI MK 11th A Gr.A “C”).
1941: January-April – Germany, III Military District (XLVI MC 11th A Gr.A “C”), from April 7 – Germany, III Military District (XXIV MC 11th A Gr.A “C”), May- June - Germany, III Military District (2 TGr), June-December - Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Bryansk, Tula (XXIV MK 2nd TGr Gr.A "Center"), from December 25 - Kharkov (LV ak 6- y A Gr.A “South”).
1942: from January 5 - Kursk (XLVIII shopping mall 2nd A Gr.A "Center"), March-May - Kharkov (6th A Gr.A "South"), June - Kharkov (XL shopping mall 6th A Gr.A " South"), July-December - North Caucasus (XL tk 1st TA Gr.A "A").
1943: January - North Caucasus (XL tk 1st TA Gr.A "A"), February - Rostov, Stalino (4th TA Gr.A "Don"), March - r. Mius (III TK 1st TA Gr.A “A”), April-June - r. Mius (reserve of the 1st TA Gr.A "South"), July - Belgorod (III TC of the 4th TA Gr.A "South"), August - Kharkov (group "Kempf" Gr.A "South"), September -October – Dnieper River, Kiev (III TK 8th A Gr.A “South”), November – Dnepr River, Kiev (XXIV TK 4th TA Gr.A “South”), December – Cherkassy (III TK 8th A Gr.A "South").
1944: January-February – Cherkasy (XXXXVIII TK 8th A Gr.A “South”), March – Uman (LII TK 6th A Gr.A “A”), April – Bug (XXXX AK 6th A Gr. A "Southern Ukraine"), May - Dniester, Chisinau (XXXX ac 6th A Gr.A "Southern Ukraine"), June-July - Dniester, Chisinau (reserve 6th A Gr.A "Southern Ukraine"), August – Vistula, Baranov (XXXXVIII TK 4th TA Gr.A “Northern Ukraine”), September-December – Narev (reserve 2nd A Gr.A “Center”).
1945: January – Hungary (LXXII ak 6th A Gr.A “South”), February-March – Hungary (III tk 6th A Gr.A “South”), April – Styria (Central Austria; IV tk SS 6- y A Gr.A “South”), May – Steyer, Enns (Styria - Central Austria; IV TK SS 6th A Gr.A “Austria”).
Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division on 1 August 1939 (Poland)
5th Panzer Regiment "Wünsdorf"(Wünsdorf)
Tank Battalion I (three light tank companies)
(Neuruppin)
Tank Battalion I (three light tank companies)
Tank Battalion II (three light tank companies)
Reinforced training tank battalion (two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
3rd Infantry Regiment
Rifle Battalion I
Rifle Battalion II
3rd Motorcycle Battalion
75th Artillery Regiment
headquarters
motorized communications platoon
motorized meteorological department
Motorized Artillery Division II
39th Anti-Tank Division
headquarters
motorized communications platoon
1st motorized anti-tank battery
2nd motorized anti-tank battery
3rd motorized anti-tank battery
4th Heavy Motorized Machine Gun Company
3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion
headquarters
motorized communications platoon
1st armored vehicle platoon
2nd armored vehicle platoon
motorcycle company
heavy motorized company
1st Engineer Company
2nd Engineer Company
3rd Engineer Company
motorized bridge
self-propelled communications company
self-propelled radio company
self-propelled communications supply column
Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division in 1940 (France)
3rd Tank Brigade "Berlin"
5th Panzer Regiment "Wünsdorf"(until 1.1941)
6th Tank Regiment "Neuruppen"
Tank Battalion I (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
Tank Battalion II (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
3rd Infantry Brigade "Eberswalde"
3rd Infantry Regiment
3rd Motorcycle Battalion
75th Artillery Regiment
39th Anti-Tank Division
3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion
39th self-propelled communications battalion
39th Divisional Supply Detachment
In August 1940 The division included the 394th Infantry Regiment.
In January 1941 The 3rd Tank Division sent the following units to Africa to form the 5th Light Division: the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Brigade, the 5th Tank Regiment, the 3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion, the 39th Anti-Tank Division, the 1st Division 75- th artillery regiment. In return, the division received in February and March 1941 the 2nd Division of the 49th Artillery Regiment, the 543rd Anti-Tank Division and the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion.
Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division in 1941:
6th Tank Regiment
Tank Battalion I (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
Tank Battalion II (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
Tank Battalion III (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
3rd Infantry Brigade "Eberswalde"
3rd Infantry Regiment
Rifle Battalion I
Rifle Battalion II
394th Infantry Regiment
Rifle Battalion I
Rifle Battalion II
3rd Motorcycle Battalion
75th Artillery Regiment
artillery division I
artillery division II
543rd Anti-Tank Battalion
1st Reconnaissance Battalion
39th self-propelled engineer battalion
39th self-propelled communications battalion
39th Divisional Supply Detachment
Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division in the summer of 1943:
Headquarters
divisional headquarters
83rd motorized topographical squad
6th Tank Regiment
regimental headquarters
headquarters battery
Tank Battalion I
tank battalion II
3rd Panzergrenadier Regiment
regimental headquarters
self-propelled panzergrenadier battalion I (on half-track armored personnel carriers)
394th Panzergrenadier Regiment
regimental headquarters
motorized regimental headquarters company
Motorized Panzergrenadier Battalion I
Motorized Panzergrenadier Battalion II
motorized infantry battery
self-propelled anti-aircraft battery
75th self-propelled artillery regiment
regimental headquarters and headquarters battery
Motorized Artillery Division I
Motorized Artillery Division II
Motorized Artillery Division III
motorized observation battery
543rd Anti-Tank Battalion
headquarters and headquarters battery
motorized anti-tank battery
self-propelled anti-tank battery
3rd Self-Propelled Reconnaissance Battalion
headquarters
1st armored vehicle company
2nd Motorcycle Company
3rd Motorcycle Company
4th self-propelled reconnaissance company (on half-track armored personnel carriers)
5th heavy self-propelled reconnaissance company (on half-track armored personnel carriers)
light motorized reconnaissance supply column
314th Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
headquarters and motorized headquarters battery
1st heavy motorized anti-aircraft battery
2nd heavy motorized anti-aircraft battery
3rd light anti-aircraft battery
4th self-propelled anti-aircraft battery
light motorized anti-aircraft supply column
39th self-propelled engineer battalion
headquarters
1st self-propelled engineer company (on half-track armored personnel carriers)
2nd motorized sapper company
3rd motorized sapper company
bridge column
light motorized engineer supply column
83rd Field Replacement Battalion(4 companies)
39th Divisional Supply Detachment
Combat operations of the 3rd Panzer Division
In March 1939., after the occupation of the Sudetenland, the 3rd Panzer Division participated in the capture of the remaining Czechoslovakia. At 8.20 am on March 13, 1939, separate units reached the Czech capital. Two days later, tanks from the 3rd Panzer Division led a German parade in Prague.
Polish company
During the Polish campaign, the division was part of General Guderian's XIX Motorized Corps and advanced from Pomerania. The XIX Corps, in the vanguard of which was the 3rd Panzer Division, crossed the Polish corridor and cut off Poland from the Baltic Sea.
On September 18, 1939, the 3rd Panzer Division established contact in the Brest-Litovsk area with the XXII Motorized Corps, advancing from the south. The second German tank ring has closed. The last units of the Polish army stopped resistance on October 6.
5th Tank Regiment (two tank battalions of three light tank companies each) – 160 tanks ( Pz IV – 9, Pz III – 3, Pz II – 77, Pz I – 63, Pz Bef – 8).
6th Tank Regiment (two tank battalions of three light tank companies each) - 158 tanks ( Pz IV - 9, Pz III - 3, Pz II - 79, Pz I - 59, Pz Bef - 8).
Training tank battalion (two light companies and a company of medium tanks) – 73 tanks (Pz IV - 14, Pz III - 37, Pz II - 20, Pz Bef - 2).
French company
After a successful campaign in Poland, the division was transferred to the Western Front. In terms of defeating France, the division was supposed to operate as part of Army Group B. She entered Belgium and the Netherlands as part of a force luring French troops into the Netherlands. In the second phase of the campaign, as the German army turned south to occupy France, the 3rd Panzer Division advanced west of Paris. The division had serious combat clashes with the French 3rd Mechanized Division. In total, the division's tankers reported 87 enemy tanks destroyed.
5th Tank Regiment – 130 tanks (Pz IV – 16, Pz III – 29, Pz II – 55, Pz I – 22, Pz Bef – 8).
6th Tank Regiment – 136 tanks (Pz IV – 16, Pz III – 29, Pz II – 60, Pz I – 23, Pz Bef – 8).
In January 1941, the division was recalled to Germany for rest and reorganization.
The 5th Tank Regiment was withdrawn from the 3rd Tank Division to form the 5th Light African Division, which became part of the newly formed Afrika Korps.
In March 1941, when the reorganization of tank forces was carried out, the 6th Tank Regiment received the III Battalion, which was transferred from the disbanded 28th Tank Regiment of the 18th Tank Division, where the II Battalion was. The battalion was armed with underwater (“diving”) tanks created from medium tanks Pz III and Pz IV for Operation Sea Lion (invasion of England).
Eastern front
After rest and recovery, in May 1941 the division was redeployed to Poland and became part of General Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group of Army Group Center.
The 6th Tank Regiment consisted of three battalions of three companies and was armed with 203 tanks Pz IV – 20, Pz III – 110, Pz II – 58, Pz Bef – 15).
June - September 1941
From June 22, 1941, as part of the 2nd Panzer Group, part of Army Group Center, the 3rd Panzer Division advanced in the first echelon. As part of the group, the division took part in all the main battles in the central direction: Minsk - Smolensk (Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, Battle of Smolensk 1941) - and by September there were about 50 tanks left in it.
After the end of the Battle of Smolensk, the 2nd Tank Group was deployed to the south, where it took part in the encirclement of the forces of the Southwestern Front near Kiev.
October - December 1941
The 3rd Panzer Division took part in the Battle of Moscow 1941-1942. as part of the 2nd Panzer Group of General Guderian.
1942
In March 1942, the 3rd Panzer Division was transferred from Army Group Center to the Kharkov region to the 6th Army of Army Group South. After the victory at Kharkov, the division was transferred to the 1st Tank Army, which was part of the newly formed Army Group A, for the attack on the Caucasus.
