Revolutions do not arise because of growing discontent with poverty, inequality and other similar phenomena. Revolution is a complex process that unexpectedly emerges from a social system that is declining in many areas at once.
Unfortunately, it can be difficult to understand whether a country is in an unstable equilibrium because, despite underlying changes, the situation in it may appear stable for a long time.
Strikes, demonstrations or riots can be dismissed as unimportant as long as they involve a small number of people and the military and police are determined and capable of suppressing them. The sympathy of other groups for the protesters and the dissatisfaction of the military and police may for the time being not be manifested externally.
Elites may hide growing divisions and their opposition until a real opportunity arises to oppose the regime.
Rulers may initiate reforms, hoping they will succeed, or launch repressions, thinking they will put an end to opposition; and only in retrospect does one realize that the reforms did not receive support, and the repressions led to even greater discontent and resistance.
Thus, revolutions are like earthquakes. Geologists are good at identifying high-risk areas, and we know that these are where earthquakes are most likely to occur. However, a series of small shocks can indicate either relaxation or an increase in tension, which may soon be followed by a strong displacement. It is usually impossible to say in advance what will happen. An earthquake can occur on a well-known fault, or it can occur on a new or previously undiscovered line. Knowledge of general mechanisms does not allow us to predict earthquakes. Likewise, sociologists can tell which societies may have fractures and tensions. This is evidenced by signs of social conflict or problems that institutions or groups face in solving routine problems or achieving their goals. However, this does not mean that we can accurately predict when a particular country will experience revolutionary upheaval.
Scholars of revolutions agree with each other on five elements that are considered necessary and sufficient conditions for unstable social equilibrium. The first of these is problems in the economic and fiscal spheres, which prevent the flow of rent and taxes to the rulers and elites and reduce the income of the entire population as a whole. Such problems usually lead to governments raising taxes or going into debt, often doing so in ways that are seen as unfair. The ability of rulers to reward supporters and pay salaries to officials and the military is also reduced.
The second element is the growing alienation and oppositional sentiments among the elites. Elites are always competing for influence. Family clans, parties, factions compete with each other. However, the ruler usually uses this competition to secure the support of elites, pitting one group against another and rewarding loyalty.
Stable elites also tend to recruit and retain talented newcomers. Alienation occurs when a particular elite group feels that it is being systematically and unfairly sidelined and denied access to the ruler.
The “old” elites think that newcomers are bypassing them, and the new and ambitious elites think that the old-timers are blocking their way. Elites may come to believe that a particular group—a small circle of close friends or members of the ruler's ethnic or regional group—is unfairly receiving the bulk of political power or economic dividends. In these circumstances, they may feel that their loyalty will not be rewarded and that the regime will always disadvantage them. In this case, they can advocate for reforms, and if reforms are blocked or declared ineffective, decide to mobilize and even try to take advantage of popular discontent to put pressure on the regime. As alienation grows, they may decide to overthrow and change the existing social order, rather than simply improve their position within it.
The third element is revolutionary mobilization, based on growing popular indignation at injustice. This outrage is not necessarily a consequence of extreme poverty or inequality. People rather feel that they are losing position in society for reasons that cannot be considered inevitable and for which they are not to blame. These may be peasants worried that they are losing access to land or are being subjected to too high rents, exorbitant taxes or other levies; or they could be workers who are unable to find work or face rising prices for basic necessities or non-indexed wages. These may be students who find it extremely difficult to find a job that meets their expectations and desires, or mothers who feel that they are unable to feed their children. When these groups realize that their problems arise from the unjust actions of elites or rulers, they will take risks and engage in revolts to draw attention to their plight and demand change.
Community groups may operate through their own local organizations, such as peasant communes and village councils, workers' unions, communities, student or youth organizations, guilds or professional associations.
But they can also be mobilized by civilian or military elites who will attract and organize the population to challenge the authorities.
Community groups may take part in city marches, demonstrations and occupation of public spaces. In the 19th century, the words “To the barricades!” were a call to block the path of the troops and prevent them from entering the “liberated” areas. Today, the takeover looks like crowds filling public spaces in city centers, such as Cairo's Tahrir Square. Workers may also call for boycotts and general strikes. If revolutionaries believe that the government in the capital is too strong, they can organize partisan detachments in remote mountainous or forest areas and gradually accumulate forces.
Rebellions that remain local and isolated are usually easily suppressed. But if the uprising spans several regions and is joined by peasants, workers and students, and these groups, in turn, establish links with the elites, the resistance may be too massive for the authorities to cope with it immediately and entirely. Revolutionary forces can concentrate in certain areas, avoiding clashes with government forces in some areas and striking in others. At some point, officers and privates or non-commissioned officers may refuse to kill their own people in order for the government to retain power, and then desertion or the collapse of the army will signal the imminent victory of the revolutionary forces.
