Red Army airplanes 1941 1945. Soviet airplanes of WWII

The most mobile means by which the front commander influenced the course of the operation was aviation. The LaGG-3 fighter, which was put into service on the eve of the war, was inferior in flight characteristics to the main German Messerschmitt-109 fighter of modifications P and C. The LaGG was equipped with a more powerful engine, the design was lightened, some of the weapons were removed, the fuel supply was reduced and the aerodynamics were improved, thanks to which significantly increased the speed and rate of climb, and improved vertical maneuverability. The speed of the new LaGG-5 fighter in horizontal flight at sea level was 8 km/h greater than its predecessor, and at an altitude of 6500 m it was superior in speed

increased to 34 km/h, and the rate of climb was better. It was practically in no way inferior to the Messerschmitt 109. But most importantly, its simple design, lack of need for complex maintenance and unpretentiousness to take-off fields made it ideal for the conditions in which Soviet Air Force units had to operate 217. In September 1942, the LaGG-5 fighters were renamed La-5. In order to neutralize the actions of the Lavochkin, the Wehrmacht decided to mass produce the Focke-Wulf Fw-190 fighter 218 . By the beginning of the war, the MiG-3 was the most numerous new generation fighter in the Soviet Air Force. On the Soviet-German front throughout the war, air battles were fought mainly at altitudes up to 4 km. The high altitude of the MiG-3, which at first was considered its undoubted advantage, became a disadvantage, since it was achieved by deteriorating the aircraft’s flight qualities at low altitudes. Wartime difficulties in providing engines for armored Il-2 attack aircraft forced the end of 1941 to abandon the production of engines for the MiG-3 219 . In the first half of 1942, to improve flight characteristics, some of the weapons and equipment were removed from the Yak-1 aircraft. Since the summer of 1942, the Yak-1 began to be equipped with a more powerful engine, the pilot’s visibility was significantly improved by installing a teardrop-shaped canopy, and the armament was strengthened (instead of two ShKAS machine guns, one large-caliber BS was installed) 220. By the end of 1942, recommendations were introduced to improve the aerodynamics of the airframe. The Yak-7, according to its data, was very close to the Yak-1, but differed from it in better aerobatic qualities and more powerful weapons (two BS heavy machine guns).

The mass of a second salvo of the Yak-7 was more than 1.5 times higher than that of other Soviet fighters, such as the Yak-1, MiG-3 and La-5, as well as the best German fighter at that time, the Messerschmitt-109 ( Bf-109G). In the Yak-7B aircraft, instead of wooden wing spars, metal ones were installed in 1942. The weight gain was more than 100 kg. A. S. Yakovlev's new aircraft, the Yak-9, was close in speed and rate of climb to the best German aircraft, but surpassed them in maneuverability 222. The first vehicles of this series took part in the defensive battles of Stalingrad. At the beginning of the war, almost all Soviet fighters were inferior to German ones in terms of firepower, since they were mainly armed with machine guns, and German fighters, in addition to machine guns, used cannon weapons. Since 1942, the Yak-1 and Yak-7 began to use ShVAK 20 mm cannon armament. Many Soviet fighters decisively switched to air combat using vertical maneuver. Air battles were fought in pairs, sometimes in flights, and radio communications began to be used, which improved aircraft control. Our fighters were increasingly reducing the opening fire distance 223 . In the spring of 1943, the La-5F fighter with a more powerful M-82F engine began to arrive at the front, and visibility from the pilot’s cockpit improved. The plane showed a speed of 557 km/h at sea level and 590 km/h at an altitude of 6200 m - 10 km/h more than the La-5. The rate of climb increased noticeably: the La-5F climbed to 5 thousand in 5.5 minutes, while the La-5 gained this altitude in 6 minutes. In the next modification of this aircraft, the La-5FN, all measures were taken to further improve the aerodynamics, the weight of the structure was reduced and a new, more powerful M-82FN engine was installed (from 1944 - ASh-82FN), and the controls were modernized. Almost everything that could be achieved without significant changes in the design was squeezed out of the layout. The aircraft's speed reached 685 km/h, while the experimental La-5FN reached 650 km/h. The armament consisted of two synchronized 20-mm ShVAK 224 cannons. In terms of combat effectiveness, the La-5FN in 1943 became the strongest air combat fighter on the Soviet-German front. During the modification of the Yak-9 (Yak-9D), to increase the flight range, two gas tanks were additionally placed in the wing consoles, due to which the maximum flight range increased by more than a third and amounted to 1,400 km. The Yak-9T was equipped with such formidable weapons as the NS-37 cannon of 37 mm 225 caliber.

At the beginning of 1943, the Germans had the Messerschmitt-109G (Bf-109G) fighter with a high-power engine 226, but the Soviet troops also began to receive the Yak-1 and Yak-7B with powerful engines that compensated for the advantage of the Germans. Soon, the Messerschmitt-109G6 (Me-109G6) used a device for short-term injection of a water-methyl mixture, which briefly (10 minutes) increased the speed by 25–30 km/h. But the new La-5FN fighters were superior to all Me-109Gs, including those with a water-methyl mixture injection system. Since 1943, the Germans began to widely use FockeWulf-190A (FW-190A-4) fighters on the eastern front, which developed a speed of 668 km/h at an altitude of 1000 m, but they were inferior to Soviet fighters during horizontal maneuvering and when exiting a dive . At the same time, the Red Army fighters were inferior in terms of ammunition (the Yak-7B had 300 rounds, the Yak-1, Yak9D and LaGG-3 - 200 rounds, and the Me-109G-6 - 600 rounds). In addition, the hexogen explosive of 30-mm German shells made it possible to have a lethal effect, like a 37-mm shell from Soviet cannons.

Germany also continued to develop new fighter aircraft with piston engines. In this sense, the Dornier-335 (Do-335), structurally unusual (thrust was provided by two propellers, one of which was in the nose and the second in the tail of the aircraft), showed itself quite well during its first flight in October 1943. a promising car, managing to reach a speed of 758 km/h; as weapons it had one 30-mm cannon and two 15-mm machine guns. Despite the strange layout, the Do-335 could have been a good combat aircraft, but this project was canceled the following year 227. In 1944, a new La-7 fighter entered testing. It became possible to install metal spars and reinforced armament on the aircraft, which consisted of three new 20-mm B-20 cannons. It was the most advanced fighter of S. A. Lavochkin’s design bureau and one of the best combat aircraft of the Second World War. The Yak-9DD, which was put into service in 1944, had an even greater flight range - up to 1800 km 228. The designers showed literally miracles of skill by placing another 150 kg of fuel in the wing and fuselage. Such ranges were in demand in bomber escort operations at the end of the war, when the relocation of airfields could not keep up with the rapid advance of our troops. The Yak-9M fighter had a unified design with the Yak-9D and Yak-9T. At the end of 1944, the Yak-9M began to be equipped with a more powerful VK-105PF-2 engine, which increased speed at low altitudes.

The most radical modification of the Yak-9 aircraft, the Yak-9U, appeared at the front in the second half of 1944. An even more powerful engine was installed on this aircraft. In the middle of the summer of 1944, the Yak-3 229 began to enter the army, based on the Yak-1 fighter, while the wing dimensions were reduced, new, lighter metal spars were installed, and aerodynamics were improved. The effect of reducing weight by more than 200 kg, reducing drag, and installing a more powerful modification of the engine provided an increase in speed, rate of climb, maneuverability and acceleration characteristics in the altitude range where air battles were fought, which enemy aircraft did not possess. In 1944, Soviet fighters ensured superiority over German fighters in all ranges of air combat. These were the Yak-3 and La-7 with more powerful engines. At the beginning of the war, the Germans used higher quality C-3 gasoline. But in 1944–1945. they experienced a shortage of this gasoline and thus were even more inferior in engine power to our fighters. In terms of aerobatic performance and ease of control, our Yak-1, Yak-3, La-5 fighters in the second period of the Great Patriotic War had equal capabilities with the German ones. In 1944–1945 The aerobatic qualities of the Soviet fighters Yak-7B, Yak-9 and especially the Yak-3 were significantly improved. The effectiveness of Soviet fighters in the summer of 1944 became so great that the Germans transferred the Yu-88 (Ju-88) and Xe-111 (He-111) to work at night. The Xe-111 had powerful defensive weapons and was inferior in speed to the Yu-88, but was quite effective in defense. High bombing accuracy was also ensured by good sighting equipment.

