The Great Patriotic War began at dawn on June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany, violating the Soviet-German treaties of 1939, attacked the Soviet Union. Romania, Italy took her side, and a few days later Slovakia, Finland, Hungary and Norway.
The war lasted almost four years and became the largest armed conflict in human history. On the front, stretching from the Barents to the Black Sea, from 8 million to 12.8 million people fought on both sides at different periods, from 5.7 thousand to 20 thousand tanks and assault guns, from 84 thousand to 163 thousand guns and mortars were used , from 6.5 thousand to 18.8 thousand aircraft.
LaGG-3 was one of the new generation fighters adopted by the USSR just before the war. Among its main advantages was the minimal use of scarce materials in the design of the aircraft: LaGG-3 for the most part consisted of pine and delta wood (plywood impregnated with resin).LaGG-3 - fighter made of pine and plywood
LaGG-3 was one of the new generation fighters adopted by the USSR just before the war. Among its main advantages was the minimal use of scarce materials in the design of the aircraft: LaGG-3 for the most part consisted of pine and delta wood (plywood impregnated with resin).
Il-2 - Soviet "flying tank"
The Soviet attack aircraft Il-2 became the most popular combat aircraft in history. He took part in battles in all theaters of military operations of the Great Patriotic War. The designers called the aircraft they developed a “flying tank,” and German pilots nicknamed it Betonflugzeug — “concrete airplane” — for its survivability.
Junkers-87 - a symbol of fascist aggression
From the first day of the war, "Junkers" took part in the bombing of the USSR, becoming one of the symbols of the blitzkrieg. Despite its low speed, vulnerability and mediocre aerodynamics, the Yu-87 was one of the most effective weapons of the Luftwaffe due to its ability to drop bombs during a dive.
I-16 - the basis of fighter aircraft of the USSR
The I-16 is the world's first serial high-speed low-wing aircraft with retractable landing gear. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the aircraft was outdated, but it was it that formed the basis of the USSR fighter aviation. Soviet pilots called it “donkey”, Spanish pilots called it “mosca” (fly), and German pilots called it “rata” (rat).
A video announcing a series of infographics about military aircraft of the 1940s,
Soviet aircraft from the Great Patriotic War are a topic that deserves special attention. After all, it was aviation that played a huge role in the victory over fascism. Without the winged helpers of the USSR army, it would have been many times more difficult to defeat the enemy. War birds significantly brought the cherished moment closer, which cost the lives of millions of Soviet citizens...And although at the very beginning of the war our forces lost more than nine hundred aircraft, by the middle of it, thanks to the dedicated work of designers, engineers and ordinary workers, domestic aviation was again at its best. So, what kind of steel birds carried victory to the Motherland on their wings?
MiG-3
At that time, this fighter, designed on the basis of the MiG-1, was considered the highest altitude and became a real threat to the German kites. He was able to climb 1200 meters, and it was here that he felt best, developing the highest speed (up to 600 kilometers per hour). But at an altitude of less than 4.5 km, the MiG-3 was significantly inferior to other fighters. The very first battle involving this aircraft model dates back to July 22, 1941. It took place over Moscow and was successful. The German plane was shot down. Throughout World War II, MiG-3 fighters guarded the skies over the capital of the Soviet Union.
The brainchild of the design bureau of Alexander Yakovlev, which in the 30s was engaged in the production of lightweight sports “birds”. Serial production of the first fighter began in 1940, and at the dawn of the war, Yak-1 aircraft took an active part in hostilities. And already in 1942, Soviet aviation received the Yak-9.
The fighter boasted excellent maneuverability, which made it the king of close combat situations at relatively low altitudes. Another feature of the model is its lightness, achieved by replacing wood with duralumin.
Over the 6 years of production, more than 17 thousand aircraft of this model rolled off the assembly line, and this allows us to call it the most popular among the “birds” of this type. The Yak-9 has gone through 22 modifications, having served as a fighter-bomber, a reconnaissance aircraft, a passenger aircraft, and a training aircraft. In the enemy camp, this machine received the nickname “killer,” which says a lot.
A fighter that became one of the most successful developments of the Lavochkin design bureau. The aircraft had a very simple design, which at the same time was amazingly reliable. The robust La-5 remained in service even after several direct hits. Its engine was not ultra-modern, but it was characterized by power. And the air cooling system made it much less vulnerable than liquid-cooled engines, widespread at that time.
La-5 proved to be an obedient, dynamic, maneuverable and high-speed machine. Soviet pilots loved him, but his enemies were terrified of him. This model became the first of the domestic aircraft of the Second World War period, which was not inferior to the German kites and could fight with them on equal terms. It was on La-5 that Alexey Meresyev accomplished his exploits. Also at the helm of one of the cars was Ivan Kozhedub.
The second name of this biplane is U-2. It was developed by the Soviet designer Nikolai Polikarpov back in the 20s, and then the model was considered a training model. But in the 40s, the Po-2 had to fight as a night bomber.
The Germans called Polikarpov’s brainchild a “sewing machine,” thereby emphasizing his tirelessness and massive impact. The Po-2 could drop more bombs than its heavy “colleagues”, since it could lift up to 350 kilograms of ammunition. The aircraft was also distinguished by the fact that it was capable of making several sorties in one night.
The legendary female pilots from the 46th Guards Taman Aviation Regiment fought with the enemy on the Po-2. These 80 girls, a quarter of whom were awarded the title of Hero of the USSR, terrified the enemy. The Nazis nicknamed them “night witches.”
Polikarpov's biplane was produced at a plant in Kazan. Over the entire production period, 11 thousand aircraft rolled off the assembly line, which allowed the model to be considered the most popular among biplanes.
