Home Hygiene Narva War. Northern War, Battle of Narva: description, causes, history and consequences

Hygiene

Narva War. Northern War, Battle of Narva: description, causes, history and consequences

Narva turned out to be a tough nut to crack. Its siege dragged on until late autumn. Having surrounded the fortress from all sides, the Russian troops waited a long time for the siege weapons to be brought up. Without them it was impossible to take the powerful fortifications of Narva. The washed-out roads made it difficult to quickly deliver heavy guns to the banks of the Narova. Only on October 20, 1700, Peter managed to fire a mortar at the fortifications for the first time. But artillery preparation was only the beginning of any siege - a complex military matter.

Meanwhile, the situation for the Russian troops became more and more alarming every day. Many siege weapons and gunpowder turned out to be bad, the assault on the rather weak fortifications of Ivan-Gorod failed three times, and contagious diseases began in the camp. Things were even worse for the Allies. Near Narva, it became known that on July 14, 1700, a Swedish squadron bombarded Copenhagen, and then Charles XII landed with a landing party and surrounded the Danish capital. This was so unexpected that the Danes, who did not expect such agility from the young king of the Swedes, immediately asked for peace. It was signed at Travendal Castle in Germany. The Danish king Frederick IV fulfilled all of Charles' wishes: Denmark withdrew from the war and broke the Northern Alliance. Alarming news also came from the camp of Augustus II near Riga. Fearing Karl's approach, he left for Poland. Russia was left alone with its enemy. At the beginning of October, the Russian command learned that selected Swedish troops led by the king had landed in Pernau (Pärnu) and headed to Revel (Tallinn). On the sixteenth of November, Charles XII attacked the cavalry army of B.P. Sheremetev and forced him to retreat from the road to Narva. It became clear that Charles was moving towards the besieged fortress to help out its garrison. Against the Russian army entrenched in a siege camp, which was 2.5 times larger than the Swedish army in terms of the number of soldiers, Charles had one weapon - speed and onslaught.

On November 19, 1700, the Swedes quickly attacked the Russian camp. They managed to break through the fortifications and cause panic in the enemy ranks. Russian soldiers rushed to the bridge across the Narova, a stampede began, the floating bridge collapsed, thousands of people were trapped ice water. B.P. Sheremetev’s cavalry also succumbed to panic. She rushed to the Narova and, having lost a thousand people, crossed to the safe right bank. Only the Guards regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky - and the Lefortovo regiment met the enemy with dignity and managed to hold their positions. At night, the Russian command decided to capitulate. Having given the banners and artillery to the winners, the Russian troops began to cross the Narova along a hastily restored bridge. The Swedes did not keep their word and began to take away weapons from Russian soldiers and rob convoys. They also detained many generals and officers of the Russian army. They were taken to Sweden, where they spent many years in prison.

Capture of Narva in 1704

By this time, Peter himself was no longer among those who fought near Narva. Literally the day before the Narva drama, he, taking with him the commander-in-chief of the troops F.A. Golovin and his favorite A.D. Menshikov, hastily left the camp and went to Veliky Novgorod. There is no reason to accuse Peter of cowardice - under the walls of Azov he showed himself at his best. Perhaps, not knowing Karl’s military talents, he thought that he would not dare to immediately attack the superior Russian forces, but would maneuver and look for opportunities to connect with the besieged garrison. Perhaps Peter, leaving the camp near Narva, decided not to take risks, because with the surrender or death of the king, the war would be irrevocably lost. Despite all his courage, Peter always avoided unnecessary risks.

The news of the terrible defeat overtook Peter in Novgorod. But the king did not fall into despair and did not show weakness. On the contrary, as often happened to him in difficult moments, he pulled himself together and began to act. His letters and orders to those close to him speak of Peter’s determination and purposefulness.

Having settled in Novgorod, Peter I sought to cover the road to Moscow with the troops remaining in the ranks and at the same time instructed Sheremetev to harass the enemy on his territory. However, everything depended on the further behavior of the Narva winner. Charles, having released the blockade of Narva and overturned the Russian troops, did not build on his success and stopped for the winter near Dorpat (Tartu). From here there were two roads in front of him: one to Russia, to Pskov, Novgorod and Moscow, the other to Livonia, to Riga. The defeated Peter I did not seem dangerous to the king. Therefore, he decided to deal with Augustus first - after all, the Saxon troops were stationed in Livonia and posed a serious danger to Swedish possessions in the Baltic states. In addition, Karl experienced some kind of vindictive feeling towards the imposing Polish king, prone to luxury, whom he certainly wanted to humiliate, “teach a lesson.” Therefore, in the spring of 1701, he turned his troops to Riga, and not to Pskov. Peter could thank God - he received a reprieve. He had the opportunity to restore the defeated army and resume military operations.

