12th army wreath. The meaning of wreath, Walther in the encyclopedia of the Third Reich

Walter Wenck(German Walther Wenck; September 18, 1900, Wittenberg, German Empire- May 1, 1982, Bad Rothenfelde, Germany) - one of the youngest generals of the German Army in World War II. He took part in the Battle of Berlin. At the end of the war, he surrendered with his army to the United States, in order not to fall into Soviet captivity.

Biography

The third son of officer Maximilian Wenck, Walter was born in Wittenberg, Germany. In 1911 he entered the Naumburg Cadet Corps of the Prussian Army. From the spring of 1918 - to the secondary military school in Gross-Lichterfeld. He was a member of the Freikorps, in whose ranks in February 1919 he was wounded during the storming of one of the newspaper publishing houses. On May 1, 1920, he was enlisted as a private in the 5th Reichswehr Infantry Regiment, and on February 1, 1923, he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. In February 1923 he graduated from the infantry school in Munich.

For some time he was Hans von Seeckt's adjutant.

The Second World War

Wenck entered World War II with the rank of major. On September 18, 1939, he received the Iron Cross, 2nd class, and two weeks later, on October 4, the Iron Cross, 1st class.

From 1939 to 1942, Wenck was chief of operations for the 1st Panzer Division. In 1940, for the quick capture of the city of Belfort, Wenck was awarded the rank of colonel. On December 28, 1942, he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and promoted (March 1, 1943) to major general. In 1942, he was an instructor at the Military Academy, chief of staff of the 57th Tank Corps and chief of staff of the 3rd Romanian Army on the Eastern Front.

From 1942 to 1943, Wenck served as chief of staff of the Army Group Hollidt (later reorganized into the 6th Army), assigned to the same 3rd Romanian Army. In 1943 he became chief of staff of the 6th Army. From 1943 to 1944, Wenck served as chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army. In 1943, he withdrew his 1st Army from the Kamenets-Podolsk cauldron. In 1944 - chief of staff of Army Group "Southern Ukraine".

From 15 February 1945, at the insistence of Heinz Guderian, Wenck commanded the German forces involved in Operation Solstice (German: Unternehmen Sonnenwende). This was one of the last tank offensive operations of the Third Reich. Approximately 1,200 German tanks attacked Soviet positions in Pomerania. However, the operation was poorly planned, the troops did not have sufficient support, and on February 18 it ended in the defeat of the attackers.

In February 1945, he was seriously injured in a car accident (5 ribs were damaged). After the accident he had to wear a corset.

Western Front

On April 10, 1945, with the rank of general of tank forces, Wenck commanded the 12th Army, which by that time was located west of Berlin. She was faced with the task of defending Berlin from the advancing Allied forces on the Western Front. But, since the troops of the Western Front moved to the east and vice versa, the German troops, which were opposite fronts, were actually pressed against each other. As a result, in the rear of Wenck's army, east of the Elbe, a large camp of German refugees appeared, fleeing the approaching Soviet troops. Wenk tried his best to provide food and accommodation for the refugees. According to various estimates, for some time the 12th Army provided food for more than a quarter of a million people every day.

Berlin's last hope

On April 21, Hitler ordered SS-Obergruppenführer and SS General Felix Steiner to attack the positions of Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front. Zhukov's forces surrounded Berlin from the north, and the troops of Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front from the south. Steiner was to attack Zhukov with his army group Steiner. Having few operational tanks and about a division of infantry, he refused to do this. Instead, he retreated to escape encirclement and complete destruction.

On April 22, due to the retreat of Steiner's troops, General Wenck's 12th Army became Hitler's last hope to save Berlin. Wenck was ordered to deploy his troops to the east and link up with the 9th Army of Infantry General Theodor Busse. According to the plan, they were supposed to surround Soviet units from the west and south. Meanwhile, the 41st tank corps under the command of General Holste was to attack from the north. Unfortunately for the Germans in Berlin, the majority of Holste's troops consisted of remnants of Steiner's units.

Participation in wars: The Second World War.
Participation in battles: Polish campaign. French campaign. Exit from the Kamenets-Podolsk cauldron. Operation Solstice. Battle of Berlin

(Walther Wenck) One of the youngest generals of the German army in World War II. Took part in the Battle of Berlin

Walter Wenck born in Wittenberg on September 18, 1900. At the age of eleven, Wenck entered the cadet corps in Naumburg, and in 1918 he was enrolled in the secondary military school in Lichterfels.

During First World War Wenck served in the volunteer corps formations, and after graduation he was enlisted in the Reichswehr with the rank of private. In February 1923, he was awarded the rank of non-commissioned officer. After ten years of service, he became a lieutenant and in May 1933 was transferred to the 3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion.

Then, having received the rank of Hauptmann, Wenck underwent training at the General Staff and in 1936 was transferred to the headquarters of the tank corps, stationed in Berlin.

In May 1939 Walter Wenck was promoted to major and accepted into service as an operations officer in the 1st Panzer Division in Weimar. With this division he went Polish and Western campaigns. Even after being wounded in the leg, he remained in service. In June 1940, Wenck's Panzer Division carried out independent operation on the capture of Belfort. The operation plan was completely developed by Wenck and approved Guderian. The initiative and professional execution of the operation did not go unnoticed by the leadership, and in December 1940 Wenck was awarded the rank of Oberst-lieutenant.

At the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, Wenck's division took part in offensive on Leningrad, and then was transferred to Army Group Center to participate in the attack on Moscow. During the Soviet counteroffensive in December 1941, the division was surrounded, from which it was able to escape only thanks to the skillful actions of Wenck. For his successes, Wenck was awarded the Golden Cross. Early next year he was sent to study at the Military Academy of the General Staff. After graduating from the academy, Wenck was promoted to Oberst, and in September 1942 he was transferred to the headquarters of the 57th Corps, with which he took part in the campaign in the Caucasus.

Wenk also participated in Battle of Stalingrad: He was appointed chief of staff of the 3rd Romanian Army. This was already during the Soviet counteroffensive near Stalingrad, in which the Romanian troops were completely defeated, and the German units within the Romanian army were disunited. Wenck tried to collect the remnants of the defeated military units and unite them into new units. And he succeeded in many ways - soon the units he formed were sent to the front. In his defense sector, he repulsed all attempts to break through the Soviet troops, which gave the opportunity to Army Group Don (former Army Group A) under the command of Field Marshal Manstein break out of the Caucasus and take charge of the operation at Stalingrad instead of the displaced Weichsa. In December 1942, Wenck was awarded the Knight's Cross and appointed Chief of Staff of the Holidt Army.

In February 1943 Wenk was promoted to major general, and in March became chief of staff of the 1st Tank Army. Taking part in the most difficult battles, the 1st Army more than once found itself under the threat of encirclement. By this time, Wenk had established himself as a master at getting out of crisis situations. So, in March 1944, the 1st Army fell into the Kamenets-Podolsk cauldron on the Dniester, but thanks to the energy of the chief of staff, it safely escaped from it. Wenk was awarded the rank of lieutenant general and transferred to chief of staff of Army Group Southern Ukraine.

Four months later Wenk appointed head of the operational department and assistant chief of staff of the OKH. Now he worked in direct contact with the Fuhrer, transmitting him reports from the Eastern Front. Hitler liked Wenck's intelligence and directness, and he forgave him even for very unpleasant comments on reports.

By mid-February 1945, Soviet troops reached the Oder. Chief of staff ground forces Guderian developed a plan for a counterattack on the flanks of the Soviet troops, hoping to stop the enemy's advance. He was appointed chief of staff of the strike force Walter Wenck. This operation could well have been successful for the German command, since the flanks of the Soviet units were indeed vulnerable, and Wenck’s experience and initiative also gave hope for success. Wenk concentrated all his efforts on this operation and, as a result, stopped the enemy troops at the initial stage of the counterattack. But Hitler began to demand Wenk's presence at daily evening meetings. In order to get to the Fuhrer for these meetings, Walter Wenck had to travel many kilometers every evening from the operation headquarters to Headquarters. During one of these trips, the lieutenant general replaced his tired driver at the wheel, but he himself fell asleep. The car Wenk was driving lost control and crashed into the parapet of the bridge. The driver saved him by pulling him out of the car and extinguishing the clothes that were burning on him. In addition to numerous bruises and broken ribs, Wenk suffered a serious skull injury. He was sent to the hospital, and the leadership of the operation was transferred to Heinrich Himmler - a man clearly incapable of carrying out this task.

While still in the hospital, Walter Wenck in April 1945 he was promoted to the rank of general of tank forces. After leaving the hospital, although not completely cured, Wenck is appointed to the post of commander of the newly created 12th Army and is sent to the Western Front.

Unexpectedly, on April 20, Wenck received orders from Hitler to turn his troops east and strike at the Soviet troops already blockading Berlin.

General of Tank Forces Walter Wenck(although there were no tank units in his army) he understood that he would not be able to save Berlin, since for offensive operation he did not have any means, but he could save the troops of the 9th Army, which was also surrounded. Despite the fact that he sent his troops towards Potsdam, he did this only to enable the troops of the 9th Army to break out of the encirclement, and at the very last moment he wanted to go west with them and surrender to the Americans there. In the Potsdam area, Wenck held out until May 1. By this time, separate units of the 9th Army had broken out of the encirclement and joined Wenck's 12th Army. He then quickly moved west and surrendered to American forces on May 7.

After the war Walter Wenck went into the world of business. In 1950, Wenck joined the board of directors of a large West German company, in 1953 he became a member of the board of directors, and in 1955 he became chairman of the board. Late 1960s Wenk retired from all affairs, retaining only his office in Bonn.

Walter Wenck - milestones in his military career

As Western explorer Samuel W. Mitchum noted, Walter Wenck was a man of good appearance and average height who always seemed to exude a sense of self-confidence. He was born on September 18, 1900 in Wittenberg, in 1911 he entered the cadet corps in Naumberg, and in 1918 he entered the secondary military school in Groß-Lichterfeld. After serving for some time in two formations of the volunteer corps, on May 1, 1920, he was enlisted in the Reichswehr with the rank of private in the 5th Infantry Regiment, where he served until 1933. On February 1, 1923, he was promoted to the rank of non-commissioned officer.

In May 1933, Wenck (already a lieutenant) was transferred to the 3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion. Having received the rank of Hauptmann, he underwent training at the General Staff and in 1936 was transferred to the headquarters of the tank corps, stationed in Berlin. On March 1, 1939, he was promoted to major and joined the 1st Panzer Division in Weimar as an operations officer.

With the 1st Panzer Division, Wenck went through the Polish and Western campaigns. During the blitzkrieg carried out by the Germans in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, Wenck was wounded in the leg, but did not leave his post. On June 17, when the 1st Panzer Division reached the goal of its day's march - Montbéliard, and there was a lot of fuel left in the tanks of its tanks, Wenck accepted independent decision. Unable to contact the division commander (Lieutenant General Friedrich Kirchner), he informed General Heinz Guderian (commander of the XIX Panzer Corps) that he had ordered an attack on Belfort on his own initiative. This bold move was approved by Guderian, and the French were taken by surprise. This decision and its skilled execution did not go unnoticed. On December 1, 1940, Wenck received the rank of Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel).

When the 1st Panzer Division crossed the border into the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Wenck was still serving as its operations officer. After a push to the outskirts of Leningrad, the 1st Panzer Division was transferred to Army Group Center to participate in the final campaign against Moscow. But, like many other tank divisions, it got stuck in the mud of muddy Russian roads and did not reach the Soviet capital. In December 1941, during a Soviet counterattack, she was surrounded, from which, however, she successfully escaped thanks to the plan developed by Wenck and returned to the German defensive lines. For his successes, Wenck was awarded the Golden Cross and two months later was admitted to the Military Academy of the General Staff. On June 1, 1942, Walter Wenck was promoted to colonel, and in September he was appointed to the headquarters of the LVII (57th) Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front. At this time, the corps was in the Rostov-on-Don area and was moving east. He took part in the campaign in the Caucasus. In November, during the dramatic battle of Stalingrad, Wenck was chief of staff of the Romanian 3rd Army. The Romanians had just been crushed to smithereens by Soviet troops and put to flight. They still continued to retreat, leaving behind only haphazardly scattered scattered German units. Wenck, having driven along the roads, collected the fugitives and put them together into prefabricated formations. At rest stops, he showed them films and, when the tired soldiers got tired of watching, he sent them off to war again.