The appearance of the La-7 with three 20-mm B-20 cannons provided superiority in firepower, but these aircraft were few in the overall fighter fleet. It must be admitted that practically in terms of firepower throughout the war, German fighters in their mass either exceeded or were equal to the Soviet ones. It should be admitted that Nazi Germany was ahead of the Soviet Union in the creation of a new generation of aviation. During the war years, the Germans created and began to produce three jet aircraft: Messerschmitt-262 (Me-262), Heinkel-162 (He-162) and Messerschmitt-163 (Me-163). The turbojet Me-262 was capable of reaching speeds of up to 860 km/h at an altitude of 6 thousand m with an initial rate of climb of 1200 m per minute. “With a combat range of up to 480 km, it represented a giant leap in aircraft technology, since it surpassed in its characteristics most aircraft with piston engines... (although it must be remembered that the British were also completing the development of a jet fighter, the first of which, the Gloster Meteor, began to arrive to the flight squadrons at the end of July 1944)" 230. The USSR also worked on creating a jet fighter. Already in May 1942, tests were carried out on the world's first jet fighter BI-1, designed by V. F. Bolkhovitinov. But the Soviet Union was unable to create a reliable jet engine. I had to start copying captured equipment, fortunately several copies of German jet engines were exported from Germany. In the shortest possible time, documentation was prepared for the production of “clones” under the designations RD-10 and RD-20. Already in 1946, the MiG-9 fighter with a turbojet engine, created by a team of scientists under the leadership of A. I. Mikoyan and M. I. Gurevich 231, was put into serial production. On the eve of the war, the design bureau of S.V. Ilyushin created a special type of aircraft - the Il-2 attack aircraft, which had no analogues in the world.

An attack aircraft is a low-speed aircraft compared to a fighter, optimized for flight at extremely low altitude - low level flight. The plane had a well-armored body. The Luftwaffe only used the Junkers 87 (Ju-87) dive bomber "stuka" (Sturzkampflugsaig - dive combat aircraft) as a battlefield aircraft. The appearance of the armored Il-2 attack aircraft at the front came as a complete surprise to the enemy, who, as a result of serious losses and demoralizing effects, soon nicknamed it the “Black Death” 232 . And Soviet soldiers dubbed it a “flying tank.” A varied composition of weapons (two 7.62 mm machine guns, two 20 mm or 23 mm cannons, eight 82 mm or 132 mm rockets and 400–600 kg of bombs) ensured the destruction of a wide variety of targets: columns of troops, armored vehicles, tanks , artillery batteries, infantry, means of communication and communication, warehouses, trains, etc. The combat use of the Il-2 also revealed its major drawback - vulnerability from fire from enemy fighters attacking the attack aircraft from the rear unprotected hemisphere. The S.V. Ilyushin Design Bureau modified the aircraft, and in the fall of 1942, the Il-2 appeared at the front for the first time in a two-seat version. The air-to-ground missiles adopted by the Il-2 in 1942 played a major role in increasing the firepower of the attack aircraft when attacking ground targets. The high survivability of the Il-2 attack aircraft should also be noted. When it hit the gas tank, the plane did not catch fire and did not even lose fuel - it was saved by the fiber from which the gas tank was made. Even after several dozen bullet hits, the gas tank retained fuel. Neither the Henkel-118 nor the Henschel-129 anti-tank aircraft, which appeared in 1942, were able to rise to the level of the Il-2 attack aircraft 233 . Since 1943, the IL-2 was produced with a more powerful engine. To improve the stability characteristics, the wing of the attack aircraft was given a slight sweep. As the main striking force of Soviet aviation, the Il-2 attack aircraft played an outstanding role in the war and had a significant influence on the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front. This combat vehicle successfully combined powerful weapons and reliable armor protection for the cockpit, engine, and fuel tanks.

The constant increase in the combat capability of the Il-2 was largely determined by the continuous improvement of its weapons in the interests of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against enemy tanks and assault guns. In 1943, the Il-2 began to be equipped with two 37 mm cannons under the wing. Equipping these guns with 37-mm armor-piercing incendiary shells BZT-37 and NS-37 aircraft guns made it possible to disable any German tank. In addition, the creation in 1943 of the anti-tank cumulative action bomb PTAB-2.5-1.5 designed by I. A. Larionov using the ADA bottom fuse significantly expanded the capabilities of the Il-2 attack aircraft in the fight against tanks and other armored vehicles. When such bombs were dropped by one attack aircraft from a height of 75–100 m, almost all tanks in a 15x75 m zone were hit, and the PTAB bomb penetrated armor up to 70 mm thick. Since the summer of 1943, Il-2KR aircraft equipped with photographic equipment and a more powerful than usual radio station 234 were used to adjust artillery fire and reconnaissance. The successful operations of the Il-2 attack aircraft at the front gave a powerful impetus to the further expansion of development work on aircraft of this class. The work proceeded in two directions.

The first came down to enhancing the bomber properties of the aircraft and enhancing its armor protection: such a heavy attack aircraft was built (Il-18), but its testing was delayed, and it was not mass-produced. The second direction implied a sharp improvement in flight performance with the same artillery and small arms armament and armor protection as the Il-2. The Il-10, which was built in 1944, became such an attack aircraft. Compared to the Il-2, this aircraft had smaller dimensions, significantly better aerodynamics and a more powerful AM-42 liquid-cooled engine. Four guns were installed on the aircraft: at the first stage - 20 mm caliber, later - 23 mm caliber, eight RS-82 rockets were located on the wing beams.

The bomb bay and external suspension allowed the use of different-caliber bombs with a total weight of up to 600 kg. At maximum horizontal speed, the IL-10 outperformed its predecessor by 150 km/h. Several air regiments armed with the Il-10 took part in the combat operations of the final stage of the Great Patriotic War. Subsequently, the IL-10 was widely used in the war with Japan. In Germany, since 1944, an assault version of the FW-109F fighter was used, which was significantly inferior in combat effectiveness to the Il-2. At the same time, it should be noted that German attack aircraft had a fairly high efficiency of bomb and cannon strikes (a more powerful bomb salvo and higher accuracy from a dive). The main Soviet front-line bomber from the beginning of the war was the Pe-2, but it had a rather weak bomb load - only 600 kg, since it was converted from a fighter. German front-line bombers Yu-88 and Xe-111 could take on board up to 2-3 thousand kg. The Pe-2 used mostly small caliber bombs of 100–250 kg and a maximum caliber of 500 kg, while the Yu-88 could lift a bomb up to 1800 kg. In 1941, the Pe-2 reached a speed of 530 km/h and was superior to German bombers in this regard. Repeated armoring and reinforcement of armament, as well as skin sheets, which were supplied from rolled stock, with a thickness of 1–1.5 mm, made the aircraft’s structure heavier (before the war, 0.8 mm rolled stock was supplied), and this led to the fact that the real maximum speed did not exceed 470 –475 km/h (like the Yu-88). In July 1941, a decision was made to adopt a new front-line dive bomber, the 103U. In terms of speed at medium and high altitudes, flight range, bomb load and the power of defensive weapons, it was significantly superior to the Pe-2 dive bomber that had just been launched into production. At altitudes of more than 6 km, the 103U flew faster than almost all production fighters, both Soviet and German, second only to the domestic MiG-3 fighter. However, in the conditions of the outbreak of war and the large-scale evacuation of aviation enterprises, the aircraft had to be converted to use different engines.

Testing of a new version of the aircraft, called 10ZV, and then Tu-2 236, began in December 1941, and already in 1942 it began to enter service with the troops. Front-line pilots rated the new bomber extremely highly. They liked its good aerobatic qualities, the ability to fly confidently on one engine, a good defensive fire pattern, a large bomb load, and the increased survivability of air-cooled engines. To support future offensive operations, the Tu-2 was an indispensable aircraft. The first vehicles appeared at the front in September 1942. The Tu-2, despite its lighter weight than the Yu-88 and Xe-111 (11,400–11,700 kg versus 12,500–15,000 kg), had the same bomb load. In terms of flight range, the Tu-2 was also at the level of German bombers and was twice as long as the Pe-2.

The Tu-2 could take 1 thousand kg of bombs into the bomb bay, while the Yu-88 and Xe-111 could only be carried on an external sling. Produced from the end of 1943, the Tu-2, with more powerful engines, enhanced defensive weapons and a simplified design, was superior to all bombers used on the Soviet-German front. Tu-2 front-line dive bombers of the second edition have participated in battles since 1944. In June of this year they were used in the Vyborg operation. The air division of Colonel I.P. Skok, armed with the Tu-2, flew during the day, worked perfectly and had no losses 237. Despite its relatively modest contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Tu-2 nevertheless remained in history as one of the outstanding aircraft of its time. Among other similar aircraft, both allied and enemy, the Tu-2 did not stand out for any record performance. Its superiority lay in an exceptionally successful combination of the main components of combat effectiveness, such as speed, flight range, defensive capability, bomb load and the ability to throw bombs of one of the largest calibers of that time. This determined its very high combat effectiveness. The main bomber aircraft of Nazi Germany in 1941 were single-engine Yu-87 and twin-engine Yu-88 and Xe-111 238. Do-17s also fought in 1941.