The 6th Tank Regiment (three battalions of three companies) was armed with 164 tanks ( Pz IV – 33, Pz III – 106, Pz II – 25).
1943
At the beginning of 1943, under the threat of encirclement, Army Group A began to retreat, and the 3rd Panzer Division was transferred to the new Army Group Don and transferred to Rostov.
In May 1943, the III Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment was disbanded. By August, the 1st Battalion received Pz Kpfw V Panther tanks.
After retreating from Kursk during the autumn of 1943, the 3rd Panzer Division was in the Kirovograd region in December, where it fell into a “cauldron”, from which it emerged with the help of a relief group with the participation of the Grossdeutschland division.
6th Tank Regiment (one tank battalion – II: headquarters and four tank companies) – 90 tanks (Pz IV – 23, Pz III – 59, Pz II – 7, Pz Bef - 1).
Pz IV "Grislybär" on the Eastern Front in September 1943
1944
Throughout the year, the 3rd Panzer Division retreated first as part of Army Group South through Ukraine, fighting at Cherkassy, Uman and the Bug. Then the 3rd Panzer Division withdrew to Poland and, as part of Army Group Center, fought on the Narew in the fall of 1944.
In December 1944, the division was replenished.
1945
In January 1945, the 3rd Panzer Division was transferred to Hungary, where it fought until April, then retreated to Austria. The remnants of the division surrendered at the end of April 1945 in the area of Steyr in Austria to American troops.
Division commanders:
The first commander was Major General, then Lieutenant General Ernst Feßmann October 15, 1935 - September 30, 1937
Lieutenant General Leo Freiherr Geyer von Schweppenburg ( Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg) October 12, 1937 – September 27, 1939
Major General Horst Stumpff September 27, 1939 - December 14, 1939
Lieutenant General Leo Freiherr Geyer von Schweppenburg December 15, 1939 – February 14, 1940
Lieutenant General Friedrich Kühn September 1940 - October 3, 1940
Lieutenant General Horst Stumpff October 4, 1940 - November 14, 1940
Lieutenant General Walter Model November 15, 1940 - October 21, 1941
General of Tank Forces Hermann Breith October 22, 1941 - September 1, 1942
Colonel Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein September 1 – October 24, 1942
Lieutenant General Franz Westhoven October 25, 1942 - October 20, 1943
Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein (
Fritz Bayerlein ) October 20, 1943 – January 4, 1944Colonel Rudolf Lang (
Rudolf Lang ) January 5, 1944 – May 24, 1944Lieutenant General Wilhelm Philips (
Wilhelm Philipps ) May 25, 1944 – January 20, 1945Major General Wilhelm Soth (
Wilhelm S ö th ) January 20, 1945 – April 19, 1945At this time, the Wehrmacht was preparing to form FOUR tank groups for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The German tank group had neither a standard composition nor a specific number of tanks.
Thus, the weakest, 4th Panzer Group of Hoepner, had three tank divisions (1st, 6th and 8th) and three motorized divisions, for a total of 602 tanks.
The largest, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, included five tank (3, 4, 10, 17, 18th), three motorized, one cavalry divisions and a separate motorized regiment "Great Germany", armed with 994 tanks.
In total, the four tank groups on June 22, 1941 included 3266 tanks, i.e. an average of 817 tanks in each group.
For the sake of truth, it should be noted that, while inferior to the Soviet mechanized corps in the number of tanks, the Wehrmacht tank group was significantly (2-3 times) superior to it in the number of personnel. So, at full strength, Guderian's tank group. was supposed to consist of more than 110 thousand personnel, while the regular strength of the Red Army mechanized corps was only 36,080 people.
This apparent contradiction has a simple explanation. In preparation for the war with the USSR, Hitler ordered to double the number of tank divisions, from 10 to 20. This was done by simple division, by reducing the number of tank regiments in a division from two to one. As a result, in a German tank division there were two infantry regiments per tank regiment, and the bulk of this infantry moved not at all on armored personnel carriers (as in the old Soviet cinema), but on assorted captured trucks. The chief of staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Halder, notes in his famous diary (entry dated May 22, 1941) that Guderian has 240 different types of vehicles in the 17th TD. How to maintain such a mobile vehicle museum in the field?
There were no tanks in the Wehrmacht motorized division. No one. G. Goth writes that the motorized divisions of his tank group were created on the basis of ordinary infantry divisions, and the vehicles received “ only in the last months before the start of the war, and the 18th division - a few days before entering the concentration area» .
In fact, the Wehrmacht tank group was a large formation of motorized infantry, reinforced by several (3 to 5) tank regiments. Continuing the line of “zoological” comparisons begun at the time by V. Suvorov, we can say that the Wehrmacht tank group was a powerful and heavy buffalo, and the Red Army mechanized corps was a flexible and swift leopard.
In nature, the outcome of a fight between four buffaloes and two dozen leopards would be a foregone conclusion. The high command of the Red Army, which made the most daring plans for the Great March, had no doubt about the capabilities of its “leopards”.