The soldiers who joined Wenck's new army came from a wide variety of army groups, including the XLVIII Panzer Corps, emergency units of the Luftwaffe, rear units of the encircled 6th Army, as well as soldiers returning from leave in Germany from the 4th Panzer and 6th Armies . The commander of the newly created Army Group Don, Field Marshal Erich Manstein, met with Wenck in Novocherkassk and told him: “You will answer with your head if you allow the Russians to break through to Rostov in your sector. The defensive line must hold. If it is not held, we will lose not only the 6th Army in Stalingrad, but also Army Group A in the Caucasus.” Wenck kept his head, and Manstein kept his army.

The colonel repulsed all attempts by Soviet troops to break through the front line in his sector. On December 28, 1942, Wenck was awarded the Knight's Cross, and a day later he was appointed chief of staff of the Holidt army.

Walter Wenck (foreground) plans the German offensive

On February 1 of the following year, Walter Wenck was promoted to major general and on March 11 became chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army. In 1943, the 1st Army took part in the most difficult battles and in March 1944 found itself in the Kamenets-Podolsk “cauldron” on the Dniester River. Once again, Walter Wenck (nicknamed “Daddy” by the troops) played a major role in breaking through the encirclement. As a result, he was expected to be promoted (the position of chief of staff of Army Group “Southern Ukraine”). It was in this position that Wenck supported Guderian's initiative to withdraw German troops from Romania. Guderian himself recalled this episode in his memoirs as follows: “Having agreed with the commander of Army Group Southern Ukraine, where the chief of staff was General Wenck, who knew the situation in Romania, I suggested that Hitler withdraw from Romania all divisions that could be removed from the front and use them to restore communications between Army Groups Center.” and "North". The transfer of these forces began immediately. In addition, Hitler ordered the commanders of Army Groups “Southern Ukraine” (Schörner) and “North” (Friessner) to be swapped. Army Group Southern Ukraine was given instructions that gave the group commander autonomy, unusual for Hitler's leadership system. As a result of these energetically taken measures, it was possible to stop the advance of the Russians in the area of ​​Dobele, Tukum (Tukums), Mitava. Now I planned not only the connection of both army groups, but also the evacuation of German troops from the Baltic states in order to significantly shorten the front line.”

On April 1, 1944, Wenck received the rank of lieutenant general. But Wenk stayed in this position for only 4 months. Soon he was appointed head of the operational department and assistant chief of staff of the OKH. Now he transmitted his reports directly to Hitler. At the very first meeting, Wenck told the Fuhrer that the Eastern Front was like Swiss cheese - “there are only holes in it.” Although Field Marshal Keitel was offended by such language (and such honesty?), Hitler appreciated both of them, he liked Wenck’s directness and intelligence.

At the end of 1944, Hitler ordered behind Guderian's back the transfer of the SS Panzer Corps, commanded by Gille, from the area north of Warsaw, where it was concentrated in the rear of the front as a reserve of Reinhardt's Army Group, to Budapest to break through the encirclement around that city. Reinhardt and Guderian were in despair. This step by Hitler led to an irresponsible weakening of the already overextended German front. All protests went unheeded. Breaking the blockade of Budapest was more important to Hitler than the defense of East Germany. He began to give foreign policy reasons when Guderian asked him to cancel this ill-fated event, and sent him away. Of the reserves collected to repel the advance of the Red Army (fourteen and a half tank and motorized divisions), two divisions were sent to another front. There were only twelve and a half divisions left on the 1,200 km front.

Walter Wenck

Returning to headquarters, Guderian once again checked the information with Gehlen and discussed with Wenck a way out of the situation, which still seemed possible. Guderian and Wenck came to the conclusion that only a cessation of all offensive actions in the West and an immediate shift of the center of gravity of the war to the East could create little prospect of stopping the Soviet offensive. Therefore, Guderian decided once again on the eve of the New Year to ask Hitler to accept this only possible solution. He went to Ziegenberg a second time. Guderian intended to act with even more preparation than the first time. Therefore, upon arrival in Ziegenberg, he first of all sought out Field Marshal von Rundstedt and his chief of staff, General Westphal, told them both about the situation on the Eastern Front, about his plans and asked for help. Guderian recalled: “Both Field Marshal von Rundstedt and his chief of staff showed, as before, a full understanding of the importance of the “other” front. They gave me the numbers of three divisions of the Western Front and one division located in Italy, which could be quickly transferred to the east, since they were located not far from railway. This required only the consent of the Fuhrer. The divisions were informed about this with all caution. I notified the head of the military transportation department about this, ordering the trains to be prepared. Then I went with these modest data to report to Hitler. The same story happened to him as on a memorable Christmas evening. Jodl said that he does not have free forces, and with the forces that the West has, he needs to keep the initiative in his hands. But this time I could refute it with data from the commander of the troops in the West. This apparently made an unpleasant impression on him. When I told Hitler the numbers of the available divisions, he asked with obvious irritation from whom I learned about this, and fell silent, frowning when I told him the commander of the troops of his own front. There was really nothing to object to this argument. I received four divisions and not one more. These four were, of course, only the beginning, but so far they remained the only ones that the high command of the armed forces and the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces were forced to give to the Eastern Front. But Hitler sent this pitiful aid to Hungary!”

Very often, Guderian's stay in Berlin was prolonged due to air raids, during which Hitler began to show concern for his life and prohibited him from leaving the city. Therefore, very often Guderian sent his first assistant, General Wenck, to the evening report to the Fuhrer in order to be able to calmly think over the situation or deal with the affairs that had accumulated in Zossen. Often, by his absence, he expressed to Hitler a protest against his attacks, which he often made during violent outbursts of anger against the officer corps or against all ground forces. Of course, Hitler guessed what was going on and controlled himself for several days, but this did not last long.

When Hitler again summoned Guderian to his office, he raised his voice a second time for the cleansing of the Baltic states, thereby causing a new attack of rage in the Fuhrer. “He stood in front of me with his fists raised, and my good chief of staff Tomale was dragging me back by the coattails of his uniform, fearing that hand-to-hand combat would break out between us.”

The decisive report concerning the situation on the Eastern Front took place on February 13 at the Imperial Chancellery. At Guderian's report, in addition to the usual people from Hitler's entourage, there were Reichsführer SS Himmler - commander of Army Group Vistula, Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich - commander of the 6th Panzer Army and General Wenck. Guderian decided to second General Wenck to Himmler for the duration of the offensive, entrusting him with the actual leadership of the operation. In addition, Guderian decided to launch the offensive on February 15, since otherwise it was generally impossible. He understood that both Hitler and Himmler would strongly oppose his proposals, since they both felt an instinctive fear of this decision, the implementation of which would demonstrate Himmler's obvious incapacity as a commander. Himmler, in the presence of Hitler, defended the view that the offensive must be postponed, since a small part of the ammunition and fuel released for the army had not yet reached the front. Contrary to this opinion, Guderian made the above proposal, which was met with hostility by Hitler. The following dialogue took place:

Guderian: “We cannot wait until the last barrel of gasoline and the last box of shells are unloaded. During this time, the Russians will become even stronger.”

Hitler: “I forbid you to reproach me for wanting to wait!”

Guderian: “I don’t make any reproaches to you, but there is no point in waiting until all the food items are unloaded. After all, we may miss the right time to attack!

Hitler: “I just told you that I don’t want to hear your reproaches that I want to wait!”

Guderian: “I just reported to you that I don’t want to make any reproaches to you, I just don’t want to wait.”

Hitler: “I forbid you to reproach me for wanting to wait.”

Guderian: “General Wenck should be seconded to the headquarters of the Reichsfuehrer, otherwise there is no guarantee of success in the offensive.”

Hitler: “The Reichsfuehrer is strong enough to handle it himself.”

Guderian: “The Reichsfuehrer does not have combat experience and a good headquarters to carry out an offensive on his own. The presence of General Wenck is necessary."

Hitler: “I forbid you to tell me that the Reichsfuehrer is not capable of fulfilling his duties.”

Guderian: “I must still insist that General Wenck be seconded to Army Group Headquarters and that he exercise sound direction of operations.”

They talked like this for about two hours. Hitler, his face flushed with anger, his fists raised, stood in front of Guderian, his whole body shaking with rage and completely losing his composure. After each outburst of anger, he began to run back and forth on the carpet, stopped in front of the Colonel General, almost face to face, and hurled another reproach at Guderian. At the same time he shouted so loudly that “His eyes were bulging out of their sockets, the veins in his temples were turning blue and swelling.” Guderian was determined not to let himself be thrown off balance, to listen calmly to him and repeat his demands. He insisted on his point with iron logic and consistency.

Suddenly Hitler stopped in front of Himmler: “So, Himmler, tonight General Wenck arrives at your headquarters and takes charge of the offensive.” He then approached Wenck and ordered him to immediately go to Army Group Headquarters. Hitler sat down on a chair, asked Guderian to sit next to him, and then said: “Please continue your report. Today the General Staff won the battle.” At the same time, a kind smile appeared on his face. Guderian himself recalled that this was the last battle that he managed to win.

On April 22, 1945, in the afternoon, the daily operational meeting began in the Reich Chancellery in Hitler's bunker. In addition to Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, it was also attended by General Krebs, General Burgdorf, Martin Bormann, Ribbentrop liaison officer M. Hevel and several adjutants.

Even in the first half of the day, Hitler demanded to contact the command post of the 11th Army, which was located in Liebenwerde. In addition, Hitler ordered SS Obergruppenführer Steiner, the former commander of the 11th Army, to gather all available forces and throw them into the defense of the Reich capital. At that moment, units of the Red Army were already on the approaches to Berlin. The haste of this order was due to the fact that the 9th Army, located southwest of Frankfurt, was surrounded between Cottbus and Baruth.

Around this same time, fighting began on the eastern outskirts of Berlin. Here, resistance to the Red Army units was provided by units of the LVI (56th) Tank Corps, whose commander was Artillery General Weidling. Anticipating the development of events, Weidling, on the night of April 22, moved the location of the corps headquarters from Schöneiche to the building of a nursing home located in Biesdorf (South). By this time, the Oder front, up to its northern part, had completely collapsed.

The operational meeting with Hitler began with a report from Colonel General Jodl. Then General Krebs took the floor. Both of them, shortly before the start of the meeting, received a message that Waffen-SS General Steiner did not have at his disposal enough troops to break through to Berlin. Colonel General Jodl was supposed to report that Soviet troops had crushed the southern flank of the German 3rd Panzer Army and that troops under the command of Marshal Zhukov could at any time begin an assault on Treuenbritzen and Zossen located south of Berlin. But before Jodl could finish his report, Hitler abruptly interrupted him. The Fuhrer wanted to know where SS-Obergruppenführer Steiner was and when his army could strike at the Red Army units located near Berlin. Now the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht's operational leadership was forced to declare that SS General Steiner had not yet launched an attack on Berlin, and his army had not even been formed - it existed only on paper. Happened to Hitler breakdown, which were not uncommon at the end of the war. He screamed and stamped his feet. He stated that he stayed in Berlin only to shoot himself “if the Soviets infiltrated it.” He ended his angry stream of words with the words: “It’s all over... It’s all over...”

Everyone present at the meeting silently looked at Hitler. Five minutes of oppressive silence passed. After this, all the generals took turns trying to convince Hitler that he absolutely had to leave the capital of the Reich. But everything was useless. Hitler took up a new task - he began to dictate his next radio address.

When Jodl was called to the telephone some time later, Keitel turned to Hitler and asked to talk with him face to face. Hitler kicked everyone out of the office, after which the Field Marshal General said that the Fuhrer had only two options. On the one hand, offer surrender. On the other hand, there was the possibility of flying to Bertechsgaden to begin negotiations from there. Field Marshal Keitel did not have time to finish when Hitler interrupted him: “I have already made a decision. I won't leave Berlin. I will defend the city to the very end. Either I will win the battle for the capital of the Reich, or I will fall as a symbol of the empire."

After Jodl was able to continue his report, he did not fail to report to Hitler about the plan that he had just come up with. This plan, according to the Colonel General, was the only way to save Berlin by breaking through the Soviet encirclement around it. The main idea of ​​this plan was to restore the line of the Western Front along the Elbe, stop the further advance of the Western Allies on this river, and then concentrate all available forces on the fight against the Red Army. From this point of view, the 12th Army, located on the banks of the Elbe, had to be removed from these positions and sent to the East in order to break through the encirclement ring around the German capital with a powerful blow to the rear of the Soviet troops.