And this aircraft is the leader in the number of units produced in the entire history of combat aviation. 36 thousand cars took to the skies from the factory floors. The model was developed at Ilyushin Design Bureau. Production of the IL-2 began in 1940, and from the first days of the war the attack aircraft was in service.
The IL-2 was equipped with a powerful engine, the crew was protected by armored glass, the “bird” fired rockets and was the main striking force of domestic aviation. The attack aircraft simply shocked with its invincibility and durability. There were cases when planes returned from battle with traces of hundreds of hits and were able to fight further. This made the IL-2 a real legend among both Soviet soldiers and the Nazis. His enemies called him the “winged tank,” “the black death,” and “the plane made of concrete.”
IL-4
Another brainchild of the Ilyushin Design Bureau is the Il-4, considered the most attractive aircraft of the Second World War. His appearance immediately catches the eye and is etched in the memory. The model went down in history, first of all, due to the fact that it was the very first to bomb Berlin. Moreover, not in ’45, but in ’41, when the war was just beginning. The aircraft was quite popular among pilots, although it was not easy to operate.
The rarest “bird” in the sky during the Great Patriotic War. The Pe-8 was used rarely, but accurately. He was trusted to carry out the most difficult tasks. Since the appearance of the plane was not familiar, it happened that it became a victim of its own air defenses, which mistook the car for an enemy one.
The Pe-8 developed a speed that was enormous for a bomber - up to 400 kilometers per hour. It was equipped with a giant tank, which allowed the “bird” to make the longest flights (for example, get from Moscow to Berlin and back without refueling). The Pe-8 dropped large-caliber bombs (maximum weight - 5 tons).
When the Nazis came close to Moscow, this powerful defender of the Motherland circled over the capitals of enemy states and rained fire on them from the sky. Another interesting fact about the Pe-8 is that USSR Foreign Minister Molotov flew it (only on the passenger version of the model) to the UK and the United States to meet with his colleagues.
It was thanks to the “magnificent seven players” presented above and, of course, other, lesser-known aircraft that Soviet soldiers defeated Nazi Germany and its allies not 10 years after the start of the war, but only 4 years later. The strengthened aviation became the main trump card of our soldiers, and did not allow the enemy to relax. And considering that all the aircraft were developed and produced in conditions of cold, hunger and deprivation, their mission and the role of the creators looks especially heroic!
USSR Air Force in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945
The Air Force (Air Force) of any state is intended for independent action in solving operational problems and for joint actions with other branches of the military. The Soviet Air Force was created together with the Red Army. On October 28 (November 10), 1917, the Bureau of Commissioners of Aviation and Aeronautics was formed under the chairmanship of A. V. Mozhaeva. In December, the All-Russian Aviation Collegium for managing the air fleet of the republic was established, and K. V. Akashev was appointed its chairman. The board was entrusted with the management of the formation of aviation units, central and local air force directorates, training of aviation personnel and logistics.
In 1921-1941, the leadership of the Soviet Air Force was carried out by A. V. Sergeev (1921-1922), A. P. Rosengolts (1923-1924), P. I. Baranov (1924-1931), commander of the 2nd rank Ya. I. Alksnis (1931-1937), commander of the 2nd rank a. D. Laktionov (1937-1939), participant in the Spanish events of 1936-1937, Lieutenant General of Aviation, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Y. V. Smushkevich (1939-1940), Lieutenant General of Aviation P. V. Rychagov (1940-1941) .
Before the outbreak of World War II, the USSR government took measures to speed up the production of the best types of aircraft. In 1940-1941, serial production of Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3 fighters, Pe-2, Pe-8 bombers, Il-2 attack aircraft and the re-equipment of aviation regiments with them began. These aircraft were superior to the equipment of the German Air Force, but by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the rearmament of air units and the retraining of flight personnel had not been completed.
The Soviet Air Force demonstrated high combat qualities in the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, in operations in Right Bank Ukraine, Belarus, Iasi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder and Berlin.
The aviation industry systematically increased aircraft production. The average monthly production in the second half of 1941 was 1630 units of equipment, in 1942 - 2120, in 1943 - 2907, in 1944 - 3355 and in 1945 - 2206.
In 2015, Russia celebrates the seventieth anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War. On the eve of the holiday, we remember that in December 1941, in the battle of Moscow, the plan of the Hitlerite command for a lightning war was overturned, and in November 1942, the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad made a radical turning point in the war. The Battle of Kursk finally broke the resistance of the enemy troops, putting his troops before the catastrophe of complete defeat. The time has come to liberate our territory from the German invaders. At the end of 1944, Soviet troops reached the state border along its entire length, from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea, thereby completely liberating Soviet land from fascist evil spirits, and, having crossed the border, began to liberate the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement. The country's Air Force played an important role in these victories. It is enough to recall the night ram in the sky of Moscow by the Hero of the Soviet Union pilot Viktor Vasilyevich Talalikhin and the name of the North Sea pilot, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Guard Colonel Boris Feoktistovich Safonov.
June 22, 1941 will forever remain in our memory as the day of the greatest tragedy. Soviet aviation suffered heavy losses, but even in conditions of chaos, confusion and outright bungling, Soviet pilots managed to meet the enemy with dignity; in air battles that unfolded from the Baltic to the Black Sea, they managed to shoot down 244 German aircraft in a day. The main blow of German aviation fell on the Belarusian Military District - here German aviation managed to burn more than 500 aircraft at airfields. However, most of the pilots who survived the first strike provided the enemy with such brutal resistance as they had not known even in the days of the Battle of Britain. In the Western Front region alone, the Nazis lost 143 of their aircraft.