The fourth element is ideology, which offers a compelling and shared narrative of resistance, uniting the grievances and demands of the population and elites, connecting different groups and facilitating their mobilization.
Ideology can take the form of a new religious movement: fundamentalist religious groups, from the English Puritans to jihadists, have often found justification for rebellion by citing the immorality of the ruler. Ideology can also take the form of a secular narrative of struggle against injustice, emphasizing rights and pointing to innocent victims of abuse.
It could be a narrative of national liberation. Whatever the form, effective resistance narratives highlight the terrible injustices of the regime, creating a sense of unity and the righteousness of their cause among the opposition.
Although elites may emphasize abstract concepts such as the evils of capitalism or the importance of natural rights, the most effective narratives of resistance also draw on local traditions and stories of past heroes who fought for justice. American and French revolutionaries cited revolutionary stories from the times of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome as examples. Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutionaries remembered the first Cuban and Nicaraguan independence fighters - José Martí and Augusto Cesar Sandino. Research has revealed an interesting fact: in order to unite and motivate their supporters, revolutionary ideologies do not need to offer a precise plan for the future. Instead, what works best is vague or utopian promises of a better life coupled with detailed and emotionally compelling depictions of the intolerable injustices and inevitable evils of the existing regime.
Finally, a revolution needs a favorable international environment. The success of the revolution often depended either on foreign aid coming to the opposition at a difficult moment, or on the refusal of assistance to the ruler by a foreign power. Conversely, many revolutions have failed or been suppressed by interventions aimed at aiding the counter-revolution.
When five conditions coincide (economic or fiscal problems, elite alienation and resistance, widespread outrage at injustice, a compelling and shared narrative of resistance, and a favorable international environment), the normal social mechanisms that restore order during crises cease to function, and society shifts into state of unstable equilibrium. Now any unfavorable event can cause a wave of popular uprisings and lead to resistance from the elites, and then a revolution will occur.
However, all five of the above conditions rarely coincide. In addition, they are difficult to recognize during periods of apparent stability. A government may hide its true financial position until it unexpectedly goes bankrupt; elites, as a rule, do not advertise their disloyalty until a real opportunity for action arises; and sections of the population seething with internal indignation hide how far they are willing to go. Narratives of resistance may circulate underground or in secret cells;
and until the revolutionary struggle begins, it is often unclear whether foreign intervention will be aimed at supporting the revolution or suppressing it.
Difficulties in figuring out whether external stability indicates a stable or unstable equilibrium give rise to the paradox of revolutions. In hindsight, after the revolution had already occurred, it seems quite obvious how severely economic or fiscal problems had an impact on the finances of governments and elites; how alienated and distant the elites were from the regime; how widespread were feelings of outrage at injustice; how compelling the revolutionary narratives were; how favorable the international situation was.
The causes of the revolution can be described in such detail that in retrospect it seems inevitable.
However, in reality, revolutions come as a complete surprise to everyone, including the rulers, the revolutionaries themselves, and foreign powers. Lenin made a widely known statement in January 1917, just months before the fall of the Tsarist regime, saying that “we old men may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution.”
This happens because usually no one can predict when all five conditions will coincide. Rulers almost always underestimate how unfair they appear to the population and how far they have alienated the elites.
If, sensing something is wrong, they resort to reforms, this often only aggravates the situation. Revolutionaries often do not fully understand the fiscal weakness of the old regime and the extent of support for the opposition. They may still feel that the fight will take many years, even as the elites and military are already defecting to the opposition and the old regime is disintegrating. This is why, even if revolutions seem inevitable in hindsight, they are usually considered improbable and even unthinkable events until they actually begin to happen.
We thank the press service and the Gaidar Institute Publishing House for their assistance in publication
It is common to think that people go out to demonstrations en masse and begin to make a revolution when they have nowhere to escape from hunger and poverty...
But actually it is not.
In the USSR, under the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, there was a special institute, which was vaguely called the “Institute of Social Sciences.” This institute trained professional foreign revolutionaries, taught communists of other countries to control the crowd, manage rumors, and political sentiments.
Based on decades of practical and theoretical work by the staff of this institute, a course “Psychology of spontaneous mass behavior” has been developed, which is taught at Moscow State University and the Russian Academy of Civil Service under the President of the Russian Federation.
In the mid-1990s, one of the authors of this course, Professor A.P. Nazaretyan, academy students, mayors and governors often asked the same thing: “Akop Pogosovich, our people are now poor, poor, living from hand to mouth. When can we expect mass uprisings, demonstrations? Or maybe there will even be a revolution, like in 1917?”
