Barrage. Stalin's fiery shaft: how Paulus was deprived of his last chance for salvation

Russian fire dance Art Russian fire dance EVENT Gala “Ballet Stars of the 21st Century” as a question about the best ballerina of the decade Not everyone will remember whether the French got into the Kremlin in 812 or not. That was a long time ago. But on September 26, 2010, they were definitely there.

09:29 23.03.2016

The website of the Zvezda TV channel publishes a series of articles about the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 by the writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book “Russian Truth”, published in 2011.

The website of the Zvezda TV channel publishes a series of articles about the Great Patriotic War of 1941– 1945 by writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book “Russian Truth”, published in 2011. In his original materials, Maslovsky, in his words, exposes “the myths invented by Russia’s ill-wishers about the events of the Great Patriotic War and shows the greatness of our Victory.” The author notes that in his articles he intends to “show the unseemly role of the West in preparing Germany for war with the USSR.” On the third of December, Manstein probably believed that Paulus’s army had already been saved. “On December 14, 1942, there was no one on the path of the advancing Hoth group except scattered rifle units and the 4th mechanized corps. This was one of those cases when, as Churchill famously said, the fate of many depended on the few. Corps commander V.T. Volsky had no room for error. He had to fight at Verkhne-Kumsky for as long as possible, delaying the German offensive until the main forces of the 2nd Guards Army concentrated. Punching a corridor to the encircled army of Paulus would mean that all those who fought and died in the sun-hot steppe in July and August 1942, who went to the last battle in the destroyed Stalingrad, would have died in vain and would have remained unavenged,” wrote A.V. Isaev. The commanders understood this, and the soldiers understood this. Under the attacks of the 4th Mechanized Corps and the 87th Infantry Division, which arrived from the front reserve, German troops abandoned Verkhne-Kumsky, and the 6th Tank Division was thrown back across the Aksai River. On December 16, the 36th Mechanized Brigade fought the Germans at Vodyanoye. On December 17, our troops again fought with German troops at Verkhne-Kumsky. Now the Soviet mechanized corps held the heights, and the Germans attacked it. Our defense held. The motorized infantry of Volsky's corps played an important role. Only on December 19 did the advancing German troops manage to overcome the defenses of the 4th mechanized corps. Under the threat of encirclement, the corps retreated to the Myshkova River line. At this time, the arriving units of the 2nd Guards Army of R. Ya. Malinovsky were already deployed along the northern bank of the river. The losses of the corps amounted to more than 5,500 people, including several more than 2,000 people killed and missing. On December 18, 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 394, the 4th Mechanized Corps was awarded the guards rank, and it became be called the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps. It must be said that the 4th Mechanized Corps was not alone: ​​it was helped by the 13th Tank Corps and the 5th Shock Army, which went on the offensive on December 14, the 7th Tank Corps of which, together with the 258th and 4th and guards rifle divisions threw German troops off the Rychkovo bridgehead and secured it for themselves. The strength of the German blow is evidenced by the fact that on December 19, German troops crossed the Myshkova River in places and occupied some settlements on the northern bank of the river. For two days, the fighting for every inch of land did not subside for a minute. The enemy's attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. But our 98th and 3rd Guards Rifle Divisions that fought at Gromoslavka lost more than half of their personnel, but survived. The battles took place on the Ergen hillocks, rugged with beams. On December 23, Manstein’s group was only 35–40 kilometers away from the encircled troops of Paulus. However, she could not advance further. On December 24, the 2nd Guards and 51st armies launched a decisive offensive. On December 24 and 25, the 2nd Guards Army between the Myshkova and Aksai rivers fought intense battles with the enemy’s 23rd and 17th tank divisions. Manstein's group was thrown back across the Aksai River. On December 29, our troops took Kotelnikovo. As a result of the offensive of the Stalingrad Front, the 4th Romanian Army was finally defeated, and the 57th Tank Corps of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army was driven back 150 kilometers with heavy losses. The success of the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies was facilitated by the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts, which began Operation Little Saturn, which began on December 16. It is obvious that this time, too, the mechanized corps played a major role in the defeat of the enemy troops. They would have fought even better if they had howitzers of 122 millimeters and above. Later, our