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Submarine warfare in the First World War. Underwater trump card

German submarines in the First World War

In August 1914, when the First World War began, the German High Seas Fleet (the main forces of the German navy on the eve and during the First World War) was not yet equipped with the number of battleships that von Tirpitz was going to build, and could not resist the English Grand -fleet (the main formation of the British Navy during the First World War). At the same time, the English fleet did not dare to give a decisive battle to the German fleet in the coastal waters of Germany. Both maritime powers followed a wait-and-see approach. During the entire First World War, only one battle took place between the fleets off the Jutland Peninsula in the North Sea, but it was fleeting and did not play any significant role in the war at sea.

Submarines took part in offensive operations on both sides, and the results of their combat trips to sea did not fail to have an impact. Already at the beginning of the war, German submarines sank three British heavy cruisers (Aboukir, Hog and Cressy) and two light cruisers (Pathfinder and Hawk), resulting in the death of two thousand sailors

At the beginning of the First World War, the British Navy did not have any special means to combat enemy submarines. The military believed that since submarines spend most of their voyages on the surface, they could be rammed or hit by gunfire. This misconception spread after the British cruiser Birmingham rammed and sank the German submarine U15. However, until the end of 1914, the British sank only one more submarine - U18. In 1914, the Germans lost five boats. In addition to the two mentioned, three died for unknown reasons (perhaps they were blown up by mines).

In 1915, when losses from attacks by German submarines became noticeable, the Admiralty expressed dissatisfaction with the existing methods of combating boats and turned to scientists and engineers with an urgent request to develop means and methods of anti-submarine defense.

During the First World War, anti-submarine defense systems were as follows.

Surface Hunters. Numerous ships (first dozens, then hundreds, and then thousands) conducted a targeted search for enemy submarines at sea. The armada of submarine hunters consisted of destroyers, patrol ships, trawlers, yachts and decoy ships (warships disguised as cargo ships). Some of the ships were equipped with hydrophones (passive underwater sound direction finders), which, when the vehicle was stopped, could detect the engine noise of a submerged boat.

In 1916, many anti-submarine defense ships began to be equipped with new weapons - depth charges, which owe their origin to mines. The best of these bombs contained 300 pounds of trinitrotoluene or amatol and were equipped with hydrostatic fuses that detonated the bombs at depths of 40 to 80 feet. Later, hydrostatic fuses were introduced, detonating bombs at depths of 50 to 200 feet. Depth charges were dropped into the water from stern bombers; in order not to damage the stern, the ship had to do this at full speed. For this reason, slow-moving ships did not use 300-pound depth charges until hydrostatic fuses were invented to fire the bombs at a safe depth.

In 1916, British ships managed to sink only two ships using depth charges. German boats

Concerned about large losses at sea, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in April 1917 ordered the Admiralty to form convoys of merchant ships and security forces - destroyers, patrol ships and other anti-submarine warfare vessels - for the safe transportation by sea of military equipment, ammunition, food and other cargo. defense

Sea convoys have been used since ancient times to protect merchant shipping from attack by a belligerent, but British naval circles before Lloyd George did not even think about forming convoys, and there were reasons for this. The main of these reasons, as determined by the English naval historian John Winton, was the obvious fact that the officers of the British Navy had forgotten the history of the emergence of their navy, the purpose of which was to protect British merchant ships. Having adopted the postulates of the American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan and his associates, who argued that supremacy at sea, ensuring the safety of its merchant fleet, could be achieved through a single victorious naval battle, the highest naval circles of Great Britain opposed the involvement of military ships to protect merchant ships. These circles viewed the formation of convoys as a forced defensive action, in which one could see Britain's recognition of the fact that it had lost supremacy at sea and was sliding into the status of a minor naval power.

The Admiralty had other reasons for its negative attitude towards sea convoys. The first of them was to underestimate the effectiveness of German submarines, despite significant losses of the merchant fleet in the coastal waters of Great Britain. The second reason lay in the well-established opinion that warships, participating in sea convoys, would be forced to go from one port to another at the speed of slow-moving merchant ships and thereby be distracted for a long time from their main task of destroying enemy ships. In addition, it was argued that escort ships in distant neutral ports during the loading and unloading of merchant ships would not only create unnecessary trouble local authorities, but they themselves will experience organizational difficulties. The third reason was that the Admiralty doubted the ability and willingness of merchant ship captains to carry out military orders - in particular, to maintain their place in the ranks when following a zigzag course at night or in inclement weather. And finally, the Admiralty believed that German submariners would certainly regard a large formation of merchant ships as a target to be destroyed.

Eventually, following Lloyd George's instructions and enlisting the support of the US Navy, the Admiralty agreed to test convoy crossings across the Atlantic. On May 10, 1917, the first convoy, consisting of 16 merchant ships and escort forces, set sail from Gibraltar for the British Isles. On May 24, the second convoy, consisting of 17 merchant ships, left Norfolk, Virginia. The first convoy reached its destination without a single loss. The second convoy, whose guard force consisted of the English cruiser Roxburgh and six American patrol ships, suffered some misfortune. Two of the twelve merchant ships were unable to sail at a speed of 9 knots, fell behind and went on their own course. One of them, heading for Halifax, Nova Scotia, was torpedoed. The remaining ten merchant ships, despite fog and poor visibility, following a zigzag course, crossed the Atlantic and arrived safely at their destination port in the British Isles.

Based on the experience of the first convoys crossing the Atlantic and on other data, in August 1917 - the beginning of the fourth year of the war - the Admiralty finally decided to introduce a system of sea convoys, which brought excellent results. By October 1917, over 1,500 merchant ships in approximately 100 convoys had safely reached the British Isles. Only ten ships were sunk by German submarines while traveling as part of convoys, i.e. one ship out of one hundred and fifty. For comparison, during the same period, one ship out of every ten independently sailing ships was sunk by German submarines. By the end of 1917, almost all long-distance merchant ships made sea crossings as part of convoys. The convoys were organized on time. In 1917, German submarines sank about 3,000 ships with a total tonnage of 6.2 million tons, most of which were independent vessels. The historian Winton wrote: “In 1917, naval convoys did not help win the war at sea, but they prevented defeat in the war.”.

One of the commanders of German submarines shared his memories of collisions with sea convoys on the pages of the press. He's writing: “For many hours of solo sailing on the open sea, submariners, as a rule, saw nothing but deserted waves, and it seemed like a miracle when the outlines of 30–50 ships, accompanied by warships, suddenly appeared on the horizon line.”. According to him, a single submarine stumbled upon a convoy by pure chance, and if its commander had self-control and nerves of iron, then it carried out not one, but several attacks, as a result of which it sank one or two ships, and with luck, more, but in any case, enemy losses were insignificant, and the convoy continued to follow its course.

During the last twelve months of the war, sea convoys became common occurrence. British and American naval authorities organized large convoy services that planned, formed and prepared convoys for passage. The security forces for merchant ships included not only warships, but often (when the convoy route passed close to land) also aircraft armed with new types of bombs.