To which Hakob Pogosovich Nazaretyan replied:
“There will be no protests, no revolution. Now the people are not so pampered and rich to make a revolution. For a revolution, a completely different mood is needed.”
And, indeed, there was no revolution in Russia in the 1990s.
So what kind of mood is needed for a person to start dreaming of revolution?
Analyzing the prerequisites for revolutionary situations in different countries and eras, the American psychologist J. Davis compared two versions - the version of K. Marx and the version of the French historian A. de Tocqueville.
According to the first version, the revolution occurs as a result of the unbearable impoverishment of the people. The author of the second version points to the fact that a revolution is always preceded by an improvement in the quality of life (economic growth, expansion of political freedoms).
For example, before the revolution of 1789, the standard of living of French peasants and artisans was the highest in Europe. And the first anti-colonial revolution - the US War of Independence - took place in the richest and best-governed colony in the world.
The American psychologist Davis showed that both K. Marx and A. de Tocqueville were right. It turned out that the revolutionary crisis was indeed preceded by a long period of economic recovery. During this period, the population has more financial opportunities, rights and freedoms, and most importantly, RISING EXPECTATIONS further well-being.
However, sooner or later, against the backdrop of this rise in expectations, SMALL economic recession caused by objective reasons: an unsuccessful war, depletion of resources, population growth, etc.
At this point, the gap between EXPECTATIONS And REALITY, and this gap is assessed by people as CATASTROPHE, as a collapse of foundations, as an incredible infringement of basic rights, vital needs, etc.
It is this discrepancy between expectations and possibilities that gives rise to mass discontent and leads to a crisis and a revolutionary situation.
Over the past 150 years, such a situation has happened in Russia three times.
During the first half XIX century, the economic standard of living and the volume of freedoms of the Russian peasantry steadily increased. Therefore, if at the beginning XIX centuries, peasants did not even think about changing the status of serfs, then by the middle XIX century, this situation no longer satisfied them.
When the Crimean War began in 1853, a rumor spread throughout the provinces that its participants would receive a free diploma. This led to massive requests for parcels to go to the front. However, the war ended unsuccessfully, and the rumor about freedom turned out to be a lie.
The gap between expectation and reality turned out to be great, and a revolutionary situation arose - mass riots and arson of boyar estates. The authorities found the strength to undertake reforms - in 1861, serfdom was abolished, which saved the country from revolution.
To the beginning of XX century, Russia was the most dynamically developing country in the world, a kind of economic miracle, GDP was growing rapidly, there was a process of industrial modernization and an increase in entrepreneurial activity.
However, the war with Japan lost in 1905 and the unsuccessful course of the World War of 1914-1917 led to unexpected difficulties in the economy and caused widespread disappointment.
Mass discontent gives rise to an acute emotional state of a dramatic, unbearable crisis.
The formal impetus for the revolution was difficulties with grain supplies. Moreover, it was not even the fact of lack of bread that started the whole process, but only themselves gossip that in St. Petersburg they may limit the distribution of bread several times.
The untimely delivery of food to the store began to be assessed as “hunger,” and the authorities’ attempt to restore order on the streets as “unbearable repression.” All this led to the revolution.
And, of course, neither this “hunger” nor the “repression” were objective. Is it what happened in February 1917 in St. Petersburg? HUNGER?
Later, 25 years later, in 1941-1942. the city on the Neva will experience a real HUNGER, and even go as far as cannibalism, but at the time of the blockade will there be even the slightest hint of an uprising against Soviet power? Although outwardly everything is very similar - the same city, the same Germans, a similar war, but psychologically everything is the opposite.
Revolution and crisis are the result of a discrepancy between the expected and the actual, between what was planned and what is.
Against the background of successful growth, suddenly at some point the satisfaction of needs decreases somewhat (often as a result of rapid demographic growth, or an unsuccessful war, which was thought of as “small and victorious”), and expectations continue to rise by inertia. The gap gives rise to frustration, the situation seems unbearable and humiliating to people, they look for those to blame - and aggression, which does not find an outlet outside, turns inside the system, the emotional resonance provokes mass unrest...
But if people live consistently poorly (from the point of view of an external observer), they do not experience painful dissatisfaction, do not have inflated expectations, and therefore the likelihood of internal explosions (revolutions) is extremely low.
The collapse of the USSR followed the same scenario. At that time, residents of most of the national outskirts lived richer than residents of the RSFSR - this, as they say, was the policy of the party: residents of the USSR went to the Baltic states to see “how they live in Europe”; We flew to Alma-Ata to go skiing, and to Georgia to lie on the beaches on the shores of the beautiful sea.