military corrected this mistake. As they say, live and learn.A. In describing these events, I. Eremenko tries to belittle the role of A. M. Vasilevsky and extol himself. A. M. Vasilevsky and R. Ya. Malinovsky point out his incorrect interpretation of events. In my opinion, being an experienced front commander, Eremenko was inferior to Vasilevsky in terms of strategic thinking and, of course, in ordinary human decency. I have already given an example that when Eremenko was asked why he lied about Stalin, he calmly replied that he was asked to do so by Khrushchev, who was then in power in the country. As for Vasilevsky, he was an intelligent, too modest and deeply decent person for his position. And it should be noted that if not for Eremenko’s intervention, the German 57th Tank Corps would not only have suffered heavy losses, but would have been destroyed. Operation “Little Saturn”, or the Middle Don Operation, is a shortened version of Operation “Saturn”. Its immediate goal was the defeat of enemy formations that could come to the aid of the encircled group. The operation ended in the complete defeat of the enemy troops. This once again confirms that we need to attack, and not sit and wait for the enemy to strike, wondering where on the front he will strike. The operation led to the defeat of all the troops concentrated by the Germans in the Tormosin area with the aim of delivering a second relief strike. Also, four tank and four infantry divisions were defeated, sent by the Germans to Nizhne-Chirskaya to launch an auxiliary strike from there, aimed at rescuing the troops of Paulus and Hoth. In these battles, the 24th Tank Corps of Major General V. M. Badaev distinguished himself, advancing beyond eight days for 240 kilometers, capturing the Tatsinskaya station on December 24 with a huge amount of trophies. As a result of the Srednedonskaya operation in the period from December 16 to 30, Soviet troops, breaking through the enemy front up to 340 kilometers wide, defeated five Italian, five Romanian and one German division, three Italian brigades, defeated four infantry and two tank German divisions, captured about 60 thousand prisoners, over 1,900 guns, 176 tanks, about 370 aircraft, advanced 150–200 kilometers and reached the rear of Army Group Don. The enemy was forced to abandon further attempts to release the group encircled at Stalingrad. Thus, on the New Year 1943, December 29, the city of Kotelnikovo was completely cleared of Germans, and on December 30, Tormosin and the surrounding areas. Our soldiers and officers celebrated New Year's Eve 1943, like New Year's Eve 1942, as victors. Having driven the Germans to the line Kantemirovka - Millerovo - Morozovsk - Kotelnikovo, our troops could, without fear of a stab in the back, liquidate the encircled group of Paulus' troops. At the suggestion of I. V. Stalin's liquidation of the encircled enemy was handed over to one hand and entrusted to the commander of the Don Front, K. K. Rokossovsky. The troops of the Stalingrad Front were also transferred to his subordination. To the remark that Eremenko would be offended, Stalin replied that now was not the time to be offended. Eremenko, of course, was very offended, but soon he was appointed commander of the Southern Front. The plan for the operation to eliminate the encircled enemy troops, developed under the leadership of K.K. Rokossovsky and N.N. Voronov, was presented to Headquarters on New Year's Eve on December 27. The operation was called "Ring". At this time, 250 thousand people out of 330 were surrounded by 22 enemy divisions and other formations. Eighty thousand people were mostly destroyed by our troops, and also died from hunger, cold, and disease. Having taken over the front in a new composition, K. K. Rokossovsky ordered to stop the attack on the encircled enemy, withdraw the troops to their starting position and go on the defensive, conducting force reconnaissance in order to keep the enemy in suspense. The Stavka allocated enough artillery to the Don Front, but warned not to count on reinforcement with rifle and tank formations. In addition to the available funds, the Stavka allocated to the Don Front, as Rokossovsky writes, a breakthrough artillery division, two high-power artillery cannon regiments, five anti-tank artillery regiments , one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, two guards mortar divisions and three guards tank regiments. The front also received 20 thousand reinforcements from the Headquarters reserve. All aviation of the 16th Air Army was allocated for operations in the offensive zone of the Don Front. Summing up the amount of funds received, Rokossovsky writes that he could not count on more, that is, he indicates that it would be desirable to receive more funds than the Headquarters allocated. But the Red Army at that time was fighting in many sectors of the front from Leningrad to Rostov-on-Don and the North Caucasus, and troops in all directions had to be replenished with personnel and equipment. According to the operation plan, the enemy group was to be dismembered from west to east, and then destroying each part separately. Headquarters sought to save the lives of our soldiers and officers and twice, on January 8 and 