Despite the setbacks, the tsar sought to preserve the Northern Alliance, which had cracked after the defeat of the allies. In February 1701, Peter met with Augustus II in the Lithuanian city of Birzai and achieved the preservation of the alliance treaty. For this, Russia made sacrifices: it promised to help Augustus with money and soldiers (remember Patkul). But in the summer of 1701, the tsar received new disappointing news - Karl defeated the Saxons near Riga, and the Russian auxiliary corps of General A.I. Repnin, without providing assistance to the ally, retreated along the Pskov road. And again Karl, seeing the hasty retreat of the Russians, did not pursue them. His goal was a strong desire to defeat Augustus II, whom he considered a dishonest and unworthy sovereign.

The years 1701 and 1702 passed for Peter in intense work. The Russian troops, commanded by B.P. Sheremetev, who became field marshal, carried out the plan that the tsar outlined in a letter to him, namely, they continuously ravaged the enemy’s possessions. Sheremetev took advantage of the absence of large Swedish forces in Livonia and Estland and began to consistently and carefully make forays and raids into Swedish possessions. His numerous troops ravaged the richest provinces: they burned cities, villages and farmsteads, destroyed crops, took them captive local residents. The purpose of these brutal actions was to intimidate the population, as well as to deprive the Swedish army of supplies and convenient bases. During 1701–1702, the Russian army took 8 small fortresses and cities and burned more than 600 villages and manors.

Let's look at the source

On those memorable hard days November-December 1700 Peter began to restore the strength of the army. He seriously feared the Swedes' approach to Pskov and Novgorod. These fortresses were hastily strengthened - everyone went to earthworks, including the elderly Novgorod Metropolitan Job. By the will of the tsar, noblemen who were part of the Novgorod regiment came from all sides. On December 5, 1700, Peter wrote to B.P. Sheremetev, who withdrew his thinned cavalry from near Narva. Apparently, Sheremetev assumed that the usual break in hostilities had come during the winter and was counting on rest. But it was not there. Peter warned Sheremetev and aimed him at continuing the war even in winter:

“In case of misfortune there is no trace of losing everything, for this reason we command you to be in charge of the task that has been taken and begun, that is, above the cavalry... to save nearby places (for later time) and to go further away, for the best harm to the enemy. Yes, and there is no excuse, there are enough people, and the rivers and swamps are frozen ... "

This sense of purpose and determination became the main features of Peter for all subsequent years.

Field Marshal Boris Petrovich Sheremetev.

In the summer of 1701, Sheremetev won his first notable victory over the Swedes in Southern Estonia, near the village of Räpina. In January 1702 he won new victory- near the village of Erestfer, and then - near the village of Rõuge in Estland. These modest victories, achieved primarily not by skill, but by numbers, contributed to the moral uplift of the Russian army, which had not yet recovered from the defeat at Narva. In addition, newly recruited soldiers gained invaluable combat experience in battles and skirmishes.

Let's look at the source

After Sheremetev’s troops finished their campaign and began to go into winter quarters, the Dutchman de Bruin wrote from Moscow: “On September 14, about 800 Swedish prisoners, men, women and children, were brought to Moscow. At first, many of them were sold for 3 and 4 guilders per head, but after a few days the price for them rose to 20 and even 30 guilders. With such cheap prices, foreigners willingly bought prisoners, to the great pleasure of these latter, for the foreigners bought them for their services only for the duration of the war, after which they returned their freedom. The Russians also bought many of these prisoners, but the most unfortunate of them were those who fell into the hands of the Tatars, who took them away as slaves into captivity - the most deplorable situation.”

In general, the situation of prisoners - both military and civilians - in those days was terrible. Before the Seven Years' War, the Russian troops were dominated by an ancient custom, according to which captured soldiers and residents of conquered countries were trophies of the victors, along with their property, livestock, and other things. According to this law, all prisoners became “polonyaniki”, more simply - slaves, regardless of the person’s previous status, the living property of the soldier or officer who captured them. The murder of a prisoner was not considered a crime, and the separation and sale of captured families and violence against women and children were commonplace in those days.