The Yu-88 could dive at an angle of 80 degrees, which ensured high bombing accuracy. The Germans had well-trained pilots and navigators; they bombed mainly with precision rather than in areas, especially since they used bombs of 1000 and 1800 kg caliber, which each aircraft could carry no more than one. The weak point of Soviet aviation in the Great Patriotic War was radio communications. In the first half of 1942, 75% of flights were made without the use of radios, and by the end of the year the vast majority of fighters did not have radio communications. The lack of communication dictated dense battle formations.

The inability to warn each other led to great losses. The planes had to be within line of sight, and the commander set the task - “do as I do.” In 1943, only 50% of the Yak-9s were equipped with communications, and on the La-5 radio stations were installed only on command vehicles. All German fighters have been equipped with high quality radio communications since pre-war times. The Il-2 attack aircraft also lacked reliable radio equipment; until 1943, radio stations were installed only on command vehicles. All this made it difficult to organize large groups; IL-2s most often flew in threes, fours or eights.

In general, the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet Air Force and the expansion of its combat capabilities were one of the main factors that contributed to the development of the domestic military strategy and the achievement of victory in the war. The increase in the combat effectiveness of aviation was facilitated by equipping aircraft with radio stations and more advanced small arms and cannon weapons. Most of the new types of aircraft had a clear advantage over the Luftwaffe in a number of important indicators. British sources noted that “the Luftwaffe... was hopelessly behind the enemy, and not only numerically. While Soviet technologies were constantly being improved when new types of aircraft were put into operation, the Germans, in pursuit of increasing production volumes, currently had to sacrifice quality for quantity - instead of presenting advanced design solutions, constantly modernize existing models, increasing their armament, increasing survivability and increasing engine power, which ultimately led them to a dead end. Maintaining air superiority in such conditions became completely impossible, and since aviation could no longer guarantee this, ground troops became vulnerable and ultimately doomed to defeat.”

Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. In 12 volumes. T. 7. Economy and weapons
war. - M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2013. - 864 pp., 20 l. ill., ill.

In the pre-war years, the USSR Air Force developed as an independent branch of the Armed Forces, and on the eve of the war it was organized into several groups. The main tactical formation was the division. Part of the long-range bomber aviation was consolidated into aviation corps. By June 1941 there were 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades. The number of air regiments grew. Compared to 1939, by June 1941 their number had increased by 80%. But by the beginning of the war, the deployment of aviation and the restructuring of the aviation rear could not be carried out; the flight personnel were undergoing retraining.

There was a lack of maintenance and repair equipment and new equipment. The development of the airfield network lagged behind the pace of aviation development. The Air Force was armed with combat aircraft of various designs, most of them had low speed and weak weapons. New aircraft (MIG-3, YAK-1, LaGG-3, PE-2, IL-2 and others) were not inferior to the fascist German ones in combat capabilities, and surpassed them in a number of indicators. However, their entry into the Air Force began not long before the start of the war, and by June 22, 1941, there were only 2,739 of them.

Aviation personnel were trained in three aviation academies, 78 flight and 18 technical schools and colleges.

On the first day of the war, fascist German aviation launched surprise attacks on Soviet airfields, where 65% of the aviation of the western border military districts were based. The armed forces lost 1,200 aircraft on the ground and in the air; the Belarusian Military District alone lost 738 aircraft. Enemy aircraft in a number of directions of the Soviet-German front seized air supremacy. This put the Soviet ground forces and aviation in a difficult position and was one of the reasons for the temporary failures of Soviet Aviation in the first period of the war. Despite great difficulties, Soviet pilots showed great courage, bravery and mass heroism. On the first day of the war they flew 6 thousand sorties. The Soviet government took measures aimed at strengthening the air force, restructuring the aviation industry and training aviation personnel. In August 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to reorganize the air force. The reorganization was generally completed by 1943 and represented a more complex system than on the eve and beginning of the war.

During military operations, aviation provided great support to ground forces. This branch of the military was the key to victory in hundreds of military operations.

By the beginning of the war, the work of the aviation industry, which had become a major branch of the national economy in the mid-1930s, was significantly restructured. In 1939, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government took emergency measures to strengthen the aviation industry in order to transfer it to the production of more advanced military aircraft. In 1939 - early 1941, new types of combat aircraft were built, tested, put into service and put into mass production: LaGG-3, MIG-3, Yak-1 fighters, PE-2, PE-8, Il-4 bombers, Il-2 attack aircraft. The aviation industry has completely switched to the production of aircraft - monoplanes with retractable landing gear, a streamlined fuselage, a closed canopy, etc. The speed of Soviet fighters reached 600 - 650 km/h, ceiling 11 - 12 km, flight range 3 - 4 thousand km, bomb load 3 - 4 tons. The number of factories in the industry increased by 1.7 times compared to 1937; by 1941, production capacity increased sharply, exceeding the capacity of German aircraft factories. However, the German aviation industry produced only new aircraft designs, while the Soviet industry produced both new and old ones. Serial production of combat vehicles of new designs began in the USSR in 1940. In total, in 1940 and the first half of 1941, the USSR aviation industry produced 249 Il-2 attack aircraft, 322 LaGG-3 fighters, 399 Yak-1, 111 Mig-1, 1289 Mig-3, 459 Pe-2 dive bombers.

In the first days of the war, the aviation industry was tasked with achieving a significant increase in the production of combat vehicles, especially new types. Many engineering and machine tool factories, as well as enterprises producing electrical equipment, were transferred to the aviation industry. Construction of new aircraft factories has begun.*

In July 1941, more than 1,800 combat aircraft were produced (twice the average monthly production in the first half of 1941), in September - 2,329. However, since October 1941, there was a significant decrease in aircraft production, caused by the relocation of most aircraft factories to the eastern regions of the country. But already from the end of 1941, the industry began to continuously increase the production of new aircraft.

In total, during the war, the aviation industry mastered and put into serial production 25 types of new and modified aircraft (10 types of fighters, 8 bombers, 2 attack aircraft, 4 transport aircraft, 1 training aircraft) and 23 types of aircraft engines.

The new aircraft were built using a simple design from non-scarce materials, which greatly facilitated their mass production in wartime conditions. In terms of simplicity and reliability, Soviet aircraft differed favorably from foreign ones.

Aviation in the Battle of Kursk

By the summer of 1943, the center of gravity of the struggle for air supremacy had moved to the central section of the Soviet-German front.

To support their ground forces from the air, the fascist German command created two powerful groups: one south of Orel, the other north of Kharkov. In total, enemy aviation forces in the Kursk Bulge area numbered 2,050 aircraft (1,200 bombers, 600 fighters, 150 reconnaissance aircraft). In the upcoming battle, the Nazis relied heavily on aviation; they concentrated on the Kursk Bulge 65% of all aircraft available on the Soviet-German front, including new types of combat aircraft - Foke-Wulf-190a fighters, modified Messer- Schmitt-109", attack aircraft "Henschel-129".

The aviation group of the Soviet troops consisted of the 16th Air Army (commander General S.I. Rudenko) of the Central Front, the 2nd (commander General S.A. Krasovsky) of the Voronezh Front and the 17th (commander General V.A. Sudets) Southwestern Front, as well as the main long-range aviation forces. The Steppe Front included the 5th Air Army (commanded by General S.K. Gorchakov). In total, the Soviet aviation formations operating on the Kursk Bulge included 1,650 aircraft.

Thus, the overall balance of forces was 1.3:3, in favor of Germany. By the beginning of the battle, a significant renewal of the Soviet Air Force's aircraft fleet had occurred. The organization of interaction between aviation and ground forces was carefully worked out, for which purpose the headquarters of the air armies allocated their representatives to the ground forces. By the beginning of the battle, the headquarters of the air armies were moving closer to the front (40 - 50 km from the front line. Since October 1942, every second fighter aircraft had transceiver radio stations.

The rear organs of the air armies, with attached engineering battalions, were intensively preparing the airfield network and accumulating supplies of combat and materiel. The population was involved in the construction of airfields.