From the moment of the invasion, air battles began in the zone from Grodno to Lvov. The lack of air defense systems among our troops allowed German pilots to act as if they were at a training ground. In the afternoon, the surviving personnel of the aviation regiment were evacuated to the east. One of the regiments was preparing to fly aircraft designed by A. S. Yakovlev (Yak-1), who arrived in the regiment and were assembled only on June 19. According to the recollection of one of the plant workers, the assembled aircraft had no weapons and were not provided with fuel, so they could not take off.
To be fair, it should be noted that at the end of the 30s, a powerful research and production base was created in the USSR, capable of designing and producing a large number of aircraft of various types. These institutions were headed by outstanding designers A. N. Tupolev, A. S. Yakovlev, S. V. Ilyushin, S. A. Lavochkin, Artem. I. Mikoyan, aircraft engine designers V. Ya. Klimov and A. A. Mikulin. In addition, during the harsh years of the war, other competent designers showed themselves - it is simply impossible to list all the names. Most of them became Heroes of Socialist Labor, many became laureates of the State Prize (at that time – the Stalin Prize). As a result, by June 1941, a base was created one and a half times larger than the German one.
Unfortunately, there is still no consensus on the quantitative composition of the Soviet Air Force at the beginning of the war. Of the total number of combat aircraft, 53.4% were fighters, 41.2% were bombers, 3.2% were reconnaissance aircraft and 0.2% were attack aircraft. About 80% of all aircraft were old types. Yes, the bulk of our aircraft were inferior in their characteristics to enemy aircraft - a lot has been written about this. But no matter how our “seagulls” and “donkeys” were criticized, it was with them that the records were achieved, so to belittle the importance of our aircraft, which were outdated at that time, means to sin before the truth: the enemy’s losses in the air, if they did not exceed ours, were in no way below.
Comparisons between the Air Force and the Luftwaffe cannot be made based on the number of vehicles alone. The availability of crews and the combat effectiveness of aircraft should also be taken into account. By the summer of 1941, German crews had two years of combat flight training. In the first six months of the war, the Soviet Air Force lost 21,200 aircraft.
Recognizing the courage and valor of the Soviet pilots, admiring their feat and self-sacrifice, it is worth understanding that the USSR managed to revive its Air Force after the disaster of 1941 solely due to its enormous human resources and the relocation of the entire aviation industry to areas inaccessible to German aircraft. Fortunately, it was mainly the equipment that was lost, and not the flight and technical personnel, who became the basis of the revived Air Force.
In 1941, the aviation industry handed over 7081 aircraft to the front. Beginning in January 1942, aircraft production increased steadily due to the commissioning of aircraft factories evacuated in the first months of the war. During 1942, the Soviet aviation industry produced 9,918 fighters, and the German - 5,515. Thus, the Soviet aviation industry began to outstrip the German. The latest aircraft began to enter service with the Air Force: the Yak-76, Yak-9, Yak-3, La-5, La-7, La-9, two-seat Il-2 attack aircraft, and Tu-2 bombers. If on January 1, 1942, the Soviet Air Force had 12,000 aircraft, then on January 1, 1944 - 32,500. In May 1942, air armies were created in front-line aviation - large aviation operational associations; at the end of the year there were 13 of them. C In the fall of 1942, the formation of separate aviation reserve corps of the Supreme High Command began as the most appropriate form of aviation reserves. But even earlier, in March 1942, long-range and heavy bomber aviation was removed from the subordination of the Air Force commander and transformed into long-range aviation subordinate to Headquarters.
The change in the organizational structure and the sharply increased number of air forces made it possible to massively use aviation in the decisive areas of action of the ground forces and to control it centrally.
During the Great Patriotic War, our Air Force was led by Lieutenant General P. F. Zhigarev (April 1941 - February 1942), Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov (April 1942 - March 1946). During the Great Patriotic War, our pilots flew about 4 million combat missions and dropped 30.5 million bombs on the enemy; 55 thousand German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at airfields (84% of all they lost on the Eastern Front).
Soviet pilots also provided great assistance to the partisans. Long-range aviation and civil air fleet regiments alone made about 110 thousand flights to partisan detachments, delivering there 17 thousand tons of weapons, ammunition, food and medicine, and transported over 83 thousand partisans by air.
Soviet pilots showed numerous examples of selfless devotion to the Motherland, true heroism and high combat skill. Unparalleled feats were performed by N. F. Gastello, V. V. Talalikhin, A. P. Maresyev, I. S. Polbin, B. F. Safonov, T. M. Frunze, L. G. Belousov and many others. Over 200 thousand Air Force soldiers were awarded orders and medals. 2,420 aviators were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 71 were awarded this title twice, and two were awarded to Colonel A. I. Pokryshkin and Major I. N. Kozhedub - this title was awarded three times, in the post-war period both rose to the military rank of Air Marshal, in addition, Pokryshkin headed DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for the Assistance of the Army, Air Force and Navy, which prepared young people for military service).
During the war, two thirds of aviation formations and units received honorary titles, more than one third were awarded the title of guards. During the war, women's aviation regiments fought in the ranks of the Air Force, the formation of which was carried out by Hero of the Soviet Union, Major Marina Mikhailovna Raskova, from January 1942 - commander of the women's bomber air regiment. Since March 1942, one of the long-range aviation regiments, later the Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment, was commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Valentina Stepanovna Grizodubova.
Recently, the Soviet Air Force has been re-equipped with jet aircraft designed by Mikoyan, Yakovlev, Lavochkin such as MiG-9, MiG-15, Yak-15, La-15 and others. The first jet aircraft was tested in 1942 by pilot Bakhjivanzhi.