In the summer of 1701, they managed to repulse the attack of the Swedish squadron on Arkhangelsk. The Swedes' plan to ruin main port Russia, through which the goods it needed from the West arrived, failed thanks to the feat of pilot Ivan Ryabov, who ran two Swedish ships aground right under the cannons of the Novodvinsk fortress and thereby did not allow the Swedish fleet to pass to the port city.

Characters

Field Marshal Boris Sheremetev

For almost the entire Northern War, he was the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, its oldest field marshal, a respected, well-born aristocrat. Sheremetev served the sovereign faithfully from a young age and was a hereditary professional military man and diplomat. Large, even fat, with a pale face and blue eyes, Sheremetev stood out among other nobles for his sedateness, his noble, calm manners, courtesy and good manners. Peter, a despotic sovereign, prone to obscene practical jokes, never allowed himself to play them with the old warrior, although sometimes he joked with him very cruelly. Sheremetev had been abroad, knew Western customs well, and even before Peter’s reforms, he was dressed in fashionable European clothes and shaved his face.

However, for all his merits, Sheremetev was not an outstanding person; he remained a completely ordinary, dull person, without imagination and spiritual quest. “I have an untested spirit,” he admitted in a letter to his friend F. M. Apraksin. But he had that solid reliability that inspires confidence in his subordinates and gives courage even in the hottest battle. Perhaps that is why Peter entrusted his army to him, although he was always dissatisfied with Sheremetev’s slowness. But at the same time, Peter was in no hurry to part with Sheremetev, did not send him into retirement, because he knew for sure that the old horse would not spoil the furrow and that the Russian Cunctator would not take risks in vain, would not rush into adventures. But Sheremetev knew that Peter himself did not like risk and was protecting the army, Russia’s only ally. In addition, in the military environment there is always a certain “score”, and according to it Sheremetev was undoubtedly the first: in terms of origin, nobility, length of service, seniority. He waged an “unheroic” but rational war, as far as it was possible in Russia: slowly, with a huge superiority of forces, move forward, gain a foothold and wait for new orders from the sovereign.

In general, the life of a field marshal was difficult and exhausting. Terrible for his enemies, he was weighed down by a terrible responsibility: all the time he was afraid not only for the army entrusted to him, but also for himself. Peter, using the abilities and experience of Boris Petrovich, did not trust him as a representative of the old boyars, shunned him and did not allow him into his inner circle, sending spies to the field marshal’s headquarters. In this unstable, unreliable position, Sheremetev was always afraid of somehow angering the tsar, of losing his favor, awards and praise. He died in Moscow on February 17, 1719. Until the very end, Sheremetev had neither will nor mental and physical peace. The royal service consumed all his time, his whole life. The richest landowner in Russia, he rarely visited his estates. He tried to resign more than once. “My God,” he wrote to his friend Apraksin, “deliver us from misfortune and give us at least a little peace in this world, at least a little life.” He tried to go to the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery. But Peter laughed at the boyar and, instead of tonsure, ordered him to marry a young woman. Having become seriously ill in 1718, Sheremetev asked in his will to be buried in the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery - I didn’t manage to live there, so at least I will lie in a holy place! But the sovereign decided otherwise. Sheremetev was buried in the Alexander Nevsky Monastery. Thus, even the death of the old field marshal, like the life he lived in eternal fear and captivity, served the highest state goals - the foundation of the famous necropolis.

Page 14. Key questions before the paragraph

What were the causes of the Northern War? How was the turning point in the war prepared after the first defeat of the Russian troops?

The main reason for the Northern War was the need for Russia to enter the Baltic Sea. Russia, having a huge territory, did not have access to sea trade routes either in the north or in the south. The development of the country's economy required access to the sea to participate in world trade.

Page 19, questions to the document

1. What aspects of a warrior’s life are discussed in the regulations? Group the requirements of the charter. Give each group a title.

Group 1 of requirements - about the behavior of soldiers on foreign territory

Group 2 of requirements - about the attitude towards prisoners

Group 3 of requirements - about the duties of officers, including advice

Group 4 of requirements - about the duty of soldiers to take care of their property

2. What penalties for failure to comply with the statutory rules are provided for in the document?

An officer will be deprived of his rank, a soldier will be beaten with bolts, and for looting - deprivation of life.