The standard of living (and therefore the expectations) of people living in the national republics of the USSR was significantly higher than that of residents of the Russian hinterland. Therefore, the fall in oil prices, shortages and the introduction of food stamps sharply increased revolutionary sentiment in the national outskirts.
As a result, the richest republics - Lithuania and Georgia, Estonia and Latvia - were the first to leave the USSR. It was the residents of these republics who subjectively felt themselves to be the most affected by the economic crisis into which the USSR then found itself. And only after this the revolutionary process captured other republics.
So, the main source of revolutionary sentiment is painful dissatisfaction from unfulfilled expectations.
The case of Auguste Comte is the simplest. From the very beginning he rejoiced in the destruction of representative and liberal institutions, which, in his opinion, were associated with the activities of critical and anarchistic metaphysical reason, as well as with the peculiar evolution of Great Britain.
Comte, in his youthful works, compares the development of the political situation in France and England. In England, he thought, the aristocracy merged with the bourgeoisie and even with the common people in order to gradually reduce the influence and power of the monarchy. The political evolution of France was completely different. Here, on the contrary, the monarchy merged with the communes and the bourgeoisie in order to reduce the influence and power of the aristocracy.
The parliamentary regime in England, according to Comte, was nothing other than a form of domination by the aristocracy. The English Parliament was the institution through which the aristocracy ruled in England, just as it ruled in Venice.
Consequently, parliamentarism, according to Comte, is not a political institution with a universal purpose, but a simple accident of English history. To demand the introduction in France of representative institutions imported from the other side of the English Channel is to make a gross historical mistake, since the most important conditions for parliamentarism are missing here. In addition, this means making a political mistake, fraught with disastrous consequences, namely, wanting to combine parliament and the monarchy, since it was the monarchy, as the highest manifestation of the previous regime, that was the enemy of the French Revolution,
In a word, the combination of monarchy and parliament, the ideal of the Constituent Assembly, seems impossible to Comte, because it is based on two fundamental errors, one of which concerns the nature of representative institutions in general, and the second - the history of France. Moreover, Comte is inclined to
the idea of centralization, which seems to him natural for the history of France. In this regard, he goes so far that he considers the distinction between laws and decrees to be a vain trick of metaphysical legalists.
According to this interpretation of history, he is therefore pleased with the abolition of the French parliament in favor of what he calls a provisional dictatorship, and applauds the action of Napoleon III in decisively putting an end to what Marx would call parliamentary cretinism.
A fragment from the Course of Positive Philosophy characterizes Comte's political and historical point of view on this matter:
“Based on our historical theory, due to the previous complete concentration of the various elements of the previous regime around royal power, it is clear that the main effort of the French Revolution, aimed at moving away irrevocably from the ancient organization, was bound to lead to a direct struggle of the people with royal power , the superiority of which since the end of the second modern phase was the only one distinguished by such a system. However, although the political purpose of this preliminary era in fact turned out to be not at all the gradual preparation for the elimination of royal power (which at first even the most courageous innovators could not imagine), it is noteworthy that constitutional metaphysics passionately desired at that time, on the contrary, an indissoluble union of the monarchical principle with power people, as well as a similar union of the Catholic government with spiritual emancipation. Therefore, the inconsistent speculations would not deserve any philosophical attention today if they were not to be seen as the first direct revelation of a general error, which, unfortunately, also contributes to the complete concealment of the true character of the modern reorganization, reducing such a fundamental revival to a vain all-embracing imitation of the transitional state structure, characteristic of England.
Such, in fact, was the political utopia of the main leaders of the Constituent Assembly, and they undoubtedly sought its immediate implementation; in the same way, it then carried within itself a radical contradiction with the distinctive tendencies of French society.
Here, then, is the natural place for the direct application of our historical theory to help us quickly appreciate this dangerous illusion. Although in itself it was too primitive to require any special analysis, the seriousness of its consequences is imperative.
I want to inform readers of the basics of the study, which they can, however, easily continue spontaneously in line with the explanations typical of the two previous chapters.
The absence of any sound political philosophy makes it easier to understand what empirical measure naturally predetermined this error, which, of course, could not but become extremely inevitable, since it could completely deceive the mind of even the great Montesquieu" (Cours de philosophie positive , t. VI, p. 190 2).
This passage raises several important questions: is it true that conditions in France at that time precluded the continuation of the monarchy? Is Comte right in believing that an institution associated with a certain system of thought cannot survive under the conditions of a different system of thought?
Of course, the positivist is right in believing that the French monarchy was traditionally associated with the Catholic intellectual and social system, with the feudal and theological system, but the liberal would answer that an institution consonant with a certain system of thinking can, by transforming, survive and perform its functions in a different historical system.
Is Comte right in reducing British-style institutions to the peculiarities of a transitional government? Is he right in regarding representative institutions as inextricably linked with the dominance of a commercial aristocracy?
