Perhaps Navalny was wrong to ridicule Rusnano, but such a reaction is provoked by the company itself
“Shut up, look here and die of delight. Anatoly Chubais even compared this project to a rocket,” Alexey Navalny sneered angrily, showing viewers of his YouTube channel a non-working device with the Rusnano label. The head of the state-owned company presented this case for the iPhone 6 with a second Plastic Logic screen to the oppositionist two years ago at their memorable debate on the Dozhd TV channel. Navalny actually accused the company of wasting 10 billion rubles, which cost the creation of the gadget. Rusnano rejected these claims. And Chubais himself, probably feeling like a winner in the next skirmish, wrote a laconic “Hee hee” on Facebook. The dispute ended, but the residue remained.
What’s wrong with Rusnano and why does what the state-owned company does cause so much sarcasm?
At the time of its creation in 2007, Rusnano had the status of a state corporation, but in the fifth year of operation it became a joint-stock company, acting as a direct investment fund. This gave the company a certain duality to its position. On the one hand, it solved the state task of building a nanotechnology industry in Russia. One can argue about approaches, but it is difficult to disagree with the fact that nanotechnology as such is a promising industry, and helping private companies that operate in this area is an acceptable task for a state institution. And note, it does not require immediate return in the form of profit.
Another side of Rusnano’s activities is investment itself. And here it’s the other way around: if you decide to invest money in business projects, then you should think first of all about profitability. Chubais, with his characteristic persuasiveness, came out of this contradiction as follows: “The question of our managerial competence, if you like, skill and art [is] to build a kind of nesting doll when we, having managed to solve the first task [to create the Russian nanoindustry], on top of it We will also solve the second one [to give impetus to Russian private equity].”
Reporting on the first task is somewhat easier. For example, we can say that over the ten years of the company’s operation, more than a hundred R&D centers and factories for the production of nanotechnology products have been created in the country. Or you can give this indicator: the production volume of the entire national nanoindustry over the past year exceeded 1.5 trillion rubles. And this is not so little, considering that the entire global market for nanotechnological products is estimated to be only 6–7 times larger.
These indicators tell us little about Rusnano's effectiveness as an investor. Here you should rely on the track record, the history of successful projects. The company has successful exits: exit from the capital of the Mikron plant, the companies Danaflex-nano and Uralplastik. However, there are also plenty of failures: the most sensational ones are the bankruptcy of the Liotech lithium-ion battery plant, the failure of the production of polysilicon for solar batteries, Usolye-Sibirsky Silicon, and the Krasnodar enterprise for their production, Solar Wind. But for venture capital investments, failure is par for the course; it is built into the business model. In addition, if you believe Chubais’s promises, the still planned unprofitable Rusnano should become a confident plus after 2017. Just the other day, the company reported a triple increase in revenue over the past three quarters, which was associated with successful exits from portfolio projects.
You should also evaluate projects in which Rusnano has invested but has not yet sold. This would help to better understand what auditors of the Accounts Chamber are dealing with, periodically giving negative opinions on the efficiency of using public funds, or, say, investigators working on the case of the former head of the company Leonid Melamed, accused of embezzlement of 220 million rubles. But only someone who deeply understands the company’s portfolio and the palette of its diverse projects and products - from tablets to wind generators - who knows the target profitability indicators, Rusnano’s share of participation and estimates of the value of these businesses can shed light here. You can try to value the entire portfolio by discounting the cash flow of the companies included in it. But Chubais rejects such methods: projects that have not passed the laboratory stage have no cash flow. What to discount?
In 2007–2015, the company received 130 billion rubles from the state, and there were also 252 billion rubles in state loan guarantees. And getting a clear picture of how well Rusnano has managed these funds is not easy right now. It is certainly more difficult than seeing the reason why a state-owned company close to profit, spending money on a promising technology industry, continues to be an object of ridicule - in particular, Navalny.
The fact is that Rusnano believes that a clear illustration of the results of work will most likely be not the number of factories built and exits carried out, but a specific consumer product that symbolizes public benefit. That is why Navalny was holding an innovative phone case in his hands, and not a piece of polysilicon and other samples of nanoproducts, obscure to most audiences, received as a gift from Chubais. And that is why, for example, many people remember the promise to create the “most advanced” electric scooter, and few people care about carbon nanotubes produced in Novosibirsk by the portfolio company Rusnano and sold to “more than five hundred companies from all over the world.”