3. Describe the style in which the charter is written

The style in which the charter is written cannot be classified as documentary or literary. The regulations are written in simple and understandable language for illiterate soldiers.

Page 20 Questions after the paragraph

1. Explain what were the reasons for the “Narva Confusion” in 1700

The reasons for the “Narva Confusion” in 1700 were the lack of experience in military operations, poor training of soldiers, incompetent military leaders, there was not enough gunpowder and cannonballs, foreign officers in Russian service surrendered.

2. What lessons did Peter I learn from the defeat at Narva? What measures did he take to mobilize forces?

After the defeat at Narva, measures were taken to strengthen the Russian army:

Recruitment into the army according to the conscription system (from a certain number of townspeople and peasant households, one person was called up for lifelong service). This is how the regular army appeared

Training of officers (Navigation school) and soldiers

Restoration of artillery (due to a shortage of metal, even bells taken from churches and monasteries were melted down)

Unified weapons and uniforms introduced

Drawing up Military and Naval regulations

4. Using a map, tell where and under what circumstances St. Petersburg was founded. What was the significance of this event?

St. Petersburg arose on the Hare Island of the Neva. Construction of a fortress of six bastions began here on May 16, 1703. This event was very great importance for Peter I (he did not like Moscow, which reminded him of scary times, experienced there, about the Streltsy riots). He put his soul and all his remarkable energy into the construction of St. Petersburg, building according to the European model. St. Petersburg connected Russia with Europe, had direct access to the sea, and gradually turned into one of the most beautiful European capitals.

5*. Consider the problem. What were the features of the construction of St. Petersburg, if we compare it with the emergence and development of other cities in Russia and Europe?

The peculiarities of the construction of St. Petersburg were that this city was built very quickly; by order of the Tsar, boyars moved here, who were ordered to build houses here in the European style. The layout of the streets was done by Peter I himself; wide and straight streets were laid out in the city, unlike other Russian cities, the development of which was carried out chaotically, the streets were narrow. Construction was carried out in unfavorable weather conditions, in swamps, with regular spring floods of the Neva and cost the lives of many thousands of serfs. That is why the enemies of Peter I said that this city was built on bones.

The siege of Narva by Russian troops is the first step in Peter I’s struggle for access to the Baltic Sea. On September 8, 1700, after concluding a truce with Turkey, Russia declared war on Sweden. In early September, the Russian army, numbering 35 thousand people, advanced and soon besieged Narva.

The choice of Narva was not accidental. The geographical location of the city allowed those who owned it to exercise control not only in the Neva River basin, but also in the Gulf of Finland, and therefore the entire Baltic region. Having taken Narva, it was easier for Russian troops to return lost Ingria and Ingria.

After the triumphant victory over Denmark and the signing of the Peace of Traventhal, Charles XII returned to his homeland, deciding to deal with Augustus the following spring. The unexpected news of the invasion of Russian troops into the Swedish provinces infuriated the king. Charles's indignation knew no bounds because of the treachery of Peter, who until recently, through his ambassadors, had sworn sincere friendship and good neighborliness. The king equipped 16,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, and at the head of the army he headed by sea to Livonia.

Narva was a fortress, which was defended by about 2,000 soldiers under the command of commandant G. Gorn. The approach of Russian troops to the fortress forced him to organize a militia, which included about 4,000 armed townspeople. Narva was defended by 400 guns.

Severe autumn storms and bad weather prevented the Swedes from concentrating forces and resources. Peter understood that the arrival of Charles with the army could dramatically complicate his plans, so he hurried with the assault. On October 20, the bombardment of Narva began with all 173 guns. The fire didn't bring desired result, besides, the Russians ran out of gunpowder.

Spurred on by news of Karl's approach, the king takes decisive action. The attack of two rifle regiments, unexpected for the defenders, allowed the Russians to gain a foothold near the fortress walls. However, the success was temporary - the next morning, without receiving reinforcements, the archers fled. Peter’s rage was extinguished only after every tenth retreater was hanged. However, the first failures in the assault and the tsar’s inadequate reaction to them had a painful effect on the Russian army. It turned out that the troops were completely untrained in the rules of a siege and did not know where to begin the assault.