In many cases, radio intelligence determined the location of German submarines at sea, which made it possible to direct naval convoys along a safe route. After the use of sea convoys to protect merchant shipping came into practice in 1918, total losses ships decreased by two-thirds compared to 1917. In ten months of 1918, the Germans sank 1,333 ships, of which 999 were their own. Only 134 ships were lost in the convoys.

Having entered the war, the United States was eager to inflict a crushing defeat on the Germans at sea, giving the enemy a single naval battle (as if they wanted to prove in practice the validity of the Mahan doctrine). However, soon the Americans, like the British earlier, became convinced of the inconsistency of such a strategy. Then the US Navy began to help the British fight German submarines. American destroyers and other small ships began hunting for German submarines, became convoy guards, and began laying mines between Orkney and Norway. Twenty-three American submarines began patrolling the Azores and off the British coast. However, none of these boats were successful. Meanwhile, the British were much more successful. If in the first half of 1917 they sank 20 German submarines

Total - 351

Killed in battle - 178 (50%)

Other losses - 39 (11%)

Completed after the armistice - 45

Transferred to the Allies - 179

Tonnage of ships and vessels of the Entente and neutral countries sunk in the First World War by German submarines

The tonnage of all sunken ships and vessels is 12,850,814 brt.

Tonnage of sunk ships and vessels of Great Britain - 7,759,090 grt.

At first, submarines were considered coastal ships with limited defensive functions. As they improved, they began to be used to wage “corsair warfare.” The use of the submarine fleet for a new purpose was a powerful factor influencing the development of naval operational art. The First World War forced military theorists of all countries to reconsider their strategic doctrines, taking into account the use of new technical means in the war, among which submarines were not the least important. In the future, any state striving for supremacy at sea must not only have a strong surface fleet, superior in striking power to the fleets of other countries, but also have reliable anti-submarine defense capabilities. However, this is not enough. Such a state must also have a powerful submarine fleet for possible combat against enemy ships and merchant vessels.

During the war, German propaganda created a myth about the German submarine fleet, which told that German submarines were an incomparable miracle of technology, and the submariners - all invincible heroes and supermen, loyal to the Kaiser to the last drop of blood - were about to be brought to their knees Great Britain and its allies. German home-grown naval historians, as well as serious researchers, in the 20s and 30s continued to nurture the myth of the strength of German submarines in the First World War. Even some Allied naval historians, such as Sir Julian Corbett, praised the strength of the German submarine fleet, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, wrote in The World Crisis that during the war, German submarines were “rapidly eroding” the foundations of the British Isles, as a result which made the defeat of the Allies seem quite real by the beginning of 1918. The American ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, noted that submarines were the most formidable means of warfare. William S. Sims, a senior naval officer representing the US Navy in England, wrote: “If Germany could constantly keep 50 submarines on the busy sea routes, nothing would prevent her from winning the war.”.

In fact, German submarines dominated the sea lanes early in the war due to the short-sightedness and unprofessionalism of the British Admiralty. In preparing for the war, the Admiralty did not admit the possibility of a “corsair war” at sea involving submarines and did not prepare for it. When the “corsair war” became a reality, the Admiralty showed unacceptable slowness in the deployment of anti-submarine defense systems, mass production of improved mines and torpedoes, and arming of merchant ships.

A careful analysis of the successful operations of German submarines shows that they destroyed most of the Allied ships not with torpedoes, but with gunfire, using mainly 88 mm (3.4") deck guns. However, if the Admiralty had equipped British merchant ships with 4" guns (slightly larger in caliber than the deck guns of German submarines), and at the same time ensured that the ships' crews were equipped with trained gun crews, then only the bravest commanders (without regard to the vulnerability of the submarine's hull) would have dared to engage in an artillery duel with commercial ships, and the losses of the British merchant fleet could have been significantly smaller. Several merchant ships equipped with guns, making a joint passage, would be able to repel German submarines, forcing them to move underwater to fight and instead of guns use less than perfect torpedoes, which were easy to evade.

The main mistake of the British was that they established the convoy system late. By September 1917, when the concept of convoys was adopted by the British Admiralty, German submarines had managed to sink ships with a total tonnage of 8 million tons out of the 12 million tons of total tonnage they destroyed throughout the war.

If the convoy system had been deployed earlier by the British Admiralty, merchant ships could have traveled in convoys along safe routes determined by radio intelligence earlier than September 1917.

But even having established a convoy system, the Admiralty did not show consistency in its actions for a long time and began to form coastal convoys only in June 1918, ignoring until that time the obvious fact that near the coast only one aircraft (even without weapons on board) is capable of forcing submerge the enemy submarine and thereby reduce its attack capabilities.

During the First World War, the Germans were not particularly smart either. The unrestricted submarine warfare they declared was the main reason for the United States entering the war. In addition, Germany did not have enough strength to win at sea. The strategic doctrine of using submarines in war has failed.

The Germans did not shine at the tactical level either. As soon as the Allies deployed the convoy system, German successes at sea began to decline sharply. The German naval command failed to organize the “wolf packs” that would prove themselves in the future - in World War II - mobile groups of submarines, deployed as a screen along the likely routes of enemy convoys to search for them.

But the German high command naively assumed that German submarines were capable of preventing the transfer of American troops from the United States to the Atlantic ports of France. German submarines completely failed their assigned mission. The Allies transported about 2 million American soldiers from the United States to France, and lost only 56 people as a result of a local explosion on the Moldavia transport with a displacement of 9,500 tons. Apart from this small success, the Germans managed to achieve little: they sank two more transports (Covington and "President Lincoln"), but both ships were empty, returning to the United States. As you know, the American troops that landed in France played main role in the final defeat of the German armies.

Unrestricted submarine warfare, contrary to the myth about the strength of the German fleet, did not bring victory to the Germans. When German submarine activity became most aggressive in 1917, the Allies established a convoy system and launched a massive merchant ship construction effort. As the English historian Arthur J. Marder notes, during the entire war, Great Britain did not experience a serious shortage of life-support products.

The submarines of the First World War, which celebrated their 15th anniversary in 1914, did not in any way influence the course of hostilities or the outcome of the war. But this is the time of the birth and formation of the most powerful type of troops. Submarines would play a significant role in World War II, demonstrating the importance and power of the submarine fleet.

The origins of the submarine fleet

By the beginning of the First World War, they represented a new, unknown means of conducting military operations on water. They were treated in the navy and in the highest levels of military leadership with misunderstanding and mistrust. Service on submarines was considered very unprestigious among them. However, the first submarines in the First World War underwent a baptism of fire and deservedly took their place in the navies of the countries participating in the conflict.

The first submarine "Dolphin" appeared in the Russian Empire in 1903. But the development of the submarine fleet went slowly, because due to the reluctance to understand its full importance, funding was insignificant. The lack of understanding of how to use submarines on the part of the main naval specialists not only in Russia, but also in other European maritime powers, led to the fact that by the time hostilities began, submarines practically did not play a significant role.