During the day of July 5, Soviet pilots shot down 260 and destroyed 60 enemy aircraft in air battles. Our losses amounted to 176 aircraft. As a result of the opposition of our fighters and the losses incurred, the activity of enemy aviation in the second half of the day decreased on the Central Front, and in the Voronezh Front, the enemy was not at all able to overcome the resistance of our fighters.

However, not everything went smoothly. Shortcomings were revealed in the actions of our fighters. They were keen on fighting enemy fighters and, at times, ignored bombers. Notification of the approach of an air enemy was not clearly organized. Assessing all this, the Air Force command and the commanders of the air armies the next day (July 6) changed the forms and methods of action of our aviation and moved on to massive strikes against the advancing enemy troops. At the same time, adjustments were made to the organization of fighter operations. Patrol zones were moved into enemy territory. Fighters began to be directed by radio primarily at bombers.

As a result of increased losses, German aviation sharply reduced its activity. If on July 5, 4,298 sorties were recorded on the Central and Voronezh fronts, then on July 6, only 2,100.

Beginning on July 7, Soviet fighters firmly seized the initiative in the air. The activity of German aviation decreased every day. By July 10, the offensive capabilities of the fascist German troops in the Oryol direction had dried up.

During the counteroffensive of our troops in the Battle of Kursk, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, an air offensive was carried out.** During the counteroffensive near Kursk, Soviet aviation flew over 90 thousand sorties. In 1,700 air battles, 2,100 enemy aircraft were destroyed, in addition, 145 aircraft were destroyed and damaged at airfields and 780 aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery.

The pilots showed massive heroism and high combat skill during the battles. The immortal feat was accomplished on July 6, 1943 by pilot A.K. Gorovets. In one air battle he shot down 9 enemy aircraft. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On July 8, squadron commander M. Malov, covering the 2nd Tatsinsky Tank Corps, destroyed several enemy tanks. In the last attack, his plane was hit by anti-aircraft guns, and the courageous pilot sent the burning car into a cluster of enemy tanks. Posthumously M. Malov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Pilots A. Nechaev and M. S. Tokarev died the death of Heroes. Here the pilot, junior lieutenant I.N. Kozhedub, later three times Hero of the Soviet Union, received his baptism of fire.

The air power of Nazi Germany melted away in air battles. The conquest of air supremacy was ensured by the continuous quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet air force, a more decisive massing of aviation in the main directions, an increase in the military skills of the flight personnel, and new methods of using aviation.

Assessing the decisive role of aviation as the main striking force in the struggle for the spread of Bolshevism and the defense of the state, in the first five-year plan the leadership of the USSR set a course for creating its own large and autonomous air force from other countries.

In the 20s, and even in the early 30s, USSR aviation had a fleet of aircraft, mostly foreign-made (only Tupolev aircraft appeared - ANT-2, ANT-9 and its subsequent modifications, which becamesubsequently the legendary U-2, etc.). The aircraft that were in service with the Red Army were of many brands, had outdated designs and poor technical condition. In the 20s, the USSR purchased a small number of German aircraft of the Junkers type and a number of other types for service air routes of the North / research of the Northern Sea Route / and the performance of government special flights. It should be noted that civil aviationin the pre-war period it practically did not develop, with the exception of the opening of a number of unique “demonstration” airlines or occasional flights of ambulance and service aviation.

During the same period, the era of airships ended, and the USSR builtin the early 30s, successful designs of “soft” (frameless) airships of the “B” type. Digression, it should be noted about the development of this type V aeronautics abroad.

In Germany, the famous rigid airshipdesign "Count Zeppepelin" explored the North, was equipped with cabins for passengers, had a significant flight range and quitehigh cruising speed / up to 130 km/h or more, providedseveral motors designed by Maybach. There were even several dog sleds on board the airship as part of the expedition to the North. The American airship "Akron" is the largest in the world, with a volume of 184 thousand cubic meters. m carried 5-7 aircraft on board and transported up to 200 passengers, not counting several tons of cargo over a distance of up to 17 thousand km. without landing. These airships were already safe, because... were filled with the inert gas helium, and not hydrogen as at the beginning of the century. Low speed, low maneuverability, high cost, complexity of storage and maintenance predetermined the end of the era of airships. Experiments with balloons also came to an end, which proved the latter’s unsuitability for active combat operations. A new generation of aviation with new technical and combat performance was needed.

In 1930, our Moscow Aviation Institute was created - after all, the replenishment of factories, institutes and design bureaus of the aviation industry with experienced personnel was of decisive importance. The old cadres of pre-revolutionary education and experience were clearly not enough; they were thoroughly eliminated and were in exile or in camps.

Already by the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37), aviation workers had a significant production base, the basis for the further development of the air force fleet.

In the thirties, by order of Stalin, demonstration, but in fact test, flights of bombers “camouflaged” as civilian aircraft were carried out. The aviators Slepnev, Levanevsky, Kokkinaki, Molokov, Vodopyanov, Grizodubova and many others distinguished themselves.

In 1937, Soviet fighter aircraft underwent combat tests in Spain and demonstrated technical inferiority. AircraftPolikarpov (type I-15,16) were defeated by the latest German machines. The race for survival began again. Stalin gave the designersindividual assignments for new aircraft models, widely and generouslyThere were bonuses and benefits - the designers worked tirelessly and demonstrated a high level of talent and preparedness.

At the March 1939 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilovnoted that, compared to 1934, the Air Force has grown in its personalis 138 percent...The aircraft fleet as a whole has grown by 130 percent.

Heavy bomber aircraft, which were assigned the main role in the upcoming war with the West, doubled in 4 years, while other types of bomber aircraft, on the contrary, decreased by half. Fighter aircraft increased two and a half times. Altitudeaircraft already amounted to 14-15 thousand m. The technology for the production of aircraft and engines was put on stream, stamping and casting were widely introduced. The shape of the fuselage changed, the aircraft acquired a streamlined shape.

The use of radios on board aircraft began.

Before the war, great changes took place in the field of aviation materials science. In the pre-war period there was a parallel development of heavy aircraft of all-metal construction with duralumin skinand light maneuverable aircraft of mixed structures: wood, steel,canvas. As the raw material base expanded and the aluminum industry developed in the USSR, aluminum alloys found increasing use in aircraft construction. There was progress in engine construction. The M-25 air-cooled engines with a power of 715 hp and the M-100 water-cooled engines with a power of 750 hp were created.

At the beginning of 1939, the USSR government convened a meeting in the Kremlin.

It was attended by leading designers V.Ya. Klimov, A.A. Mikulin,A.D. Shvetsov, S.V. Ilyushin, N.N. Polikarpov, A.A. Arkhangelsky, A.S. Yakovlev, head of TsAGI and many others. The People's Commissar of the aviation industry at that time was M.M. Kaganovich. Possessing a good memory, Stalin was quite well aware of the design features of aircraft; all important issues regarding aviation were resolved by Stalin. The meeting outlined measures for the further accelerated development of aviation in the USSR. Until now, history has not conclusively refuted the hypothesis of Stalin’s preparation for an attack on Germany in July 1941. It was on the basis of this assumption about the planning of Stalin’s attack on Germany (and further for the “liberation” of Western countries), adopted at the “historic” plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in August 1939 and this fact, incredible for that (or any other) time, of the sale of advanced German equipment and technology to the USSR seems explainable. A large delegation of Sovietaviation workers, who traveled to Germany twice shortly before the war, got their hands on fighters, bombers, guidance systems, and much more, which made it possible to sharply advance the level of domestic aircraft production. A decision was made to increase the combat power of aviation, since it was from August 1939 The USSR began covert mobilization and prepared strikes against Germany and Romania.

Mutual exchange of information on the state of the armed forces of the three states (England, France and the USSR), represented in Moscow in August1939, i.e. before the start of the partition of Poland, showed that the numberThere are 2 thousand first-line aircraft in France. Of these, twothirds were completely modern aircraft. By 1940, it was planned to increase the number of aircraft in France to 3000 units. Englishaviation, according to Marshal Burnet, had about 3,000 units, and the potential production was 700 aircraft per month.German industry underwent mobilization only at the beginning1942, after which the number of weapons began to increase sharply.

Of all the domestic fighter aircraft ordered by Stalin, the most successful variants were the LAGG, MiG and YAK.The IL-2 attack aircraft delivered a lot to its designer Ilyushinneniya. Manufactured initially with rear hemisphere protection (double)he, on the eve of the attack on Germany, did not suit the customers of hiswastefulness.” S. Ilyushin, who did not know all of Stalin’s plans, was forced to change the design to a single-seat version, i.e., bring the design closer to the “clear sky” plane. Hitler violated Stalin’s plans and the plane at the beginning of the war had to be urgently returned to its original design.