« ...Tank corps, supported by massive aviation, burst into the enemy’s defensive zone, break his anti-tank system, hit artillery along the way and go into the operational depth... The use of mechanized corps concentrically will be especially effective, when with their crushing blow these mechanized corps will bring the pincers together for a subsequent strike against the enemy... With such actions, we believe that a pair of tank corps in the direction of the main attack will have to deliver a destructive blow within a couple of hours and cover the entire tactical depth of about 30-35 km. This requires the massive use of tanks and aircraft; and this is possible with new types of tanks“- so, with a feeling of legitimate pride, the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Army General Pavlov, reported at a well-known meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army in December 1940.
« ...The pace of the further offensive after overcoming the tactical depth will be greater and will reach 15 km per hour... We believe that the depth of 60 km behind enemy lines is not the limit. We must always, through acceleration and organization, have in mind to immediately overcome the second band of resistance on the first day and reach the entire operational depth...»
It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines... Unfortunately, even Hitler, although he was considered a “possessed corporal,” had enough sense not to wait, but to attack himself. Attack before Stalin completes all his twenty-nine mechanized corps to the last nut. As a result, it was not the same mechanized corps that had to fight as described above.
It was not possible to fully staff all 29 mechanized corps to full strength by June 1941. Historians from the department of special propaganda always talked about this - as the clearest and most convincing evidence of our “unpreparedness for war”, forgetting to explain to readers exactly what kind of war the “invariably peace-loving” Stalinist empire, which was creating an armored horde, was preparing for (but did not have time to prepare for) , the number of guns in which should have exceeded the number of sabers in the army of Batu Khan.
« We did not calculate the objective capabilities of our tank industry,- the Great Marshal of Victory complains bitterly in his memoirs, - to fully staff the mechanized corps, 16,600 tanks of only new types were required... there was nowhere to get such a number of tanks within one year under almost any conditions» .
Well, how could the former Chief of the General Staff forget the program for the deployment of mechanized corps, which he himself approved on February 22, 1941?
All mechanized corps were divided into 19 “combat”, 7 “reduced” and 4 “reduced second stage”. In total, by the end of 1941 it was planned to have 18,804 tanks in the mechanized corps and two separate tank divisions, including 16,655 tanks in the “combat” mechanized corps.
In other words, the average number of tanks (877) in the 19 “combat” mechanized corps should have been equal to the average number of tanks in each of the 4 Wehrmacht tank groups.
From a quantitative point of view, this program was successfully implemented. Already by February 22, 1941, there were 14,684 tanks in the mechanized corps. The planned increase in numbers by 4,120 units by the end of the year was significantly less than the actual production, which amounted to 6,590 tanks in 1941 (including 1,358 KB and 3,014 T-34).
For comparison, we note that the Germans (who allegedly “worked all of Europe”) in 1941 produced only 3094 tanks of all types, including 678 light Czech PZ 38(t).
The following year, 1942, the USSR tank industry already produced 24,718 tanks, including 2,553 heavy KB and 12,527 medium T-34. Total: 3911 KB and 15,541 T-34 in two years.
Moreover, this volume of production was ensured under conditions that in February 1941 Zhukov and Stalin could only see in a nightmare: two of the most important enterprises (the world's largest tank plant No. 183 and the country's only manufacturer of tank diesel engines, plant No. 75) fell under transported with bombs from Kharkov to the Urals, and two huge Leningrad factories (No. 185 named after Kirov and No. 174 named after Voroshilov) found themselves in the blockade ring. There are no reasonable grounds to doubt that, under normal conditions, Soviet industry would have been able to fully equip and re-equip all 29 mechanized corps with new tanks by the end of 1942 (as planned), for which “only” 3654 KB tanks were required. and 12,180 T-3 tanks.
Having finished with the disputes and forecasts, let's move on to assessing what happened in kind. By the beginning of hostilities, there were 11,029 tanks in the 20 mechanized corps deployed in the five western border districts. More than two thousand more tanks were part of three mechanized corps (5th, 7th, 21st) and a separate 57th tank division, which were brought into battle near Shepetovka, Lepel and Daugavpils already in the first two weeks of the war. Thus, Zhukov and others like him had to start the war, content with only a FOUR TIMES numerical superiority in tanks. This is if we consider it super-modestly, i.e. not taking into account the tanks that were in service with the cavalry divisions and troops of the internal districts. In total, as of June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 19,540 tanks (again, not counting the light amphibious T-37, T-38, T-40 and T-27 tankettes), not counting 3,258 cannon armored vehicles.
The distribution of available tanks among the mechanized corps was extremely uneven. There were corps (1st, 5th, 6th), which were almost completely equipped, and there were corps (17th and 20th), which did not have hundreds of tanks. The composition of the tank fleet was equally heterogeneous. In most of the mechanized corps there were no new tanks (T-34, KB) at all; some (10th, 19th, 18th) were armed with extremely worn-out BT-2 and BT-5, produced in 1932-1934, or even light tankettes T-37 and T-38. And at the same time, there were mechanized corps equipped with hundreds of the latest tanks.
At first glance, it is difficult to understand the internal logic of such formation. At least, no connection is found between the serial number and the level of staffing. Thus, Rokossovsky’s 9th mechanized corps, the formation of which began back in 1940, was armed with only 316 (according to other sources - 285) tanks, and the 22nd mechanized corps, deployed in the spring of 1941, already had 712 tanks by the beginning of the war.