Anticipating future applications

By the beginning of the fighting of the First World War, the use of submarines had its supporters, one might say, who fanatically believed in the future. In Germany, a lieutenant commander of the navy sent a memo to the command, in which he gave a calculation of the use of submarines against England. The Commander-in-Chief of the English Navy, Lord Fisher, submitted his memoranda to the government, in which he indicated that submarines, in violation of maritime laws, would be used against both military and commercial ships of the enemy.

However, it should be emphasized that most military experts imagined the use of submarines, due to their specifics, only as a coastal positional guard. They were predicted to play the role of minelayers in the construction of mobile ships. An attack by them on enemy ships was presented as a special case at the time the ship was anchored.

Russia was no exception. Thus, I. G. Bubnov, the leading Russian designer of submarines, assigned them the role of “typical mine cans” in the First World War. The Russian Navy by that time was one of the few that had already used submarines in the war between Russia and Japan. It should be noted that the Russian high command gravitated more towards huge multi-gun ships and frankly did not attach much importance to submarines.

Russian submarine fleet at the beginning of the First World War

Submarines in Russia were in three fleets, their total number consisted of 24 combat and three training boats. A brigade consisting of 11 submarines was based in the Baltic Sea, of which 8 were combat boats and 3 were training boats. The Black Sea Fleet had 4 submarines. The Pacific Fleet was represented by a detachment consisting of 14 submarines.

Russian submarines in the First World War were assigned the role of coast guard, and the main burden fell on the Baltic Brigade, since the main naval power Germany participated in the war as the opposing side of Russia. The most important naval actions against Russia were planned in the Baltic. The main goal is to ensure the protection of the Russian capital and prevent a breakthrough of the German fleet, which at that time was considered one of the most powerful and equipped in the world.

Black Sea Fleet

Before Turkey entered the war against the Entente, the command of the Black Sea Fleet pursued a policy of passively awaiting an attack by the Turkish fleet. Practically nothing had changed at the beginning of Turkey’s entry into the war. Open connivance and betrayal on the part of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Ebenhard, brought great damage to the Russian forces when attacked first by the Turkish squadron, then in a collision with two German cruisers “Goeben” and “Breslau”. It became clear that the “honorable” Admiral Ebonhard was, to put it mildly, unfit for his position. During his command, submarines were not even mentioned.

New Russian submarines of the First World War appeared in the Black Sea Fleet only in the autumn of 1915, at the same time the minelayer “Crab” began to operate. The use of submarines was initially of a single (positional) nature. Subsequently, they already used the maneuverable method - cruising a certain water area. This method has received significant development.

The first campaigns of Russian submarines on the Black Sea

By the end of the winter of 1916, the tactics of using submarines had changed significantly; they became the main weapon in the fight against enemy communications. Cruising trips lasted ten days. Two for transition and eight for searching for the enemy. During the voyage, the submarines covered up to 1,200 miles on the surface, and more than 150 miles under water. The main area where submarines were used was the southwest of the maritime theater.

The submarine Tyulen, under the command of Lieutenant Kititsyn, especially distinguished itself in the First World War, which met the armed steamship Rodosto, with a displacement of 6 thousand tons and equipped with two 88-mm and two 57-mm guns, under the command of a German commander, near the Bosphorus Strait and a mixed German-Turkish crew.

The "Seal", being on the surface due to a breakdown, entered the battle at a distance of 8 cables, and inflicted more than 10 hits on the steamer. The ship's crew raised a white flag and, under the escort of a submarine, were transported to Sevastopol. During the fighting, the Tyulen damaged or captured 20 enemy ships. In the Black Sea, for the first time, Russian submarines from the First World War began to go on cruises together with destroyers, which gave more significant results.

Disadvantages of using submarines

First of all, this is a short time spent under water, during which the boat could travel only 150 miles. The breakers during the dive made the boat vulnerable, and the trail from the fired torpedo gave away the attack and gave the enemy ship time to maneuver. A big difficulty was the control of submarines. They were equipped with radios whose range was limited to 100 miles. Therefore, it was impossible for the command to control them at a greater distance.

But in 1916, a solution was found, which consisted in the use of “rehearsal” ships, most of them were destroyers. They received the radio signal and transmitted it further. At that time, this was a way out of the current situation, which allowed the submarines to keep in touch with the command.

Russian submarines in the Baltic

The main center of naval operations unfolded in the Baltic Sea. The initial goal of the German fleet was to break into the Gulf of Finland, where they would defeat Russian ships and strike Petrograd from the sea. At the very beginning, the cruisers Magdeburg and Augsburg, which were accompanied by destroyers and submarines, attempted to break into the Gulf of Finland. But they failed to do this. For defense, the Russians created a mine and artillery position, which stretched between the Porkalla-Udd peninsula and the island of Nargen. The task of the submarines was to serve in front of the position in order to jointly fire with the cruisers.

The creation of mine and artillery positions was carried out before the start of the war. Since its inception, submarines have served at certain distances. The fighting in the Baltic was fundamentally different from the fighting on the Black Sea coast. Most of the German ships were sunk or damaged by Russian mines. It was they who forced the German command to abandon attempts to break into the Gulf of Finland.

Russian legend

In May 1916, the Baltic Fleet received a new submarine, the Wolf. The First World War saw many examples of selfless courage and heroism of submarine sailors. But the crew of one of them became legendary. Legends were made up in the Baltic Fleet about the submarine "Wolf", commanded by Senior Lieutenant I. Messer, the son of Vice Admiral V.P. Messer.

I. Messer had many victories on his personal account before he took command of the Wolf. In 1915, as commander of the submarine Cayman, he and his crew captured the German steamer Stahleck in the Olandsgaf Strait. On 05/17/1916, the submarine “Wolf” set up an ambush in Norchepa Bay, on the border with Swedish territorial waters, where it sank three transport ships - “Gera”, “Kolga” and “Bianka”. Almost a month later, the military transport Dorita was sunk.

Features of the war in the Baltic

The German fleet was forced to fight on two fronts with England and Russia. The Gulf of Finland was reliably closed with mines. Great Britain had the most advanced fleet at that time, so all the main forces of Germany were diverted to it. She bought ore from neutral Sweden, so the war in the Baltic Sea was reduced mainly to the capture and sinking of German merchant ships carrying metal ore. The Russian command had a goal - to prevent the enemy from freely transporting raw materials. And it was achieved partly thanks to submarines.

German submarines

From the first moment of the war, the Entente, mainly the English fleet, began a siege of Germany. In response, Germany began to blockade Great Britain with submarines. By the way, during the war period the Germans launched 341 submarines, and 138 remained on the stocks. German submarines of the First World War were distinguished by their survivability and could go on cruises for up to 10 days.

It is worth mentioning separately about the submarine crews, who were particularly cruel. They never offered to surrender to the crews of transport ships and did not rescue crew members, but sank the ships in cold blood. For this, all ships of the British Navy were given an order, which instructed them not to take German submariners prisoner.

German submarines of the First World War caused significant damage to England. In 1915 alone, the Entente countries lost 228 merchant ships. But they failed to defeat the English surface fleet; in addition, by 1918, Germany’s opponents had learned to fight submarines. During this year, 50 German submarines were sunk, which significantly exceeded the number launched from the stocks.