Guided by this general theory, our graduate of the École Polytechnique, without chagrin, believed that a secular dictator would put an end to the vain imitation of English institutions and the pretended domination of the garrulous metaphysicians of Parliament. In “The System of Positive Politics” he expressed satisfaction with this and even went so far as to write in the introduction to the second volume a letter to the Russian Tsar, where he expressed the hope that this dictator (whom he called an empiricist) could be taught positive philosophy and thus to decisively promote a fundamental reorganization of European society.
The appeal to the Tsar caused some excitement among the positivists. And in the third volume, Comte's tone changed somewhat due to the temporary delusion to which the secular dictator succumbed (I want to say - in connection with the Crimean War, for which Comte seems to have blamed Russia). In fact, the era of great wars was historically over, and Comte congratulated the secular dictator of France for putting an honorable end to the temporary aberration of the secular dictator of Russia.
This way of considering parliamentary institutions - if I venture to use Comte's language - is explained exclusively by the special character of the great teacher of positivism. This hostility towards parliamentary institutions, taken to be metaphysical or British, is still alive today 3 . Let us note, however, that Comte did not want to completely eliminate representation, but it seemed sufficient to him that the Assembly should convene once every three years to approve the budget.
Historical and political judgments, in my opinion, follow from the basic general sociological position. After all, sociology, as Comte imagined it and as Durkheim also applied it, considered social rather than political phenomena to be the main ones - even subordinating the latter to the former, which could lead to a belittlement of the role of the political regime in favor of the main, social reality. Durkheim shared the indifference, not free from aggressiveness or contempt, towards parliamentary institutions characteristic of the creator of the term “sociology”. Fascinated by social issues, questions of morality and the transformation of professional organizations, he looked at what was happening in parliament as something secondary, if not ridiculous,
Revolution...
They scare her, they wait for her, they cover up dirty deeds with her name, they celebrate her anniversaries, they curse her...
Why did this happen, and what is the original meaning of this concept and the social significance of this event? What is it - degradation, devastation and bloody chaos, destroying all the best, or progress, prosperity and a step forward? Is there a difference between a revolution and a coup d'etat, and in whose interests does it occur?
We are trying to answer these and other questions that are becoming increasingly relevant in the political and economic reality around us.
Introduction
There are terms that seem obvious and self-evident to most people, but in reality it turns out that everyone understands different things by them, sometimes completely opposite. This especially often affects political terms that have a strong emotional connotation and great significance for the past and present. Revolution is one of them. We are not going to beat around the bush and say frankly: a revolution will most likely be a necessary condition for the implementation of the changes proposed by the project in society. Therefore, we must first decide what we mean by this word.
Given the situation, it is likely that the first things that come to mind when hearing the word “revolution” are various “Rose Revolutions”, “Revolutions of Dignity”, “Arab Spring” and other similar phenomena, usually referred to as revolutions in the media of “developed countries”. Why are they called revolutions, although we are just talking about coups d'etat, when one group of the “elite” pushes another away from the trough with the support of street extras? Is a revolution really just a change of scenery and people in power, and also an incomplete one? Is the point of the revolution to ensure that its sponsors line their pockets deeper at the expense of ordinary people, whose discontent they take advantage of to defeat their competitors?
Of course no.
Why then are these events persistently called revolutions? Because it is beneficial both to those who commit them and benefit from it, and to their formal opponents in power. No matter how much the word “revolution” is erased from memory, it still evokes positive associations and hopes among dissatisfied people. Therefore, the media and the authorities of “developed countries” like to label any coup carried out by the elite group they support as a “people’s revolution”. For them, a “popular revolution” is when people convenient for them come to power, and an “illegal coup” is when these people are overthrown. Everything here is clear, like all their so-called “universal” morals and standards.
In other countries, the same “revolutions” are used as a bogeyman, which is convenient for intimidating the people. The destructive results of these coups d'etat are presented as the consequences of any possible change of power, or simply the struggle for a better life for the majority. Thus, such an interpretation of the word “revolution” is beneficial to the entire ruling class as a whole: those who are already in power, and those who dream of getting there, both the governments of “developed” and the authorities of “developing” countries.
Since, through the efforts of domestic and foreign propaganda, it is precisely this definition that dominates the public consciousness, it is necessary to explain what real revolution, a social revolution in the interests of the working majority, and how exactly it differs from the “revolutions” mentioned above.
Revolution as a natural event
Taking of the Bastille. One of the symbols of the Great French Revolution
A real revolution is not just a replacement of people in power, accompanied by a change of flag, symbols and other tinsel. This is a serious, turning point historical event. During a revolution, power is replaced not for the sake of seizing power, but with the goal of radically transforming the entire economic, political and social system.