But as soon as we put the locations of mechanized corps on the map of the border regions of the USSR, the plan of the upcoming “Thunderstorm” will be revealed to us in all its splendor.
The seven most powerful mechanized corps of the Red Army, superior in number and (or) quality of tanks to any Wehrmacht tank group, were located on the eve of the war in the following, very logical way.
The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the Southwestern Front on Krakow-Katowice. That is why three mechanized corps (4th, 8th, 15th), numbering 2627 tanks, including 721 KB and T-3, were deployed at the very top of the “Lviv ledge”. In total, the troops of the Southwestern Front included eight (!!!) mechanized corps.
An auxiliary attack on Lublin and Warsaw was to be delivered by the troops of the left wing of the Western Front - and in the forests near Bialystok, next to the Warsaw Highway, we find the 6th Mechanized Corps (1131 tanks, including 452 new KB and T-34). And three other mechanized corps hid in remote places of the cramped “Bialystok bulge.”
The second echelon of the South-Western and Western fronts, in the region of Shepetovka and Orsha, advanced two other “heroes” - the 5th MK (1070 tanks) and the 7th MK (959 tanks).
The troops of the Southern (Odessa District) and Northwestern (Baltic District) fronts were given much more modest tasks: to firmly cover the flanks of the strike groups and prevent the enemy from invading the territory of the districts. That is why in their composition we find only two corps, half staffed, and with old tanks.
Everything is simple, clear and completely logical. The only thing that seems somewhat of a mystery is the location of that particular mechanized corps, with the story about which we began this part of the book.
“And he went, taken up by the command...”
The first mechanized corps in terms of number, “age” and staffing before the war was part of the Northern Front (Leningrad District). Why and why? Although the Leningrad District is traditionally included in the list of “western border districts of the USSR”, what kind of “western border” is this? From the west, the district bordered the Soviet Baltic states, and the borders of East Prussia were already 720 km from Leningrad. The Leningrad District was a border district only in relation to Finland, which has a population of four million.
The Leningrad Military District turned into a front called “Northern”. At first glance, this is quite strange - it would be more logical to call it “Leningrad”, “Baltic”, or at worst “Karelian”. But in Stalin's empire, accidents happened extremely rarely.
« In mid-June 1941, a group of district leaders, headed by the district commander, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov, went on a field trip to Murmansk and Kandalaksha“recalls one of the participants in this trip, Air Chief Marshal (in those days - commander of the district air force) A.A. Novikov. Murmansk is not just the north, it is already the polar north. Further, Comrade Marshal, with a feeling of deep indignation, describes how Popov and other Soviet generals watched the columns of dust that were raised over the forest roads by the Finnish troops advancing to the border. In other words, the “field trip” of the district (front) command took place in close proximity to the Finnish border. Looking at the “forest roads” in the adjacent territory (in military parlance this is called “reconnaissance”) fascinated the commander so much that Lieutenant General Popov returned to Leningrad only on June 23, and the entire first day of the Soviet-German war the front (district) was commanded by someone who had arrived from Moscow as a representative of Headquarters K.A. Meretskov.
Of course, it can be assumed that General Popov’s trip to Murmansk was related to the preparation of the district’s troops to repel a future Nazi invasion. Alas, this is not true. No one expected the Germans to attack in the Arctic. This is very eloquently evidenced by the memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel H. Reisen, commander of Bomber Group II/KG30, about the first raid on Murmansk on June 22, 1941:
« ... we did not encounter any fighter or anti-aircraft opposition. Even the planes carrying out low-altitude attack were not fired upon... enemy aircraft literally did not exist, German aircraft operated over Soviet territory completely without interference...»
Yes, and some kind of strange chronology of events turns out: General Popov, before the start of hostilities, leaves for Murmansk to prepare the city for “defense from the Germans,” but immediately leaves it as soon as the German attack becomes a fait accompli...
You can also write about the transfer of the 1st Tank Division that its goal was to “strengthen the defense of Murmansk.” Can. Paper will endure anything. But why treat Soviet generals as complete fools? If they wanted to transport a tank division to Murmansk, they would have done so; the Kirov Railway was brought right to Murmansk. What was the need to turn left 260 km before the destination and unload the division in a deserted and roadless forest-tundra?
And how could a division equipped with light BT tanks strengthen the defense of the Soviet Arctic? Let us turn once again to the memoirs of the commander of the 1st TD, General V.I. Baranova:
« ...the actions of the tankers were complicated by the very rough terrain. Off-road terrain, rocks and steep hills covered with forest, hollows and clearings overgrown with bushes and strewn with boulders, lakes, mountain streams, swamps... The use of tanks, even as part of a battalion, was out of the question. The battles were fought in small groups, platoons and even ambush vehicles...»
In such “anti-tank terrain”, a high-speed armored vehicle inevitably lost its main quality - mobility. And there were never any other special advantages for this combat vehicle with bulletproof armor and a light 45-mm cannon. So was it really possible that a tank division was transported far away only to tear it apart into small groups and “act in separate vehicles from ambushes”? To “strengthen the defense,” it would be much simpler and more effective to transfer a dozen heavy artillery regiments of the RGK to the Arctic Circle in the same echelons, and to ambush not light tanks armed with a “forty-five” (the fragmentation shell of which weighed 1.4 kg), but heavy howitzers of 152 caliber or, even better, 203 mm. So they would have met the enemy with shells weighing 43-100 kg, from which you couldn’t hide even among granite boulders.