Submarine fleet of Austria-Hungary

The Austro-Hungarian submarines of the First World War could not have any influence on the course of naval combat clashes. Austria-Hungary had access to the small Adriatic Sea. But to maintain prestige, long before the start of the submarine war, in 1906, she purchased a submarine project from the American company S. Lake. By the beginning of the war, two submarines U-1 and U-2 had been built.

These were small-sized submarines with quiet running, a gasoline engine, ballast systems on a durable hull, and a steering wheel for controlling the boat on the surface was installed only after surfacing. They could hardly compete with any submarine of the countries participating in the war.

But it is worth noting that already in 1917, Austria-Hungary had 27 submarines, which inflicted significant damage on the enemy, mostly the Italians. The British also suffered from them. For an empire collapsing for national reasons, this is a pretty good result.

The First World War radically changed attitudes towards submarines. It became clear that they were the future, when they would become a formidable force and be able to travel thousands of miles to strike the enemy.

In 2015, we celebrated the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I. Unfortunately, this war has been forgotten.
By 1914, submarines represented a new means of warfare at sea. There was practically no practice of using them. All the warring countries could not adequately assess their significance at the beginning of the war.
The first combat submarine "Dolphin" appeared in the Russian Navy in 1903. Due to an incorrect assessment of the importance of Submarines, allocating money for their construction presented a big problem. Many prominent naval specialists, such as Kolchak and Admiral N.O. Essen, were ardent opponents of the new cause. They revised their views during the 1st World War! Service on submarines was considered not prestigious, so few officers dreamed of serving on them.
By the beginning of World War 1, Russia had 8 combat and 3 training submarines, organized into a brigade in the Baltic Fleet, 4 submarines, organized into a separate division in the Black Sea Fleet, and a separate detachment of 12 submarines in the Pacific Ocean.
Baltic Fleet.
The Baltic Fleet was faced with the task of repelling the breakthrough of the German Fleet to Petrograd, preventing landings, and protecting the capital of the empire. To accomplish the task, a mine and artillery position was created between the island of Nargen and the Porkalla-Udd peninsula. The existing submarines were to be deployed in front of the mine and artillery position in order to deliver, together with the cruisers, weakening attacks on the ships of the German fleet.
The main forces of the Baltic Fleet, hiding behind a mine and artillery position, were supposed to prevent it from penetrating into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland.
The creation of a mine and artillery position and the deployment of Fleet forces, at his own peril and risk (apparently taking into account the sad experience of the Russo-Japanese War), Admiral Essen began even before the start of mobilization and the declaration of war.
With the outbreak of hostilities, submarines served in certain positions, ready to meet the enemy.
In August 1914, the submarine fleet of the Baltic Fleet was replenished with three submarines: N1, N2, and in September N3, manufactured by the Nevsky Plant. These newly built boats formed the Special Purpose Division.
After a month of waiting for the appearance of the German fleet, the Russian command realized that for the Germans the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland were a secondary direction. The main forces of the German fleet are deployed against the British. In the Baltic, the German fleet made demonstrative actions using the fast cruisers Augsburg and Magdeburg, the Germans laid minefields, shelled ports, lighthouses and border posts and ensured the safety of sea transport of iron ore from Sweden to Germany.
After the German cruiser Magdeburg ran aground off the island of Odensholm on August 13, documents captured by Russian sailors made it possible to decipher German radiograms. Thus, the command was able to accurately determine the situation in the Baltic Sea.
As a result of these circumstances, the submarine positions were moved to the west.
On September 8, 1914, the first torpedo attack of a Russian submarine on an enemy ship took place. The Akula submarine, under the command of Lieutenant Gudima, attacked with one torpedo (although before the war, Russian submariners had already practiced firing three torpedoes, a prototype of fan firing), the destroyer escorting the German cruiser Amazon. Unfortunately, the trace of the torpedo was discovered and the destroyer managed to evade.

Unlimited submarine warfare- a type of military action that involves conducting active combat operations on the lines of sea communications using submarines to destroy enemy military and civilian transport ships. The doctrine was widely used by Germany in the First and Second World Wars, as well as by the United States in the Pacific in 1941-1945.

Total information

Emergence of the doctrine was a logical development of military-technical thought, due to the emergence of a new class of ships - submarines. The history of submarines dates back to the 16th and 17th centuries, when projects of such devices were conceptually justified and the first working models were created. Due to the technical imperfections of the first submarines, they were not widely used, being an attractive idea to which outstanding engineers of their time returned from time to time.

The development of science and technology contributed to the improvement of submarines, and they gradually began to replenish the fleets of leading maritime powers.

At the same time, despite the rapid pace of scientific and technological progress, leading to the emergence of new types of weapons, submarines were in the eyes of naval commanders and officials of the naval departments atypical weapons that are strikingly different from traditional armadas consisting of surface ships. This gave rise to a negative attitude towards military underwater vehicles, as well as a lack of understanding of how to use them in real combat operations. Indicative in this sense is the statement of Admiral Henderson of the British Navy, who stated in 1914:

A similar point of view was prevalent in the British Admiralty. Subsequently, the shortsightedness of the naval commanders of a great sea power will play with An empire on which the sun never sets, a cruel joke.

However, with the outbreak of war, submarine cruisers demonstrated their military potential when on September 5, 1914, the German submarine U-9 sank the British light cruiser Pathfinder, and two weeks later, on September 20, 1914, three more British Navy warships were destroyed. What happened had a huge effect on the warring countries, which believed in the promise of the new weapon.

Doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare

The essence of the doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare is to destroy, with the help of the submarine fleet, enemy merchant ships transporting weapons, reinforcements, as well as supplying troops and civilians with supplies and fuel. The first country to resort to this strategy was Germany, which contested dominance over Europe and the colonies from the Entente countries in the First World War. The targeted use of the submarine fleet against merchant ships was a consequence of the deadlock in trench warfare and was caused by the naval blockade of Germany itself.

The safety of civilian courts during interstate hostilities was ensured by the London Declaration of Law naval war 1909, which was ratified by all the great powers except England. The declaration ordered warships of opposing countries, when meeting an enemy merchant ship, to fire a warning shot along its course. The civilian crew had to be allowed to abandon the ship before it was destroyed or given to the enemy crew as a prize.

However, during the First World War, the British Navy widely used the so-called. decoy ships, warships converted from merchant ships, as well as specially built anti-submarine ships, similar in silhouette to civilian steamships. When the crew of a German submarine attempted to capture such a ship, the British sailors opened cannon and machine gun fire on the enemy ship that had surfaced.

In November 1914, the German naval command changed its mind to the idea of using submarine forces against the merchant fleet of the British Empire:

Since England completely disregards international law, there is not the slightest reason for us to limit ourselves in our methods of warfare. We must use this weapon (the submarine fleet) and do it in a way that best suits its characteristics. Consequently, submarines cannot spare the crews of steamships, but must send them to the bottom along with their ships. Merchant shipping could be prevented and all maritime trade with England would cease within a short time

Excerpt from a note submitted by the fleet command to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm. background Field

The actions of groups of submarines on enemy lines of communication in the pre-war years were not part of the naval doctrines of the leading world powers. The submarines were primarily assigned reconnaissance and defensive functions. Thus, at the initial stage of the First World War, German submarines were located in a defensive arc on the approaches to the Heligoland Bight, where, according to the Headquarters of the German Navy, the English fleet would strike.