On February 25, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "Onreorganization of the aviation forces of the Red Army." The resolution provided for additional measures to re-equip air units. In accordance with the plans for a future war, the task was set to urgently form new air regiments, and, at the same time, equip them, as a rule, with new machines. The formation of several airborne corps began.

The doctrine of war on “foreign territory” and “little bloodshed” causedthe emergence of a “clear sky” aircraft intended for the unpunishedraids on bridges, airfields, cities, factories. Before the war, hundreds of thousands

young men were preparing to transfer to a new one, developed by the post-Stalincompetition, the SU-2 aircraft, of which it was planned to produce 100-150 thousand units before the war. This required accelerated training of the corresponding number of pilots and technicians. SU-2 is essentially a Soviet Yu-87, and in Russia it did not stand the test of time, because There was never a “clear sky” for either country during the war.

Air defense zones with fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery were formed. An unprecedented recruitment into aviation began, voluntarily andforcibly. Almost all of the small civil aviationwas mobilized into the Air Force. Dozens of aviation schools were opened, incl. ultra-accelerated (3-4 months) training, traditionally, the officers at the helm or control handle of the aircraft were replaced by sergeants - an unusual fact and evidence of haste in preparing for war. Airfields were urgently moved to the borders (about 66 airfields), supplies of fuel, bombs, and shells were imported. Carefully and raids on German airfields and the Ploieşti oil fields were detailed in special secrecy...

On June 13, 1940, the Flight Test Institute was formed(LII), during the same period other design bureaus and research institutes were formed.In the war with the Soviet Union, the Nazis assigned a special role to theiraviation, which by this time had already gained complete dominance inair in the West. Basically a plan for the use of aviation in the Eastplanned the same as the war in the West: first to conquer the dominantin the air, and then transfer forces to support the ground army.

Outlining the timing of the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler's commandThe operation set the following tasks for the Luftwaffe:

1.Destroy Soviet airfields with a surprise attackSoviet aviation.

2.Achieve complete air supremacy.

3. After solving the first two tasks, switch aviation to support ground forces directly on the battlefield.

4. Disrupt the work of Soviet transport, complicate the transfertroops both in the front line and in the rear.

5. Bombard large industrial centers - Moscow, Gorky, Rybinsk, Yaroslavl, Kharkov, Tula.

Germany dealt a crushing blow to our airfields. Only for 8Hours of the war, 1,200 aircraft were lost and mass casualties occurred.flight personnel, storage facilities and all supplies were destroyed. Historians noted the strange “crowding” of our aviation at the airfields the day beforewar and complained about the “mistakes” and “miscalculations” of the command (i.e. Stalin)and assessment of events. In fact, “crowding” foreshadows plansa super-massive strike on targets and confidence in impunity, which did not happen. The Air Force flight personnel, especially the bomber ones, suffered heavy losses due to the lack of support fighters; the tragedy of the death of perhaps the most advanced and powerful air fleet inhistory of mankind, which had to be revived again under the blows enemy.

It must be admitted that the Nazis managed to largely implement their plans for an air war in 1941 and the first half of 1942. Almost all available forces were thrown against the Soviet Union G Hitler's aviation, including units removed from the Western Front. Atit was assumed that after the first successful operations, some of the bombsarmored and fighter formations will be returned to the Westfor the war with England. At the beginning of the war, the Nazis had not only quantitative superiority. Their advantage was also the fact that the pilotsthe personnel who took part in the air attack have already been seriouslynew fighting school with French, Polish and English pilots. Onthey also had a fair amount of experience interacting with their troops,acquired in the war against Western European countries.Old types of fighters and bombers, such as the I-15,I-16, SB, TB-3 could not compete with the latest Messerschmitts and"Junkers". Nevertheless, in the unfolding air battles, even on the lipsnew types of aircraft, Russian pilots caused damage to the Germans. From 22June to July 19, Germany lost 1,300 aircraft only battles

Here is what the German General Staffist Greffath writes about this:

" Behind period from June 22 to July 5, 1941 German air forcelost 807 aircraft of all types, and during the period from July 6 to July 19 - 477.

These losses indicate that despite the surprise achieved by the Germans, the Russians were able to find the time and strength to provide decisive resistance ".

On the very first day of the war, fighter pilot Kokorev distinguished himself by ramming an enemy fighter, the crew’s feat is known to the whole worldGastello (the latest research into this fact suggests that the ramming crew was not Gastello’s crew, but the crew of Maslov, who flew with Gastello’s crew to attack enemy columns), who threw his burning car onto a cluster of German equipment.Despite the losses, the Germans in all directions brought everything into battlenew and new fighters and bombers. They abandoned the front4940 aircraft, including 3940 German, 500 Finnish, 500 Romanianand achieved complete air supremacy.

By October 1941, the Wehrmacht armies approached Moscow and were busycities supplying components for aircraft factories, the time has come to evacuate the factories and design bureaus of Sukhoi, Yakovlev and others in Moscow, Ilyushin inVoronezh, all factories in the European part of the USSR demanded the evacuation.

Aircraft production in November 1941 decreased by more than three and a half times. Already on July 5, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to evacuate from the central regions of the country part of the equipment of some aircraft equipment factories to duplicate their production in Western Siberia, and after some time it was necessary to make a decision on the evacuation of the entire aircraft industry.

On November 9, 1941, the State Defense Committee approved schedules for the restoration and relaunch of evacuated factories and production plans.

The task was not only to restore aircraft production,but also to significantly increase their quantity and quality. In December 1941The aircraft production plan was completed in less than 40 years.percent, and motors - only 24 percent.In the most difficult conditions, under bombs, in the cold, cold of Siberian wintersbackup factories were launched one after another. They were refined and simplified.technologies, new types of materials were used (without compromising quality), women and teenagers took over the machines.

Lend-Lease supplies were also of no small importance for the front. Throughout the Second World War, aircraft supplied 4-5 percent of the total production of aircraft and other weapons produced in the USA. However, a number of materials and equipment supplied by the USA and England were unique and indispensable for Russia (varnishes, paints, other chemicals substances, devices, tools, equipment, medicines, etc.) that cannot be characterized as “insignificant” or secondary.

The turning point in the work of domestic aircraft factories came around March 1942. At the same time, the combat experience of our pilots grew.

Between November 19 and December 31, 1942 alone, the Luftwaffe lost 3,000 combat aircraft in the battles for Stalingrad. Our aviation becameact more actively and showed all its combat power in the NorthCaucasus. Heroes of the Soviet Union appeared. This title was awardedboth for downed aircraft and for the number of combat sorties.

In the USSR, the Normandie-Niemen squadron was formed, staffed by French volunteers. The pilots fought on Yak aircraft.

Average monthly production of aircraft rose from 2.1 thousand in 1942 to 2.9 thousand in 1943. Total industry in 1943produced 35 thousand aircraft, 37 percent more than in 1942.In 1943, factories produced 49 thousand engines, almost 11 thousand more than in 1942.

Back in 1942, the USSR surpassed Germany in the production of aircraft - the heroic efforts of our specialists and workers and the “complacency” or unpreparedness of Germany, which did not mobilize industry in advance for war conditions, had an impact.

In the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, Germany used significant quantities of aircraft, but the power of the Air Force for the first time ensured air supremacy. For example, in just one hour on one day of the operation, a force of 411 aircraft was struck, and so on in three waves during the day.

By 1944, the front received about 100 aircraft daily, incl. 40 fighters.The main combat vehicles were modernized. Aircraft withimproved combat qualities of the YAK-3, PE-2, YAK 9T, D, LA-5, IL-10.German designers also modernized the aircraft."Me-109F,G,G2", etc.

By the end of the war, the problem of increasing the range of fighter aircraft arose; airfields could not keep up with the front. Designers proposed installing additional gas tanks on airplanes, and jet weapons began to be used. Radio communications developed, and radar was used in air defense. Bomb strikes became more and more intense. Thus, on April 17, 1945, bombers of the 18th Air Army in the area of ​​Königsbergaz carried out 516 sorties for 45 minutes and dropped 3,743 bombs with a total weight of 550 tons.

In the air battle for Berlin, the enemy took part in 1,500 combat aircraft based at 40 airfields near Berlin. This is the most intense air battle in history, and the highest level of combat training on both sides should be taken into account.The Luftwaffe was fought by aces who shot down 100,150 or more aircraft (record300 downed combat aircraft).