Meanwhile, it became known that Charles and his army had landed in the Gulf of Riga in Pernau and were on the march towards Narva. Soon news of the next failure arrived. Not far from Narva stood the city of Wesenberg. Its capture would allow the Russians to block the path of the Swedish troops. Sent by B.P. Sheremetev and his cavalry were unable to dislodge the Swedish garrison from the city. Moreover, the Russian military camp deployed in the vicinity of Wesenberg was unexpectedly attacked by secretly approaching Swedish battle formations. The Russian cavalry fled, opening a direct path to the main forces of Charles XII.

The unpreparedness and confusion in the Russian troops worsened even more after Peter left the Russian positions, leaving the troops under the command of Duke Charles de Croix, who had served primarily in the Austrian army. The tsar's trust in foreign generals and officers subsequently had a detrimental effect on the outcome of the battle. There was no trained Russian command corps, and foreign military specialists were in no hurry to shed blood for a foreign and, from their point of view, “barbarian” country.

Why, at a moment of extreme tension, did Peter leave the army, entrusting command to a foreign duke? It is absurd to accuse Peter of cowardice; throughout his entire military life he more than once proved enviable courage and courage in the most dangerous moments. This question is answered by historian S.M. Soloviev, who wrote: “reckless daring, the desire to be exposed to useless danger was completely not in the character of Peter, which is why he was so different from Charles XII. Peter could have left the camp at the news of Charles’s approach, having become convinced that remaining was dangerous and useless, that his presence could be useful elsewhere. This was a man who was least capable of being guided by false shame.”

On November 19, 1700 the main battle took place. Croix deployed Russian troops in a long 7-kilometer line. This did not go unnoticed in the Swede camp, nor did the fact that Russian formation was not covered by artillery, which remained in its previous positions opposite Narva. Having assessed the situation, Charles organized shock fists, forming his infantry into narrow columns, placing them opposite the center of the Russian position. Thus, the king ensured the numerical superiority of the Swedes in the direction of the main attack. The Swedish infantry was supported by artillery according to plan. The plan also included capturing the bridge over the Narva River and blocking the retreat routes of Russian troops. The Swedish cavalry had the task of breaking through behind enemy lines and completing the operation.

On the day of the battle, thick wet snow fell with a piercing wind. Well-trained and battle-hardened Swedish grenadiers rushed to the Russian positions. Poor visibility allowed Charles's soldiers to suddenly appear in front of the Russian positions. Having discharged their baguettes, the Swedes rushed into hand-to-hand combat, in which they were unsurpassed.

The Russian return salvo was ineffective in stopping the onslaught of the attackers. Less prepared for hand-to-hand combat and the Russians, who had no combat experience, after a short battle, were unable to hold back the pressure of the Swedes. The power of foreign officers over soldiers was lost. The troops became uncontrollable. The hired foreign officers surrendered and went over to the enemy's side. A panicky mood spread like lightning to Russian units. Uncontrollable crowds of soldiers rushed to the bridge, which, under the weight of those running, collapsed into the icy waters of the river. Sheremetev's cavalry, which had a chance to strike the flanks of the Swedish formation and turn the tide of the battle, treacherously rushed to flee. Having lost his courage and control over his troops, the Duke of Croix surrendered. Thirty officers followed his shameful example. Only two regiments - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky - retained their courage and steadfastness. Their stubborn resistance caused alarm in Charles. Despite the fact that their commander, Colonel Blumberg, defected to the Swedes at the beginning of the battle, the regiments did not flinch. Fencing themselves with slingshots and carts, they steadfastly defended themselves and repulsed all the attacks of the Swedes. Deprived of leadership, the disorganized army lost its ability to resist. Generals A. Golovin, Prince Y. Dolgoruky and I. Buturlin who remained with the Russian units were forced to enter into negotiations with Karl.

The agreement between the parties provided for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian units while preserving light small arms. The artillery went to the Swedes. However, the Swedish side violated the terms of the agreement and disarmed some Russian formations. Some of the officers were taken prisoner, which also contradicted the agreement. Russian losses amounted to 8,000 people. The senior officers, including 10 generals and the Duke of Croix himself, were captured.

On November 21, the ceremonial entry of Swedish troops into Narva took place. On the occasion of the victory, a thanksgiving prayer service was held in the temple. The celebrations were accompanied by the roar of guns. Commandant of the Narva garrison G.R. Horn received the rank of general. The victory was immortalized in 14 commemorative medals.