As British and German admirals testify in their records, in war time no one counted possible use submarine fleet against merchant ships. This was due both to the possible negative reaction of the public to such an act of aggression, and purely practical problems, namely, the lack of the required number of submarine cruisers. Thus, German experts assessed the need for 200 submarines for successful operations against England.

The use of Unlimited Submarine Warfare has been noted in several military campaigns:

Battle of the Atlantic, used by Germany in 1915, 1917-1918;
Second Battle of the Atlantic, fought by Nazi Germany from 1939-1945;
US military actions in the Pacific against Japan (1941-1945).

First Battle of the Atlantic

By the beginning of the First World War, the German Empire had only 28 submarines with 41 battleships. Realizing the vulnerability of England's island position, German military leaders were interested in disrupting the supply routes for its troops. The possibility of conducting military operations against merchant ships was also considered in relation to the rest of the Entente countries. Initially, the German Navy headquarters assigned the task of destroying enemy merchant and warships to surface ships and raiders. However, the losses among them were too high, which prompted consideration of submarine cruisers as an alternative.

Admiral von Pohl, commander of the High Seas Fleet in 1915-1916.

A supporter of the use of the submarine fleet to deplete the enemy was Admiral von Pohl, who replaced Admiral Ingenohl as commander of the High Seas Fleet on February 2, 1915. Seeking to weaken the British fleet as much as possible before the general battle, von Pohl practically abandoned the use of surface ships, focusing on submarine fleet operations on enemy lines of communication. The purpose of the actions taken was to blockade Great Britain.

German submarine activity between February 1915 and April 1916. can be characterized within the framework of the so-called Limited submarine warfare. There was no consensus in Germany on the issue of conducting military operations against civilian ships. German Kaiser Wilhelm II opposed the increasing number of civilian casualties, while the majority of the Admiralty was in favor of using all available means to achieve victory. Sailors were allowed to sink ships of neutral states only under prize law after inspection and detection of contraband. First, it was necessary to verify that the ship belonged to a neutral country, which became especially difficult at night.

Max Valentiner, one of the first ace submariners

Of the 30 submarines that were part of the German Navy in 1915, 7 operated in the Baltic and North Seas, the remaining 23 off the coast of England and in the Atlantic Ocean. A significant part of the submarines operating in the western direction were stationed in Flanders, where the bases were well equipped, and the Allies’ poor anti-submarine defense allowed German submarines to penetrate the Atlantic under the enemy’s nose.

In total, as a result of actions on the enemy’s lines of communication in 1915, the German submarine fleet managed to sink 228 Entente merchant ships with a total displacement of 651,572 gross register tons, as well as 89 ships of neutral countries with a tonnage of 120,254 gross register tons. During this period, a number of successful operations took place. Thus, the crew of Max Valentiner’s U-39 distinguished itself by destroying 22 cargo ships, 5 fishing schooners and 3 sailing ships with a total tonnage of 70 thousand tons in one combat campaign.

Anti-submarine actions of the allied countries did not bring much success. The periodic easing of the trade war by Germany was largely due to the position of the country's leadership, seeking to reduce the number of incidents with the use of submarines leading to the loss of civilian ships. One of the most striking manifestations of the horrors of the general war was the sinking of the steamer by the German submarine U-20 on May 7, 1915 Lusitania. The destruction of the airliner, which led to the death of 1,198 people, was negatively received by the world community.

Despite the excuses of the German side (the ship was moving in a combat zone and the German embassy in Washington notified of the possible consequences of this for civilian ships), the political scandal that broke out had a negative impact on Germany’s reputation and led to a reduction in trade turnover between Berlin and Washington. Subsequently, there was a rupture in trade and diplomatic relations with the entry of the United States into the war on the side of the Entente in April 1917. After this incident, the operations of the German submarine forces were partially curtailed, which, however, did not affect the actions of German submarines in the Mediterranean Sea. Fears caused by the possible entry of the United States into the war prevented Germany from lifting restrictions on submarine warfare until February 1917.

In 1916, von Pohl was replaced as commander of the High Seas Fleet by Admiral Reinhard Scheer. He considered it necessary to continue to put pressure on England through the active actions of submarine forces, which, however, as before, were given secondary importance - the destruction of the merchant fleet, luring out warships for their subsequent destruction by German surface forces. However, after Battle of Jutland From May 31 to June 1, 1916, it became clear that the High Seas Fleet would not be able to challenge Britain's naval hegemony. Admiral Scheer spoke for the beginning Unlimited submarine warfare.

Unlimited submarine warfare. 1917 campaign

All preparations for the start of Unlimited Submarine Warfare have been made. In January 1917, the US government received a note from Berlin announcing that all ships of the Entente countries and neutral states encountered by the German Navy would be sunk. On January 9, the command of the German fleet received a telegram in which the start of a new submarine campaign was scheduled for February 1, 1917:

Admiral Scheer

The main area for operations against merchant ships was the western approaches to the British Isles, where most trade routes converged. In addition, German submarines cruised in the Mediterranean Sea, violated lines of communication with the mainland in the English Channel, and operated in the North Sea against ships of neutral states chartered by the Entente. These areas were patrolled by small submarines UB and UC, suitable for operating in local conditions.

During the first month of the submarine war, 87 ships were sunk, with a total tonnage of 540 thousand gross tons. Neutral merchant ships stopped sailing in the North Sea. The Germans lost 4 submarines. The following month, merchant fleet losses amounted to 147 ships with a tonnage of 574 thousand gross tons. The number of ship deaths off the western coast of England increased. In April, the result of the submarine war was expressed in 881 thousand brt, which the Entente countries missed, exceeding all expected calculations. Such high rates of ships sunk by German submarines are due to both the technical imperfection of the anti-submarine weapons that Germany’s opponents had at their disposal and the inadequacy of the measures they took to combat German submarines. The April losses greatly worried the British command. In fact, Germany has shown that it is the new master of the Atlantic.

Admiral Jellico

On average, out of every 100 ships leaving English ports, 25 were sunk by German submarines. The tonnage losses threatened the British navy's war supplies. Despite the commissioning of new ships and the chartering of ships from neutral states, the ships that London had at its disposal would soon be barely enough to transport food. According to calculations of losses from the actions of German submarines, by the end of 1917 the transportation of military cargo should have stopped due to a lack of tonnage. The difficulties encountered with supplies forced England to withdraw troops from Thessaloniki.

Admiral Jellico (Adm. Scheer’s opponent in the Battle of Jutland), who assumed the post of the First Marine Fleet in November 1916, faced a number of difficulties in organizing anti-submarine warfare with the beginning of Unlimited Submarine Warfare. The technical backwardness of a significant part of the destroyers did not allow them to be used on the open sea to search for enemy submarines.