At the end of the war, the Germans used jet aircraft, which were significantly faster than propeller-driven aircraft in speed - (Me-262, etc.). However, this did not help. Our pilots in Berlin flew 17.5 thousand combat sorties and completely destroyed the German air fleet.

Analyzing military experience, we can conclude that our aircraft, developed in the period 1939-1940. had constructive reserves for subsequent modernization. Along the way, it should be noted that in the USSR not all types of aircraft were accepted for service. For example, in October 1941, production of MiG-3 fighters was stopped, and in 1943, IL-4 bombers.

The USSR aviation industry produced 15,735 aircraft in 1941. In the difficult year of 1942, during the evacuation of aviation enterprises, 25,436 aircraft were produced, in 1943 - 34,900 aircraft, in 1944 - 40,300 aircraft, in the first half of 1945, 20,900 aircraft were produced. Already in the spring of 1942, all factories evacuated from the central regions of the USSR beyond the Urals and to Siberia, they fully mastered the production of aviation equipment and weapons. Most of these factories in new locations in 1943 and 1944 produced products several times more than before the evacuation.

The successes of the rear made it possible to strengthen the country's air force. By early 1944, the Air Force And grounded 8818 combat aircraft, and German - 3073. In terms of the number of aircraft, the USSR exceeded Germany by 2.7 times. By June 1944, the German Air Forcehad only 2,776 aircraft at the front, and our Air Force - 14,787. By the beginning of January 1945, our Air Force had 15,815 combat aircraft. The design of our aircraft was much simpler than that of American, German or British aircraft. This partly explains such a clear advantage in the number of aircraft. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the reliability, durability and strength of our and German aircraft, as well as to analyze the tactical and strategic use of aviation in the war of 1941-1945. Apparently, these comparisons would not be in our favor and would conditionally reduce such a striking difference in numbers. However, perhaps, simplifying the design was the only way out in the absence of qualified specialists, materials, equipment and other components for the production of reliable and high-quality equipment in the USSR, especially since, unfortunately, in the Russian army they traditionally hire by “numbers”, not by skill .

Aircraft weapons were also improved. in 1942, a large-caliber 37 mm aircraft gun was developed, later it appearedand a 45 mm cannon.

By 1942, V.Ya. Klimov developed the M-107 engine to replace the M-105P, adopted for installation on water-cooled fighters.

Greffoat writes: “Relying on the fact that the war with Russia, like the war in the West, would be lightning fast, Hitler intended, after achieving the first successes in the East, to transfer bomber units, as well asthe required number of aircraft back to the West. In the East they mustair connections intended for directsupport for German troops, as well as military transport units and a number of fighter squadrons..."

German aircraft created in 1935-1936 at the beginning of the war no longer had the possibility of radical modernization. According to the German General Butler "The Russians had the advantage that in the production of weapons and ammunition they took into account all the featuresconducting the war in Russia and ensuring maximum simplicity of technology. As a result of this, Russian factories produced a huge amount of weapons, which were distinguished by their great simplicity of design. Learning to wield such a weapon was relatively easy... "

The Second World War fully confirmed the maturity of domestic scientific and technical thought (this ultimately ensured the further acceleration of the introduction of jet aviation).

Nevertheless, each country followed its own path in designing airplanes.

The aviation industry of the USSR produced 15,735 aircraft in 1941. In the difficult year of 1942, during the evacuation of aviation enterprises, 25,436 aircraft were produced, in 1943 - 34,900 aircraft, for1944 - 40,300 aircraft, 20,900 aircraft were produced in the first half of 1945. Already in the spring of 1942, all factories evacuated from the central regions of the USSR to the Urals and Siberia had fully mastered the production of aviation equipment and weapons. Most of these factories moved to new locations in 1943 and 1944 years they produced several times more production than before the evacuation.

Germany had, in addition to its own resources, the resources of the conquered countries. In 1944, German factories produced 27.6 thousand aircraft, and our factories produced 33.2 thousand aircraft in the same period. In 1944, aircraft production was 3.8 times higher than the 1941 figures.

In the first months of 1945, the aircraft industry prepared equipment for the final battles. Thus, the Siberian Aviation Plant N 153, which produced 15 thousand fighters during the war, transferred 1.5 thousand modernized fighters to the front in January-March 1945.

The successes of the rear made it possible to strengthen the country's air force. By the beginning of 1944, the Air Force had 8,818 combat aircraft, and the German - 3,073. In terms of the number of aircraft, the USSR exceeded Germany by 2.7 times. By June 1944, the German Air Forcehad only 2,776 aircraft at the front, and our Air Force - 14,787. By the beginning of January 1945, our Air Force had 15,815 combat aircraft. The design of our aircraft was much simpler than the American and Germanor English cars. This partly explains such a clear advantage in the number of aircraft. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make a comparison of the reliability, durability and strength of our and German aircraft, andalso analyze the tactical and strategic use of aviation in the war of 1941-1945. Apparently these comparisons would not be inour benefit and would conditionally reduce such a striking difference in numbers. However, perhaps, simplifying the design was the only way out in the absence of qualified specialists, materials, equipment and other components for the production of reliable and high-quality equipment in the USSR, especially since, unfortunately, in the Russian army they traditionally hire by “numbers”, not by skill .

Aircraft weapons were also improved. In 1942, a large-caliber 37 mm aircraft gun was developed, and later a 45 mm caliber gun appeared. By 1942, V.Ya. Klimov developed the M-107 engine to replace the M-105P, adopted for installation on water-cooled fighters.

The fundamental improvement of the aircraft is its conversionchanging from a propeller to a jet. To increase flight speeda more powerful engine is installed. However, at speeds above 700 km/hspeed increase from engine power cannot be achieved. Outputhouse from the position is the use of jet traction. Appliesturbojet/turbojet/ or liquid jet/LPRE/ engine.the second half of the 30s in the USSR, England, Germany, Italy, later - inThe United States was intensively creating a jet aircraft. In 1938, jets appearedhighest in the world, German jet engines BMW, Junkers. In 1940the first Campini-Capro jet aircraft made test flightsneither", created in Italy, later the German Me-262, Me-163 appearedXE-162. In 1941, the Gloucester aircraft with a jet was tested in Englandengine, and in 1942 they tested a jet aircraft in the USA - "Irokometh". In England, the twin-engine jet aircraft "Me" was soon createdtheor", who took part in the war. In 1945, on the Me planeTheor-4" set a world speed record of 969.6 km/h.

In the USSR, in the initial period, practical work on the creation of reactionstive engines was carried out in the direction of the liquid rocket engine. Under the leadershipS.P.Koroleva, A.F.Tsander, designers A.M.Isaev, L.S.DushkindevelopedThe first domestic jet engines were built. Pioneer turbojeakA.M.Lyulka became the first ative engine.At the beginning of 1942, G. Bakhchivandzhi made the first flight on a rockettive domestic aircraft. Soon this pilot diedduring aircraft testing.Work on the creation of a jet aircraft for practical useresumed after the war with the creation of the Yak-15, MiG-9 using non-German JUMO jet engines.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the Soviet Union entered the war with numerous, but technically backward fighter aircraft. This backwardness was, in essence, an inevitable phenomenon for a country that had only recently embarked on the path of industrialization that Western European states and the United States had followed in the 19th century. By the mid-20s of the 20th century, the USSR was an agricultural country with a half-illiterate, mostly rural population and a tiny percentage of engineering, technical and scientific personnel. Aircraft manufacturing, engine manufacturing and non-ferrous metallurgy were in their infancy. Suffice it to say that in Tsarist Russia they did not produce ball bearings and carburetors for aircraft engines, aircraft electrical equipment, control and aeronautical instruments at all. Aluminum, wheel tires and even copper wire had to be purchased abroad.

Over the next 15 years, the aviation industry, along with related and raw materials industries, was created practically from scratch, and simultaneously with the construction of the largest air force in the world at that time.

Of course, with such a fantastic pace of development, serious costs and forced compromises were inevitable, because it was necessary to rely on the available material, technological and personnel base.

The most complex knowledge-intensive industries—engine building, instrument making, and radio electronics—were in the most difficult situation. It must be admitted that the Soviet Union was unable to overcome the gap from the West in these areas during the pre-war and war years. The difference in the “starting conditions” turned out to be too great and the time allotted by history was too short. Until the end of the war, we produced engines created on the basis of foreign models purchased back in the 30s - Hispano-Suiza, BMW and Wright-Cyclone. Their repeated forcing led to overstressing of the structure and a steady decrease in reliability, and, as a rule, it was not possible to bring our own promising developments to mass production. The exception was the M-82 and its further development, the M-82FN, which gave birth to perhaps the best Soviet fighter of the war, the La-7.