Field Marshal Keitel interrupted Jodl and volunteered to go personally to the headquarters of the 12th Army to convey the Fuhrer's order to General Walter Wenck. He himself wanted to make sure that all measures for the speedy movement of the 12th Army in the direction of Berlin were taken as soon as possible. In addition, Field Marshal Keitel said that Wenck would save Berlin, even if the city was under a tight Soviet siege. To begin with, Wenck's army could release the 9th Army, after which, by combining their forces, they could defeat the Red Army units near Berlin. Hitler approved this plan.

After this, Jodl went to the Wehrmacht Operations Headquarters, which was now located at Krampnitz near Potsdam, and Field Marshal Keitel went west to General Wenck.

Colonel General Heinrici, who on April 22, 1945 expected that, with Hitler’s consent, the 9th Army would begin the retreat, found himself in the most difficult situation. Soviet troops could destroy his army at any moment. In any case, by the evening of April 22, it was split into several parts. Heinrici tried to force General Krebs to take at least some measures to save her. But the chief of the Supreme Command of the German Ground Forces conveyed to the commander of Army Group Vistula only the order of the Fuhrer that the 3rd Tank Army was to push back the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front (Marshal Rokossovsky) to the Oder. When Colonel General Heinrici called the High Command of the Ground Forces on April 22, 1945 for the third time, General Krebs had already gone to report to Hitler at the Reich Chancellery. General Detleffsen answered the phone. Heinrici almost begged him to make at least some decision. The general called Krebs. He called back from the Fuhrer's bunker at about 14:50 and informed the commander of the Vistula Army Group that Hitler had agreed that the 9th Army would leave the Frankfurt-on-Oder area and retreat to the northern sector of the front along this river.

In Frankfurt itself, the battle group under the command of Colonel Bieler continued to fiercely defend itself. He did not have the slightest opportunity with his group to escape from the ring of Soviet encirclement.

Two hours later, General Krebs again contacted the commander of Army Group Vistula. This time he informed Colonel General Heinrici that during an operational meeting with the Fuhrer, it was decided to withdraw Wenck’s army from the Western Front. Its units were supposed to launch a diversionary offensive northeast of Berlin.

Colonel General Heinrici, who believed that the German 9th Army was still strong enough to break through the Soviet encirclement and escape from it in a western direction, demanded that General Busse be given the order to begin the breakthrough. As soon as this order was given, Heinrici personally called the commander of the 9th Army, General Busse. He informed him of the new positions that his army was to occupy. Busse himself had to gather all the most combat-ready units of his army into a fist so that they could break through the ring of Soviet encirclement and move westward towards the 12th Army.

Meanwhile, Field Marshal Keitel was heading from Berlin to the location of Wenck's army. The roads to the west and southwest of Berlin were clogged with columns of refugees. The car had to be stopped more than once, as Soviet aviation regularly carried out raids. By the time darkness fell, the German field marshal had reached Wiesenburg, which was located southwest of Belzig. The command post of the XX Army Corps was located here. General Köhler immediately reported to Keitel about the state of affairs at the front and the state of the divisions that he was entrusted with commanding. Somewhat later, the chief of the Wehrmacht High Command headed to the Alte Hölle forest estate. During the night ride, he lost his way more than once. Until he finally reached the command of the 12th Army.

Wenck's army itself was only able to repel several American attacks on April 21, 1945, which were launched from the southwest in the direction of Dessau, as well as in the Mulde area. They tried to overcome the constant raids of the Allied aviation with the help of anti-aircraft artillery, but due to the dominance of the Anglo-Americans in the air over West Germany, each time it turned out to be more and more difficult.

On the afternoon of April 22, 1945, the command of Wenck's army received evidence that not only the Clausewitz Panzer Division was completely destroyed, but also the Schlageter Division, which, according to the order, was supposed to advance from Julzen through Brunswick to Fallersleben. Wenck's army lost two divisions in a few days.

German refugees near the Elbe

Under these conditions, General Wenck set his headquarters the task of protecting civilians, refugees and the wounded from the Red Army advancing from the east for as long as possible. For as long as it was possible. From his numerous visits to the front, visits to the divisions, Wenck brought out the firm conviction that the most powerful weapon in this situation was the faith of the soldiers, as well as an unshakable desire to save the civilian population from the tyranny of the victorious allies (primarily meaning units of the Red Army). To achieve this goal, General Wenck had to make very rational use of the forces at his disposal. Besides this, it spoke purely human feelings, and he did not want to set initially impossible tasks for military units. Over the past few days, he has been driving around the area day and night to provide food to the refugees. Where possible, he tried to make it easier for them to cross the Elbe.

When the telephone rang at the headquarters of the 12th Army at about one o'clock on April 23, General Wenck was dozing in his chair - he had just returned from a trip to the front. He didn't even have time to take off his field uniform.

The general picked up the phone. The officer on duty was on the line and said that Field Marshal Keitel had arrived. Walter Wenck immediately summoned his chief of staff. Colonel Reichhelm immediately arrived to the army commander. Wenk told him: “It looks like we have distinguished guests. Field Marshal Keitel has arrived." The visit of the chief of the Wehrmacht High Command did not cause a surge of optimism in either Wenck or Colonel Reichhelm. If the head of the Supreme Command himself arrived at the army headquarters, then we could hardly talk about insignificant things. Outside, there was the sound of a car approaching.

Field Marshal Keitel, in full dress uniform, with a marshal's baton in his hand, entered the army command post. The adjutant followed him. Wenck was immediately struck by Keitel's nervousness. Wenck and Reichhelm responded to the field marshal's greeting with restraint. While the field marshal's adjutant was unfolding a map on the table, Keitel pointed with his baton at dark spot, which Berlin seemed to be on the map, and without any introduction said: "We must rescue the Fuhrer!" Judging by the faces of Wenck and Reichhelm, Keitel realized that he had made a mistake and started with the wrong place to start the conversation. After this, he asked General Wenck to give him an operational report on the situation of the 12th Army, at the same time he ordered coffee and sandwiches to be served.

After Wenck finished his short report, Field Marshal Keitel stood up sharply. Next, Wenck and Reichhelm listened silently as the chief of the Wehrmacht High Command said that the battle for Berlin had begun and that the fate of Hitler himself, and therefore the whole of Germany, was at stake. The field marshal looked expressively at Wenk: “Your duty is to attack and save Berlin!” General Wenck, who from his own experience knew exactly how to talk to Field Marshal Keitel, immediately replied: “The army will attack, Herr Field Marshal!”

"Fine!- Keitel answered, nodding his head. - You will launch an attack on Berlin from the Belzig - Treuenbritzen area." During the trip, the field marshal finalized the plan proposed by Jodl. As he spoke, General Wenck understood more and more clearly that this operation was planned on the Fuhrer's duty card, on which flags were displayed indicating divisions, which either ceased to exist altogether or were pitiful remnants of divisions. Meanwhile, new divisions were still being formed.

Keitel ordered the 12th Army to withdraw from the Elbe front to the Wittenberg - Niemegk sector, from where it was to move to its original positions (Belzig - Treuenbritzen) in order to then launch an attack on Jüterbog. Having pushed back the Soviet troops from this city, the 12th Army was supposed to unite with the 9th Army, and then together they were supposed to break through the encirclement ring around Berlin from the north and “save the Fuhrer.” Since German radio intelligence provided fairly accurate data regarding the real position of the 9th Army, General Wenck imagined that he could hardly count on support during the planned offensive. But nevertheless, it did not seem to him a fantastic idea to break through to Jüterbog solely on his own, in order to then help the 9th Army advance in a western direction. Such a strategic plan seemed quite realistic to him. Among other things, such a strategic decision made it possible to gain time for refugees who were heading from east to west. Similar considerations arose in the mind of General Walter Wenck while Field Marshal Keitel outlined the details of the plan for the upcoming offensive.

However, Wenck did not completely agree with the plan proposed by Keitel. The map showed that the encircled 9th Army was unlikely to play a significant role in the proposed German offensive on Berlin. He also emphasized that sufficient forces for this offensive were available only near Rathenow, which the Germans continued to control, and therefore the offensive could successfully develop in an eastern direction only from the vicinity of Havel. General Wenck came to the conclusion: “Only there is it possible to concentrate all the forces of the army. Only there can the division of the army into two extended military groups be avoided.” At the same time, the 9th Army itself, which was unlikely to be able to completely break out of the tongs of the Soviet encirclement, could only make its way to the south, to the army group of Ferdinand Schörner. Of course, the 12th Army's advance to Havel would have required a couple of days more, but this could have prevented a military catastrophe. General Wenck ended his message by saying that only the XX Army Corps could quickly reach positions north of Havel. Waiting for all the forces of the 12th Army to gather near Havel would be a waste of precious time. At the same time, an offensive south of Havel solely with the forces of the XX Army Corps could not have given the expected result - Berlin would not have been released. General Wenck's proposal to gather the forces of the 12th Army north of Havel was categorically rejected by Keitel. He said irritably: “We can’t wait two days!” The situation in Berlin was critical. Keitel believed that every hour counted. The 12th Army had to immediately begin preparations to carry out the Fuhrer's order. Keitel got up to leave the Alte Hölle. At the door he turned. “Yes, I wish you success!” - he said goodbye.

General Wenck spent the whole night with Colonel Reichhelm working on the map. It was then that the officers became friends for the rest of their lives. They were ready to take responsibility for all the measures they took. Responsibility for both our soldiers and the civilian population who find themselves in the combat zone. Despite all the instructions, they continued to plan to strike to the east in order to release the 9th Army and save as many refugees as possible. The commander of the 12th Army, as well as its chief of staff, understood perfectly well that in this case it was not about the fate of individuals, but about the fate of tens of thousands of people. If there was even the slightest opportunity to get through to Berlin, then Wenck and his army intended to take advantage of this albeit insignificant chance. By and large, the German capital had no other chance of salvation. General Wenck himself said on this occasion: “It should be noted that our army could save thousands and thousands of refugees who were heading to West Germany. They fled from Silesia, from the Oder and Warte, from Pomerania and other occupied areas. The soldiers who saw these terrible pictures, who heard about the suffering of people who fled, leaving all their property, who experienced the horrors of the entry of Russian troops, were ready to resist the enemy with all the courage. Even if the situation was completely hopeless, they were ready to fight to give women and children a chance to find refuge in the West. This is where the roots of the rare heroism that our soldiers demonstrated in the April and May days of 1945 lie. They fought even if they could not change the fate of the last German army." General Wenck and Colonel Reichhelm did not want senseless bloodshed, as Field Marshal Keitel insisted on. They wanted the upcoming offensive to help thousands of people.

In the early morning of April 23, 1945, American aircraft suddenly stopped delivering powerful bombing attacks on all positions of the 12th Army. The German soldiers could catch their breath. The terrible bombing of the Anglo-American allies largely constrained the actions of the command of Wenck's army.

On the front sector, which was held by the forces of the Ulrich von Hutten division (Bitterfeld and the surrounding area), only under these conditions was Lieutenant General Engel able to begin preparing a defensive line facing the East. His division was supposed to go over to him if Red Army units entered Berlin. By the evening of April 23, 1945, at the headquarters of the Ulrich von Hutten division there was no longer any doubt that the Red Army strike groups had already taken the heights to the south and north of the Reich capital. This development of events did not come as a surprise. Apart from this, there were no signs that the Americans intended to cross the Elbe and move further east. As a result, most of the headquarters of the 12th Army (from the regiment and above) received orders to occupy defensive positions facing not to the west, but to the east.

Tank barriers or anti-tank lines from anti-aircraft guns, which were equipped with vehicles carrying them, excluded the possibility of any unexpected breakthrough of the Red Army from the east. All reserves located in the German rear, as well as supply units, were converted into tank destroyer detachments. They were armed with Faust cartridges, and for mobility they were equipped with motorcycles or bicycles. These teams were supposed to conduct continuous reconnaissance in the southwestern, eastern and northeastern sectors of the front in order, if necessary, to stop the forward advance of Soviet tanks. Thanks to these precautions, the Germans managed to hold the area around Jüterbog, where the first Soviet tank units appeared on April 23, 1945.