Admiral Jellico, together with Rear Admiral Daff, head of the new anti-submarine department, formed special hunting squads to search for and neutralize German submarines. However, the lack of anti-submarine ships prevented the organization of large-scale activities in areas where German submarines were active. Attempts to limit their activities to the North Sea ended in failure. Protective structures in the Strait of Dover and mining of the Heligoland Bay could not prevent German crews from leaving their bases. Search raids by British destroyers, trying to keep German submarines at depth until their batteries ran out and they floated to the surface, were also ineffective (in 24 hours, submarines of the type U could travel 80 miles under water, escaping the attack of the British patrols).

German underwater minelayers actively laid deadly traps in the straits and on the approaches to ports. Thus, in 1917, the British discovered over 536 mine cans and cleared 3,989 mines; 170 ships were blown up by mines.

An attempt to replace lost ships with new ones could not give the desired result. At the end of 1917, German submarines sunk over 6 million tons of tonnage; taking into account the ships that entered service, the deficit was 2 million tons.

England, caught in a naval blockade, was on the verge of exhaustion. The situation changed fundamentally in April 1917 with the entry of the United States into the war. Counting on the support of his ally, the commander of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Jellico, obtained help in the form of merchant and warships. In June 1917, the Allies switched to the tactic of organizing convoys to escort merchant ships, and the number of shipping routes was reduced, allowing efforts to be concentrated on protecting ships. The ports for the formation of convoys heading to England were New York and the Hampton roadstead; the port of Sydney was designated for the collection of ships from American ports and Halifax for Canadian ships. Dakar was supposed to serve the trade routes of the South Atlantic, i.e. the ports of Africa and South America. Gibraltar was established as a gathering point for ships coming from the Mediterranean Sea. In August, ships bound for England from Gibraltar North America and the South Atlantic, began to form caravans under the protection of warships.

The United States deployed 34 anti-submarine ships across the Atlantic Ocean to the areas of greatest activity of German submarines (the English Channel, Irish waters). In Portsmouth, New Haven, Portland and Dartmouth in June 1917, detachments consisting of naval boats armed with hydrophones were formed, and air patrols were also created.

The new protective measures bore fruit, so in September-December 1917, only 6 ships were sunk at sea more than 50 miles from the coast, instead of 175 ships destroyed in the same way between April and August.

Number, composition and deployment of German submarines

During the First World War, the number of submarines increased significantly. If in 1914 Germany had only 28 ships of this class, then by the beginning of the Unlimited Submarine War in February 1917 there were already 111 boats in service, and five months later - 140.

The German submarine fleet was represented by ships three types - U, UB, U.C.. Large type boats U used for operations in the waters west of the coast of England. The duration of their stay at sea ranged from 21 to 28 days, they were also sent to remote theaters of combat (White, Mediterranean seas).

Small submarines type UB were used for operations in the North Sea, in the English Channel. The first samples of underwater vehicles had a displacement of 125 tons, the latest modifications had a tonnage of 500 tons. Boats of this type were armed with 4 torpedoes.

Submarines type U.C. were armed with both torpedoes and mines, and mainly carried out mine laying in areas of active shipping near the British Isles and in the North Sea. They had a displacement of 125 tons, subsequently increased to 400 tons by the end of the war. Submarines type U.C. carried 18 mines and 4 torpedoes.

Of the total number of active submarines (on average about 120 monthly), usually 1/3 was under repair, 1/3 on a cruise (and on vacation) and 1/3 in action, i.e. about 40 submarines. Typically, of these 40 submarines, 30 operated in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean between Ireland and Spain. Operating submarines were distributed among the following bases:

60 submarines were based in German ports (Wilhelmshaven and Ems);

35 to the Flemish bases (Bruges, Zeebrugge and Ostend);

25 to the Austrian bases (Pola and Cattaro).

Anti-submarine measures of the Entente countries

To combat German submarines, the Allies used various defensive measures. In the Strait of Dover, the narrowest part of the English Channel, a special network was installed to prevent German submarines from breaking through in the southern waters of England. This, however, did not prevent the crews of German submarines from regularly breaking through the protective structure under the cover of darkness. Thus, in March 1917, German submariners crossed the barrier over 40 times. Also, in order to combat German raids, areas of greatest submarine activity were mined, and over 140 thousand mines were installed in the North Sea alone. To counteract German submarines, over 5 thousand ships were brought in: destroyers, decoy ships, submarines, in addition, airships and balloons were used in patrols. Delivered by underwater minelayers U.C. mines were cleared by British minesweepers. Nevertheless, the defensive defenses of England and its allies until April 1917 were not effective enough.

The introduction of the convoy system made it possible to reduce the losses of the transport fleet. The commanders of German submarines made less and less attempts to attack ships moving under the protection of warships, preferring to look for single targets.

The first samples of the depth charge were tested as an effective anti-submarine weapon, showing the German crews that being under water was no longer safe for them.

Other anti-submarine measures consisted of equipping ships with smoke equipment to set up smoke screens, using tethered balloons on convoys, using zigzag courses (which made underwater hunting very difficult), and placing trawlers equipped with hydrophones at the head of convoys.

The effectiveness of the use of anti-submarine weapons
Year	Mines	Deep bombs	Torpedoes	Artillery	Ram	Trap vessels	Air strength	Networks	Trawls	Unfortunate. cases	Surrender	Unknown causes	Total
1914	3	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
1915	3	-	3	2	5	3	-	-	1	1	-	1	19
1916	6	2	2	3	-	2	-	2	2	1	1	1	22
1917	14	12	8	5	3	5	6	3	1	2	-	4	63
1918	18	24	6	6	5	2	-	1	1	1	-	5	69
Total	44	38	19	16	15	12	6	6	5	5	1	11	178

End of the first Battle of the Atlantic

Until December 1917, the amount of lost Allied tonnage remained at 600 thousand gross tons. At the same time, the convoy system and the laying of mines in the Strait of Dover and the Heligoland Bight lead to a decrease in the activity of the submarine forces of the German Navy. It becomes clear that the initiative at sea has passed into the hands of the Entente, despite the increasing number of German submarine hunters.

During the period January-August 1918, Germany lost 50 submarines, the number of losses exceeded the number of ships entering service. In August, Admiral Scheer became commander of the High Seas Fleet and tried to rectify the situation. However, opportunities for active submarine warfare were missed. In September 1918, the ships stationed in Flanders were evacuated. Thus, strategically important bases were lost that made it possible to operate in close proximity to the enemy.

The outbreak of revolutionary actions in the navy put an end to the continuation of the struggle. The last ship destroyed by a German submarine was an English battleship Britannia, torpedoed by the crew of UB-50 on November 9, 1918.

Losses of the merchant fleet in 1915, 1917-1918.

The First Battle of the Atlantic was an example of the effective use of submarines against military and civilian ships. The actions of submarines on enemy lines of communication became a factor capable of changing the balance of power in the war, which subsequently influenced the development of ships of this class.