The old government is not just seized - it is destroyed, and in its place a new one is built, with its own institutions and on its own principles. The old orders are not simply improved or softened - they are abolished, and new ones are introduced in their place, more consistent with the real interests of the majority and the requirements of progress.
After the revolution, people begin to live not just better or worse - people begin to live differently.
A typical historical example is the Great French Revolution, which finally destroyed feudal society in France and greatly weakened it throughout Europe. It is precisely by its principles that the entire modern “civilized” world formally lives - and yet back in the middle of the 18th century, from an official point of view, they were dangerous nonsense, “irresponsible fantasies,” and in some places even blasphemy. And it’s hard to deny that this has overall turned out to be a good thing for humanity. The return of class society is usually dreamed of either by fools who sincerely believe that they would have been nobles back then, or by “respectable gentlemen” who would have had a good time even then, since titles were in practice bought and sold. But they would not have to pretend that they are formally equal to the “common people.” Even now they are offended by this.
The October Revolution in Russia is also such an example, no matter what those who make their living by indulging the opinions of the ruling “elite” may say about it. It is to her, and the ruling minority’s fear of its repetition, that the entire “civilized” world owes the eight-hour working day, pension, disability benefits and other manifestations of the “welfare state,” “capitalism with a human face” and “socially responsible business.” That is why the ruling minority is so afraid and hates it to this day, although its main brainchild has been formally dead and buried for a quarter of a century. That is why not a month can pass without the Western or Russian media kicking it, the long-dead Bolsheviks and the long-collapsed Soviet Union.
What is characteristic is that the gains of both of these revolutions, both French and Russian, were not completely canceled after the collapse of the regimes they created, even in the conditions of the formal restoration of the old order. They changed the world so seriously that a complete rollback was very difficult or even impossible.
The collapse of the USSR, the “velvet revolutions” in the countries of Eastern Europe and all kinds of Maidans and coups in the countries of the “Third World” cannot serve as examples of revolutions. Yes, people’s dissatisfaction with the Soviet nomenklatura was used to formalize the final funeral of the Soviet project, but it itself has not gone away. On the contrary, its representatives and their children, having turned into oligarchs and officials of the new Russia, had the opportunity to fatten at the expense of the rest of the population in a way that they would never have been able to before. As a result of the “orange revolutions” and other coups, one clan in power also changes to another. No historical progress is taking place - on the contrary, the ugliest remnants of the past are coming to light, from religious fanaticism to extreme nationalism.
A real revolution has one more feature that distinguishes it from ordinary and unusual coups. Contrary to what supporters of the current government or various “saviors of the fatherland” constantly say, revolution is impossible entirely set up from abroad or “done” through the efforts of a group of conspirators. Such a misconception stems either from attempts to pass off wishful thinking, or from the desire to obscure the true, objective reasons for the revolutions of the past, and to present them as the work of a small group of fanatics or the fruit of the work of foreign intelligence services.
The deep cause of a revolution is always a crisis of society, either because in its development it has outgrown the economic and political system established in it, or because the course that the ruling minority is leading it is destructive and leads to degradation. Begin A revolution in favorable conditions can be carried out by a separate group, party or organization, but without communication with the majority of workers and support from them, it is doomed to failure.
This separate group, party or organization, as a rule, is also a concentrated expression of the interests, aspirations and aspirations of the majority, its most active part. Since the revolution is historically inevitable and objectively conditioned, one might think that it is enough to wait for a revolutionary situation when everything will happen somehow “by itself.” And in the present you can do nothing, which is very convenient for those who think so. But this is as stupid as expecting to make a revolution solely on your own.
First, the revolution may well fail. It may be crushed, and then it will go down in history, written by the victors among the ruling class, as another failed uprising. As the famous expression says, “a rebellion cannot be successful - then it is called differently”.
Secondly, if you do nothing, then nothing will happen. Nothing is ever done “by itself.” The masses of the people making a revolution are not some aliens existing besides us, they are us, and no one will do this except ourselves.
Thirdly, in the absence of progressive forces, or in case of their weakness, political forces and organizations that are not at all interested in progress and improving the lives of the majority can take advantage of popular discontent - this is what happened, for example, during the revolution in Iran, which is now called “Islamic” ".
The objectively existing revolutionary process lies precisely in the fact that changes in the economy, working and living conditions, and other areas of human life give the working majority new opportunities and pose new problems and tasks for them. This, in turn, leads to an increasingly massive emergence of active and progressive-minded people coming from this majority and expressing its aspirations and interests.
About revolutionary violence
Storming of the Moscow Kremlin in 1917
Ordinary citizens are often intimidated by revolution as a bloody event, the onset of complete chaos, which can only be desired by narrow-minded fanatics or dishonest people wishing to fish in troubled waters. In this way, official propaganda calls for tolerating the current order of things, because “it’s better this way than nothing.”