Lieutenant General Herxapdt Engel, commander of the infantry division "Ulrich von Hutten" (pictured still with the rank of colonel)

Lieutenant General Engel decided to send the division's reserve - an infantry regiment with a subordinate artillery battalion, tank destroyers and assault guns - to the site of the proposed battles, so that the division could launch an offensive to the east at any moment. When, finally, on April 24, 1945, an order from the Wehrmacht High Command came over the radio, according to which the 12th Army, with the forces of one division, was to launch an offensive in the eastern direction, the Ulrich von Hutten division immediately took action. On April 24, Lieutenant General Engel ordered to engage in battle with the Americans only if they themselves launched an attack. On the same day, the divisions of the 12th Army received orders to abandon their positions along the Mulde and Elbe and move east. Their first task was to create a large bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Elbe near Wittenberg. After such a regrouping, units of the 12th Army were supposed to block the path of Soviet troops (from three to four divisions) who were advancing on Wittenberg. On the night of April 25, units formed from construction battalions, personnel of party institutions and teams of industrial enterprises were to be transferred to Wittenberg. The division itself was supposed to transfer at least two regiments to this area by shuttle method. To do this, they had to travel 40–50 kilometers.

Lieutenant General Engel himself recalled the first battle with the Red Army on this section of the front as follows: “In the morning hours of April 25, 1945, both of these regiments, with their assigned artillery and assault guns, took up positions east and southeast of Wittenberg, the city associated with the life of Luther. There they gave battle to three Russian rifle divisions. It was here that a very rare phenomenon in war happened - troops advancing towards each other met in battle. No one knew the location of their enemy. And, as often happened in this war, without false modesty I have grounds for such statements, our units showed great courage and iron will. Two regiments, insignificant artillery units that we had during this offensive, and anti-aircraft guns that had taken up unchanged positions, which until now had covered positions along the Elbe - that was all the forces thanks to which in the first half of the day it was possible to push three Soviet divisions back to 10 kilometers. We tore German units out of the encirclement and were able to form a bridgehead 30 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep near Wittenberg. This bridgehead was crucial for all subsequent military operations of the 12th Army, which had already begun a hasty regrouping for the attack on Berlin. This was an important prerequisite for saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians and our soldiers."

Throughout April 25, Soviet troops repeatedly launched attacks on the bridgehead near Wittenberg, which was then held by the forces of the Ulrich von Hutten division. But each time the Red Army units, which suffered heavy losses, had to retreat. This was due to the fact that the command of the Ulrich von Hutten division had tanks and assault guns at its disposal.

When the division headquarters began to receive reports that the German defensive points located on the right flank were surrounded by Soviet units, Lieutenant General Engel gave the order to form a special strike group that was supposed to release them. The Germans struck a swift blow to the southeast, and the task assigned to the group was completed.

On April 26, as well as in the early morning of April 27, the fighting for the bridgehead at Wittenberg continued with the same ferocity. But now the positions of the Ulrich von Hutten division began to be stormed by tank units of the Red Army. The first Soviet tanks, mainly T-34s, began their attack on the night of April 27. The onslaught on the position of the Ulrich von Hutten division turned out to be so powerful that a decision was made to withdraw all military units from the city, leaving only a small garrison there. Just the day before, on the evening of April 26, 1945, Lieutenant General Engel received an order from the command of the 12th Army to leave positions near Wittenberg and relocate the following night to their original positions near Belzig in order to take part in the planned attack on Berlin.

To withdraw his division from the attack of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Engel decided to apply the knowledge that he had acquired on the Eastern Front. He knew that during a sudden attack, Soviet troops launched a counterattack very carefully. Indeed, in this situation, very rare Soviet commanders went into an oncoming battle. In this situation, the Ulrich von Hutten division could only leave its positions by taking decisive action.

Late in the evening and at night, quickly formed German battle groups, which were reinforced by reconnaissance detachments armed with Faustpatrons and several assault guns and tanks, attacked Soviet positions under cover of darkness. The rapid attack of the Germans achieved its goal: the Soviet troops went on the defensive, they lost the tactical initiative. Under the current conditions, neither side intended to develop an offensive. Units of the Red Army waited, and the Ulrich von Hutten division safely left its positions, without the risk that Soviet troops would attack it from the rear or flank. The tactics of camouflaging the withdrawal of the German division turned out to be very successful. The German units remaining in Wittenberg were attacked again only at noon on April 27. That is, the Ulrich von Hutten division had about 10–12 hours to retreat to new positions. Lieutenant General Engel was able to gain much-needed time. As Soviet troops approached Wittenberg, most of the division (including artillery, tanks and assault guns) moved along the Elbe through the forests that lie north of Coswig. Only one artillery battery was left at the previous positions, which was supposed to conduct continuous fire at the Soviet troops, thereby covering and masking the division’s withdrawal.

Despite the fact that the Ulrich von Hutten division was drawn into fierce fighting, in the end it was able to reach Belzig quite safely and reach its original positions. Forward, to the east, the division command released heavy reconnaissance vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles from the 3rd Tank Destroyer Battalion. They had to take up positions along a wide front to protect the division from a surprise Soviet attack.

What was happening at the High Command at this time?

On the afternoon of April 24, 1945, Soviet troops crossed the “canal” near the town of Nieder-Neuendorfer, which was located northwest of Spandau. The Wehrmacht High Command located in Krampnitz was forced to urgently evacuate. It moved to a country building near Fürstenberg. An hour after the German generals left their previous building, Soviet tank crews were already there.

It is immediately worth noting that the command of the Red Army, which until April 23 knew nothing about the new German army located on the banks of the Elbe, on April 24 was dumbfounded by this news. They learned about him almost from a German propaganda leaflet, which outlined the Fuhrer’s order.

Soldiers of Wenk's army!

I give an order that will be for you great value. You must leave your strategic bridgeheads facing our western enemy and head east. Your task is very clear:

Berlin must remain German!

The goals set for you must certainly be achieved, since otherwise the Bolsheviks, who began the assault on the capital of the empire, will eradicate Germany. But Berlin will never surrender to the Bolsheviks. The defenders of the Reich capital were enthusiastic about the news of your speech. They continue to fight bravely in the hope that they will soon hear the thunder of your guns.

The Fuhrer has called you. Start, as in the old days, a hurricane onslaught on the enemy. Berlin is waiting for you. Berlin yearns for your warm hearts."

After reading this pompous and pathetic text, General Walter Wenck ordered under no circumstances to distribute this leaflet in parts, but to burn its main edition.

Meanwhile, by the morning of April 24, 1945, Soviet troops crushed the right flank of the 3rd German Tank Army. The Germans were driven back to the Ruppiner Canal. And the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front continued to press Manteuffel’s army on the flanks. At the same time, the troops of Marshal Rokossovsky, having a tenfold superiority over the Germans, continued their offensive in the lowlands near the Oder. If the German 3rd Army wanted to retain at least part of its divisions, then it had to retreat beyond the bend of the Randow River. Panzer General Hasso requested permission to retreat on behalf of Manteuffel from the Wehrmacht High Command. In response, Colonel General Jodl categorically forbade even talk about the possibility of retreat. However, it was clear to experienced generals that the destruction of the 3rd German Tank Army by the troops of Marshal Rokossovsky was only a matter of time. Its weak defenses could be broken through at any moment. At Hitler's Headquarters, apparently, they were hoping for a miracle. They continued to rely on armies that actually no longer existed. Nobody wanted to face the facts. Everyone in the Reich Chancellery was frightened by reality. Only the commanders of the divisions fighting at the front understood perfectly well that their formations could not be saved by a miracle. Only retreat could save them.

At noon on April 24, when the command of the 12th Army was ready to give the order for the attack on Berlin to the XX Army Corps, the divisions "Ulrich von Hutten", "Theodor Körner", "Ferdinand von Schill" and the XXXXI Panzer Corps, came from the Wehrmacht High Command new order.

“The army must select the strongest formation, at least a division, and lead it to the Wittenberg-Treuenbrietzen area for an attack to the east. Details about the objectives and goals of the offensive will be communicated later. From this moment on, the infantry division “Friedrich Ludwig Jahn” comes under the control of the Supreme Command of the German Ground Forces. The commander of a division must be ready, without taking into account the completion of its formation, at the first order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces to move in an eastern or northern direction.”

This order was immediately transmitted by the command of the 12th Army to Colonel Weller, commander of the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division. The colonel himself immediately contacted the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces. At the same time, he ordered the immediate arming of all units of the division. By telephone from the High Command of the Ground Forces, he received the following order: “Immediately set out on a march in the direction of Potsdam, where you are placed at the disposal of General Reimann, commander of the Potsdam Corps Group.”

Colonel Franz Weller, from April 25 to May 3, 1945, commander of the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn infantry division

Together with the head of the operational department of the headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Pretorius, Colonel Weller began to plot on the map the route for individual columns and the division as a whole. At the moment when the soldiers of the division began to be issued weapons, a general alarm was declared. The fact is that some of the Soviet tank units, which were bypassing Berlin and Potsdam from the south, unexpectedly turned to Jüterbog. A Soviet tank wedge crashed into the positions of the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division. Soviet tank crews opened heavy fire on the Germans from machine guns and tank guns. A fierce battle began. The Germans did not have any weapons at their disposal, except for Faustpatrons, which could stop the tank breakthrough. But the Germans managed to quickly correct the situation. Having withstood the first onslaught, they launched detachments of tank destroyers on the flanks. Then the strike group of the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division was moved to the front line, which had assault guns at its disposal. It was she who was able to stop the sudden Soviet attack. However, the fact turned out to be a fact. In this battle, the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division suffered huge losses.

An hour after the Soviet tank attack, the division's columns were already on the march. During their movement to the north, they repeatedly encountered small units of the Red Army, which were conducting reconnaissance in a westerly direction. Almost immediately they were completely destroyed. Twice during the march the Germans had to use assault guns, thanks to which the path to Potsdam was paved. As a result, the division nevertheless reached this city, where it linked up with the Potsdam corps group.

Two hours after the order came from the Wehrmacht High Command, a new order followed, addressed to the command of the 12th Army. The chief of staff of the 12th Army, Colonel Reichhelm, recalled him: “All strong combat units had to be withdrawn from the Western Front and sent to the east. Urgently submit proposals on combat strength and calendar dates. The direction of the offensive and its goals will be reported separately.”

Meanwhile, on April 24, 1945, units of the Theodor Körner division attacked Troenbrietzen, into whose territory units of the Red Army were able to penetrate. Soldiers from the Jaeger battalion followed the German assault guns that were assigned to the battalion for the attack on the city. The Germans managed to break through the Soviet defense line. After several Soviet tanks were knocked out, German rangers began clearing the city. Street fighting broke out. At a certain moment, the advancing Germans came across a defensive line formed from several machine gun nests and anti-tank guns. We had to pull up the assault guns again. The crews of the German assault guns, staffed by experienced front-line soldiers who had fought on the Eastern Front, fired shell after shell. After half an hour of battle, the defensive line was destroyed. Huntsmen shouting “Hurray!” followed the cars. Treuenbrietzen was again controlled by the Germans. The Theodor Körner division took up positions facing east.

On April 25, 1945, the 12th Army was ready to launch an offensive to the east. The division "Ulrich von Hutten" was to march from Wittenberg, "Ferdinand von Schill" from Nimegk, "Scharnhorst" just east of Zerbst, and "Theodor Körner" from the newly captured Treuenbrietzen. Early in the morning of April 25, an order from the Wehrmacht High Command arrived at Wenck's army headquarters. It reported: “Units of the 12th Army must immediately advance with all available forces to the east along the Wittenberg-Nimegk line in the direction of Jüterbog in order to unite there with the 9th Army, which is making its way to the west, and then, with joint efforts, release Berlin from the north.”

As of April 24–25, 1945, the general position of the 12th Army was as follows. After the start of the general offensive of the Soviet troops, the command of Wenck's army had to make a clear decision where it would be used: in the east against the Red Army or in the west against the Anglo-American allies? Such a decision was necessary even if there were no orders from higher authorities or such orders were contradictory. Conducting battles on two fronts simultaneously was tantamount to senseless death. For the command of the 12th Army itself, the decision was quite obvious - in the current conditions it had to oppose the Red Army. Officers, soldiers, even civilians and numerous refugees arriving from East Germany were guided by this. To all this was added a circumstance that could facilitate the actions of Wenck’s army. Based on indirect signs (intelligence data, the cessation of bombing by Anglo-American aviation), which, of course, was very difficult to verify, the command of the 12th Army came to the conclusion that the Americans did not intend to develop their offensive through the Elbe and Mulde. There was, quite rightly, we note, the impression that the demarcation line between the positions of the Red Army and the Americans should have passed along the Elbe.