In 1968, pilot-cosmonaut G. T. Beregovoi was awarded the title of twice Hero of the Soviet Union, and he received his first Gold Star during the Great Patriotic War. Of the 35 cosmonauts who were twice awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 19 are former pilots.
From the book The Formation and Collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics author Radomyslsky Yakov IsaakovichThe USSR Navy in the Great Patriotic War The main base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was Tallinn. For the immediate defense of Leningrad, all the forces of the fleet were needed, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave the order to evacuate the defenders of Tallinn and move
From the book History of Public Administration in Russia author Shchepetev Vasily Ivanovich3. Features of public administration during the Great Patriotic War
From the book “Black Death” [Soviet Marines in battle] author Abramov Evgeniy Petrovich2. Development of the Marine Corps during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Marine units added stability to the defense and helped repel enemy assaults... In coastal areas, as well as near Moscow, Tikhvin, Rostov, shoulder to shoulder with ground forces
From the book History of Russia. XX century author Bokhanov Alexander NikolaevichChapter 6. The Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War
author Kuznetsov Alexander From the book Award Medal. In 2 volumes. Volume 2 (1917-1988) author Kuznetsov Alexander From the book Award Medal. In 2 volumes. Volume 2 (1917-1988) author Kuznetsov Alexander From the book Award Medal. In 2 volumes. Volume 2 (1917-1988) author Kuznetsov Alexander From the book Award Medal. In 2 volumes. Volume 2 (1917-1988) author Kuznetsov Alexander From the book Award Medal. In 2 volumes. Volume 2 (1917-1988) author Kuznetsov Alexander From the book “For Stalin!” Great Victory Strategist author Sukhodeev Vladimir VasilievichPrevent falsification of the USSR victory in the Great Patriotic War Six and a half decades separate us, contemporaries, from the Great Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945. Preparations for the anniversary celebration are intensified
author Skorokhod Yuri Vsevolodovich5. Direct and potential opponents of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War Information publicly available until the 90s about who, when, how and what goals they pursued when fighting against the USSR in 1941–1945 can now be significantly clarified and supplemented .From the outside
From the book What we know and what we don’t know about the Great Patriotic War author Skorokhod Yuri Vsevolodovich15. Human losses of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War One of the most speculative questions when falsifying the history of the Second World War is the question of the human losses suffered by the USSR during its course. Through the media it is drummed into the people that the USSR won the war by “filling the enemy with corpses.”
From the book What we know and what we don’t know about the Great Patriotic War author Skorokhod Yuri Vsevolodovich16. Direct organizers of the USSR’s victory in the Great Patriotic War Currently, one of the most controversial is the question of who the USSR owes to the victory in the Second World War. The media offer a patriotic-sounding answer - to the people! The people and victory are, of course, inseparable, but
From the book Lend-Lease Mysteries author Stettinius EdwardThe role of Lend-Lease in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. B. Sokolov The role of Western supplies during the Great Patriotic War has traditionally been belittled by Soviet historiography since the beginning of the Cold War. Thus, in the book by N. A. Voznesensky “The Military Economy of the USSR in
From the book Rehabilitation: how it was March 1953 - February 1956 author Artizov A NNo. 39 DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR “ON THE AMNESTY OF SOVIET CITIZENS WHO COOPERATED WITH THE OCCUPERS DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941–1945.” Moscow, Kremlin September 17, 1955 After the victorious end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people
By the beginning of the war, there were significantly more MiG-3 fighters in service than other aircraft. However, the “third” MiG was not yet sufficiently mastered by combat pilots, and the retraining of most of them was not completed.
Two MiG-3 regiments were quickly formed with a large percentage of testers familiar with them. This partly helped in eliminating piloting deficiencies. But still, the MiG-3 lost even to the I-6 fighters, common at the beginning of the war. While superior in speed at altitudes above 5,000 m, at low and medium altitudes it was inferior to other fighters.
This is both a disadvantage and at the same time an advantage of the “third” MiG. The MiG-3 is a high-altitude aircraft, all the best qualities of which were manifested at an altitude of over 4500 meters. It found use as a high-altitude night fighter in the air defense system, where its high ceiling of up to 12,000 meters and speed at altitude were decisive. Thus, the MiG-3 was mainly used until the end of the war, in particular, guarding Moscow.
In the very first battle over the capital, on July 22, 1941, Mark Gallay, a pilot of the 2nd Separate Air Defense Fighter Squadron of Moscow, shot down an enemy plane in a MiG-3. At the beginning of the war, one of the ace pilots, Alexander Pokryshkin, flew on the same plane and won his first victory.
Yak-9: the “king” of modifications
Until the end of the 30s, the design bureau of Alexander Yakovlev produced light, mainly sports aircraft. In 1940, the Yak-1 fighter, which has excellent flight qualities, was launched into production. At the beginning of the war, the Yak-1 successfully repelled German pilots.
Already in 1942, the Yak-9 began to enter service with our Air Force. The new Soviet vehicle had high maneuverability, allowing for dynamic combat close to the enemy at low and medium altitudes.
It was the Yak-9 that turned out to be the most popular Soviet fighter of the Great Patriotic War. It was produced from 1942 to 1948, in total almost 17 thousand aircraft were built.
The Yak-9's design used duralumin instead of heavy wood, making the aircraft lighter and leaving room for modifications. It was the Yak-9’s ability to upgrade that became its main advantage. It had 22 main modifications, of which 15 were mass-produced. This includes a front-line fighter, fighter-bomber, interceptor, escort, reconnaissance aircraft, special purpose passenger aircraft and training aircraft.
The most successful modification is considered to be the Yak-9U fighter, which appeared in the fall of 1944. Suffice it to say that his pilots called him “the killer.”