The fear of revolution as bloodshed is, in principle, justified.
If we talk specifically about Russian realities, we can see that in the conditions of the “new Russia” social ties are destroyed and people are confidently dehumanized Those. They stop treating each other (and sometimes themselves) as people, and begin to perceive others as objects with whom they can do whatever they want in the name of satisfying their own needs. , which means that the further this process goes, the more atrocities the rebel people will be ready for when the order built on their backs collapses for some reason.
The bloodiness of a revolution, a change of power, and indeed any large-scale changes in society, as well as the level of everyday violence in it, strongly depend on the level of development of the society itself: the more primitive it is, the poorer the people, and the smaller the feeder for the “elites,” the more bloody it usually is turns out to be any redistribution or uprising. The relationship between the level of violence, measured by the number of murders per 100 thousand people, and the standard of living, measured by the UN Human Development Index, is quite clear: the lower the HDI, the more murders and domestic violence, in principle. This can be seen, for example, in this document from the relevant UN organization.
It should be noted that the second important factor is the level of socio-economic inequality in society: the higher it is, the more bitter people are, the higher the crime and domestic violence. And this is a very logical pattern:
The greater the gap between classes, the less their representatives see each other as people.
Russia is socially degrading, with the exception of several large cities, where some progress has been observed from a purely consumer point of view, and over the years of a market economy, various outdated stereotypes of behavior and social structure are being carefully revived, which means that:
The later the revolution occurs, the bloodier it will be.
The easiest way to show this is with an example accessible to everyone. Revolution is a painful but necessary solution to a problem, like making an unpleasant but inevitable decision, or a surgical operation. If you put off making a decision for a long time, or neglect the disease for fear of surgery, you can end up with complications that are much more dangerous to your health. History is full of examples from completely different spheres, be it politics or medicine, when the pure delay in making any decision and fear of radical measures led to much worse consequences than any revolution.
The longer the problem is pushed deeper and not allowed to be resolved, the more destructive the explosion will be.
What will the revolution be like?
A revolution is not just a replacement of people in power, or even lustration, so beloved by liberals, that is, a more or less complete change of the entire bureaucratic composition. Revolution means the complete dismantling of the old state apparatus, with all its vices, principles and practices, from the government and parliament to the army and police in their current form. Even the most shabby bureaucratic offices in the most remote corners of the country should not remain untouched.
"But wait,- some may object, - How can you run a country without bureaucracy? Complete chaos will ensue, and it will only get worse, not better! And why do it so radically at all, because you still can’t do without specially trained people in administrative positions.” The historical example of the Soviet Union clearly shows us that the separation of managers into a separate layer with their own interests and privileges is a disastrous phenomenon for a society that is trying to focus on equality and satisfying the interests of the majority. How exactly can one live without state bureaucracy, and therefore without the risk of its degeneration into the “Soviet nomenklatura” - is written in the Project Program.
All economic orders will also be transformed beyond recognition. Unlike various “color revolutions”, where the “right” oligarchs replace the “wrong” ones in power under the guise of popular discontent, after the real revolution there will be no oligarchs left. No freedom and no power of the majority is possible as long as practically everything that this majority uses for life and work is owned, and therefore in the power, of the “wealthy” minority.
In the same way, the “office plankton” that serves the activities of this minority will decrease. The introduction of modern information technologies and the elimination of many “economic entities”, each of which produces its own accounting and document flow, will free a huge number of people from the fate of mindless paper shufflers and will give them the opportunity to engage in real, productive work.
“Yes, you’re just jealous of wealthy people,- one of the ideological servants of this very minority would answer contemptuously, - Revolution is an attempt to take away from successful people and divide among losers, perpetrated by the hands of thugs and drunken sailors.”. In general, defenders of the existing system love the idea that only embittered nonentities can want to shake the existing order of things. They say they failed to realize themselves in other areas of life, and they blame anyone but themselves for their own troubles. This is a very convenient position, since this type of people really exists, and everyone has probably met them at least once.
But that's not true.
A revolutionary is a progressive-minded person, aware of the need for radical changes in social relations. Of course, at the same time, he cannot be marginalized or a weak-willed idiot, and sit on benefits, parental handouts and other types of dependency. A revolutionary is, first of all, one who earns his living by his labor, makes his personal contribution to the creation of human civilization, and therefore sees from personal experience how unfairly and ineptly his efforts and the efforts of all other working people are wasted - and cannot do this any longer tolerate.