During the war years, the Soviet Union was unable to establish serial production of turbochargers and two-stage superchargers, multifunctional propulsion automation devices similar to the German “Kommandoherat”, powerful 18-cylinder air-cooled engines, thanks to which the Americans crossed the milestone of 2000, and then at 2500 hp. Well, by and large, no one in our country was seriously involved in work on water-methanol boosting of engines. All this greatly limited aircraft designers in creating fighters with higher performance characteristics than the enemy.

No less serious restrictions were imposed by the need to use wood, plywood and steel pipes instead of scarce aluminum and magnesium alloys. The irresistible weight of the wooden and mixed construction forced us to weaken the weapons, limit the ammunition load, reduce the fuel supply and save on armor protection. But there was simply no other way out, because otherwise it would not have been possible to even bring the flight data of Soviet aircraft closer to the characteristics of German fighters.

For a long time, our aircraft industry compensated for the lag in quality through quantity. Already in 1942, despite the evacuation of 3/4 of the aircraft industry's production capacity, the USSR produced 40% more combat aircraft than Germany. In 1943, Germany made significant efforts to increase the production of combat aircraft, but nevertheless the Soviet Union built 29% more of them. Only in 1944, the Third Reich, through the total mobilization of the resources of the country and occupied Europe, caught up with the USSR in the production of combat aircraft, but during this period the Germans had to use up to 2/3 of their aviation in the West, against the Anglo-American allies.

By the way, we note that for each combat aircraft produced in the USSR there were 8 times fewer machine tools, 4.3 times less electricity and 20% fewer workers than in Germany! Moreover, more than 40% of workers in the Soviet aviation industry in 1944 were women, and over 10% were teenagers under 18 years of age.

The given figures indicate that Soviet aircraft were simpler, cheaper and more technologically advanced than German ones. Nevertheless, by the middle of 1944, their best models, such as the Yak-3 and La-7 fighters, surpassed German aircraft of the same type and contemporary ones in a number of flight parameters. The combination of fairly powerful engines with high aerodynamic and weight efficiency made it possible to achieve this, despite the use of archaic materials and technologies designed for simple production conditions, outdated equipment and low-skilled workers.

It can be argued that the named types in 1944 accounted for only 24.8% of the total production of fighter aircraft in the USSR, and the remaining 75.2% were older types of aircraft with worse flight characteristics. We can also recall that in 1944 the Germans were already actively developing jet aviation, having achieved considerable success in this. The first samples of jet fighters were put into mass production and began to arrive in combat units.

Nevertheless, the progress of the Soviet aircraft industry during the difficult war years is undeniable. And his main achievement is that our fighters managed to recapture from the enemy low and medium altitudes, at which attack aircraft and short-range bombers operated - the main striking force of aviation on the front line. This ensured the successful combat work of the Ilovs and Pe-2s against German defensive positions, force concentration centers and transport communications, which, in turn, contributed to the victorious offensive of the Soviet troops at the final stage of the war.

By the beginning of the war, there were significantly more MiG-3 fighters in service than other aircraft. However, the “third” MiG was not yet sufficiently mastered by combat pilots, and the retraining of most of them was not completed.

Two MiG-3 regiments were quickly formed with a large percentage of testers familiar with them. This partly helped in eliminating piloting deficiencies. But still, the MiG-3 lost even to the I-6 fighters, common at the beginning of the war. Superior in speed at altitudes above 5000 m, at low and medium altitudes it was inferior to other fighters.

This is both a disadvantage and at the same time an advantage of the “third” MiG. The MiG-3 is a high-altitude aircraft, all the best qualities of which were manifested at an altitude of over 4500 meters. It found use as a high-altitude night fighter in the air defense system, where its high ceiling of up to 12,000 meters and speed at altitude were decisive. Thus, the MiG-3 was mainly used until the end of the war, in particular, guarding Moscow.

In the very first battle over the capital, on July 22, 1941, Mark Gallay, a pilot of the 2nd Separate Air Defense Fighter Squadron of Moscow, shot down an enemy plane in a MiG-3. At the beginning of the war, one of the ace pilots, Alexander Pokryshkin, flew on the same plane and won his first victory.

Yak-9: the “king” of modifications

Until the end of the 30s, the design bureau of Alexander Yakovlev produced light, mainly sports aircraft. In 1940, the Yak-1 fighter, which has excellent flight qualities, was launched into production. At the beginning of the war, the Yak-1 successfully repelled German pilots.

Already in 1942, the Yak-9 began to enter service with our Air Force. The new Soviet vehicle had high maneuverability, allowing for dynamic combat close to the enemy at low and medium altitudes.

It was the Yak-9 that turned out to be the most popular Soviet fighter of the Great Patriotic War. It was produced from 1942 to 1948, in total almost 17 thousand aircraft were built.

The Yak-9's design used duralumin instead of heavy wood, making the aircraft lighter and leaving room for modifications. It was the Yak-9’s ability to upgrade that became its main advantage. It had 22 main modifications, of which 15 were mass-produced. This includes a front-line fighter, fighter-bomber, interceptor, escort, reconnaissance aircraft, special purpose passenger aircraft and training aircraft.

The most successful modification is considered to be the Yak-9U fighter, which appeared in the fall of 1944. Suffice it to say that his pilots called him “the killer.”

La-5: disciplined soldier

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, German aviation had an advantage in the skies of the USSR. But in 1942, a Soviet fighter appeared that could fight on equal terms with German aircraft - this is the La-5, developed at the Lavochkin Design Bureau.

Despite its simplicity - the La-5 cockpit did not have even the most basic instruments like an attitude indicator - the pilots immediately liked the plane.

Lavochkin's new plane had a strong design and did not fall apart even after dozens of direct hits. At the same time, the La-5 had impressive maneuverability and speed: turn time was 16.5-19 seconds, speed was above 600 km/h.

Another advantage of the La-5 is that, as a disciplined soldier, it did not perform the “spin” aerobatics without a direct order from the pilot, and if it got into a spin, it came out of it on the first command.

La-5 fought in the skies over Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, ace pilot Ivan Kozhedub fought on it, and the famous Alexey Maresyev flew on it.

Po-2: night bomber

The Po-2 (U-2) aircraft is considered the most popular biplane in the history of world aviation. When creating a training aircraft in the 1920s, Nikolai Polikarpov did not imagine that there would be another, serious application for his unpretentious machine.

During World War II, the U-2 developed into an effective night bomber. Aviation regiments armed exclusively with U-2s appeared in the Soviet Air Force. It was these biplanes that carried out more than half of all Soviet bomber missions during the war.

“Sewing machines” - that’s what the Germans called the U-2s that bombed their units at night. One biplane could make several sorties per night, and given the maximum bomb load of 100-350 kg, the aircraft could drop more ammunition than a heavy bomber.

It was on Polikarpov’s biplanes that the famous 46th Guards Taman Aviation Regiment fought. Four squadrons of 80 pilots, 23 of whom received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For their courage and aviation skill, the Germans nicknamed the girls Nachthexen - “night witches.” During the war years, the women's air regiment flew 23,672 combat missions.

In total, 11 thousand U-2 biplanes were produced during the war. They were produced at aircraft factory No. 387 in Kazan. Cabins for airplanes and skis for them were mass-produced at the plant in Ryazan. Today it is the State Ryazan Instrument Plant (GRPZ), part of KRET.

It was only in 1959 that the U-2, renamed Po-2 in 1944 in honor of its creator, ended its impeccable thirty-year service.

IL-2: winged tank

Il-2 is the most produced combat aircraft in history; in total, more than 36 thousand aircraft were produced. Il-2 attacks brought huge losses to the enemy, for which the Germans nicknamed the attack aircraft “Black Death”, and among our pilots they called this bomber “humpbacked”, “winged tank”, “concrete plane”.

The IL-2 entered production just before the war - in December 1940. The first flight on it was made by the famous test pilot Vladimir Kokkinaki. These serial armored attack aircraft entered service at the beginning of the war.

The Il-2 attack aircraft became the main striking force of Soviet aviation. The key to excellent combat performance was a powerful aircraft engine, armored glass necessary to protect the crew, as well as high-speed aircraft guns and rockets.

The best enterprises in the country, including those that are part of Rostec today, worked on the creation of components for the most mass-produced attack aircraft in history. The leading enterprise for the production of ammunition for aircraft was the famous Tula Instrument Design Bureau. Transparent armored glass for glazing the Il-2 canopy was produced at the Lytkarino optical glass plant. The assembly of engines for attack aircraft was carried out in the workshops of plant No. 24, today known as the Kuznetsov enterprise. The propellers for the attack aircraft were produced in Kuibyshev at the Aviaagregat plant.