Russia's defeat at Narva had enormous foreign policy significance, from which the country could not recover until 1709. For Europe, Russia has ceased to exist as a powerful power. Russian ambassadors were subjected to all sorts of ridicule and humiliation. Satirical medals were passed from hand to hand, on which the Russian Tsar was depicted running in panic and throwing away weapons. European poets compared Charles to Alexander the Great and predicted great feats for him, and artists and medalists glorified the hero on canvas and in plastic.

The defeat at Narva was of great instructive significance. The battle showed weak sides the Russian army, its poor training in military affairs, the lack of trained middle and senior officers, disorganized supply, etc.

The victory of the experienced and excellently trained Swedish army was natural.

Russian troops converged on the Narva fortress for a very long time and in an extremely disorganized manner. The timing for the hike was extremely unfortunate - it was autumn and it was constantly raining. Due to bad weather, carts with ammunition and food constantly broke down. The supply was poorly organized, because of this the soldiers and horses were constantly malnourished - this led to the death of the horses by the end of the campaign.

By the beginning of hostilities, Peter 1 expected to gather about 60 thousand soldiers, but due to the above problems, 2 large detachments with a total number of more than 20 thousand soldiers did not have time to approach. In total, by the beginning of hostilities near Narva, Peter 1 had at his disposal from 35,000 to 40,000 soldiers and 195 artillery pieces.

The garrison of the Narva fortress consisted of only 1,900 soldiers, 400 of whom were militia. The Narva fortress was located on the banks of the Narva River, on the other bank there was another fortress called Ivangorod. Both fortresses were connected by a bridge and this allowed the defenders to move from fortress to fortress during a siege.

To avoid replenishing the fortress with provisions and soldiers, Peter 1 had to besiege both fortresses, and this stretched his army and made it weaker. To protect against attack from the rear, Peter 1 built a defense line of 2 shafts with a length of more than 7 kilometers.

On the last day of October, Russian artillery began daily shelling of the Narva fortress. But due to the fact that the ammunition lasted only 2 weeks and the caliber of the guns was too small, the fortress suffered virtually no losses.

Battle of Narva 1700

Before the approach of the main forces of the Swedish king, Peter did not know the exact number of soldiers in Charles’s army. According to captured Swedes, an army of 30 to 50 thousand soldiers was moving towards the Russian army. But Peter 1 could not confirm the words of the prisoners, because Sheremetev’s detachment of 5 thousand people, which was sent to cover the Russian troops from the Swedes, did not conduct reconnaissance and did not engage in serious battles with the Swedish army. The day before the battle, Peter 1 leaves the army, leaving command to the Dutch general Duke de Croix.

There is a version that Peter did not expect such a quick attack from the Swedes and left the army to come with reinforcements and surround the Swedish army.

Russian generals understood that Charles would attack with his main forces from the west, so the Russian army prepared a defensive line seven and a half kilometers long. One of the main mistakes of the Russian commander was the decision to place the entire army in a line between the ramparts for the entire length of the defensive ramparts - more than 7 km. This made the Russian army very vulnerable in the event of a breakthrough of the defense line. The Swedish king deployed his army in 2 lines.

On the night of November 30, 1700, the Swedish army moved towards the Russian troops. The Swedes tried to remain quiet so as not to be noticed until the last minute. The Russian army saw Charles's army only at 10 o'clock in the morning.

It was snowing heavily that day. Thanks to this, Charles’s troops managed to make a surprise attack and break through the defenses of the Russian army. Although the Russians had numerical superiority, this did not help them because the troops were too stretched.

Soon the Russian defense line was broken through in 3 places. Panic began in the ranks of the Russian army. The main part of the soldiers began to run away from the battlefield in the hope of being saved, but many drowned in the river. Foreign officers of the Russian army began to surrender.

Only the right flank, which was defended by the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments, as well as the Lefortovo regiment, did not retreat and continued to resist the Swedes. On the left flank, the division under the command of the Russian general Weide Adam Adamovich also successfully repelled the attacks of the Swedes. The battle continued until nightfall, but the Swedish army was never able to put the flanks of the Russian army to flight; there was no communication between the surviving flanks.

The next morning, the remaining generals decided to begin negotiations with Charles XII about the surrender of the Russian army. Prince Yakov Dolgorukov agreed on the passage of the Russian army without weapons and banners to the other side of the river.

The next day, December 2, General Weide’s division also capitulated. On the same day, the surviving Russian army left the shores of Narva. From the Russian army after the Battle of Narva, the Swedes were left with:

about 20 thousand muskets,
210 banners,
32 thousand rubles.