Nevertheless, General Walter Wenck did not exclude the possibility that the Americans could still launch an offensive from the Zerbst-Barbie bridgehead in the direction of Berlin. In such a situation, it was necessary to urgently turn the front of action against the Americans. But in this case, German units were ordered to open fire only in the presence of a real American offensive.

The unexpected attack by tank units, which the Red Army quickly delivered on both sides of Berlin, clearly showed how inferior the Germans were to the Soviet troops. Throughout the Eastern Front, the Germans found themselves deprived not only of any reserves, but also of real tank support. In addition, it was discovered complete absence The Germans have heavy guns and an air force.

From day to day, Soviet troops could completely surround the German capital. Since the tanks of the Red Army could at any time strike the rear units and command posts of the divisions that were supposed to hold the Western Front along the Elbe, a fundamental decision was urgently required. In addition, the situation changed in the east almost hourly. Information came from Jüterbog that Soviet tanks had broken into the location of the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division, after which the division itself suffered huge losses.

For this reason, at the end of April 24, 1945, the command of the 12th Army gave the order: “a) XXXXI Panzer Corps, leaving only minor covering parts on the Elbe, sends all forces at its disposal in an easterly direction to first break through to the defense line, passing east of Brandenburg, then passing through the chain of lakes between Brandenburg and Potsdam and then establishing contact with the rear units of Army Group Vistula;

b) the commander of the XX Army Corps, General of the Cavalry Köhler, whose headquarters is again ready for use in full force, receives the task of preparing and starting the fight in the east. But first, the bulk of the Scharnhorst division must be left, following the previous order, on a bridgehead near Barbie. In this case, the corps command must position the most combat-ready units along the Elbe between Coswig and Dessau to cover positions from the south. From now on, the “Ulrich von Hutten” division is subordinate to the command of the “Theodor Körner” division. After which she should arrive in the Belzig area;

c) the division “Ulrich von Hutten”, under the cover of night darkness, breaks away from the enemy forces, leaving only insignificant cover in its previous positions, and marches from Grafehainichen to Wittenberg.

Assignment for the division “Ulrich von Hutten”:

Creation of a defensive line facing east and northeast on the bridgehead near Wittenberg, covering the Elbe in the south - between Wittenberg and Coswig. For this assignment, reports to the headquarters of the XX Army Corps;

d) the division “Theodor Körner” concentrates its forces in the Belzig area to carry out next task: defense and reconnaissance in the northeast, east and southeast directions, maintaining contact with the Ulrich von Hutten division north of Wittenberg. To carry out the mission, reports to the headquarters of the XX Army Corps;

e) the division “Ferdinand von Schill” completes its formation and plans to move through Cisar in the direction of Nimegk on April 25. Reports to the headquarters of the XX Army Corps;

f) XXXXVIII Tank Corps continues to carry out its previous mission. To do this, he must quickly prepare for the departure of all the most combat-ready units on April 25 across the Elbe (between Wittenberg and Dessau). Further task: defense of positions along the Elbe between Wittenberg and Dessau, facing south."

In the early morning of April 25, 1945, all divisions of the 12th Army, after tiring marches, reached their established positions. They were let through by the rear units. By this time, the Ulrich von Hutten division was already fighting north of Wittenberg, as well as on the eastern outskirts of the city. Its units initially managed to repel all Soviet attacks. But let’s immediately make a reservation that the Red Army sent very insignificant forces in this direction.

On April 25, Cavalry General Köhler ordered the Scharnhorst division to be withdrawn from the bridgehead between Zerbst and Barbie, despite the existing threat of continuing the American offensive to the east. It was planned that this connection should have reached its original positions, which were located north of Wittenberg. Only two construction battalions were left on the Western Front. They came under the command of sapper officers who came from the sapper school. As a result, both battalions immediately received orders to mine all positions around the American bridgehead.

Actually, on the Eastern Front on April 25, things were much worse for the Germans. For the command of the 12th Army great importance had the fact that it was on this day that the 9th Army was completely surrounded. She tried to conduct defensive battles east of Barut. Almost immediately after the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division moved north towards Potsdam, Jüterbog was occupied by Soviet troops. The most powerful Soviet units were almost immediately transferred east of Wittenberg. They continuously attacked this city. Here, as before, units of the Ulrich von Hutten division were located, which tried to hold back the Soviet offensive, thereby preserving the front of the army corps.

However, south of Nimegk, between the exposed northern flank of the Ulrich von Hutten division and the southern flank of the Theodor Körner division, there was a small gap in the German defensive line. It was here that the Soviet troops struck. On this day, Red Army tanks repeatedly probed German positions east of Brandenburg (Hawel). The Soviet onslaught on the new defensive lines of the XXXXI Panzer Corps was constantly increasing. In this situation, the command of the 12th Army could not seriously plan an attack on Jüterbog. In addition, German intelligence reported that it was here that the powerful forces of the Red Army were concentrated.

As a result, Wenck's army could only provide all possible resistance to the advanced detachments of the Red Army, trying to constrain their actions west of Berlin. At this moment, the command of the 12th Army makes the following decision: “The attack on surrounded Berlin, where it was still possible, could not relieve the city. A decisive offensive by disciplined and battle-proven units can be undertaken to inflict significant damage on the enemy, which may open the way for countless German refugees.”

Indeed, numerous refugees from the eastern territories of Germany, who accumulated in the places of supposed hostilities, became perhaps the most serious problem for the command of the 12th Army. All these civilians wanted to cross the Elbe as quickly as possible. But they did not know that the Americans were supposed to prevent the crossing of civilians across the Elbe.

As a result, the command of the 12th Army decided to gain time. To do this, it was necessary to stop the Soviet offensive to the west with all available forces. At the same time, the possibility of launching an offensive was not ruled out. Two possibilities were considered as a direction of attack.

1. At the suggestion of the command of the XX Army Corps, it was possible to attack from the Belzig area in the direction of Berlin (via Potsdam). The undoubted advantage of this plan was the fact that the night before the divisions of the 12th Army completed all the regroupings necessary for this. In addition, German intelligence reported that it was in this direction that the weakest resistance from the Red Army units could be expected. And, finally, in this situation it was very possible to release the 9th Army, which could break out of the Soviet encirclement to the west north of Troyenbritzen.

2. The advance of units of the XXXXI Panzer Corps between the chain of lakes that lay north of Havel. Moreover, the offensive itself could bring the 12th Army to the left flank of Army Group Vistula, whose positions seemed to have stabilized near Fehrbellin. However, the implementation of this operation, the possibility of which General Wenck reported to Field Marshal Keitel on April 23, presupposed regular regroupings of German troops. But with all this, the command of the 12th Army saw several advantages in this direction of a possible offensive:

a) The 12th Army was stretched out into a long thin line, which was the last connecting link between the German troops fighting in the south and north of Germany. Communication with southern Germany had to be abandoned, especially since the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, which was ordered to withdraw to the Elbe between Wittenberg and Dessau, was not in a position to maintain it. A solution naturally suggested itself, which involved the concentration of German troops in northern Germany. In this case, the 12th Army would take the brunt of the attack. But after regrouping, she could avoid encirclement, and at least two combat-ready corps could take part in the offensive against the Red Army;

b) if the Vistula Army Group had not been able to mobilize forces southeast of Fehrbellin in order to strike north towards Berlin from there, then when interacting with units of the 12th Army, the Germans could have inflicted significant damage on the Red Army units that would have been attacked from west to northwest of the German capital. As a result of these actions, the path would be open for refugees. They could withdraw to the west through Brandenburg, Gentin and Havelberg;

c) lakes near Havel could be used as a natural barrier, which made it possible to avoid complex operations with fire support and flank cover for the advancing units of the 12th Army.

From the answer that came over the radio it followed that the Wehrmacht High Command fundamentally rejected the second option of the offensive proposed by the command of the 12th Army. But despite this, Army Group Vistula was still ordered to attack the northern approaches to Berlin. This was an indication that the Wehrmacht High Command still hoped to win the battle for the German capital with such modest forces. In fact, Army Group Vistula, even under ideal circumstances, could achieve only very modest tactical successes. She could only gain time in order to “bargain” for herself the most favorable conditions for surrender.

As one might expect, the Wehrmacht High Command began to insist that Wenck's army carry out the first plan of attack. It was very clear to Wenck himself that with this development of events, he would quickly lose any contact with the German units that continued to fight in northern Germany.

Lieutenant General Karl Arndt (Colonel pictured), commander of the XXXIX Panzer Corps

In the early morning of April 26, 1945, the XXXIX Panzer Corps was subordinated to the command of the 12th Army, which was reorganized after the almost complete destruction of the Clausewitz and Schlageter divisions. It was commanded by Lieutenant General Arndt. To reorganize the tank corps, he was sent to Dömnitz, a place located near the Elbe on the northern border of the 12th Army's positions. By order of the Wehrmacht High Command, the corps this time was to consist of the Hamburg reserve division, the Meyer division, parts of the 84th Infantry Division and the remnants of the Clausewitz division. Both divisions could not be called full-fledged formations - in two weeks of heavy and bloody battles, the tank divisions lost more than two-thirds of their personnel. The newly formed German units, which in total constituted one reinforced regiment, were to be sent to the 3rd Panzer Army as soon as possible. However, in the future they became a source of reinforcements for the divisions of the 12th Army and the XXXXI Tank Corps located on the Eastern Front.

In the early morning of April 28, 1945, a conversation took place between General Wenck and the chief of staff of the 12th Army, Colonel Reichhelm. The commander of the 12th Army planned on this day to launch an offensive towards the encircled 9th Army. At the same time, the divisions “Ferdinand von Schill” and “Ulrich von Hutten” were supposed to move in the direction of Potsdam. They were supposed to break through the ring of Soviet encirclement and, if this operation was successful, unite with the 9th Army, after which it was planned to recapture Potsdam from the Red Army from both sides (the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division was advancing from the west). “If we succeed, then after that we will retreat to the Elbe and surrender to the Americans. This is our last combat mission."- said General Wenck.

On April 28, the soldiers of the XX Army Corps were still in their positions between Belzig and Wittenberg. When the sun rose, a command was heard that many had already been expecting for several days: “We advance to the east!” On the left flank of the Ulrich von Hutten division, several strike groups of the Ferdinand von Schill division began an offensive. They attacked in a northeast direction, intending to advance to the forest area, better known as Laninersky Forest.

“Assault guns, forward!” - Major Nebel’s loud voice came through the headphones. The assault gun brigade, part of the Ferdinand von Schill division, began to move. On the left flank of the offensive they formed an armored wedge, which simultaneously covered the division's positions from the north. The vehicle commanders rode, leaning out of the hatches. Some time later, German assault guns encountered the first Soviet tanks. It was part of the Red Army, which was bivouaced in the middle of the field.

"Ready for battle." The commanders of the German assault guns closed the hatches and the loaders sent a shell. The gunners were waiting for the order to open fire. The rapid attack by German assault guns turned out to be fatal for the Soviet unit; in the short-lived battle it was almost completely destroyed. Actually, the relaxation of the Red Army soldiers was largely explainable. Many of them, who were away from Berlin, believed that the war was over for them. They awaited the fall of the German capital with undisguised joy. Most of them were happy that they did not have to take part in the “Berlin meat grinder.” And then suddenly the advancing Germans appeared in front of them, as if out of thin air. The forces of the Ferdinand von Schill division passed like a knife through butter through the positions of the relaxed Soviet unit. The Red Army battalion was destroyed. But then the Germans did not have to count on such luck. Near a small village, Major Nebel gave the order to outflank it. The Schill motorized infantry battalion was supposed to enter into battle with the Red Army soldiers who were in it. A battle broke out in the village. The Germans again managed to push back the Soviet troops. The Red Army soldiers chose to retreat. The village was recaptured from the Red Army. It seemed that Germany was by no means losing the war. The guns paved the way for the German infantry.