La-5: disciplined soldier
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, German aviation had an advantage in the skies of the USSR. But in 1942, a Soviet fighter appeared that could fight on equal terms with German aircraft - this is the La-5, developed at the Lavochkin Design Bureau.
Despite its simplicity - the La-5 cockpit did not have even the most basic instruments like an attitude indicator - the pilots immediately liked the plane.
Lavochkin's new plane had a strong design and did not fall apart even after dozens of direct hits. At the same time, the La-5 had impressive maneuverability and speed: turn time was 16.5-19 seconds, speed was above 600 km/h.
Another advantage of the La-5 is that, as a disciplined soldier, it did not perform the “spin” aerobatics without a direct order from the pilot, and if it got into a spin, it came out of it on the first command.
La-5 fought in the skies over Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, ace pilot Ivan Kozhedub fought on it, and the famous Alexey Maresyev flew on it.
Po-2: night bomber
The Po-2 (U-2) aircraft is considered the most popular biplane in the history of world aviation. When creating a training aircraft in the 1920s, Nikolai Polikarpov did not imagine that there would be another, serious application for his unpretentious machine.
During World War II, the U-2 developed into an effective night bomber. Aviation regiments armed exclusively with U-2s appeared in the Soviet Air Force. It was these biplanes that carried out more than half of all Soviet bomber missions during the war.
“Sewing machines” - that’s what the Germans called the U-2s that bombed their units at night. One biplane could make several sorties per night, and given the maximum bomb load of 100-350 kg, the aircraft could drop more ammunition than a heavy bomber.
It was on Polikarpov’s biplanes that the famous 46th Guards Taman Aviation Regiment fought. Four squadrons of 80 pilots, 23 of whom received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For their courage and aviation skill, the Germans nicknamed the girls Nachthexen - “night witches.” During the war years, the women's air regiment flew 23,672 combat missions.
In total, 11 thousand U-2 biplanes were produced during the war. They were produced at aircraft factory No. 387 in Kazan. Cabins for airplanes and skis for them were mass-produced at the plant in Ryazan. Today it is the State Ryazan Instrument Plant (GRPZ), part of KRET.
It was only in 1959 that the U-2, renamed Po-2 in 1944 in honor of its creator, ended its impeccable thirty-year service.
IL-2: winged tank
Il-2 is the most produced combat aircraft in history; in total, more than 36 thousand aircraft were produced. Il-2 attacks brought huge losses to the enemy, for which the Germans nicknamed the attack aircraft “Black Death”, and among our pilots they called this bomber “humpbacked”, “winged tank”, “concrete plane”.
The IL-2 entered production just before the war - in December 1940. The first flight on it was made by the famous test pilot Vladimir Kokkinaki. These serial armored attack aircraft entered service at the beginning of the war.
The Il-2 attack aircraft became the main striking force of Soviet aviation. The key to excellent combat performance was a powerful aircraft engine, armored glass necessary to protect the crew, as well as high-speed aircraft guns and rockets.
The best enterprises in the country, including those that are part of Rostec today, worked on the creation of components for the most mass-produced attack aircraft in history. The leading enterprise for the production of ammunition for aircraft was the famous Tula Instrument Design Bureau. Transparent armored glass for glazing the Il-2 canopy was produced at the Lytkarino optical glass plant. The assembly of engines for attack aircraft was carried out in the workshops of plant No. 24, today known as the Kuznetsov enterprise. The propellers for the attack aircraft were produced in Kuibyshev at the Aviaagregat plant.
Thanks to modern technologies at that time, the IL-2 became a real legend. There was a case when an attack aircraft returned from a mission and was hit more than 600 times. After quick repairs, the “winged tanks” were sent into battle again.
And why did you ultimately lose?
Evert Gottfried (lieutenant, Wehrmacht infantry): Because a flea can bite an elephant, but not kill it.
Anyone attempting to study air warfare in the Great Patriotic War is confronted with a number of obvious contradictions. On the one hand, absolutely incredible personal accounts of the German aces, on the other, the obvious result in the form of the complete defeat of Germany. On the one hand, there is the well-known brutality of the war on the Soviet-German front, on the other, the Luftwaffe suffered the heaviest losses in the West. Other examples can be found.
To resolve these contradictions, historians and publicists are trying to build various kinds of theories. The theory must be such as to link all the facts into a single whole. Most people do it pretty poorly. To connect the facts, historians need to invent fantastic, incredible arguments. For example, the fact that the Red Army Air Force crushed the enemy in numbers - this is where the large numbers of aces come from. The large German losses in the West are allegedly explained by the fact that the war in the air on the Eastern Front was too easy: Soviet pilots were primitive and frivolous opponents. And most ordinary people believe in these fantasies. Although you don’t need to rummage through the archives to understand how absurd these theories are. It is enough to have some life experience. If those shortcomings that are attributed to the Red Army Air Force were in reality, then no victory over Nazi Germany would have happened. There are no miracles. Victory is the result of hard and, most importantly, successful work.
The beginning of the war in the East and personal accounts of German aces
The pre-war theory of air combat was based on the requirement to achieve a decisive victory in air combat. Each battle had to end in victory - the destruction of the enemy aircraft. This seemed to be the main way to gain air supremacy. By shooting down enemy planes, it was possible to inflict maximum damage on him, reducing the size of his aircraft fleet to a minimum. This theory was described in the works of many pre-war tacticians both in the USSR and in Germany.
It is impossible to say with certainty, but, apparently, it was in accordance with this theory that the Germans built the tactics of using their fighters. Pre-war views required maximum concentration on victory in air combat. The focus on destroying the maximum number of enemy aircraft is clearly visible from the criteria that were taken as the main ones when assessing the effectiveness of combat operations - the personal account of downed enemy aircraft.