Thanks to modern technologies at that time, the IL-2 became a real legend. There was a case when an attack aircraft returned from a mission and was hit more than 600 times. After quick repairs, the “winged tanks” were sent into battle again.

One of the branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the main tasks of which included air cover of the Ground Forces (ground forces) and the navy (navy), direct destruction of enemy objects and forces, participation in special operations, airlifts, as well as a decisive role in the conquest air supremacy.

In the pre-war years in the USSR, the profession of a military pilot was especially popular. Until December 1940, the Air Force was staffed exclusively by volunteers who underwent the strictest selection. The popularity of aviation among young people was facilitated by numerous records set by Soviet aviators in the 1930s. The names of heroic pilots V. P. Chkalov, G. F. Baidukov, S. A. Levanevsky, M. M. Gromov, brave pilots V. S. Grizodubova, M. M. Raskova were no less famous than the names of popular actors and musicians . Soviet aviation industry, still at the end. 1920s which was in its infancy, by the end of the first five-year plan it stood on its feet and was able to provide the Air Force with modern aviation equipment. So, if in 1928 there were only 12 aviation enterprises in the USSR, then by 1933 their number increased to 31. Towards the end. 1930s In terms of aircraft production, the Soviet Union was ahead of all developed capitalist countries. However, by that time a number of serious problems had emerged. The domestic engine industry lagged significantly behind; there was a shortage of light aviation materials (aluminum, duralumin, etc.); Aircraft produced by the domestic industry, which 2-3 years ago were considered quite modern, due to the rapid development of design ideas in the West, began to rapidly become obsolete. In 1939, the Soviet government began to take emergency measures to modernize the Air Force aircraft fleet. New design bureaus are being created under the leadership of young engineers A. S. Yakovlev, S. A. Lavochkin, P. O. Sukhoi, A. I. Mikoyan and M. I. Gurevich. N.N. Polikarpov, S.V. Ilyushin, as well as A.N. Tupolev, V.M. Petlyakov and many others are working on new machines. By June 1941, the Soviet Air Force numbered approx. 16,000 combat aircraft. Directly in the five western border districts, 10,243 aircraft were deployed, of which 7,473 belonged to the Red Army Air Force (front-line, army and corps aviation), 1,437 aircraft of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets and 1,333 long-range bomber aircraft (LBA), subordinated directly to the High Command of the Red Army. Most Soviet aircraft were obsolete types: I-15bis, I-16, I-153 fighters; bombers SB, Ar-2, TB-3; reconnaissance aircraft R-5, R-Z, R-10, MBR-2. The short-range bombers Su-2, Yak-2, Yak-4 and long-range DB-3 and DB-3f (Il-4) could be considered relatively modern. All of these aircraft were, to one degree or another, inferior to similar enemy aircraft; the gap was especially strong in fighter aircraft. Even to the aging German fighter Me-109E, the Soviet I-16, depending on the modification, lost 60-100 km/h in speed, and the new Me-109F, of which the Germans had the majority, lost 120-150 km/h. The situation could be corrected by new Soviet fighter aircraft Yak-1, MiG-3 and LaGG-3, Il-2 attack aircraft, and Pe-2 bombers, but these aircraft did not have time to replace outdated models in units. But even in those units that received new equipment, the personnel did not have time to master it. Although there were already 1,540 new types of aircraft in the west of the country, only 208 crews were retrained on them. The level of training of Soviet pilots was also lower than that of German ones. During 1939-1941 A large number of young pilots trained under a shortened program joined the ranks of the Air Force. Only a little more than 3 thousand Soviet pilots had at least some combat experience gained in Finland, Spain or Khalkhin Gol. Among the German pilots, the vast majority had experience of fighting in Poland, France, over England, Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete. Many German fighter pilots received the right to be called aces. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) and its allies - Hungary, Romania, Finland and Slovakia - numbered 4,130 combat aircraft. In the fall of 1941, they were joined by aircraft from the Italian and Croatian Air Forces. And yet the Soviet pilots offered fierce resistance. On the very first day of the war, the enemy lost 78 aircraft, and another 89 were damaged. 18 aircraft were shot down by ramming attacks by Soviet pilots. Soon the names of the first Soviet aces of the Great Patriotic War became known: A. Antonenko, P. Brinko, B. Safonov. On July 22, 1941, German aircraft carried out their first raid on Moscow. In response, on the night of August 8, Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force bombers bombed Berlin. In July-August, the staffing structure of Air Force regiments and divisions was changed. At the same time, the position of commander of the Air Force was introduced, who became the head of the Air Force Directorate, General P. F. Zhigarev (from April 1942 - General A. A. Novikov). In the spring of 1942, the enemy was able to recover from the blow received and, having gathered huge forces on the southern sector of the front, again went on the offensive. The 4th Luftwaffe air fleet operating here consisted of 1,200 combat vehicles, not counting the air forces of Hungary, Romania and Italy. These planes supported the fascist troops rushing to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The Soviet aviation operating near Stalingrad did not have even a thousand aircraft. In such conditions the grandiose Battle of Stalingrad began. In the spring and summer of 1942, the organizational structure of the Soviet Air Force underwent changes again. In March, the DBA was reorganized into long-range aviation (ADA, commander - General A.E. Golovanov). In May-June, the formation of air armies (AA) began - independent aviation formations. Unlike the previously operating system, when air force forces were split between the front, armies and even corps, the new organization made it possible to use aviation more massively, concentrating its efforts on the most important sectors of the front. In total, 18 air armies were formed during the war (the ADD was reorganized into the 18th Air Army in 1944). To strengthen the air forces operating in the directions of the main attacks, the formation of reserve aviation corps of the Supreme High Command began in the fall of 1942. Until the end In 1944, 30 such corps were formed; by January 1, 1945, they included 43% of all aircraft of the Red Army Air Force. These events became possible because since 1942, Soviet industry launched the mass production of modern combat aircraft. If in 1941 15,735 aircraft were produced, then in 1942 - already 25,436, in 1943 - 34,884, in 1944 - 40,261. Only the US aviation industry worked at a faster pace, which, however, there was no need to evacuate their enterprises and re-organize all production. Without slowing down the rate of production, the Soviet aviation industry mastered new types of aircraft, while at the same time continuing to improve the earlier ones. The allies also provided significant assistance. From the end 1941 until the summer of 1945, 18,865 aircraft were received under Lend-Lease, including Airacobra, Kittyhawk, Kingcobra, Thunderbolt, Hurricane, Spitfire fighters, bombers and torpedo bombers "Mitchell", "Boston", "Hampden", various naval, transport and training aircraft. Aviation gasoline and various aviation materials came from the USA, Great Britain and Canada. In the spring-summer of 1943, during the grandiose air battles in Kuban (April-May) and on the Kursk Bulge (July-August), the Soviet Air Force broke enemy resistance and did not lose its air superiority until the very end of the war. In 1944-1945 The Soviet Air Force firmly maintained air superiority, although the enemy periodically tried to seize the initiative on certain sectors of the front. In the Soviet Air Force, in addition to the already operating French Normandy air regiment, Polish and Czechoslovakian national aviation formations appeared. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe began to receive increasingly new and advanced military equipment, including including Me-262 jet fighters and Ar-234 bombers. As we approached the German borders, the resistance to German anti-aircraft artillery, which was armed with radar-guided guns, increased significantly. Until the last days of the war, fascist aviation and air defense offered fierce and stubborn resistance. Thus, in less than a month of the Berlin offensive operation, the losses of the Soviet Air Force amounted to 917 aircraft out of more than 7,500 participating. In August 1945, the Red Army Air Force and the Pacific Fleet took part in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army. From the very first day, our aviation reigned supreme in the skies, supporting the advance of ground units. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet aviation (excluding the naval air force) made 3 million 124 thousand combat sorties. 30 million 450 thousand bombs with a total weight of 660 thousand tons were dropped on the enemy. 57 thousand enemy aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at airfields, and the total losses of Germany and its satellites on the Eastern Front amounted to 77 thousand aircraft. Own losses amounted to 88,300 aircraft, including 43,100 shot down and destroyed at airfields. For 1941-1945 2,420 aviators were awarded the honorary title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 65 pilots were awarded this title twice, and two (I.N. Kozhedub and A.I. Pokryshkin) became Heroes of the Soviet Union three times.

Historical sources:

List of associations and formations of the Soviet armed forces that were part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945: (reference book). M., 1992.