Consumer technology and electronics, including flexible ones, are typically the focus of private companies operating in an extremely competitive global market. The state's attempt to get into this area is practically doomed to failure. Why then does Chubais repeatedly expose to the public consumer products produced with the participation of Rusnano money? Perhaps this is the easiest way to demonstrate both the country’s leadership and ordinary people that the company is in demand. Perhaps Rusnano could do without these tricks and simply report on new laboratories and supplies of innovative nanomaterials abroad. Even better – about successfully made investments. This year was the last year when the company – according to plan – could afford a loss. So a positive financial result from it should now be expected with much more attention than another unsuccessful gadget.
In 2018, the public was again interested in the question of where Anatoly Borisovich Chubais is currently located and what he is doing now. In the 90s, the economist and political activist earned himself a reputation as a fraud. Not without his participation, during the reign of Boris Yeltsin, the Russian economy rapidly went down.
Chronology of events
Thanks to Chubais, the country almost lost its energy complexes. He was going to sell them. In addition, everyone probably remembers the Rusnano scam. For this, the politician could well have deserved a real sentence, but for some reason this has not happened to this day.
Why is Chubais still at large?
The public cannot understand why the politician who committed the crime has not yet been punished. This is at least strange, given the fact that the current President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, speaking with journalists in 2013, openly stated that he considers Chubais an American spy, emphasizing that his activities cause significant harm to the State.
As it turned out, the whole problem is that neither the privatization scam nor the loans-for-shares auctions can be blamed on politics. It is believed that there was nothing illegal in his actions at that time. He did not violate any article of the law.
But there is another compelling reason for impunity. In Yeltsin's times, the politician had enormous influence; he practically ruled the country, being at the pinnacle of power.
Later, Putin, the new head of state, could not oppose anything to politics. But gradually, Chubais lost his leading position.
Events of 2003
RAO UES, which at that time was ruled by the notorious politician and practically destroyed the entire structure, was his last government appointment. In 2018, there is no exact information about where Anatoly Borisovich Chubais is located.
Then the state-owned commercial enterprise, in the literal sense of the word, turned into a financial hole for Russia. This is the direct “merit” of Chubais, who was approved to manage this structure in 2008. Today even people who were part of his circle of subordinates are turning away from the odious politician.
Work of Rusnano
Anatoly Borisovich, under whose leadership the enterprise was located, made it somewhat legendary. It became famous for its corrupt practices. The essence of a commercial organization is to generate profit; in the case of Rusnano, everything turned out quite the opposite.
Throughout the entire time, the enterprise was only engaged in squeezing fabulous money from the State Treasury, the count was in the billions.
Studying the state of affairs over the past few years, it turned out that Rusnano’s loss amounted to more than 15 billion rubles. The amount is more than impressive. Especially considering where she went.
Everything is very simple, these funds were used to pay bonuses to the senior management of this very commercial organization. And only part of the money was spent on purchasing goods. By the way, 1% of Rusnano’s budget (which is more than 50 million rubles) belongs to no one but the red-haired politician himself.
Do you know who Anatoly Chubais is?
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News 2018
Analysts assumed that the presidential elections held in March 2018 would bring Anatoly Borisovich Chubais under investigation. Judging by the fact that the politician is now under close surveillance by the FSB, their predictions are coming true.
So far, information has not been disclosed regarding where exactly Chubais is located. Putin, when forming a new government, did not invite him, thereby showing that Russia is not interested in this figure. Consequently, he can only dream of his former power at the state level.
Immediately after the March elections, Anatoly Borisovich decides to privatize Rusnano, but makes a grave mistake. Documentedly, everything seems to be correct. Moreover, the deal was formalized with the permission of senior management and looked like a buyout of shares by managers. Everything could have gone smoothly, if not for one “but”. The FSB structure suspected something was wrong, and the employees’ attention was drawn to the amount, which was clearly underestimated, many times over.
From the report of the Prosecutor General, it becomes clear that thanks to the coordinated actions of the Federal Security Service, theft in the amount of 147 billion rubles was prevented. Chubais is now under investigation.
It is not clear why the politician, who repeatedly breaks the law, has not yet been arrested and what his future fate will be. People still have many questions, and not a single clear answer. First of all, of course, one is interested in: how privatization will turn out for Chubais and why he has not yet answered for what he has done, given that all the facts are clear.