9, sent envoys to the Germans with an ultimatum, that is, with an offer to surrender without a fight. For the first time, rifle fire was opened on our envoys, and then machine gun and mortar fire. The second time it was stated that the German command refused to accept the ultimatum. The officers and privates of the German troops were afraid of our captivity. They knew about the abuse, torture and executions that Soviet prisoners were subjected to, and they were sure that they would not get away with it just like that, without revenge. They did not know that the Soviet people were head and shoulders above the peoples of liberal Europe and did not kill an unarmed enemy. On January 10, 1943, Soviet guns, mortars and guards rocket launchers opened fire on the encircled enemy. Rudenko's front-line aviation and Golovanov's long-range aviation began bombing enemy positions. Mother infantry also went forward behind the fiery barrage of artillery. The main blow was delivered by the 65th Army of P.I. Batov. By January 15, our troops advanced in the center to a distance of ten to 22 kilometers. The German positions were well fortified. They were erected by both our and enemy builders. “Strong strongholds with a large number of bunkers, armored caps and tanks dug into the ground stood close to each other. The entire area on the approaches to them was surrounded by barbed wire and heavily mined. The frost reached 22 degrees, and the snowstorms intensified. Our troops had to advance across open terrain, while the enemy was in trenches, dugouts and dugouts. It was necessary to truly love one’s Motherland, the Soviet regime, and to fiercely hate the enemy in order to overcome these formidable positions. Fulfilling his duty, the Soviet soldier did this. The soldiers took trench after trench, bunker after bunker. Every step forward cost blood. The position of the enemy troops worsened. As our units advanced, the enemy lost airfields and landing sites. Now his planes flew only at night, dropping food, ammunition and fuel by parachute. Our air blockade system operated reliably, and only a few planes managed to fly to their destination. Most of them died without completing the task,” K. K. Rokossovsky left us his memories. If it weren’t for the huge number of horses that found themselves in the zone of encircled enemy troops, the German soldiers would have died of hunger long ago, and our soldiers would not have had to chew through the enemy’s defenses. And it was very difficult to advance both due to the strong defense of the enemy and due to severe cold and the inability to even warm up by the fire. It helped that our advancing troops had a lot of weapons, and the enemy’s defenses were crushed by artillery. There were few soldiers in the rifle units. “Thin chains of fighters moved across the snow-covered field. Direct fire guns followed them in echelon. There were more people on the line of guns - these were artillerymen servicing the guns. In the vast space, up to a dozen tanks could be seen, behind which small groups of infantrymen moved, either crouching to the ground or jumping up. The artillery, operating from closed positions, accompanied with its fire this entire battle formation, striking individual areas. From time to time volleys of Katyusha rockets fell on the enemy. Attack aviation, even in the most difficult conditions, also tried to support the actions of our small infantry, striking at pockets of resistance with groups of aircraft, and in fog - with single aircraft. In these battles, our pilots won the deep respect of ground troops,” he continues to describe the battles with the encircled German group K. K. Rokossovsky. For the first time in the war, artillerymen supported the attack of infantry and tanks with a barrage of fire. Stalin said that the enemy has a defense in depth and what is needed now is not artillery preparation, as was the case, for example, in the Battle of Moscow, but an artillery offensive. And he explained what an artillery offensive is, saying: “What does this mean? This means that the artillery must advance together with the infantry; this means that the infantry must advance not when the artillery preparation ends, but together with the artillery, which, accompanying the infantry, must suppress all the enemy’s fire weapons until his defenses are breached to the full depth.” .Stalin said: “Forcing the infantry to advance without support will not be an offensive, it will be a crime, a crime against troops who are forced to make senseless sacrifices, and a crime against the Motherland.” The conclusions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief were the basis for the new infantry combat manual, approved in 1942. When eliminating the Germans in the cauldron, in accordance with the new regulations, the small number of infantry was supported by a fiery shaft of artillery, which fell on the enemy ahead of the advancing infantry and moved forward with it. For such an offensive, artillerymen and infantrymen needed to have a high level of combat training. To be continued… The opinions expressed in the publications of Leonid Maslovsky are the opinions of the author and may not coincide with the opinions of the editors of the Zvezda TV channel website.