On the right flank of the Ferdinand von Schill division, units of the Ulrich von Hutten division went on the offensive. They advanced in the direction of the Beelitzer sanatorium. Next they had to advance in the direction of Potsdam. The Ulrich von Hutten division itself, according to General Wenck’s plan, was to become a striking force, which, moving east from Belzig on both sides of the railway line, was supposed to break any Soviet resistance and still reach Potsdam. Since the division commander considered it too dangerous to undertake an offensive without cover on the flanks and reconnaissance, on the night of April 28 he sent forward a powerful vanguard. It was composed of several eight-wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicles mounted with a 75 mm short gun, motorcycle gunners and a company of armored personnel carriers. In addition, this forward shock detachment of the division was covered from the east by the forces of a powerful reconnaissance group, which had at its disposal several trucks and 50-mm field guns. Meanwhile, on the wide right flank of the 12th Army, which was held by the divisions “Theodor Körner” and “Scharnhorst,” there were continuous fierce battles starting from April 27, 1945.

Tank reconnaissance of the Ulrich von Hutten division, which was distinguished by tangled forests, suddenly encountered Soviet units northeast of Belzig, which offered strong resistance to the Germans. The Germans did not want to lose the tactical initiative under any circumstances. But if the plans of General Wenck had become clear to the Soviet command, in particular, the offensive of the Ulrich von Hutten division had been revealed, then the Red Army units could have used effective countermeasures. For example, the possibility of a Soviet offensive on the right flank was not excluded, which, if successful, could end in the complete destruction of the 12th Army. For this reason, the tanks were ordered to retreat, as if depicting a “wandering” Wehrmacht group.

But already towards noon, units of the Red Army launched a powerful attack on the positions of the Ulrich von Hutten division. But the Germans once again launched their assault guns into battle. They managed to repulse the Soviet attack and push back parts of the Red Army to the east. The destroyed Soviet reconnaissance armored vehicles allowed the command of the German division to come to the conclusion that the Germans were mainly opposed by motorized reconnaissance units. But the situation was constantly changing throughout the day. The closer the Ulrich von Hutten Division got to the forests southwest of Potsdam, the stronger the Soviet defense became. Soviet anti-tank guns began to appear. At first they were isolated. Then anti-tank barriers began to emerge from them. Already in the afternoon the German offensive died down. Under these conditions, Lieutenant General Engel faced a dilemma: whether he should stop the offensive or, on the contrary, throw new forces into battle to continue it. Engel himself preferred to choose the second.

Parts of the division managed to break through the second line of Soviet defense, which ran 15 kilometers northeast of Belzig. For this purpose, high explosive and tracer charges were used. As German officers recalled, this tactic had a very strong “influence” on the confused Red Army soldiers. Soviet troops were forced to retreat. The artillery shots heard on the right flank and the noise of the battle showed the command of the Ulrich von Hutten division that neighboring divisions were also engaged in a bloody battle.

On the afternoon of April 28, the Ulrich von Hutten division and the units of the Ferdinand von Schill division located on the left flank were able to penetrate into the Laniner Forest. The intended goal - crossing the Havel to the southwestern outskirts of Potsdam - seemed to be within easy reach. The division “Ulrich von Hutten” was separated from it by some 15 kilometers. But on the night of April 29, the division's positions were attacked several times by Soviet reconnaissance battalions. For the subsequent offensive, which was scheduled for April 29, the lieutenant general allocated two regiments, which were moved to the front line under cover of darkness. The first regiment was reinforced by a company of assault guns, and the second by two tank platoons. They were supposed to move forward, and the German infantry strike groups were to sit on their armor. This was the only way to quickly advance along forest and field roads. At the same time, Lieutenant General Engel had to take into account the possible presence of significant Soviet forces in Laninersky Forest. To neutralize a possible threat from the flanks, he assigned several armored personnel carriers and armored reconnaissance vehicles as cover. It was in this order that the Ulrich von Hutten division began its offensive on April 29. Both regiments had to fight their way through bloody forest battles. In some places, the Germans still managed to break through the Soviet defenses. In the clearings, special teams of faustpatrons were used to fire at Soviet tanks.

Mobile radio vehicles "Taube" ("Pigeons") sent for flank reconnaissance constantly reported to division headquarters about the movements of flank groups, as well as the movements of units of the neighboring division "Ferdinand von Schill", which were also drawn into forest battles. Looking ahead, let's say that the day before the Ferdinand von Schill division was reinforced by units of Reimann's corps group from Potsdam. By noon, during the fighting, units of the Ulrich von Hutten division managed to recapture at least six forest villages and farmsteads from the Red Army units. Reports from the Scharnhorst and Theodor Körner divisions indicated that they, while fighting fiercely for Belzig, were embroiled in a battle against two Soviet mechanized corps. These divisions had difficulty holding back the Soviet onslaught, but continued to fight, as this was the main prerequisite for the divisions "Ulrich von Hutten" and "Ferdinand von Schill" to reach Potsdam.

Meanwhile, a strong battle began for the interchange on the motorway, which was located southeast of Potsdam. Here, units of the Red Army launched heavy IS-3 tanks (“Joseph Stalin-3”), which were armed with 152 mm guns. While elements of the German Ferdinand von Schill Division held positions on the left flank of the Ulrich von Hutten Division, there was some assurance that the Soviet troops would not be able to take the aforementioned junction, which was known as the Leipzig Triangle, outright. This transport junction was of strategic importance for the command of the 12th Army, since it was through it that the 9th German Army could escape from encirclement.

Lieutenant General Engel decided to put the most experienced assault gun crews back into action. The command was heard again: “Assault guns, forward!” The cars rushed to attack. Experienced tank crews and “assault artillerymen”, even on the Eastern Front, were well aware of one weak side of the “steel giants”, Soviet IS-type tanks. After the shot, the crew took a long time to reload the gun. To do this, it was necessary to lower the barrel of the tank gun slightly. At this moment, German assault guns could successfully attack the seemingly impregnable ISs.

Disguised behind the bushes that grew along the highway, the assault guns rushed forward. They walked in such an order that they could only come under fire from a single Soviet tank. As soon as the Soviet IS fired a shot, the German assault gun burst out of cover. In the few seconds given to the German crew, a shot could be fired. Usually the Germans aimed at the IS's weak point - the gap between the turret and the tank's hull. The shell that hit there completely disabled the Soviet tank. So, during this battle, German assault guns managed to knock out six “armored colossi”. At the same time, the Germans themselves did not lose a single vehicle.

As we see, the German assault guns again determined the outcome of the battle. The Germans were able to reach an intermediate defensive line, to which the 9th Army was supposed to withdraw. Meanwhile, the main units of the Ulrich von Hutten division were able to reach Lake Havel. In addition, they were able to take positions on the northern and southern shores of Lake Shvilov. This made it possible to cover the division's flanks without unnecessary hassle. Now Lieutenant General Engel sent one of the regiments to Beelitz to provide support to the Theodor Körner and Scharnhorst divisions fighting there.

On the right flank of the 12th Army, the Theodor Körner Division advanced to deliver the main blow towards Potsdam and Berlin with its left wing. But here the division encountered powerful Soviet defenses. Periodically, units of the Red Army tried to launch counterattacks, but all of them were repelled by the Germans both in the second half of April 27 and in the first half of April 28.

Along with the Ulrich von Hutten division, Beelitz attacked the Malov regiment of the Scharnhorst division (it was named after the regiment commander, Major Malov, who died near Zerbst). As a result, on the right flank, units of the Ulrich von Hutten division found themselves closely connected with this battle group of the Scharnhorst division. The commander of the regiment "Malov" (also a major - his name was not preserved in German historiography) personally led soldiers in an attack on the Beelitz sanatorium occupied by the Red Army. There was clearly a shortage of officers in the regiment. Shortly before this, the headquarters of the 2nd battalion was blown up in the forest by a direct hit from a mine. But, despite this, the battalion continued its offensive. In the second half of April 28, German armored personnel carriers broke through to the prisoner of war camp located near the sanatorium. It housed about 3 thousand wounded German soldiers. The guard, consisting of several Red Army soldiers, chose to retreat. The Germans began to storm the sanatorium. One of the officers of the Malov regiment was able to penetrate the Soviet communications post, where he cut all the wires. Five minutes later the sanatorium was in German hands. The sanatorium staff (doctors, nurses), as well as the German wounded themselves, could not believe what had happened. No one expected units of the 12th Army to appear in Beelitsa.

The officers immediately contacted General Wenck. He hastened to assure the head doctor of the German sanatorium: “The army will do everything possible to remove all the wounded as quickly as possible. All wounded who are able to move independently should immediately move on foot to the west. Our roads in the rear up to the Elbe are not yet occupied by the enemy.” The command of the 12th Army immediately gave the order to send all available vehicles for transporting the wounded. Ambulances and buses shuttled the wounded to Barbie. However, this did not mean the end of the offensive itself. On April 28, the advanced units of the XX Army Corps had already reached Ferch, which was located slightly south of Potsdam.

Meanwhile, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps crossed the Elbe. This allowed the command of the 12th Army to send the remnants of the XX Army Corps remaining in this area into battle. It must be immediately stated that in this situation representatives of the Red Cross intervened in the matter. One of them, by pure coincidence, ended up in the Beelitz sanatorium occupied by the Germans. On April 29, he went to the Americans to negotiate the possibility of transporting most of the wounded from the sanatorium to their occupation zone.

In the afternoon of April 28, a radio message from German units defending in Potsdam arrived at the headquarters of the 12th Army. It sounded like this: “The XX Army Corps has reached Ferge. We are looking for everything possible means and establish contact with the 12th Army.” General Reimann immediately began to act. To break through the Soviet encirclement, he gathered about 20 thousand German soldiers. After this, he managed to establish contact with the divisions “Ferdinand von Schill” and “Ulrich von Hutten” that had escaped from the Laniner Forest. While the assault guns of the Ferdinand von Schill division tried to relieve Potsdam from the southwest, its German defenders attempted to move towards them and break through the Soviet encirclement.

After this, General Wenck instructed General Reimann to begin a breakthrough through the coast of the lakes near Alt-Geltow in the afternoon. It was easier to break through the ring of the Red Army there. The formal meat grinder began. The Germans who tried to escape repeated their attempts again and again. Some of them found gaps in the encirclement ring.

Lieutenant Colonel Muller led his division along the forest towards the groups that had escaped from the encirclement. Major Nebel with a brigade of Schill assault guns tried to destroy Soviet tanks advancing from the left flank from the clearing. He tried to hold the gap through which the Germans were leaving Potsdam. One of these groups almost reached the positions of the Ulrich von Hutten division, but suddenly found itself under attack by Soviet tanks. As a result, she was forced to break through to the Ferdinand von Schill division. The small space between the Laninersky forest and the lakes turned into one continuous battlefield, from which small groups of Germans tried to escape to the west.

At some point, General Reimann was able to reach Lieutenant Colonel Müller. Both German officers without unnecessary words shook hands. And if the general was forced to go to the headquarters of the 12th Army, then his subordinates (corps group Potsdam), who were lucky enough to escape the encirclement, had to join the ranks of the Ferdinand von Schill division.

From his command post in Prizerb, General Wenck transmitted a message to the Wehrmacht High Command about the completed release of Potsdam and the successes in Ferch and Beelitz. At this time, units of the Red Army were already fighting on the outskirts of the German capital. The news conveyed by Wenk could inspire some optimism. As a result, the liaison officers immediately relayed this message. With lightning speed, this news was delivered from the Wehrmacht High Command to the Fuhrer's bunker. At the same time, the surrounded 9th Army learned about the military successes of General Wenck. General Wenck himself was constantly in radio contact with the 9th Army. He couldn't hide his disappointment at her situation. The “cauldron” was shrinking narrower and narrower with each passing hour. He himself understood perfectly well that the forces of the 9th Army were already running out. General Busse, even if he managed to lead the army out of encirclement, was unlikely to be able to launch an attack on Berlin. The units at his disposal were exhausted in battle.

On the morning of April 29, 1945, Wenck’s headquarters received another radio message that described the situation in the “cauldron.” General Busse himself did not try to sugarcoat the situation. At the end of this report he said: "Physical and mental condition soldiers and officers, as well as the lack of fuel and ammunition, not only do not imply the possibility of breaking through the enemy’s encirclement, but also hardly allow one to count on long-term defense. A separate problem is the needs of the civilian population who find themselves in a constantly shrinking ring of encirclement. Only measures carried out by all generals at once make it possible to still control the units. It goes without saying that the 9th Army will fight to the last.”