And yet, the 1st Tank arrived precisely in Alakurtti (and precisely in those days when Soviet generals were looking at Finnish forest roads through binoculars) not by chance, and not at all out of stupidity, but in accordance with an amazingly beautiful Plan. We will discuss this plan a little later, but now let’s turn again to the events of June 17, 1941.
It was on this day, when the 1st TD began loading into trains leaving for the Arctic, that the command staff of the 10th MK left for staff exercises. The district leadership decided to conduct these exercises in the north of the Karelian Isthmus, in the Vyborg region, near the Finnish border. At 9 o'clock in the morning on June 21, something changed, the exercises were unexpectedly interrupted, and all commanders were ordered to immediately return to their units.
At two o’clock in the morning on June 22, 1941 (at the same time when the trains with the 1st Tank Division were approaching the unloading station), the general himself arrived at the command post of the 21st Tank Division of the 10th Mechanized Corps, in the village of Chernaya Rechka near Leningrad. - Lieutenant P.S. Pshennikov is the commander of the 23rd, the largest of the three armies of the Northern Front. The lieutenant general personally assigned the commander of the 21st TD, Colonel Bunin, the task of preparing the division for action.
At 12.00 on June 22, a combat alert was declared in the division with units leaving for their assembly areas on alert. The next day, at 6 a.m. on June 23, the 21st Tank Division received a combat order from the headquarters of the 10th MK to move to the Ilya-Noskua area (now Svetogorsk, Leningrad Region), a few kilometers from the Finnish border.
The author did not have at his disposal the text of the “Journal of Combat Operations” of other divisions of the 10th MK (24th Tank and 198th Motorized), but judging by the fact that they left the area of permanent deployment in Pushkin and Oranienbaum at the same time time as the 21st TD, and moved in the same direction, it can be assumed that on June 22, 41, they received similar orders from the corps command and the 23rd Army.
Now is the time to get to know this mechanized corps better.
The 10th Mechanized Corps (commander - Major General I.G. Lazarev) was equipped and prepared for combat operations much worse than the 1st MK. Different sources give different figures for the number of tanks in the 10th MK: from 469 to 818 units. Such confusion in the numbers is most likely due to the fact that the corps adopted many T-26 and BT tanks of early production, which were quickly written off before the start of the war in anticipation of the arrival of new equipment.
To a greater extent, this remark applied to the 24th Tank Division of the 10th Mechanized Corps, formed on the basis of the 11th Reserve Tank Regiment and received from it heavily worn-out training equipment: 139 BT-2 and 142 BT-5 (a total of 281 tanks produced 1932-1934). When the 24th Tank Division began moving into the initial area for the offensive, out of 281 available tanks, 49 were left at their permanent location as faulty. After which, out of 232 tanks that went on the campaign, only 177 tanks reached the forest area in the Svetogorsk region.
In all respects, things were better in another tank division of the 10th MK. The 21st Tank Division was formed on the basis of the 40th Red Banner Tank Brigade, which earned its order for the courage and skill shown in the battles on the Karelian Isthmus. By the beginning of the war, the 21st TD had a list of 217 T-26 light tanks. And this division carried out the march in a much more organized manner. In the combat log of the 21st Tank we read: “ ...on the march there were lags in individual tanks and vehicles, which were quickly restored by the division's closing service and sent along the route» .
As for the third division of the 10th MK - the 198th Motorized Division - it had only a few dozen serviceable tanks, and in fact was an ordinary rifle division with an unusually large number of vehicles.
Everything is relative. We will turn to this golden rule, so carefully forgotten by communist “historians,” more than once. Of course, in comparison with the 1st MK (1039 tanks and 4730 vehicles for various purposes, from gas tanks to refrigerators and shower cabins, the latest tracked tractors and the latest howitzers in artillery regiments), the 10th MK looks simply unarmed. But they were going to fight not with their neighbor in the district, but with some other enemy...
On the same day and hour, when huge rumbling and fairly smoking columns of tanks, armored cars, tracked tractors of the 10th mechanized corps moved through Leningrad to Vyborg, on the morning of June 23, 1941, along the Leningrad highway from Pskov to Gatchina (Krasnogvardeysk) the main striking force of the Northern Front: two divisions (3rd tank and 163rd motorized) from the 1st MK.
« The tanks were rushing, the wind was picking up, and the menacing armor was advancing...»
They just rushed in some strange direction. Not for war - but from war. Or still go to war, but to another?
And at this time, on the farthest (still farthest) western approaches to Leningrad, great trouble was brewing.
From the very first hours of the war in the Baltics, in the defense zone of the North-Western Front, the course of hostilities clearly took on the character of an unprecedented defeat.
This is how Soviet military historians describe the events of those days in the monograph “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions”: “ ...the consequences of the first enemy strikes turned out to be catastrophic for the troops of the North-Western Front. The troops of the covering armies began a disorderly retreat... Having lost control, the front command was unable to take decisive measures to restore the situation and prevent the withdrawal of the 8th and 11th armies...»