12 Jan - RIA Novosti, Andrey Stanavov. A dense wall of powerful explosions rises with a roar at the enemy’s front line and gradually moves into the depths of the battle formations, sweeping away and grinding everything in its path. Large-caliber shells fall almost continuously. The fiery tsunami slowly rolls through neat networks of trenches and communication passages, dugouts, concrete defensive fortifications, guns and machine guns dug into the ground.

What remains behind is a burning field plowed up with craters, along which tanks and motorized infantry of the advancing troops are already moving like a rapid avalanche. They encounter almost no resistance - the enemy is defeated and demoralized, and the bunkers are turned into piles of concrete and hot reinforcement. Read about the most formidable and proven tactical techniques of artillerymen, which leave no chance for the enemy, in the RIA Novosti material.

Fire dance

According to the official version, the Soviet command first resorted to barrage tactics in 1943 to support the breakthrough of infantry and tanks of the 65th Army of the Don Front during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. However, a number of sources indicate that this tactic has been used before. According to the author of an article published in February 1941 in the Smena magazine, it was thanks to powerful artillery support that the Red Army managed to break through the “Mannerheim Line” during the Soviet-Finnish War.

“On Sunday, February 11, at 8:20 am, the Russians began artillery preparation... The power of the fire - about a hundred concentrated batteries - was so great that it can only be compared with the largest artillery battles of the world war... In the most dangerous section of Lähtee, the entire area, starting from the front line and two kilometers behind the support line, it was densely dotted with shell craters,” Finnish Colonel Josse Hannula recalled that assault.

From a tactical point of view, the barrage method represents the massive use of artillery against enemy positions, combined with the advance of mobile formations. They usually fire high-explosive fragmentation and smoke shells. Unlike classical artillery preparation, which traditionally precedes each attack, in this case we are talking about the total “processing” of enemy battle formations from long-range guns, reminiscent of a giant fiery roller. So that the stunned enemy does not have time to come to his senses and grab the machine guns, tanks and infantry are sent after the “roller”. Moreover, they go almost close to the fault line. The scale and suddenness of such an assault demoralizes the enemy and allows them to “swoop” through deep-echeloned defense lines.

The most difficult job is for the gunners - they are required to conduct an avalanche of explosions in synchronization with the advancing units. The intensity of the fire and areas of coverage are updated in real time. If the infantry is stuck, the rampart is stopped; if it breaks through, it is moved further into the depths of the defense. In order not to cover our own, the firing lines are coordinated and discussed in advance. To concentrate fire, positions are usually chosen that are maximally saturated with cannons, machine guns and mortars. The distance between the lines is 300-400 meters. Each battery is assigned its own section of the front. A barrage of fire, as a rule, is preceded by classical artillery preparation against reconnoitered targets; in the intervals between raids, “combing” fire is used to suppress pinpoint pockets of resistance that have withstood the first onslaught.

There is also a scheme for false transfers of fire, when a barrage of explosions suddenly moves deeper into the battle formations. The defenders perceive this as a signal to attack; many lose their nerve and begin to shoot feverishly. Premature return fire reveals camouflaged machine gun and artillery positions. Spotters fix them and return the fiery shaft to the leading edge. This procedure is repeated until all the cannons and machine guns are silent.

Despite its high efficiency, the fire shaft method also has significant disadvantages. The main one is the need to concentrate a huge amount of artillery and ammunition in a relatively narrow breakthrough area. On average, about four artillery divisions were required per kilometer of front, which is more than 70 guns. Typically, such activity in war does not remain a secret to enemy intelligence and clearly indicates the area where the main attack is being prepared. In addition, shooting at a fast pace is accompanied by a monstrous consumption of shells, which literally melt into arsenals.

I challenge myself

The barrage in its classic version was “removed from service” by Soviet artillerymen in the 1980s, replacing it with a similar tactic - the so-called moving fire zone method. This is approximately the same thing, only fragmentation shells no longer explode in front of their advancing troops, but... right above their heads, in the air. Naturally, the attacking line consists only of armored fighting vehicles - tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with infantry hidden inside. The deadly hail of fragments and destructive elements moves synchronously and, without causing harm to the attackers, completely sweeps away the enemy’s anti-tank weapons and manpower. At the front line, up to 95 percent of the defenders are affected, including those sitting in the trenches.

“This is a very complex process,” explains RIA Novosti, editor-in-chief of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, Colonel Viktor Murakhovsky. “Before each such attack, a planned interaction table is drawn up, where all elements of tasks, boundaries and artillery operating time are coordinated with an accuracy of tens of seconds. The command to transfer fire to the first line is given by the commander of the advancing battalion, who is in a tank or infantry fighting vehicle. This requires very highly qualified officers, a reliable combat control system and highly trained units. I would like to note that the Soviet army has been able to successfully implement such tactics more than once in large-scale exercises "Even with units staffed by conscripts."