On January 28, the Board of Directors of OJSC Rusnano will decide on early termination of powers Chairman of the Board of the company Anatoly Chubais. As stated by the company's management, Chubais will take the post of Chairman of the Board of Management Company Rusnano LLC.
Anatoly Chubais is considered one of the ideologists and leaders of economic reforms in Russia in the 1990s and the reform of the Russian electric power system in the 2000s. Ordinary citizens still do not like him and supporters of liberal reforms still defend him. AiF.ru has collected 10 interesting facts related to the famous Russian politician and businessman.
"Robespierre reforms"
During the years of Chubais's leadership, about a trillion rubles of private investment were attracted into the Russian electric power industry, spent on the construction of new and reconstruction of old facilities. But Russians themselves have always criticized Chubais’s reforms, especially those related to high electricity tariffs. During the reforms, the “chief energy engineer of the country” promised that after privatization, electricity prices would be freed from state regulation, but it soon became clear that the state did not intend to release electricity prices, leaving itself the possibility of manual regulation. And privatization proceeded at such a pace that by 2007, 48% of Russian power plants had turned from state-owned to private. During those transformations, Chubais received the nickname “Robespierre of reform” - he called him that Minister of Finance of the time Alexander Lifshits.
“Two Volgas for a voucher”
On October 1, 1992, Russians began to be given vouchers with a nominal value of 10 thousand rubles each. They gave the owner the right to a “piece” of state property. The instigator of privatization in the energy sector, Anatoly Chubais, argued that one voucher would be equal to the cost of two Volga cars. Resident of the village of Energetik, Vladimir region, Vladimir Kuvshinov sent Chubais a letter in which he asked for advice on where to invest the voucher to get two Volgas. In the letter, Chubais advised to give it to the State Property Committee in exchange for part of the shares of the Scientific Institute of Light Alloys. He did not receive the shares and filed a lawsuit. The Zamoskvoretsky court of the city of Moscow awarded: satisfy Kuvshinov’s claim and recover two Volgas from Chubais on account of the voucher. Vladimir Kuvshinov is still the first and will remain the last who was able to sue his"Volga" with a voucher.
"Cagliostro with a switch"
In 1998, many paid for electricity using bills of exchange, bricks, cement, airplanes, and consumer goods. As head of RAO UES of Russia, Anatoly Chubais advocated the abolition of payments for electricity through mutual offsets. For debts, electricity was turned off in hospitals, the military-industrial complex, and the army. “Rolling blackouts” in the country completely stopped in 2003. For these “rolling blackouts,” Chubais was popularly nicknamed “Cagliostro with a switch.”
Big sale of RAO UES
For seven years, Anatoly Chubais has been preparing RAO UES for a big sale. By mid-2008 it was completed. Among the new owners of power plants were the German E.On, the Italian Enel, and the Finnish Fortum. Russian oligarchs also invested money in the domestic energy sector - Victor Vekselberg, Vladimir Potanin And Mikhail Prokhorov, Vagit Alekperov And Nikolay Tsvetkov,Andrey Melnichenko And Sergey Popov. In total, about $30 billion was received from the sale of assets of the liquidated RAO UES.
“It’s all Chubais’s fault!”
Popular phrase “It’s all Chubais’s fault!” was first heard on the NTV channel in the program “Dolls”. It is associated with a similar statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who in January 1996 dismissed then First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais.
Meeting of Russian President Boris Yeltsin (right) with the head of his administration Anatoly Chubais (left). 07/31/1996. Photo: RIA Novosti / Dmitry Donskoy
Boris Yeltsin’s phrase sounded like this: “Chubais is to blame for the fact that only about 10% of voters voted for the NDR in the parliamentary elections. If it weren’t for the mistakes he made in pursuing economic policy, the number of voters would have been no less than 20%.”
"Grey cardinal" of the right
Chubais not only made a career takeoff in the early 90s, but also managed to become one of the influential characters in Russian politics. He became the main ideologist of the Union of Right Forces. He managed to try on Gaidar with Kiriyenko, which made possible the formation of a right-wing election bloc in the summer and autumn of 1999. Chubais managed to quell intra-party intrigues and provide right-wing support for the presidential administration. None other than Chubais provided funding for the Union of Right Forces throughout almost the entire existence of this party - from 2000 to 2007. However, Chubais’s participation did not bring popularity to the party: in the 1999 elections, the SPS gained about 8.5% of the vote, and in 2003 it did not even overcome the 5% barrier.