Naval campaign of 1917 and 1918 turned out to be quite effective for the German submarine fleet. Most of the lost ships fell to the British Empire, which lost over 5 million gross tons. or 69% of the destroyed tonnage. In total, during the First World War, the losses of the transport fleet of the Entente countries and neutral states amounted to more than 11 million gross tons. Against the background of the losses of the German submarine fleet, the chosen strategy of combat operations at sea turns out to be very successful. A total of 372 submarines participated in the German fleet in the war. Of these, 178 died: 62 types U, 64 types UB and 52 types U.C.. At the time of the armistice, Berlin had 169 submarine hunters, with another 438 at various stages of construction. During the war years, Germany's submarine forces made a leap in their development, increasing 7 times compared to the pre-war composition of the German fleet.

Legal protection of shipping from attacks by submarines

During the First World War, submarines proved to be effective weapons for disrupting maritime supply lines. Attempts by individual powers to ban the construction of ships of this class in the post-war period were unsuccessful. However, measures were taken to introduce restrictions on the actions of submarine crews in relation to transport ships in wartime.

As an annex to the London Protocol of 1936, the Rules for the Operation of Submarines in Relation to Merchant Ships in Wartime were formulated. They provided for compliance by submarine teams international law on a par with surface ships. Submarines were required to conduct military operations according to the principle of prize law. When meeting with a merchant ship, the crew of the boat had to give the ship the order to stop; if it continued moving, the submarine had the right to attack the intruder. The stopped ship had to be inspected for carrying prohibited cargo. If carrying contraband or military cargo, the merchant ship could be sunk. However, there was a requirement to ensure the safety of the crew by taking them on board the boat and/or transporting them to land to a safe place.

A year later, in connection with the Spanish Civil War, the Nyon Agreements of 1937 qualified the destruction of a merchant ship by a submarine of any of the warring parties as an act of aggression, and measures had to be taken to search for and destroy the submarine. An attack by a warship on a merchant ship in peacetime was considered an act of piracy. Regulatory regulation also affected weapons used in underwater warfare. The Hague Convention on the Laying of Underwater Mines that Explode Automatically on Contact of 1907 prohibited the use of mines without anchors and the laying of minefields in areas of commercial shipping.

Second Battle of the Atlantic

The results of the First World War showed leading states the vulnerability of communication lines in wartime. At the same time, submarines, as a formidable weapon against surface ships, provided them with a worthy place in the navies of various countries even after the end of the first general war.

The fact that Germany managed to retain submarine design engineers, and Germany in 1935 was allowed to build modern ships, incl. and submarines, played a significant role in the restoration of the submarine fleet. Britain did not rely on the use of submarine forces in its naval doctrine, so the number of ships of this type in the Navy of the British Empire was small, amounting to 57 in 1939 (France - 78). Despite the limitation of having 45% of submarines (with the possibility of increasing to 100%) of England's already small number of submarines, Germany made efforts to restore the submarine fleet. In 1935, Berlin formed the 1st submarine flotilla, called “Weddigen” in honor of Lieutenant Commander Otto Weddigen, who sank three British cruisers at the beginning of the First World War, which was quickly replenished with new ships.

Erich Topp, submarine ace who sank 28 transport ships on the submarine U-552

Despite the successful use of submarines to attrition the enemy in World War I, Germany continued to rely on its surface fleet, which was reflected in the shipbuilding program of 1939, which included the construction of 233 boats by 1948.

Berlin's plans changed with the outbreak of World War II, and the pace of submarine construction accelerated. In the ensuing war at sea, Germany was able to field only 56 ships of this class, despite the fact that there was a need for 300 submarines.

From the first days of the war, German submarines came into conflict with British surface ships. International treaties limited the actions of German submariners, who were ordered to conduct fighting according to the principle of prize law. However, civilian casualties could not always be avoided. So, on one of the first days of the war - September 4, 1939, a passenger steamer was mistakenly sunk by the German submarine U-30 Athenia, which was mistaken for an auxiliary cruiser.

As a result of actions against merchant shipping by German submarines, from September 3, 1939 to February 28, 1940, 199 ships with a total displacement of 701,985 gross tons were sunk. British anti-submarine measures resulted in the loss of 14 submarines with a total tonnage of 9,500 tons. At the same time, the German crews had to face a number of technical problems that affected the effectiveness of the “hunt” - the impact fuses of the torpedoes turned out to be extremely unreliable, and often did not explode when hitting the ship’s hull. After a thorough investigation, the problems were resolved and the number of failures decreased. The German command used small 250-ton submarines to lay mines in the straits and areas of the most active movement of enemy ships. During the entire period of World War II, 115 ships with a total tonnage of 394,533 gross tons were lost in minefields.

After the capture of Norway by Nazi troops in June 1940, the German Navy Headquarters was able to focus on organizing combat operations in the Atlantic. Submarines, concentrated in the North Sea to counter British ships, returned to the shores of Britain. France is already in the hands German troops, which meant unhindered access to the ocean. England lost the opportunity to prevent submarine attacks in the waters west of the British Isles, the Gibraltar area and the Mediterranean Sea. Boats needed less time to move from bases to the combat area. This increased the number of ships simultaneously operating against England.

Germany's submarine forces used tactics throughout World War II wolf pack. It implied the use of groups of submarines to attack enemy ships. Since the Allies, from the beginning of hostilities, adhered to the practice of convoying transport ships, the actions of groups of submarines gave the best results. Between May and October 1940, German submarines sank 287 ships with a total tonnage of 1,450,878 GRT. This success is explained by the use of “wolf pack” tactics against convoys.

The 1941 naval campaign was less successful. There was a dispersion of Germany's submarine forces (sending ships to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas), which affected the overall effectiveness of the fleet's actions against Britain. The dispatch of a significant number of ships to the Mediterranean to support Italy and disrupt the transport of Middle Eastern oil eased the pressure on British positions in the Atlantic.

With the entry of the United States into the war, Germany's position at sea seriously deteriorated. She found herself at war with two of the most powerful naval powers. On February 1, 1941, the United States created the Atlantic Fleet, which led Admiral King. The American “safety zone” extended in the Atlantic east to 26 degrees west longitude. 4/5 of the Atlantic Ocean was under the supervision of the American fleet, whose main goal was to detect and, together with the British, destroy all German ships.

Despite the difficult working conditions for submarine crews in the Atlantic in 1942 (unusually strong storms raged), good results were achieved. From June to November, the Allies lost an average of about 500 thousand brt every month, with losses reaching their peak in November, when 700,000 brt were sunk.

Wolf Pack Tactics

Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz

The key factor that ensured that Great Britain and its allies in the First World War protected transport ships from the actions of German submarines was the convoy system, which made attacks by single submarines ineffective. The British naval command, relying on already tested protective measures, believed that German submarines would not be effective in a modern war, and the situation in 1915, 1917-1918. will not be repeated. However, a World War I submarine veteran Karl Dönitz, appointed commander of the German submarine fleet in 1939, was able to draw conclusions from previous defeats. The submarine tactics he developed were called the “wolf pack.” It involved the actions of groups of submarines to search and destroy convoys.