The very accounts of the German aces are often called into question. It seems incredible that the Germans managed to achieve such a number of victories. Why such a huge gap in the number of victories compared to the allies? Yes, in the initial period of World War II, German pilots were better trained than their American, British or Soviet colleagues. But not at times! Therefore, there is a great temptation to accuse German pilots of banal falsification of their accounts for the sake of propaganda and their pride.
However, the author of this article considers the accounts of German aces to be quite truthful. Truthful - as far as possible in the military confusion. Enemy losses are almost always overestimated, but this is an objective process: in a combat situation it is difficult to accurately determine whether you shot down an enemy plane or only damaged it. Therefore, if the accounts of German aces are inflated, then not by 5-10 times, but by 2-2.5 times, no more. This doesn't change the essence. Whether Hartman shot down 352 planes or only 200, he was still too far behind the pilots of the anti-Hitler coalition in this matter. Why? Was he some kind of mystical cyborg killer? As will be shown below, he, like all German aces, was not much stronger than his colleagues from the USSR, USA or Great Britain.
Indirectly, the fairly high accuracy of the aces' accounts is confirmed by statistics. For example, 93 of the best aces shot down 2,331 Il-2 aircraft. The Soviet command considered 2,557 Il-2 aircraft lost to fighter attacks. Plus, some of the “unknown cause” numbers were probably shot down by German fighters. Or another example - one hundred of the best aces shot down 12,146 aircraft on the eastern front. And the Soviet command considers 12,189 aircraft shot down in the air, plus, as in the case of the Il-2, some of the “unidentified” ones. The figures, as we see, are comparable, although it is obvious that the aces still overestimated their victories.
If we take the victories of all German pilots on the Eastern Front, it turns out that there are more victories than the Red Army Air Force lost aircraft. Therefore, of course, there is an overestimation. But the problem is that most researchers pay too much attention to this issue. The essence of the contradictions does not lie in the accounts of aces and the number of downed aircraft. And this will be shown below.
The day before
Germany attacked the USSR, having a significant qualitative superiority in aviation. First of all, this concerns pilots who had rich combat experience of the war in Europe. German pilots and commanders have behind them full-scale campaigns with the massive use of aviation: France, Poland, Scandinavia, the Balkans. The Soviet pilots have only local conflicts limited in scope and scale - the Soviet-Finnish war and... and, perhaps, that’s all. The remaining pre-war conflicts are too small in scope and massive use of troops to be compared with the war in Europe in 1939-1941.
The German military equipment was excellent: the most popular Soviet fighters I-16 and I-153 were inferior to the German Bf-109 model E in most characteristics, and the F model absolutely. The author does not consider it correct to compare equipment using tabular data, but in this particular case there is no need to even get into the details of air battles in order to understand how far the I-153 is from the Bf-109F.
The USSR approached the beginning of the war in the stage of rearmament and transition to new equipment. The samples that have just begun to arrive have not yet been mastered to perfection. The role of rearmament is traditionally underestimated in our country. It is believed that if an aircraft leaves the factory gates, it already counts towards the total number of aircraft in the Air Force. Although it still needs to arrive at the unit, the flight and ground crew must master it, and the commanders must delve into the details of the combat qualities of the new equipment. A few Soviet pilots had several months to do all this. The Red Army Air Forces were distributed over a vast territory from the border to Moscow and were unable to repel attacks in a coordinated and concentrated manner in the first days of the war.
The table shows that 732 pilots could actually fight on the “new” types of aircraft. But for the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 there were not enough aircraft for them. So the total number of combat-ready units is 657. And finally, you need to think carefully about the term “pilots retrained.” Retrained does not mean that they have mastered the new technique to perfection and have become equal in their ability to conduct air combat with their German opponents. Think about it for yourself: aircraft of the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 types began to reach troops in 1941, i.e. In the months remaining before the war, the pilots simply physically could not have time to gain sufficient and full-fledged combat experience on the new aircraft. This is simply unrealistic in 3-4 months. This requires at least a year or two of continuous training. With the MiG-3 the situation is a little better, but not significantly. Only aircraft that entered service with the troops in 1940 could be more or less efficiently mastered by their crews. But in 1940, only 100 MiG-1 and 30 MiG-3 were received from industry. Moreover, it was received in the fall, and in winter, spring and autumn in those years there were known difficulties with full-fledged combat training. There were no concrete runways in the border districts; they only began to be built in the spring of 1941. Therefore, one should not overestimate the quality of pilot training on new aircraft in the fall and winter of 1940-1941. After all, a fighter pilot must not only be able to fly - he must be able to squeeze everything out of his machine to the limit and a little more. The Germans knew how to do this. And ours have just received new planes, there can be no talk of any equality. But those of our pilots who have already long and firmly “grown” into the cockpits of their aircraft are pilots of the outdated I-153 and I-16. It turns out that where a pilot has experience, there is no modern technology, and where there is modern technology, there is no experience yet.
Blitzkrieg in the air
The first battles brought severe disappointment to the Soviet command. It turned out that it is extremely difficult to destroy enemy aircraft in the air using existing military equipment. The high experience and skill of the German pilots, plus the perfection of technology, left little chance. At the same time, it became obvious that the fate of the war was being decided on the ground, by ground forces.
All this pushed us to fit the actions of the Air Force into a single, global plan for the actions of the armed forces as a whole. Aviation could not be a thing in itself, operating in isolation from the situation at the forefront. It was necessary to work precisely in the interests of the ground forces, which decided the fate of the war. In this regard, the role of attack aircraft sharply increased, and the Il-2, in fact, became the main striking force of the Air Force. Now all aviation actions were aimed at helping their infantry. The nature of the war that began quickly took the form of a struggle precisely above the front line and in the near rear of the parties.