It is worth noting that the “disorderly withdrawal” of the troops of the North-Western Front gave the enemy the impression of a pre-planned retreat! The Chief of Staff of the German Ground Forces F. Halder writes on June 23, 1941 in his famous “War Diary”:
« ...there is still no need to talk about organized withdrawal. The exception is, perhaps, the area in front of the front of Army Group North, where, apparently, the withdrawal beyond the Western Dvina River was actually planned and prepared in advance. The reasons for such preparation cannot yet be established...“Yes, the German generals did not have enough imagination to imagine our realities...
Let us return, however, to the description of these events given by Russian historians:
« ...On June 26, the situation of the retreating troops deteriorated sharply. The 11th Army lost up to 75% of its equipment and up to 60% of its personnel. Its commander, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov, reproached the front commander, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov in inaction... the Military Council of the front considered that he could not report in such a rude form, while F.I. Kuznetsov made the erroneous conclusion that the army headquarters, together with V.I. Morozov was captured and works under the dictation of the enemy... Discord arose among the command. Member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar P.A. Dibrov, for example, reported that the chief of staff, Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov, was always sick, the work of the headquarters was not organized, and the front commander was nervous...»
While they were looking for the “extreme” at the headquarters of the North-Western Front, on June 26, 1941, in the Daugavpils area, the head of the Operations Directorate of the North-Western Front headquarters, Major General Trukhin, surrendered (later Trukhin actively collaborated with the Germans, headed the headquarters of the Vlasov “army” and ended his life on the gallows on August 1, 1946).
For a correct understanding of further events, it is very important to note that the High Command in Moscow soberly assessed the situation and did not harbor any illusions that the scattered remnants of the uncontrollable North-Western Front would be able to hold back the advance of German troops.
Already on June 24 (i.e., on the third day of the war!) it was decided to create a defensive zone at the turn of the Luga River - 550 km west of the border, 90 km to the streets of Leningrad. At the same time, on June 25, the Headquarters decided to conduct a counterattack against the 56th Tank Corps of the Wehrmacht, which broke through to Daugavpils. In an effort to somehow delay the German offensive on the natural defensive line of the Western Dvina River, the command of the Red Army attracted the completely understaffed 21st Mechanized Corps to participate in this counterattack (the planned completion date for the formation of this corps was set for 1942) and even the 5th Air Force -an airborne (!) corps that did not have the appropriate weapons or proper training to fight tanks. In other words, they tried to plug the gap in the crumbling defense front with everything that was at hand.
And in this situation, the most powerful 1st mechanized corps in the northwestern theater of operations (which, even after sending the 1st TD to Lapland, still had six times more tanks than Lelyushenko’s 21st mechanized corps!), smashing the roads with the tracks of hundreds tanks, went north to Gatchina, i.e. in the exact opposite direction from the front line!
By the way, the Germans themselves were very discouraged by the inexplicable disappearance of the “Pskov tank group”. At first it seemed to them that the 1st MK had left Pskov to the south. Halder notes in his diary on June 22, 1941:
« ...Russian motorized Pskov group... was discovered 300 km south of its previously assumed area of concentration. ..»
« ...of all the enemy’s operational reserves known to us, only the location of the Pskov tank group is currently unclear. Perhaps it was transferred to the area between Siauliai and the Western Dvina...»
The next day, June 25, Halder was informed that “ The enemy's 7th Tank Corps was transferred from the Pskov area across the Western Dvina to the area south of Riga» .
Let's not be too harsh in assessing the work of German military intelligence. It simply could not occur to them where to actually look for the 1st Mechanized Corps. And they did not have reconnaissance aircraft with such a range that would have made it possible to record the movements of tank units of the Northern Front. Now, if they had a reconnaissance satellite, then a truly fantastic sight would be revealed from its “board”.
From the border of East Prussia to the Western Dvina, two German tank corps from the 4th Panzer Group moved in two long columns in a northeast direction: the 41st under the command of Reinhardt and the 56th under the command of Manstein. Further, in a huge three-hundred-kilometer space, ordinary peaceful (if you look at it from space) life was going on. And even further to the east, in the same northwest direction, in the same clouds of dust and smoke, two Soviet mechanized corps were moving: the 1st MK - from Pskov to Leningrad, the 10th MK - from Leningrad to Vyborg.
And what is quite surprising is that the marching Soviet and warring German divisions moved at almost the same speed!
Manstein's corps covered 255 km from the border to Daugavpils (Dvinsk) in four days. The average rate of progress is 64 km per day.
Reinhardt's corps marched from the border to the town of Krustpils on the Western Dvina in five days. The average rate of progress is 53 km per day.
And the tank divisions of the 10th Mechanized Corps reached their designated concentration area northeast of Vyborg, 150 km from Leningrad, only at the end of the day on June 24. The divisions of the elite 1st Mechanized Corps also needed two days to march from Pskov to Gatchina (200 km in a straight line).
Strictly speaking, the rate of advance of Soviet tank divisions was still one and a half times higher.
But the Germans didn’t just march, but (as is commonly believed) also “overcame the fierce resistance of the Red Army.”