Working for JP Morgan Chase
In 2008, Anatoly Chubais became the first Russian to join the international advisory board of one of the oldest and largest American banks, JP Morgan Chase & Co. The council consists of prominent businessmen and public figures, and provides recommendations to the bank's top management on issues of global strategy. Now it includes 35 people, including Tony Blair And Henry Kissinger. Assets of JP Morgan Chase & Co. are estimated at $1.8 trillion. The bank does business in more than 60 countries. Chubais will serve on the advisory council free of charge.
Bulat Okudzhava dedicated his last poem to Chubais
The idol of Anatoly Chubais was Bulat Okudzhava. They met in 1994 thanks to Egor Gaidar and met regularly for the old New Year at the dacha of Bulat Shalvovich. On June 3, 1997, Okudzhava died in a Paris clinic. Shortly before this, he wrote a poem for the birthday of Anatoly Chubais.
Anatoly Chubais with his third wife, director and TV presenter Avdotya Smirnova. Photo: RIA Novosti
Father of Russian capitalism
Chubais is the man who privatized Russia and created a new class of billionaire oligarchs. But at the same time, he is not included in the list of the hundred richest people in Russia. The head of Rusnano OJSC Anatoly Chubais earned 16% less in 2013 than the year before. His income for the period from January to December last year amounted to 217.6 million rubles.
Ginger cats and cats in Russia are called “Chubais”
Despite criticism of his activities from the population, Anatoly Chubais is proud of his popularity, which is evidenced by the fact that red cats in Russia are still called “Chubais.” According to the country's former chief energy officer, he does not want power plants and streets named after him: “I have more modest ambitions than Dima Bilan. My favorite red cats, called Chubais, are enough for me, that suits me quite well.”
Is the collapse of the USSR not a fact for you?
There was no control technology. Power in the country since 25 belonged to an ordinary dictator with all the signs and had no resemblance, even remotely, to communist or socialist ideas. The dictator had only one technology to remain in power until death. Stalin was such a dictator, that is, selfish, that he did not even think about the “Continuation” of his work. It was enough for him to rule the country to death, and at least the grass wouldn’t grow there. For some time, the elite did not know how or what to do; there were only fears born of the interests of warring clans. Khrushchev was essentially the same dictator, but not so selfish. He liked power, but at the same time, unlike Stalin, he was ambitious and ambitious. He wanted to be a reformer and became one despite his wild illiteracy and lack of experience. He made an attempt to establish a political system with a fairly large degree of freedom as opposed to the Stalinist regime. This seemed dangerous to the political elite for maintaining power. The Stalinist regime was too fresh in the memory, when anyone could fall out of favor and lose their heads, and not only their own, but also the heads of relatives up to the third generation. Khrushchev also did not guarantee the immunity of the elite. A striking example is the fate of Zhukov. And not only him. But no one has solved the problem of transferring power in a legitimate way from an undesirable ruler to a desirable one. I had to organize a coup and put a purely nominal, not independent figure in charge. We can trace the following evolution, dictated by the struggle to maintain its influence by the political elite: bloody dictatorship (Stalinist), soft dictatorship (Khrushchevite), power of a group of individuals (Politburo with a nominal leader). The power of the Politburo suited the elite, as it established simple and understandable rules. Only the “Politburo” pursued one goal - its own interests. Khrushchev stood out by taking into account not only his own interests, but also the interests of the working people. This was probably the only period associated with gaining the feeling that the state cares about the people. There are not only Khrushchev buildings here. The spirit of the sixties itself was characterized by universal enthusiasm. The Politburo turned out to be so short-sighted that it did not bother to think through the mechanism for transferring power from itself to itself. It allowed for the possibility of the existence of interests of rival individuals and groups of individuals. For example, Andropov and then Gorbachev were initially chosen as a counterweight to individual forces in the Politburo. Andropov did not become a destroyer after coming to power because he was a reformer within the framework of the existing political doctrine. He was of course dangerous to the Politburo. The elite was saved by the brevity of Andropov’s reign, which was remembered for its anti-corruption struggle. Gorbachev was one of the less rigid reformers. No one imagined that he could destroy the Politburo. After all, his activities concerned only economic affairs. When Gorbachev announced new political guidelines, no one could do anything. There was no mechanism for transferring power to suit the political elite. As a result, an illegitimate attempt was made to save the country, which ended in failure (GKChP). This, for example, is impossible in China. There the leader is controlled by the Politburo. Moreover, each new secretary general is limited in terms of terms and powers. The time comes and, without options, a carefully vetted new candidate is appointed. By the way. In Russia, the president is like an absolute monarch. It is more than reasonable to trust the authorities. For example, Yeltsin is a narrow-minded, incompetent ruler, he messed up almost more than the smart Gorbachev. To this day, he, a fool and a drunkard, is considered the father of Russian democracy. But it’s impossible to mitigate his stupidity somehow.