The fighters were also reoriented to solve two main tasks. The first is the protection of their attack aircraft. The second is to protect the formations of our ground troops from retaliatory strikes by enemy aircraft. Under these conditions, the value and meaning of the concepts of “personal victory” and “shooting down” began to fall sharply. The criterion for the effectiveness of fighters was the percentage of losses of protected attack aircraft from enemy fighters. It doesn’t matter whether you shoot down a German fighter or simply shoot on course and force it to evade the attack and go to the side. The main thing is to prevent the Germans from shooting accurately at their Il-2s.
Nikolai Gerasimovich Golodnikov (fighter pilot): “We had a rule that “it’s better not to shoot down anyone and not lose a single bomber than to shoot down three and lose one bomber.”
The situation is similar with enemy attack aircraft - the main thing is to prevent them from dropping bombs on their own infantrymen. To do this, it is not necessary to shoot down the bomber - you can force it to get rid of the bombs before approaching the targets.
From NKO Order No. 0489 of June 17, 1942 on the actions of fighters to destroy enemy bombers:
“Enemy fighters, covering their bombers, naturally strive to pin down our fighters, to prevent them from approaching the bombers, and our fighters go along with this enemy trick, get involved in an air duel with enemy fighters and thereby enable enemy bombers to drop bombs on our troops with impunity or to other targets of attack.
Neither the pilots, nor the regiment commanders, nor the division commanders, nor the commanders of the air forces of the fronts and air armies understand this and do not understand that the main and main task of our fighters is to first of all destroy enemy bombers, not to give them the opportunity to drop their bomb load on our troops, on our protected facilities.”
These changes in the nature of the combat work of Soviet aviation led to post-war accusations from the losing Germans. Describing the typical Soviet fighter pilot, the Germans wrote about the lack of initiative, passion, and desire to win.
Walter Schwabedissen (Luftwaffe General): “We must not forget that the Russian mentality, upbringing, specific character traits and education did not contribute to the development of individual wrestling qualities in the Soviet pilot, which were extremely necessary in air combat. His primitive and often stupid adherence to the concept of group combat made him lacking initiative in individual combat and, as a result, less aggressive and persistent than his German opponents.”
From this arrogant quote, in which a German officer who lost the war describes Soviet pilots of the period 1942-1943, it is clearly visible that the halo of a superman does not allow him to descend from the heights of fabulous “individual duels” to everyday, but very necessary in war, massacre. We again see a contradiction - how did the stupid collective Russian principle prevail over the individually unsurpassed German knightly principle? The answer here is simple: the Red Army Air Force used the tactics that were absolutely correct in that war.
Vitaly Ivanovich Klimenko (fighter pilot): “If an air battle broke out, then by agreement we had one couple leave the battle and climb up, from where they watched what was happening. As soon as they saw that a German was approaching ours, they immediately fell on top of them. You don’t even have to hit it, just show the route in front of his nose, and he’s already out of the attack. If you can shoot him down, then shoot him down, but the main thing is to knock him out of the attack position.”
Apparently, the Germans did not understand that this behavior of the Soviet pilots was completely conscious. They did not try to shoot down, they tried to prevent their own people from being shot down. Therefore, having driven the German interceptors away from the guarded Il-2s to some distance, they left the battle and returned. IL-2 could not be left alone for a long time, because they could be attacked by other groups of enemy fighters from other directions. And for every lost IL-2 they will ask harshly upon arrival. For abandoning attack aircraft over the front line without cover, one could have easily been sent to a penal battalion. But for an unbroken messer - no. The main part of the combat sorties of Soviet fighters was to escort attack aircraft and bombers.
At the same time, nothing changed in German tactics. The aces' scores continued to grow. Somewhere they continued to shoot down someone. But who? The famous Hartman shot down 352 aircraft. But only 15 of them are IL-2. Another 10 are bombers. 25 attack aircraft, or 7% of the total number shot down. Obviously, Mr. Hartman really wanted to live, and really did not want to go to the defensive firing installations of bombers and attack aircraft. It’s better to hang around with fighters, who may never get into an attack position during the entire battle, while an IL-2 attack is a guaranteed fan of bullets in the face.
The majority of German experts have a similar picture. Their victories include no more than 20% of attack aircraft. Only Otto Kittel stands out against this background - he shot down 94 Il-2s, which brought more benefit to his ground forces than, for example, Hartman, Nowotny and Barkhorn combined. True, Kittel’s fate turned out accordingly - he died in February 1945. During an Il-2 attack, he was killed in the cockpit of his plane by the gunner of a Soviet attack aircraft.
But the Soviet aces were not afraid to attack the Junkers. Kozhedub shot down 24 attack aircraft - almost as many as Hartman. On average, strike aircraft account for 38% of the total number of victories of the first ten Soviet aces. Twice more than the Germans. What was Hartman doing in reality, shooting down so many fighters? Did he repulse their attacks by Soviet fighters on his dive bombers? Doubtful. Apparently, he shot down the security of the stormtroopers, instead of breaking through this security to the main goal - the stormtroopers killing the Wehrmacht infantrymen.
Vitaly Ivanovich Klimenko (fighter pilot): “From the first attack, you need to shoot down the leader - everyone is guided by him, and bombs are often thrown “at him.” And if you want to personally shoot down, then you need to catch the pilots who fly last. They don’t understand a damn thing; they’re usually young people there. If he fights back, yeah, it’s mine.”