Famous electrical engineer and underground Bolshevik L.B. Krasin
A revolutionary can be someone who finds it unpleasant to lead a seemingly settled life in an unsettled society, or someone who simply finds it painful to look at the suffering and degradation of the people around them. A typical example is Dr. Ernesto Guevara, for whom his origin and profession prepared him for a seemingly completely comfortable existence. However, after traveling around Latin America, he was so struck by the unsanitary conditions and poverty in which the majority of the population of these countries lived that he became a professional revolutionary from a successful young doctor.
It is precisely such people who are able to express the interests of the working majority and change society in its interests - because they are flesh of the flesh of this very majority. But they themselves will most likely be much smaller, since the existing conditions in which this majority is forced to live and work allow only a limited part of it to think and act normally.
It turns out to be some kind of contradiction - the interests of the majority are expressed and fought against by the ruling minority, which is also sort of like a minority. But the ruling class also does not completely rule the state and make laws. This is done by a minority that has emerged from it and is in direct control of the levers of power. But without support - voluntary or forced - from its class, this power will ultimately be overthrown, so it is forced not only to respect its narrow interests, but also to serve the interests of its entire class as a whole.
Some ruling groups do it worse, some better, and sometimes a coup occurs and one of them replaces the other - but power remains within the same social class.
The task of revolutionaries is to ensure that power passes from one class to another, to the working majority, even if represented at first by a small but active and conscious group of them. Without the support of the majority, this group will not succeed. After all, in the end, it is the majority that must learn to govern themselves independently, which will change the face of the entire society beyond recognition.
This will be a real social revolution.
1 If you often look at the website of the same BBC, and not their Russian service, but the original, English-language one, you will notice that articles about the “horrors of the Soviet Union” appear there with enviable regularity, although the topic for residents of the UK, it would seem, is not very relevant .
2 In Russia, this is aggravated by the tense situation and the general constant fear of the “elite” for their fortunes, which, unlike their colleagues from “developed countries,” they plundered not figuratively, but literally.
3 For example, the Napoleonic Code was the most comprehensive of the first civil codes, and laid the foundation for purely bourgeois social relations not only in France, but throughout Europe. It is still used in a modified form, although after the restoration of the monarchy it was renamed the Civil Code.
4 Thus, on October 29, 1917, the Soviet government adopted a resolution introducing an 8-hour working day, which, coupled with the fear of the revolution spreading throughout Europe, further prompted the governments of other countries to also take steps in this direction. In 1918, a 48-hour work week was recognized by the legislation of Germany, Poland, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; in 1919 - Yugoslavia, Denmark, Spain, France, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, Italy (48-hour - because they worked 6 days a week then, and the only day off was Sunday). Most of the “civilized world” still lives with this eight-hour working day.
5 It is most clearly seen who exactly benefited from the destruction of the socialist camp, according to the seemingly loyal report of the chief economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development S. Guriev, which can be viewed. Despite ritual incantations in support of the market and democracy, the picture is disappointing: there are more losers from the transition to a market, inequality is growing, the gap with developed countries is decreasing slowly, and those born during the transition to a market are 1 cm shorter than those born before or after - the effect. comparable to a full-scale war. In Russia specifically, everyone but the richest lost, and the notorious “average” income growth actually applies to the top 20% of the population. And most importantly, for those born, or even those who began studying, after 1987, the greatest role in obtaining an education and a good job is played by the characteristics of their parents, or, more simply, their origin. That is, the inequality of opportunity has become much deeper than before.
6 The overthrow of the Shah's regime in Iran took place against the backdrop of mass strikes and popular unrest, the causes of which were inflation and the growing gap between rich and poor, including geographical ones. However, Islamist organizations managed to ride this social protest in time and direct popular discontent towards the “depraved Western way of life” and the Shah’s administration drowning in it, instead of the ruling class of owners and its privileged position. As a result, all progressive forces after the revolution were exterminated by Islamists, and a theocracy was established in the country.
7 There are indeed many historical examples that can be cited. From military history, one can note the indecisive actions of generals Gorchakov and Dannenberg, which cost the Russian army defeat in the Battle of Inkerman, as well as General Kuropatkin, notorious for his indecision, who managed to lose all the land battles of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, in which he had to command troops . From political history, the most striking example is the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany and the subsequent policies of European leaders aimed at appeasing their aggressive aspirations, which served as a prologue to the Second World War.
8 In this sense, it is especially significant that, despite all the demonstrative fight against corruption and the increasing suppression of dissent, the authorities are willing to soften the legislation in that part that concerns economic crimes, that is, business. And soon they will be allowed to engage in entrepreneurial activity without leaving the pre-trial detention center. Almost like the liberal opposition dreams of. Which is not surprising - after all, the difference between them is not at all small, it’s just that some want those who have power to have money, and others want those who have money to have power.