Egor Timurovich Gaidar (acting),
Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin
Egor Timurovich Gaidar (acting),
Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin
2.
Borisov, Minsk region, BSSR, USSR
Daughter: Olga
Anatoly Borisovich Chubais(June 16, 1955, Borisov, Minsk region, BSSR, USSR) - Soviet and Russian political and economic figure, general director of the state corporation “Russian Nanotechnology Corporation” (c).
Education and academic degrees
In 1984-1987 - leader of the informal circle of “young economists”.
In March 1990, Chubais and a group of supporters proposed to Mikhail Gorbachev a project for market reforms, which included the option of forcibly restricting political and civil freedoms (freedom of speech, the right to strike, etc.)
First appointment to the Russian government
Since November 15, 1991 - Chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for State Property Management - Minister of the RSFSR.
Under the leadership of Chubais, a privatization program was developed and its technical preparation was carried out. In addition to the law “On the privatization of state and municipal enterprises in the RSFSR” of 1991, with the participation of acting. Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and Chubais in 1992 issued a decree of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin “On accelerating the privatization of state and municipal enterprises,” which led to the creation of a state privatization program and gave rise to reform.
On July 31, 1992, Chubais, by order No. 141, created the “Department of Technical Assistance and Expertise,” which employed American economic advisers. The head of the department, Jonathan Hay, according to the former chairman of the State Property Committee Vladimir Polevanov, was a CIA employee. In 2004, a trial began against Jonathan Hay and Andrei Shleifer in the United States on charges of fraud and financial abuse of wasting American taxpayers' money. Polevanov noted regarding the activities of Chubais’s advisers: “Having picked up the documents, I was horrified to discover that a number of the largest military-industrial complex enterprises had been bought up by foreigners for next to nothing. That is, factories and design bureaus that produced top-secret products are out of our control. The same Jonathan Hay, with the help of Chubais, bought a 30% stake in the Moscow Electrode Plant and the Graphite Research Institute, which operated in cooperation with it, the only developer in the country of graphite coatings for stealth aircraft. After which Hay blocked the order of the military space forces for the production of high technologies."
Later, in November 2004, in an interview with The Financial Times, Chubais said that privatization in Russia was carried out solely for the purpose of the struggle for power against the “communist leaders”: “We needed to get rid of them, but we did not have time for this . The count was not in months, but in days.” Chubais also believes it was correct to conduct loans-for-shares auctions, when, as the newspaper writes, “the most valuable and largest Russian assets were transferred to a group of tycoons in exchange for loans and support for the then seriously ill Yeltsin in the 1996 elections.” According to Chubais, the transfer of control over enterprises with hundreds of thousands of workers to the oligarchs helped them acquire administrative resources, which prevented the victory of the opposition Communist Party in the 1996 presidential elections: “If we had not carried out mortgage privatization, the Communists would have won the elections in 1996.”
Chubais’s promise in 1992 is widely known that subsequently one voucher will be equal in value to two cars. Later in society this promise began to be perceived as a deception. In his book in 1999, he wrote that propaganda support was important for the initiators of privatization at that moment: “it was necessary not only to come up with effective schemes, write good regulatory documents, but also to convince the Duma of the need to adopt these documents, and most importantly, to convince 150 millions of people get up from their seats, leave their apartment, get a voucher, and then invest it meaningfully! Of course, the propaganda component was fantastically important.”
In Russia, about 130 thousand enterprises were privatized in 1991-1997; thanks to the voucher system and loans-for-shares auctions, a significant part of large state assets ended up in the hands of a narrow group of individuals (“oligarchs”). By purchasing vouchers for next to nothing from the impoverished population under the conditions of reforms and crisis (liberalization of prices and non-payment of wages), lost savings and ill-informed population, redistribution through financial pyramids, and the implementation of corrupt loan-for-shares auction schemes, large state property was concentrated with the “oligarchs.” Chubais was subsequently called the founder of oligarchic capitalism in Russia.