Wenk was very disappointed. As a result, he turned to the headquarters of the 12th Army with a request to try to plan a last attempt to relieve the 9th Army.

Meanwhile, rumors were circulating intensely in Berlin: “The wreath is already standing near Potsdam!” This message snapped the Germans out of their horror and gave them the last vague hope. Although the most literate of them noted skeptically: why is no official information given about this? This omission was quickly corrected. One day, General Wenk's orderly was listening to the radio at the command post. Suddenly he stood up and addressed the army commander: “Mr. General! You definitely need to hear this.” General Wenck and all the staff officers clung to the radio. They transmitted a report from the Wehrmacht. What they heard shocked them as much as it outraged them.

“The Wehrmacht command announces. The fateful struggle of the entire German people against Bolshevism found its expression in the heroic struggle of Berlin. While a battle unprecedented in history for our capital was unfolding, our units located on the Elbe turned away from the Americans and rushed to the aid of the heroic defenders of Berlin. The divisions transferred from the west in fierce battles drove back the enemy on a wide front and are now approaching Ferhe.” The staff officers looked at each other in amazement. After some silence, General Wenck said indignantly: “If our goals were so brazenly announced to the whole world, then tomorrow we will not be able to move a single step forward. Now the Russians will throw all their forces at us.”

Fighting 12th Army east of the Elbe, including the breakthrough to Potsdam

Shortly before this event, General Wenck again contacted the headquarters of the 9th Army by radio. During the communication session, he pointed out that the environs of Jüterbog, which were occupied by Soviet troops, were too “crowded” to begin breaking through the encirclement there. Indeed, in this case, the Red Army could concentrate considerable forces between Jüterbog and Treuenbritzen! However, there was no particular concentration of Soviet troops south of Beelitz. The Red Army units there were dispersed over a fairly wide area. Breaking through the encirclement ring around the 9th Army could only succeed on this section of the front. It was there that the 12th Army prepared an intermediate defensive line for the 9th Army, holding back the steadily increasing onslaught of Soviet troops.

By the evening of April 29, 1945, the position of the 12th Army became threatening. Soviet troops could crush its flanks at any moment. In the south, units of the Red Army, supported by numerous tanks, tried to break through to the Treuenbritzen area in order to encircle the advanced units of Wenck's army. At the same time, Soviet tank units attacked Beelitz from the east again and again. Both divisions (Theodor Körner on the right flank and Scharnhorst in Beelitz itself) managed to repel Soviet attacks. But this couldn't last forever. On that day, as support, they received from Lieutenant General Engel one of the regiments of the Ulrich von Hutten division, which was transferred to another sector of the front. During the fighting, the Beelits sanatorium changed hands three times. But even under these conditions, the Germans tried to continue the offensive. But without tank support, only with the “little man’s anti-tank gun” (as they called the Faustpatron), the German soldiers were unlikely to be able to break through the barriers from Soviet tanks. The wooded terrain greatly favored tank destroyer groups and small machine gun teams, which could take advantage of the terrain at forks in the forest roads leading from east to west.

As a result, by the end of the day, three tank wedges launched an offensive on the Jüterbog-Troyenbritzen front. Having mobilized all available forces, the rangers and German motorized infantry went on the defensive. They understood that the transportation of refugees and wounded from the sanatorium had to last at least a couple of days. The 9th Army also needed these two days to break through the encirclement. But two days in these battles was a very long time.

On the right flank, the onslaught of Soviet troops was held back by the Theodor Körner and Scharnhorst divisions. At the same time, the divisions “Ulrich von Hutten” and “Ferdinand von Schill” were fighting on the left flank. Their positions were somewhat advanced. This made it possible to cover both Leninersky Bor and the transport interchange on the highway - the “Leipzig Triangle” - from the Red Army units cautiously moving forward from Potsdam. Nevertheless, the Soviet infantry, which had considerable experience in fighting in forests, gradually infiltrated into Laninersky Bor. The German assault guns were forced to slowly but steadily withdraw.

Around this very time, Brandenburg, located to the west of Berlin, was captured from the south and east by the Soviet “pincers”. Now the entire northern flank of the 12th Army was exposed. The Ferdinand von Schill division, supported by Kampfgruppe Potsdam, was to hold the northern flank under all circumstances so that Soviet troops could not encircle the 12th Army by outflanking it from the north and west.

In the nearby copses, separate groups of German assault guns tried to attack Red Army units. Supported by German infantry, they used surprise raid tactics. They unexpectedly drove out of the thicket, opened hurricane fire on the Red Army soldiers, and after they retreated, they disappeared into the forest again. Individual Soviet tank units that were able to break into the forest were usually shot in ambush by hidden assault guns. At the same time, the aim of the fire was quite high. Usually the Germans opened fire when Soviet vehicles approached within a hundred meters. Under these conditions, every shot from the ambush was a direct hit. Some time later, almost all forest roads and clearings were clogged with burning Soviet tanks. As a result, Soviet troops had to look for new ways to attack. But at the same time, it was impossible to forget that on a very elongated line of combat, the 12th Army very quickly exhausted its strength. By April 29, the command of the 12th Army believed that it had only two main missions.

First, to wrest out of the “cauldron” the 9th Army, with which the headquarters of the XX Army Corps maintained constant radio contact. The headquarters of the 9th Army itself had to plan a breakthrough not in the Jüterbog-Troyenbritzen sector, where the Red Army had a powerful group, but south of Beelitz, where the Soviet positions were not stable. For the command of the 12th Army it was extremely clear that in order to complete this task it was necessary to hold the captured positions for several days, which meant fighting until the last bullet. However, the Germans were not without some military sacrifice. Later, many of them pointed to fulfilling their comradely duty. Secondly, an orderly withdrawal across the Elbe. If possible, then continuation of hostilities in northern Germany, in the Havelberg area.

The headquarters of all German units were verbally informed that the command of the 12th Army intended to fight against the Red Army, so to speak, “until the last bullet,” after which they planned to begin negotiations with the Americans. It was assumed that the 12th Army was supposed to capitulate on honorable terms, that is, entire military units were supposed to surrender with weapons in hand. The completion of the second task was complicated by the fact that on April 29, 1945, the Americans launched a rapid attack on Wittenberg from the bridgehead in Barbie. It lasted until May 2 inclusive and risked ending with the complete encirclement of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. Fortunately for the Germans, the American offensive did not have time to develop into full force. The Germans managed to hold the southern flank, which later became a prerequisite for the orderly withdrawal of the 12th Army.

Hitler's last radiogram sent to Jodl

The battles of the 12th Army with units of the Red Army continued on April 29, 1945. Now Wenck's army, surrounded on three sides, had to go on the defensive. All divisions, without exception, took part in the battles - the army had no reserves. In the second half of April 29, Wenck gave the order to send a radiogram with the following content to Fürstenberg to the Wehrmacht High Command: “The army, and in particular the XX Army Corps, which was tasked with restoring contact with the Potsdam garrison and which was completed, is squeezed along the entire front line, and therefore an attack on Berlin is no longer possible, especially in conditions when there is no we have to rely on the support of the 9th Army, which has lost its combat power.” This radiogram was never transmitted by the Wehrmacht High Command to Berlin. The command itself, on the afternoon of April 29, departed from the camp near Fürstenberg in a northerly direction. In the evening of the same day, the German generals reached the Dobbin estate, where they settled down. It was there that Hitler’s last radiogram arrived at about 11 p.m. Her text read:

“To the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Operational Command, Colonel General Jodl.

1. Where are the advanced units of Wenk?

2. When will they perform?

3. Where is the 9th Army?

4. Where is Holste's group?

5. When will she perform?

Signed Adolf Hitler."

Despite the brevity of these words, they do not need comments. In this case, you don’t even need to be able to read between the lines to understand that even on April 29, 1945, Hitler still hoped for salvation. Apparently, the Fuhrer’s bunker also hoped for the release of the Reich capital by Wenck’s army. There was no need to give an answer to these questions. When the Wehrmacht High Command received this radiogram, Soviet troops controlled most of Berlin. Eighteen hours later, Hitler committed suicide.

He went down in history as “the last hope of the Fuhrer”

...On the night of April 29-30, 1945, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the OKW, received an alarming message from Adolf Hitler, in which the question was asked: “Where are the advanced units of Wenck?” We were talking about the 12th Army of General Walter Wenck, which, according to Hitler, was the only hope for salvation that Berlin and he himself could rely on. But this hope had nothing in common with reality, since General Wenck did not have tanks, and the guns at his disposal were too few. Although during the war Wenck established himself as a master at getting out of difficult situations...

...But the task of saving Berlin was impossible...

…Walter Wenck was a man of good appearance and average height who always seemed to exude a sense of self-confidence. He was born on September 18, 1900 in Wittenberg, in 1911 he entered the cadet corps in Naumberg, and in 1918 he entered the secondary military school in Groß-Lichterfeld. After serving for some time in two formations of the volunteer corps, on May 1, 1920, he was enlisted in the Reichswehr with the rank of private in the 5th Infantry Regiment, where he served until 1933. On February 1, 1923, he was promoted to the rank of non-commissioned officer.

In May 1933, Wenck (already a lieutenant) was transferred to the 3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion. Having received the rank of Hauptmann, he underwent training at the General Staff and in 1936 was transferred to the headquarters of the tank corps, stationed in Berlin. On March 1, 1939, he was promoted to major and joined the 1st Panzer Division in Weimar as an operations officer. With the 1st Panzer Division, Wenck went through the Polish and Western campaigns.

During the “blitzkrieg” carried out by the Germans in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, Wenck was wounded in the leg, but did not leave his post. On June 17, when the 1st Panzer Division reached the goal of its day's march - Montbéliard, and there was a lot of fuel left in the tanks of its tanks, Wenck made an independent decision. Unable to contact the division commander (Lieutenant General Friedrich Kirchner), he informed General Heinz Guderian (commander of the XIX Panzer Corps) that he had ordered an attack on Belfort on his own initiative.

Walter Wenck

This bold move was approved by Guderian, and the French were taken by surprise. This decision and its skilled execution did not go unnoticed - on December 1, 1940, Wenck received the rank of Oberstleutnant.

When the 1st Panzer Division crossed the border into the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Wenck was still serving as its operations officer. After a push to the outskirts of Leningrad, the 1st Panzer Division was transferred to Army Group Center to participate in the final campaign against Moscow. But, like many other tank divisions, it got stuck in the mud of muddy Russian roads and did not reach the Soviet capital. In December 1941, during a Soviet counterattack, she was surrounded, from which, however, she successfully escaped thanks to the plan developed by Wenck and returned to the German defensive lines. For his successes, Wenck was awarded the Golden Cross and two months later was admitted to the General Staff Military Academy.

On June 1, 1942, Walter Wenck was promoted to oberst (colonel), and in September he was assigned to the headquarters of the LVII Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front. At this time, the corps was in the Rostov-on-Don area and was moving east. He took part in the campaign in the Caucasus. In November, during the dramatic battle of Stalingrad, Wenck was chief of staff of the Romanian 3rd Army. The Romanians had just been crushed to smithereens by Soviet troops and put to flight. They still continued to retreat, leaving behind only haphazardly scattered scattered German units. Wenck, having driven along the roads, collected the fugitives and put them together into prefabricated formations. At rest stops, he showed them films and, when the tired soldiers got tired of watching, he sent them off to war again.

Heinz Guderian and Walter Wenck

The soldiers who joined Wenck's new army came from a wide variety of army groups, including the XLVIII Panzer Corps, emergency units of the Luftwaffe, rear units of the encircled 6th Army, as well as soldiers returning from leave in Germany from the 4th Panzer and 6th Armies . The commander of the newly created Army Group Don, Field Marshal Erich Manstein, met with Wenck in Novocherkassk and told him: “You will answer with your head if you allow the Russians to break through to Rostov in your sector. The defensive line must hold. If it is not held, we will lose not only the 6th Army in Stalingrad, but also Army Group A in the Caucasus." Wenck kept his head, and Manstein kept his army...

Oberst repulsed all Russian attempts to break through the front line in his sector. On December 28, 1942, Wenck was awarded the Knight's Cross, and a day later he was appointed chief of staff of the army of Karl-Adolf Holidt. On February 1 of the following year, Walter Wenck was promoted to major general and on March 11 became chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army. In 1943, the 1st Army took part in the most difficult battles and in March 1944 found itself in the Kamenets-Podolsk cauldron on the Dniester River.