The Germans guarded their bombers completely differently from the Soviet Air Force. Their actions were proactive in nature - clearing the sky along the route of the strike groups. They did not carry out direct escort, trying not to hamper their maneuver by being tied to the slow bombers. The success of such German tactics depended on the skillful counteraction of the Soviet command. If it allocated several groups of interceptor fighters, then the German attack aircraft were intercepted with a high degree of probability. While one group pinned down German fighters clearing the skies, another group attacked the unprotected bombers. This is where the large numbers of the Soviet Air Force began to show, even if not with the most advanced technology.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “The Germans could have gotten involved in battle when it was not at all necessary. For example, when covering their bombers. We took advantage of this throughout the war; one group got involved in battle with cover fighters, distracted them, while the other attacked the bombers. The Germans are glad that there is a chance to shoot down. “Bombers” are immediately on their side and they don’t care that our other group is hitting these bombers as best they can. ... Formally, the Germans covered their attack aircraft very strongly, but they only got involved in battle, and that’s all - cover on the side, they were quite easily distracted, and throughout the entire war.”
The defeat failed
So, having managed to rebuild tactics and received new equipment, the Red Army Air Force began to achieve its first successes. The “new types” of fighters received in sufficiently large quantities were no longer inferior to German aircraft as catastrophically as the I-16 and I-153. It was already possible to fight with this technology. The process of introducing new pilots into combat was established. If in 1941 and early 1942 these were, indeed, “green” aviators who had barely mastered takeoff and landing, then already at the beginning of 1943 they were given the opportunity to carefully and gradually delve into the intricacies of air warfare. Newcomers are no longer thrown straight into the fire. Having mastered the basics of piloting at the school, the pilots ended up in ZAPs, where they underwent combat use, and only then went to combat regiments. And in the regiments they also stopped thoughtlessly throwing them into battle, allowing them to understand the situation and gain experience. After Stalingrad, this practice became the norm.
Vitaly Ivanovich Klimenko (fighter pilot): “For example, a young pilot comes. Finished school. He is allowed to fly around the airfield for a bit, then a flight around the area, and then eventually he can be paired up. You don’t let him into battle right away. Gradually... Gradually... Because I don’t need to carry a target behind my tail.”
The Red Army Air Force managed to achieve its main goal - to prevent the enemy from gaining air supremacy. Of course, the Germans could still achieve dominance at a certain time, over a certain section of the front. This was done by concentrating efforts and clearing the sky. But, in general, they failed to completely paralyze Soviet aviation. Moreover, the volume of combat work increased. The industry was able to establish mass production, albeit not of the best aircraft in the world, but in large quantities. And they are very slightly inferior in terms of performance characteristics to the German ones. The first bells rang for the Luftwaffe - continuing to shoot down as many planes as possible and increasing the counters of personal victories, the Germans were gradually leading themselves to the abyss. They were no longer able to destroy more aircraft than the Soviet aviation industry produced. The increase in the number of victories did not lead to real, tangible results in practice - the Soviet Air Force did not stop combat work, and even increased its intensity.
1942 is characterized by a surge in the number of Luftwaffe combat missions. If in 1941 they made 37,760 sorties, then already in 1942 - 520,082 sorties. This looks like a commotion in the calm and measured mechanism of the blitzkrieg, like an attempt to put out a blazing fire. All this combat work fell on the very small German aviation forces - at the beginning of 1942, the Luftwaffe had 5,178 aircraft of all types on all fronts. For comparison, at the same moment the Red Army Air Force already had more than 7,000 Il-2 attack aircraft and more than 15,000 fighters. The volumes are simply incomparable. During 1942, the Red Army Air Force made 852,000 sorties - a clear confirmation that the Germans had no dominance. The survivability of the Il-2 increased from 13 sorties per 1 aircraft killed to 26 sorties.
During the entire war, the Soviet command reliably confirmed the death of approximately 2,550 Il-2s due to the actions of the Luftwaffe IA. But there is also a column “unidentified reasons for loss.” If we make a big concession to the German aces and assume that all the “unidentified” aircraft were shot down exclusively by them (and in reality this could not have happened), then it turns out that in 1942 they intercepted only about 3% of Il-2 combat sorties. And despite the continued growth of personal accounts, this rate rapidly fell further, to 1.2% in 1943 and 0.5% in 1944. What does this mean in practice? That in 1942, IL-2s flew to their targets 41,753 times. And 41,753 times something fell on the heads of German infantrymen. Bombs, NURSs, shells. This, of course, is a rough estimate, since Il-2s were also killed by anti-aircraft artillery, and in reality not every one of the 41,753 sorties ended with bombs hitting the target. Another thing is important - German fighters could not prevent this in any way. They shot down someone. But on the scale of a huge front, on which thousands of Soviet Il-2s worked, it was a drop in the bucket. There were too few German fighters for the Eastern Front. Even making 5-6 sorties a day, they could not destroy the Soviet Air Force. And nothing, everything is fine with them, the bills are growing, crosses with all sorts of leaves and diamonds are awarded - everything is fine, life is wonderful. And so it was until May 9, 1945.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “We are covering the attack aircraft. German fighters appear, circle around, but do not attack, they believe that there are few of them. The “Ilas” are processing the front line - the Germans are not attacking, they are concentrating, pulling fighters from other areas. The “silts” move away from the target, and this is where the attack begins. Well, what's the point of this attack? The “silts” have already “worked out”. Only for “personal account”. And this happened often. Yes, it happened even more interesting. The Germans could have “scrolled” around us like this and not attacked at all. They are not fools, intelligence worked for them. “Red-nosed” “cobras” - 2nd GIAP of the KSF Navy. Why should they, completely headless, get involved with an elite guards regiment? These can shoot down. It’s better to wait for someone “simpler.”
To be continued…
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