The privatization program outlined 7 main goals: the formation of a layer of private owners; increasing the efficiency of enterprises; social protection of the population and development of social infrastructure using funds from privatization; assistance in stabilizing the country's financial situation; promoting demonopolization and creating a competitive environment; attracting foreign investment; creating conditions for expanding the scale of privatization. When he was the head of the State Property Committee, V. Polevanov, having analyzed the results of privatization in a document addressed to the Prime Minister, concluded that of the seven privatization goals, only the seventh and formally the first were fully realized, while the rest were failed. Although formally there were several tens of millions of shareholders in Russia, only a small part of them actually controlled property; the desire for demonopolization at any cost led to the destruction of many technological chains and contributed to the deepening of the economic recession; foreign investment not only did not increase, but also decreased, and those that did arrive were directed mainly to the primary industries.
On December 9, 1994, the State Duma adopted a resolution in which it described the results of privatization as unsatisfactory.
In general, the Russian population has a negative attitude towards the results of privatization. As data from several sociological surveys show, about 80% of Russians consider it illegitimate and are in favor of a complete or partial revision of its results. About 90% of Russians are of the opinion that privatization was carried out dishonestly and large fortunes were acquired dishonestly (72% of entrepreneurs also agree with this point of view). As researchers note, Russian society has developed a stable, “almost consensus” rejection of privatization and the large private property formed on its basis.
Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation
On July 15, 1996, he was appointed head of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. In 1996, he was awarded the qualification category Actual State Advisor of the Russian Federation, 1st class.
Second appointment to the Russian government
On March 7, 1997, he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, and from March 17, at the same time, Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation.
On November 20, 1997, he was relieved of his post as Minister of Finance, retaining the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Government. In 1997, five leading reformers from the Government and the Presidential Administration received an advance of $90 thousand each from a publishing company for the not yet written book “The History of Russian Privatization.” The story was publicized as a “writing affair.” The authors of this book included A. Chubais, who at that time held the positions of First Deputy Chairman of the Government and Minister of Finance. In connection with the accusations, President Boris Yeltsin removed him from the post of Minister of Finance, however, the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Government was retained by him. See Book Scandal (1997).
In 1997, based on an expert survey of the world's leading financiers, he was named the best finance minister of the year by the British magazine Euromoney (with the wording “for his contribution to the successful development of his country’s economy”).
In April 1997, he was appointed manager for the Russian Federation at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
May 1997 - May 1998 - member of the Russian Security Council.
...the use of the RAO UES system to achieve goals unrelated to energy supply objectives, including political ones, incompetence and lack of professionalism, major miscalculations in the implementation of electricity reform, selfish tariff policy pursued by the state under the dictation of energy monopolies, self-confidence and negligence.
A member of the board of directors of RAO UES, Boris Fedorov, said in 2000 that the restructuring of RAO is being carried out in the interests of the company’s management, as well as affiliated oligarchic and political structures, calling Chubais “the worst manager in Russia, who is trying to become a major oligarch at the expense of the state and shareholders.”
On July 1, 2008, RAO UES was liquidated, the unified energy complex was fragmented into many companies involved in generation, maintenance of electrical networks, and energy sales.
Chubais himself assesses the results of the reform of the energy industry as follows: “The approved program provides for a volume of capacity commissioning in 2006-2010 that was unattainable in Soviet times - 41 thousand megawatts. In 2010 alone we will introduce 22 thousand. At the same time, the maximum volume of annual commissioning in the USSR was 9 thousand megawatts.”
Russian Nanotechnology Corporation
Political activities and beliefs
In December 1998, he joined the organizing committee of the Right Cause coalition and was elected to the coordinating committee of the coalition's organizing committee. Headed the commission on organizational work of the coordinating council.
In May 2000, at the founding congress of the all-Russian political organization "Union of Right Forces" he was elected co-chairman of the coordination council. On May 26, 2001, at the founding congress of the Union of Right Forces party, he was elected co-chairman and member of the federal political council. On January 24, 2004, he resigned from the post of co-chairman of the party. Elected to the party's federal political council.
Chubais believes that capitalism is the only path for Russia, despite contrary opinions: “You know, I have been re-reading Dostoevsky in the last three months. And I feel almost physical hatred for this man. He is certainly a genius, but his idea of the Russians as a chosen, holy people, his cult of suffering and the false choice he offers makes me want to tear him to pieces.”