Once again, Walter Wenck (nicknamed “Daddy” by the troops) played a major role in breaking through the encirclement. As a result, he was expected to be promoted (the position of chief of staff of Army Group “Southern Ukraine”). On April 1, 1944, he received the rank of lieutenant general. But Wenk stayed in this position for only 4 months. Soon he was appointed head of the operational department and assistant chief of staff of the OKH. Now he transmitted his reports directly to Hitler. At the very first meeting, Wenck told the Fuhrer that the Eastern Front was like Swiss cheese - “there are only holes in it.” Although Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel was offended by such language (and such honesty?), Hitler appreciated both of them, he liked Wenck’s directness and intelligence.

Wenck (foreground) plans the German offensive

By mid-February 1945, the Russians had reached the Oder River between Schwedt and Grünberg, with their flanks still vulnerable. The General Staff developed a plan for a counterattack, which was to be carried out by the Vistula group, which was under the command of Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. In a heated argument, Heinz Guderian, now Chief of the General Staff of the Army, convinced the Fuhrer to appoint Walter Wenck to the post of Chief of Staff of the group. This gave at least some hope for the success of the operation. Wenck's coordinated attack was initially successful. At the same time, Hitler insisted that he continue to attend nightly meetings with the Führer, which meant Wenck made 200-mile trips every day.

On February 14, 1945, on the way from the front line, Wenk, tired to the limit, replaced his unconscious driver Hermann Dorn at the wheel. Wenk fell asleep at the wheel, lost control, and the car crashed into the parapet of a bridge on the Berlin-Stettin autobahn. Dorn pulled Wenk out from under a pile of flaming rubble, pulled off his general's jacket and put out the burning clothes. Wenk's skull was damaged in several places, five ribs were broken, and there were numerous bruises on his body. Without Wenk, who was hospitalized, the counterattack failed...

Still recovering, Wenck was promoted to general of tank forces on April 10, 1945. Hitler soon created a new 12th Army and appointed General Wenck (who at that time was forced to wear a corset due to injuries) as its commander. Wenck's army had no tank units and only one anti-tank battalion. Sent initially to defend against the Americans, Wenck received orders on April 20 to turn east and strike at Soviet units. But Wenck's goal, as opposed to saving Berlin (which was already virtually surrounded by Soviet troops), was to save the 9th Army of General Theodor Busse.

Walter Wenck did not like defeats, but accepted them with dignity...

Shortly before midnight on April 22, Field Marshal Keitel arrived at Wenck's headquarters in a depressed mood. Wenk was somewhat confused when he saw him. The field marshal arrived in full dress uniform and, having formally greeted him (lightly touching his cap with his baton), excitedly pointed to the map, saying that their duty told them to save Hitler. Keitel told Wenck that the situation was completely desperate and that both armies, Busse's 9th and Wenck's 12th, must march to Berlin immediately. Wenck, realizing that it was useless to argue with Keitel, who was agitated and had lost the ability to think, agreed.

But at the same time, Walter Wenck knew that time to save the 12th Army was lost. Despite the fact that he retained his position and even managed to send advanced units towards Potsdam, he did this only to enable the encircled 9th Army to join his units. Next, Wenck hoped to hold out as long as possible in order to allow refugees fleeing the Russians to escape to the west and take advantage of the cover of his forces. At the very last moment, he intended to move west and surrender to the Americans. On April 24 and 25, Keitel again appeared at Wenck's, exhorting him to liberate Potsdam and establish contact with Berlin. It’s surprising that Wenck still managed to get almost close to Potsdam, but that’s all he was capable of, since he didn’t have any resources to complete the task.

Hitler, still hoping for salvation, made a request to Keitel about Wenck's whereabouts on the night of April 29-30. Wenck managed to hold out until May 1, when separate units of Busse's army broke through from the encirclement and joined the 12th Army. Then Wenck, gathering all his forces, together with thousands of German civilians quickly moved west, crossed the Elbe and surrendered to the Americans on May 7, 1945...

General Walter Wenck, nicknamed "Papa", "Young General"

Immediately after the war, Wenck served as a manager in a medium-sized commercial firm in Dalhausen. In the business world he was able to achieve a position as successful as he had in the army. In 1950, he joined the board of a large industrial company and in 1953 became a member of the board of directors, and in 1955 he took the place of chairman of the board. At the end of the 60s he retired, although he retained his office in Bonn. At the end of the 70s he was still alive and well...

A few more touches to the portrait of Walter Wenck from the book by Elena Syanova: “An employee of Allen Dulles’s apparatus, Colonel Garrison (a private letter dated August 3, 1967 from the retired Garrison was addressed to his friend) wrote: “General Wenck’s breakthrough to Potsdam and in general the whole situation around it man in itself was amazing, but Walter Wenck himself seemed even more amazing to us, whom I had the opportunity to observe for half an hour on May 7... While signing the papers, he looked very drunk. He answered questions, although clearly, but only “yes” and “no”, and when after the first short conversation, left the headquarters building, then, without taking even two steps, he literally collapsed into the arms of the staff who picked him up. “Good,” I thought. “I found the time!”

Many of them then got drunk to the point of bestiality and completely lost their “Aryan” luster. This is how they drowned out despair... They brought Venk back to the headquarters, called a doctor to see him, who listened to his pulse, looked at his pupils, shrugged his shoulders and ordered him to undress, just in case. We all gasped. Venka was wearing a corset, the kind worn for spinal injuries. When the corset was cut, the doctor spread his hands and looked at us rather disapprovingly and questioningly. Wenk's body looked as if he had been beaten several times for a long time and severely. His adjutant, however, immediately explained that his boss had been in a serious car accident two and a half months ago and since then had almost no opportunity for treatment, since he was always in the most critical places on the front, following orders. The doctor first said that the general was most likely in pain shock, but after examining him again, he discovered that Wenck was simply sleeping. I confess to you, the fortitude of this handsome guy made an impressive impression on us then, especially against the backdrop of the order and dignity in which his two armies with kilometer-long tails of refugees were at that moment.”

General Wenck formed his last units from such members of the Hitler Youth...

After the war, Walter Wenck would live another 37 years. He will never serve again. Although more than once he will experience the pressure of an order - an “eternal order” for a German soldier to get back into line. Why? “We all winced at the Jewish pogroms, at rumors about the cruel treatment of Russian prisoners of war and deportations... we winced and... followed the order. You're right, an order is not an excuse. There is no order or justification in my life now. But there is a feeling of disgust, because... - Walter Wenck wrote to Margarita Hess (letter dated June 22, 1950), - because no one accuses me. I'm not on any of the lists. Even the Russians spat on me. Why the hell did I surrender to them?! Why the hell did I give in to myself?! I remember when I was a child, in the cadet corps, our entire platoon was punished for something - everyone except me. It's hard to imagine a worse punishment. The humiliation made me sick..."

One of the indirect references to General Wenck is associated with the Soviet trophy - the legendary “Goliath”. "Goliath" is an ultra-long-wave radio station that provides communications with submarines at a distance of up to 4,000 kilometers. It was built in Germany near the city of Kalbe in 1943 to coordinate the actions of German submarines from the so-called “wolf packs”. The radio station is a mast field; cables stretched between the masts serve as antennas.

The 13th Army Corps of two-star General Guillem (9th US Army) received the command to occupy the territory of Altmark from the Hanover region through the cities of Gardelengen and Kalbe (Milde) towards the Elbe River to reach the line of communication with the advancing Soviet troops. The 47th is coming towards them towards the Elbe Soviet army, closing a possible path to a breakthrough to the west from the encirclement of the Berlin Wehrmacht group. The Americans are in a hurry. They would like to enter Berlin before the Soviet troops. But this task turned out to be beyond their strength. The bridges across the Elbe are blown up one after another at the first appearance of American tanks. On April 12, American tank units of the 13th Army Corps stopped on the western bank of the Elbe, 85 kilometers from Berlin. All three bridges over the Elbe in Altmark were blown up. At noon on April 16, American front-line commanders received orders to stop their advance on the Elbe and wait for the Russian allies there.

The famous German transmitter "Goliath"

In April 1945, when only a few days remained before the end of the war, Wehrmacht troops were taken out of concentration camps located in northern districts, able-bodied prisoners and sent them to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Berlin. But the Nazis did not have time to deliver the prisoners to their destination, since the Americans were moving very quickly towards the Elbe. The prisoners were dropped off near the town of Gardelegen, which is two dozen kilometers from the town of Kalbe (Milde), taken to a large field, taken into a barn and set on fire.

The Americans who entered the city found everyone already dead. At this place it was decided to create a Military Cemetery-Memorial to the victims of fascism. The plaque reads: “Here lie 1,016 Allied prisoners of war, killed by their guards. The residents of Gardelegen buried them and pledged to preserve their graves, just as the memory of the dead would be kept in the hearts of peace-loving people. The cemetery is maintained under the supervision of the 102nd Division of the US Army. Any disturbance of the peace of the dead will be punished with the heaviest punishments. Frank Keating, Commander American army».

The Americans occupied the Goliath area at noon on April 11, 1945, and turned it into a camp for prisoners of war of German soldiers and officers, possibly due to the presence of a ditch and a high fence. After the collapse of the German front on the Oder, hundreds of thousands of Wehrmacht soldiers and officers crossed the Elbe to escape the advancing Soviet troops. The prisoner of war camp on the territory of "Goliath" filled up very quickly.

Germans in American captivity

According to reports from participants in those events, up to 85,000 people were placed in the fields between the antenna masts. Among them is General Walter Wenck, commander of the German 12th Army, with the command staff of this army. In total, 18 generals - commanders of tank, infantry, SS corps and divisions - and a large number of senior officers of the defeated German troops were in American captivity on the territory of "Goliath". There were a lot of young people aged 15-16 years old from the 12th Army in the prisoner of war camp. The treatment of German prisoners of war in the camp by American guards was harsh. The guards were soldiers of the US 102nd Division, and they saw what the Nazis did to prisoners of war in Gardelegen allied forces.

At the end of May, the Americans were replaced by the British in the area of ​​​​the city of Kalbe (Milde). A Scottish military unit began to guard the prisoner of war camp. And already at the end of June 1945, in accordance with the decisions of the Yalta Conference of 1945 on the zones of German occupation, Soviet troops entered the territory of Altmark and the Goliath radio station. On July 2, 1945, the territory of “Goliath” and the remains of the prisoner of war camp were received by representatives of the Soviet troops. The prisoner of war camp finally ceased to exist on July 26, 1945.

Of course, the commanders of Soviet military units immediately drew attention to the unusual structures and structures on the territory where the camp for German prisoners of war was located. This was reported on command to senior management. After the closure of the prisoner of war camp, Soviet specialists took over the territory of the radio station.

The Reich Eagle was finally defeated...

The first Soviet military commandant of the city of Kalbe (Milde) was appointed engineer-major Matvey Markovich Goldfeld, a representative of the USSR Navy Communications Directorate. Despite the trees that have grown over the years, the remains of Goliath are clearly visible in satellite images today. This is where the German part of the history of the VSD radio station “Goliath” ended.

According to standards international law German VDF radio station "Goliath" - a military trophy, that is, military property of the German fleet, surrendered Soviet Union at the surrender of Germany in 1945. Therefore, it is considered the property of the Russian Federation as a state that assumed all the obligations of the USSR, the winner of World War II, and can be used by Russia for both military and other purposes.

P.S. Reference: Walter Wenck (1900-1982) became a successful businessman in the post-war world and was still very active in the industrial sector at the end of the 70s. Among others whose professional and political careers took off after the end of the war, it is worth noting, first of all, the former Imperial Secretary Erhard Milch, Hasso von Manteuffel, as well as the famous Luftwaffe ace Major Erich Hartmann. After the war, Milch lived in Düsseldorf, where he worked as an industrial consultant for the aircraft manufacturing department of the Fiat company and the Thyssen steel syndicate. Manteuffel worked as an adviser in the Cologne bank of Oppenheim, in 1947 he was elected to the magistrate of the city of Neuss am Rhein, and from 53 to 57 he was even a member of the Bundestag. And finally, Hartmann came to court in the newly created German Air Force, even receiving under his command the 71st Richthofen Fighter Regiment stationed in Oldenburg. General Wenck himself died in a car accident...