The inability of mechanized units to organize a forced march was the first unpleasant surprise that the command of the Northern Front faced. The low rates were not at all associated with the particular slowness of Soviet tanks (BT to this day can be considered the fastest tank in history), but with the disgraceful organization of the service for regulating traffic and evacuating faulty vehicles. In an order specially dedicated to this issue from the commander of the 1st Mechanized Corps dated June 25, 1941, it was noted that the vehicles followed in columns spontaneously, overtaking each other, stopping at the request of the drivers at unplanned parking lots, creating traffic jams. There was no collection of stragglers and repair of faulty machines.
Things were not much better in the 10th Mechanized Corps. The length of the advance route of the 24th Panzer Division was 160 kilometers, which it covered in 49 hours! The average march speed is 3.5 km/h (if you remember, D. Pavlov assumed that the mechanized corps would not just march, but advance at a pace of 15 km/h!). In the 21st Panzer Division, tanks spent 14-15 engine hours during a two-day march, which clearly indicates that even in this most prepared and better equipped division, half of the “march” consisted of standing in traffic jams and congestion.
Be that as it may, by June 25-26, all units and formations of the 1st and 10th mechanized corps deployed in the areas indicated by them in a vast space from Gatchina to the Arctic, put people and equipment in order after a multi-day march, and sent them to the Finnish border , and as it has now become known from the memoirs of living participants in the event, and BEYOND the Finnish border, reconnaissance groups and...
And nothing happened. The ground (let's underline this word with a bold line) forces of the Northern Front (14th, 7th, 23rd armies consisting of fifteen rifle, two motorized, four tank divisions and a separate rifle brigade) froze in tedious and inexplicable inaction.
At dawn on June 25, 1941...
While the troops of the Northern Front (Leningrad Military District) were making these mysterious regroupings, the fighting in the Baltic States continued to develop in the same way, i.e. catastrophic direction. Only in the Daugavpils area did Lelyushenko’s desperately bold attack by the tankers of the 21st Mechanized Corps slow down the enemy’s advance for a couple of days. In all other sections, the Germans crossed the Western Dvina almost unhindered, reaching the “finish line” Rezhitsa - Pskov - Leningrad.
The only reserve that the Soviet command could immediately use was the very powerful aviation forces of the Leningrad District. Bridges and crossings over the Western Dvina were within the reach of the 2, 44, 58th (Staraya Russa area), 201, 202, 205th (Gatchina area) bomber air regiments. Did the Soviet military command understand the enormous role that aviation could play in maintaining a strategically important water line? How I understood! A few days later, when in Belarus, in the zone of the defeated Western Front, the Germans began to cross the Berezina, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko himself gave an order, according to which literally everything that could fly was involved in the destruction of the crossings across the Berezina. From light Su-2 bombers to heavy and clumsy, like a river barge, TB-3.
Tymoshenko's order required bombing continuously, from low altitudes. German historians called those days the “airy Verdun.” Our aviation suffered terrible losses. Regiments of long-range DB-3 bombers, in no way suitable for action from low altitudes, melted like a candle in the wind. Long-range aviation pilots and navigators, professionals with a unique level of training for the Red Army Air Force, were dying. This was the price that Headquarters paid for the opportunity to win a few days to transfer reserves from the internal districts to Belarus. And, let us note, none of the later historians and military specialists ever criticized this cruel, but justified by the situation, decision of the People's Commissar...
Let us return, however, to the Baltic states. Could the Northern Front Air Force have delivered a significant blow to the crossings on the Western Dvina (Daugava)? On the eve of the war, the six above-mentioned bomber regiments included 201 SB in good condition. In addition, three bomber air regiments (35, 50, 53rd) from the 4th Air Division (Tartu area in Estonia), which was operationally subordinated to the Northern Front at the start of hostilities, could be involved in the massive air strike. This is another 119 serviceable bombers.
The distance of 400-450 km from the airfields where these units were based to the Western Dvina allowed the use of “obsolete” SB bombers with a maximum bomb load. Moreover, in contrast to the tragic situation that developed in the skies over the Berezina, the bombers could be covered along the entire route to the target and back with the latest MiG-3 fighters from the 7th, 159th and 153rd fighter regiments. These newest ones were - according to Soviet historians - very few: only 162 MiGs in good condition. This is indeed less than we would like, but one and a half times more than the number of the only Luftwaffe fighter squadron in the entire northwestern theater of operations, JG 54 (98 serviceable Messerschmitt Bf-109 F as of June 24, 1941).
If this was not enough, then the Northern Front also included the 10th, 137th and 72nd bomber air regiments in the area of Murmansk and Petrozavodsk, which could be quickly relocated to the south, to Leningrad.
Perhaps this is not as many as one would like, but the 1st Luftwaffe Air Fleet, which paved the way for the German divisions of Army Group North, had only 210 serviceable bombers (as of the morning of June 24, 1941). It is noteworthy that in the report of the headquarters of the North-Western Front No. 3, compiled at 12 noon on June 22, it was said that “ the enemy has not yet brought into action significant air force forces, limiting himself to the action of individual groups and single aircraft". The assessment is quite understandable if we take into account that the actual number of serviceable combat aircraft of all types (330 units) in the 1st Luftwaffe Air Fleet turned out to be exactly ten times less than what the top leadership of the Red Army expected to see in this direction. At least, this is exactly the conclusion that can be drawn from the materials of the famous operational-strategic “game” conducted by the General Staff in January 1941, declassified only in 1993.
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