According to him, the moving fire zone method is a non-standard artillery tool. It is used in special cases when you need to quickly break through enemy defenses in a strategic area without wasting time on reconnaissance of firing points. For this purpose, the attacking unit is given several additional artillery divisions, which are removed from other sectors of the front. However, as the experience of modern conflicts shows, such emergency measures are now resorted to less and less often. Artillery and missile forces have learned to target targets more accurately, economically and efficiently.

Individual approach

“Today, artillerymen and tactical missilemen mainly operate as part of the so-called fire reconnaissance and strike contours,” says Murakhovsky. “Roughly speaking, targets in the area of ​​​​responsibility of a unit or formation are hit as they are identified - online. This work is carried out continuously and targeted, without accumulating artillery and shells. Such tactics are prescribed in most modern combat manuals."

It is noteworthy that the introduction of automated combat control circuits makes this process intelligent - after detecting and identifying a target, the system itself determines how to suppress it: for example, “put” a pair of 152-mm howitzer shells nearby or cover it with a volley of a Smerch multiple launch rocket system. . Many parameters are taken into account here, including the degree of combat readiness of the installation, the distance to it and the type of loaded ammunition - anti-tank, high-explosive fragmentation or cluster.

Although, Murakhovsky notes, if there is an urgent need, Russian artillerymen can even now create a barrage of fire without any problems. Moreover, due to the introduction of automated systems, it is much easier to control the fire roller. Today, the latest artillery and operational-tactical missile systems are in service and are being tested, which hit faster, more accurately and further.

Thus, the promising self-propelled 152-mm howitzer "Coalition-SV" can send a projectile 70 kilometers, remaining out of reach of enemy artillery. One self-propelled gun is capable of hitting a target simultaneously with several projectiles fired along different trajectories. “The sweat of artillery preserves the blood of infantry” - apparently, this old soldier’s saying will not soon lose its relevance.

MOSCOW, January 12— RIA Novosti, Andrey Stanavov. A dense wall of powerful explosions rises with a roar at the enemy’s front line and gradually moves into the depths of the battle formations, sweeping away and grinding everything in its path. Large-caliber shells fall almost continuously. The fiery tsunami slowly rolls through neat networks of trenches and communication passages, dugouts, concrete defensive fortifications, guns and machine guns dug into the ground.

What remains behind is a burning field plowed up with craters, along which tanks and motorized infantry of the advancing troops are already moving like a rapid avalanche. They encounter almost no resistance - the enemy is defeated and demoralized, and the bunkers are turned into piles of concrete and hot reinforcement. Read about the most formidable and proven tactical techniques of artillerymen, which leave no chance for the enemy, in the RIA Novosti material.

Fire dance

According to the official version, the Soviet command first resorted to barrage tactics in 1943 to support the breakthrough of infantry and tanks of the 65th Army of the Don Front during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. However, a number of sources indicate that this tactic has been used before. According to the author of an article published in February 1941 in the Smena magazine, it was thanks to powerful artillery support that the Red Army managed to break through the “Mannerheim Line” during the Soviet-Finnish War.

© Infographics Battle tactics "Barrage of fire"

© Infographics

“On Sunday, February 11, at 8:20 am, the Russians began artillery preparation... The power of the fire - about a hundred concentrated batteries - was so great that it can only be compared with the largest artillery battles of the world war... In the most dangerous section of Lähtee, the entire area, starting from the front line and two kilometers behind the support line, it was densely dotted with shell craters,” Finnish Colonel Josse Hannula recalled that assault.

From a tactical point of view, the barrage method represents the massive use of artillery against enemy positions, combined with the advance of mobile formations. They usually fire high-explosive fragmentation and smoke shells. Unlike classical artillery preparation, which traditionally precedes each attack, in this case we are talking about the total “processing” of enemy battle formations from long-range guns, reminiscent of a giant fiery roller. So that the stunned enemy does not have time to come to his senses and grab the machine guns, tanks and infantry are sent after the “roller”. Moreover, they go almost close to the fault line. The scale and suddenness of such an assault demoralizes the enemy and allows them to “swoop” through deep-echeloned defense lines.