According to Chubais, subsidiaries should be created at every university, and “a teacher who is unable to create a business calls his professionalism into question.” In November 2009, he stated “If you are an associate professor, professor, head of a department in a specialized area and you don’t have your own business, why the hell do I need you at all?” .
Criticism of Chubais' activities
Anatoly Chubais is one of the most unpopular statesmen in Russia. Thus, according to the results of a social poll by VTsIOM in December 2006, 77% of Russians did not trust Chubais. In a 2000 FOM poll, the overwhelming majority assessed Chubais’s actions negatively; he was characterized as “a person acting to the detriment of Russia,” “a discrediter of reforms,” a “thief,” and a “swindler.” The respondents also negatively characterized his work at the head of RAO UES: “it is very cruel to leave children without electricity: hospitals, kindergartens, schools,” “he turns off the electricity - children die in the maternity hospital.” At the same time, a small part of the respondents noted his business qualities: efficiency, good organizational skills, energy. In a Romir survey in August 1999, Chubais was named one of those whose political and economic activities cause the greatest harm to the country. 29% of voters (44 thousand people) in one of the electoral districts of Moscow voted for the officer who ran for the State Duma, Vladimir Kvachkov, accused of organizing the assassination attempt on Chubais (and no longer known).
In 2008, opposition politician Garry Kasparov was very critical of Chubais. Kasparov, in particular, stated: “The “liberal reformers” did not develop the achievements of perestroika, but, on the contrary, buried them,” “Chubais is definitely not lying about one thing - he and his comrades did not lose the country. This country lost”, “the liberals of the 90s do not like their people and are afraid of them.” According to Kasparov, the “deprivations of the early 90s” were in vain.
Attempt on Chubais
On March 17, 2005, an attempt was made on Chubais. At the exit from the village of Zhavoronki, Odintsovo district, Moscow region, a bomb was detonated on the route of Chubais’s car, and in addition, the vehicles of the motorcade were fired upon. Chubais was not injured. Three people were detained in connection with the assassination attempt: retired GRU colonel Vladimir Kvachkov and paratroopers of the 45th Airborne Regiment Alexander Naydenov and Robert Yashin.
Kvachkov, while in prison, became involved in politics; he ran for the State Duma from the Preobrazhensky district, and took second place; then he was denied registration as a candidate from the Medvedkovo district. He stated the following:
| From a military-political point of view, this action is one of the forms of a national liberation war. The destruction of any foreign invaders and accomplices of the occupiers, including in the economic field, is the duty and sacred responsibility of every officer, soldier, and any warrior, regardless of whether he is fighting in open armed struggle at the front or operating in the enemy-occupied territory of his country |
Anatoly Chubais in folk culture
For his ambiguity, Chubais became the hero of jokes. For example, like this:
Participants in the attempt on the life of Anatoly Chubais received a suspended sentence under the article “negligence and inattention.”
Chubais himself, apparently, treats his image in the eyes of the people with irony - on his personal website there is a special section of jokes about himself.
Family
Married for the second time, his wife is also an economist. From his first marriage - son Alexey and daughter Olga.
Awards and titles
Books about Chubais
- A. Kolesnikov - Unknown Chubais. Pages from the biography:: Moscow, “Zakharov”, p.158, 2003, ISBN 5-8159-0377-9
- M. Berger, O. Proskurina - Chubais Cross :: Moscow, KoLibri, p.448, 2008, ISBN 978-5-389-00141-1
- A. Kolesnikov - Anatoly Chubais. Biography:: Moscow, AST, AST MOSCOW, p.350, circulation 7000, 2008, ISBN 978-5-17-053035-9, ISBN 978-5-9713-8748-0
- David Hoffman - Oligarchs. Wealth and power in the new Russia:: Moscow, KoLibri, p.624, circulation 10000, 2007, ISBN 978-5-98720-034-6
see also
Notes
- Tombstones of the parents of A. B. Chubais
- Chubais Igor Borisovich. Personal page
- Gelman V. Deadlock of authoritarian modernization // polit.ru, February 23, 2010.
- “Hard course...” Analytical note of the Leningrad Association of Social and Economic Sciences // Twentieth Century and the World. 1990. No. 6. P.15-19.
- Barsenkov A. S., Vdovin A. I., “History of Russia. 1917-2007" - M.: Aspect Press, 2008 - p. 683