The Russian army lost more than 7,000 people wounded and killed. The Swedes lost only 677 killed and 1,250 wounded. Seven hundred people remained in captivity, including 10 generals, 10 colonels, as well as other officers and soldiers.

Results of the Battle of Narva

The army of Peter 1 suffered a severe defeat at the very beginning of the Northern War. Almost all the artillery was lost, there were killed and wounded great amount soldiers, the officer corps was significantly thinned out.

This defeat near Narva in Europe was perceived as a sign of the incapacity of the Russian army, and the Swedish army began to be feared even more. But there were also advantages in this battle near Narva. This victory of the Swedes allowed Peter 1 to carry out a number of military reforms to replenish the army with new regular troops and Russian command personnel, because. Karl hoped that the Russian army would no longer be able to provide worthy resistance for the next few years.

Imperial Russia Anisimov Evgeniy Viktorovich

"Narva Confusion"

On November 19, 1700, the Swedes quickly attacked the Russian camp. They managed to break through the fortifications and cause panic in the enemy ranks. Russian soldiers rushed to the bridge across the Narova, a stampede began, the floating bridge collapsed, thousands of people found themselves in the icy water. B.P. Sheremetev’s cavalry also succumbed to panic. She rushed to the Narova and, having lost a thousand people, crossed to the safe right bank. Only the Guards regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky - and the Lefortovo regiment met the enemy with dignity and managed to hold their positions. At night, the Russian command decided to capitulate. Having given the banners and artillery to the winners, the Russian troops began to cross the Narova along a hastily restored bridge. The Swedes did not keep their word and began to take away weapons from Russian soldiers and rob convoys. They also detained many generals and officers of the Russian army. They were taken to Sweden, where they spent many years in prison.

Capture of Narva in 1704

By this time, Peter himself was no longer among those who fought near Narva. Literally the day before the Narva drama, he, taking with him the commander-in-chief of the troops F.A. Golovin and his favorite A.D. Menshikov, hastily left the camp and went to Veliky Novgorod. There is no reason to accuse Peter of cowardice - under the walls of Azov he showed himself at his best. the best side. Perhaps, not knowing Karl’s military talents, he thought that he would not dare to immediately attack the superior Russian forces, but would maneuver and look for opportunities to connect with the besieged garrison. Perhaps Peter, leaving the camp near Narva, decided not to take risks, because with the surrender or death of the king, the war would be irrevocably lost. Despite all his courage, Peter always avoided unnecessary risks.

The years 1701 and 1702 passed for Peter in intense work. The Russian troops, commanded by B.P. Sheremetev, who became field marshal, carried out the plan that the tsar outlined in a letter to him, namely, they continuously ravaged the enemy’s possessions. Sheremetev took advantage of the absence of large Swedish forces in Livonia and Estland and began to consistently and carefully make forays and raids into Swedish possessions. His numerous troops ravaged the richest provinces: they burned cities, villages and farmsteads, destroyed crops, and took local residents captive. The purpose of these brutal actions was to intimidate the population, as well as to deprive the Swedish army of supplies and convenient bases. During 1701-1702, the Russian army took 8 small fortresses and cities and burned more than 600 villages and manors.

Let's look at the source

In those memorable difficult days of November-December 1700, Peter began to restore the strength of the army. He seriously feared the Swedes' approach to Pskov and Novgorod. These fortresses were hastily strengthened - everyone went to earthworks, including the elderly Novgorod Metropolitan Job. By the will of the tsar, noblemen who were part of the Novgorod regiment came from all sides. On December 5, 1700, Peter wrote to B.P. Sheremetev, who withdrew his thinned cavalry from near Narva. Apparently, Sheremetev assumed that the usual break in hostilities had come during the winter and was counting on rest. But it was not there. Peter warned Sheremetev and aimed him at continuing the war even in winter:

This sense of purpose and determination became the main features of Peter for all subsequent years.

Field Marshal Boris Petrovich Sheremetev.

In the summer of 1701, Sheremetev won his first notable victory over the Swedes in Southern Estonia, near the village of Räpina. In January 1702, he won a new victory - near the village of Erestfer, and then - near the village of Rõuge in Estland. These modest victories, achieved primarily not by skill, but by numbers, contributed to the moral uplift of the Russian army, which had not yet recovered from the defeat at Narva. In addition, newly recruited soldiers gained invaluable combat experience in battles and skirmishes.