The most difficult job is for the gunners - they are required to conduct an avalanche of explosions in synchronization with the advancing units. The intensity of the fire and areas of coverage are updated in real time. If the infantry is stuck, the rampart is stopped; if it breaks through, it is moved further into the depths of the defense. In order not to cover our own, the firing lines are coordinated and discussed in advance. To concentrate fire, positions are usually chosen that are maximally saturated with cannons, machine guns and mortars. The distance between the lines is 300-400 meters. Each battery is assigned its own section of the front. A barrage of fire, as a rule, is preceded by classical artillery preparation against reconnoitered targets; in the intervals between raids, “combing” fire is used to suppress pinpoint pockets of resistance that have withstood the first onslaught.

There is also a scheme for false transfers of fire, when a barrage of explosions suddenly moves deeper into the battle formations. The defenders perceive this as a signal to attack; many lose their nerve and begin to shoot feverishly. Premature return fire reveals camouflaged machine gun and artillery positions. Spotters fix them and return the fiery shaft to the leading edge. This procedure is repeated until all the cannons and machine guns are silent.

Despite its high efficiency, the fire shaft method also has significant disadvantages. The main one is the need to concentrate a huge amount of artillery and ammunition in a relatively narrow breakthrough area. On average, about four artillery divisions were required per kilometer of front, which is more than 70 guns. Typically, such activity in war does not remain a secret to enemy intelligence and clearly indicates the area where the main attack is being prepared. In addition, shooting at a fast pace is accompanied by a monstrous consumption of shells, which literally melt into arsenals.

I challenge myself

The barrage in its classic version was “removed from service” by Soviet artillerymen in the 1980s, replacing it with a similar tactic - the so-called moving fire zone method. This is approximately the same thing, only fragmentation shells no longer explode in front of their advancing troops, but... right above their heads, in the air. Naturally, the attacking line consists only of armored fighting vehicles - tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with infantry hidden inside. The deadly hail of fragments and destructive elements moves synchronously and, without causing harm to the attackers, completely sweeps away the enemy’s anti-tank weapons and manpower. At the front line, up to 95 percent of the defenders are affected, including those sitting in the trenches.

“This is a very complex process,” explains RIA Novosti, editor-in-chief of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, Colonel Viktor Murakhovsky. “Before each such attack, a planned interaction table is drawn up, where all elements of tasks, boundaries and artillery operating time are coordinated with an accuracy of tens of seconds. The command to transfer fire to the first line is given by the commander of the advancing battalion, who is in a tank or infantry fighting vehicle. This requires very highly qualified officers, a reliable combat control system and highly trained units. I would like to note that the Soviet army has been able to successfully implement such tactics more than once in large-scale exercises "Even with units staffed by conscripts."

According to him, the moving fire zone method is a non-standard artillery tool. It is used in special cases when you need to quickly break through enemy defenses in a strategic area without wasting time on reconnaissance of firing points. For this purpose, the attacking unit is given several additional artillery divisions, which are removed from other sectors of the front. However, as the experience of modern conflicts shows, such emergency measures are now resorted to less and less often. Artillery and missile forces have learned to target targets more accurately, economically and efficiently.

Individual approach

“Today, artillerymen and tactical missilemen mainly operate as part of the so-called fire reconnaissance and strike contours,” says Murakhovsky. “Roughly speaking, targets in the area of ​​​​responsibility of a unit or formation are hit as they are identified - online. This work is carried out continuously and in a targeted manner, without accumulating artillery and shells. Such tactics are prescribed in most modern combat manuals."

It is noteworthy that the introduction of automated combat control loops makes this process intelligent - after detecting and identifying a target, the system itself determines how to suppress it: for example, “put” a pair of 152-mm howitzer shells nearby or cover it with a volley of a Smerch multiple launch rocket system. . Many parameters are taken into account here, including the degree of combat readiness of the installation, the distance to it and the type of loaded ammunition - anti-tank, high-explosive fragmentation or cluster.

Although, Murakhovsky notes, if there is an urgent need, Russian artillerymen can even now create a barrage of fire without any problems. Moreover, due to the introduction of automated systems, it is much easier to control the fire roller. Today, the latest artillery and operational-tactical missile systems are in service and are being tested, which hit faster, more accurately and further.

Thus, the promising self-propelled 152-mm howitzer "Coalition-SV" can send a projectile 70 kilometers, remaining out of reach of enemy artillery. One self-propelled gun is capable of hitting a target simultaneously with several projectiles fired along different trajectories. “The sweat of artillery protects the blood of infantry” - apparently, this old soldier’s saying will not soon lose its relevance.