Let's look at the source

In the summer of 1701, they managed to repulse the attack of the Swedish squadron on Arkhangelsk. The Swedes' plan to ruin the main port of Russia, through which the goods it needed from the West arrived, failed thanks to the feat of pilot Ivan Ryabov, who ran two Swedish ships aground right under the cannons of the Novodvinsk fortress and thereby did not allow the Swedish fleet to pass to the port city.

Characters

Field Marshal Boris Sheremetev

For almost the entire Northern War, he was the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, its oldest field marshal, a respected, well-born aristocrat. Sheremetev served the sovereign faithfully from a young age and was a hereditary professional military man and diplomat. Large, even fat, with a pale face and blue eyes, Sheremetev stood out among other nobles with his sedateness, his noble, calm manners, courtesy and good manners. Peter, a despotic sovereign, prone to obscene practical jokes, never allowed himself to play them with the old warrior, although sometimes he joked with him very cruelly. Sheremetev had been abroad, knew Western customs well, and even before Peter’s reforms, he was dressed in fashionable European clothes and shaved his face.

From the book The Old Dispute of the Slavs. Russia. Poland. Lithuania [with illustrations] author

Chapter 8. SMOLENSK CONFUSION (RUSSIAN-POLISH WAR 1632–1634) In the 20s. XVII century Relations between Russia and Poland continued to remain tense. The Russian border regions were periodically agitated by rumors about impostors “Dmitriy”. There were clashes at the border between

From the book Myths and realities of the Battle of Poltava author Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Chapter 3. Narva Confusion On August 22, 1700, Peter set out from Moscow to Narva with five regiments of the “new order,” a total of eight thousand people. Two days later the main forces of the Russian troops moved there. On September 23, the Russians besieged Narva. According to various sources, the number of besiegers was

From the book Poland. Irreconcilable Neighborhood author Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Chapter 10 Smolensk embarrassment In the 20s. XVII century Relations between Russia and Poland continued to remain very tense. The Russian border regions were periodically agitated by rumors about impostors “Dmitriy”. On the border there were skirmishes between private armies of Polish

From the book Peter the Great: personality and reforms author Anisimov Evgeniy Viktorovich

“Narva Confusion” From the bastions of the Swedish fortress of Narva on September 9, 1700, one could observe troops and convoys moving from the northeast - this was Peter’s almost 40,000-strong army approaching the Swedish fortress on the Narova River bordering Russia. This is how it began for Russia

From the book Award Medal. In 2 volumes. Volume 1 (1701-1917) author Kuznetsov Alexander

“Narva Confusion” From time immemorial, the Izhora land with the adjacent shores of the Gulf of Finland was Russian land. Alexander Nevsky also beat the Swedes and Germans in 1240 for invading these Russian lands. But in 1617, weakened by the war with Poland, Russia was forced

From the book Northern Wars of Russia author Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Chapter 2. Narva Confusion At the end of July 1699, a Swedish embassy arrived in Moscow, the purpose of which was to confirm the Kardis Peace Treaty of 1661. However, the ambassadors were told that the tsar had gone to Voronezh and Azov for several weeks, and they had to negotiate with

From the book Historical Districts of St. Petersburg from A to Z author Glezerov Sergey Evgenievich

From the book Gapon author Shubinsky Valery Igorevich

NARVA OUTPUT, EVERYWHERE EVERYWHERE The trade union on the Vyborg side with several hundred members - this was, according to Gapon's plan, only the beginning, the core of a truly mass organization. Now it was necessary to organize departments. Petersburg was great, there were industrial settlements in it

From the book Leningrad Utopia. Avant-garde in the architecture of the Northern capital author Pervushina Elena Vladimirovna

Moscow-Narvskaya factory-kitchen Current address - pl. Stachek, 9. Although the Kirov factory-kitchen was built in the same years 1929–1931 and by the same group of architects (A.K. Barutchev, I.A. Gilter, I.A. Meerzon) as the factory-kitchen of the Stalin district , these buildings are not duplicates.

From the book Peter and Mazepa. Battle for Ukraine author Shambarov Valery Evgenievich

13. Narva embarrassment Having returned from European travels, Peter began negotiations on an alliance with the Danish ambassador Gaines. He conducted them strictly secretly, all meetings took place face to face. The Dane even had to travel to Voronezh for negotiations. And soon she rushed to Moscow