After a submarine or observation aircraft detected an enemy convoy, several submarines concentrated on its path. They were instructed to attack enemy ships at night. The attack was carried out from several directions on the surface. Submarines went into an underwater position after firing torpedoes and to break through anti-submarine formations or evade pursuit. The pursuit of the convoy was accompanied by repetition of attacks to inflict the greatest damage on the enemy. This tactic proved quite effective against the Allies in the early years of the war.

The correctness of the chosen tactics of group actions of boats is confirmed by a comparison: from October 10 to November 30, 1940, the crews of Italian submarines, using outdated tactics of single submarines, sank only one ship with a displacement of 4,866 GRT during 243 days spent in positions in the combat area . One submarine accounted for 20 tons per day. During the same time and in the same area, German submariners spent 378 days at sea and sank 80 ships with a total displacement of 435,189 GRT. For each German submarine there were 1,115 tons per day.

Allied anti-submarine measures and increasing losses of German submarines

The system of organizing convoys, despite the effectiveness of the actions of the German "wolf packs", underwent only minor changes. Great importance American escort aircraft carriers were responsible for ensuring the safety of maritime transportation in the Atlantic Ocean, whose air groups became an indispensable means of anti-submarine warfare. Deck-based torpedo bombers Grumman TBF Avenger, having a long range and the ability to carry four 350-pound depth charges in the bomb bay, have proven to be effective anti-submarine aircraft, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific.

The increase in losses of German submarines during the transition to the area of operations in the second half of 1942 was a consequence of the use of radars for direction finding of boats. Back in 1933, the British fleet received at its disposal radar system ASDIC, recording high-frequency ultrasounds created by the noise of submarine propellers. Subsequently, improved devices began to be installed on patrol aircraft. They did a poor job of detecting submarines at depth, however, since most of the time (on passages and in night attacks) German boats were on the surface, radars became a real scourge of submariners. Hunting opportunities were also narrowed by the introduction of these devices on security ships.

The Hedgehog rocket launcher, one of the Allies' most dangerous anti-submarine weapons

Depth charges were improved by using a more powerful explosive charge. A rocket launcher entered service with British ships. Hedgehog, throwing out 16 small depth charges. Despite the effectiveness of the new anti-submarine weapons, losses among transport ships remained quite significant. December 1942 – February 1943 marked by a loss of a total of 900 thousand gross tons.

The largest submarine battle of World War II was the attack on convoy HX-229, which took place on March 15-19, 1943. The attack involved 40 submarines against 50 transport and military vessels. The Allies lost 21 ships with a total tonnage of 141,000 gross tons, and German losses amounted to 1 submarine.

At the same time, it became obvious that the joint actions of the Anglo-American fleet in the Atlantic, the coordinated actions of transport, military ships and aviation, were nullifying the actions of German submariners. In May, the Germans lost 38 submarines, which was a third of the number of submarines operating in the Atlantic (118). The ratio of sunk ships/dead submarines was rapidly deteriorating, not in Germany's favor. So, if at the beginning of 1942 there were 210 thousand gross tons per submarine, then a year later it was already 5.5 thousand gross tons. The trend continued - in May 20 ships were sunk and 21 boats were lost, in July the Allies lost 45 ships, with 33 German submarines destroyed.

In 1944 the number of German submarines operating off the coast of England decreased by 3 times compared to 1942 - from 30 to 40 German submarines were operating here at the same time. In September-December 1944, the Allies lost 14 ships in coastal waters and 2 in the Atlantic from submarine attacks. At the same time, during these four months, 12,168 merchant ships crossed the ocean in both directions. German losses exceeded the number of ships sunk and amounted to 37 submarines. Dönitz realized that the initiative at sea had been lost.

However, the deplorable state of dying Germany did not allow the development of a new phase of the submarine war.

The February patrol off the Shetland and Faroe Islands claimed the lives of the crews of 21 submarines. In March, as a result of massive raids by the Anglo-American air forces on German ports, 32 submarines were destroyed. The April result of air patrols of the North Sea led to the death of 51 boats. The damage caused by the boats could not be compared with their own losses. During 1945, they managed to sink only 38 merchant ships (156,199 GRT) and 8 small warships.

The defeat of Germany put an end to the six-year-long Battle of the Atlantic. As British and German military leaders point out in their memoirs, Germany’s mistake was that it joined the fight for the Atlantic too late, and, moreover, scattered its forces on the construction of surface ships. Churchill wondered why the Germans, having the experience of the First World War behind them, were unable to recognize the potential of submarines and did not build hundreds of them from the very beginning? The use of the doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare became Germany's only truly effective weapon at sea against obviously stronger powers - England and the USA. The successful operations of German submarines in World War II in all theaters of combat led to the loss of 27,570 ships with a total tonnage of 14,518,430 GRT. (93% of the tonnage was destroyed in the Atlantic, Indian Oceans and North Sea). The submariners themselves lost 768 ships.

Total tonnage losses of allied and neutral countries in 1939–1945 (brt.)
Reasons for losses	Submarines	Aviation	Surface ships	Mines	Other reasons	Navigation accidents	Total
Period	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage	number of vessels/tonnage
1939	103 / 420445	10 / 2949	15 / 61337	84 / 257430	4 / 3551	107 / 188716	323 / 934428
1940	435 / 2103046	174 / 557020	95 / 518347	199 / 510219	79 / 188762	363 / 672286	1345 / 4549680
1941	422 / 2132943	320 / 967366	102 / 492945	107 / 229757	163 / 318904	305 / 551510	1419 / 4693425
1942	1149 / 6248687	148 / 697825	85 / 400394	45 / 103188	137 / 232331	302 / 620266	1866 / 8302691
1943	459 / 2585005	74 / 419393	11 / 47903	36 / 119991	8 / 37623	257 / 508390	845 / 3718305
1944	129 / 765304	19 / 120656	13 / 26935	23 / 95383	9 / 28571	233 / 400689	426 / 1437593
1945	54 / 263000	5 / 37000	5 / 10200	19 / 79000	5 / 8000	-	88 / 397200
Total	2751 / 14518430	750 / 2802209	326 / 1558111	513 / 1394973	405 / 817742	1567 / 2941857	6312 / 24033322

Unlimited submarine warfare in the Pacific

Having a fairly balanced fleet, the United States declared unlimited submarine warfare on the very first day of the war with Japan. On December 7, 1941, the crews of 51 submarines in the Pacific Ocean received orders to consider all Japanese cargo and fishing ships as military targets. All restrictions imposed by international law were lifted

The total displacement of the Japanese transport fleet at the beginning of the war was 6.1 million gross tons, half of the total tonnage of American ships. Japan's island position and numerous possessions in mainland China made the Land of the Rising Sun potentially vulnerable to attacks on its supply lines. The length of individual sea routes reached 3-4 thousand miles.

The dispersion of the Japanese Navy over a long sea area prevented the effective protection of communication lines. The destroyers and torpedo boats that were part of the Japanese Navy were mainly used to guard large warships. To protect transport routes, destroyers and patrol ships with weak anti-submarine weapons, unoccupied in other operations, were used. In 1943, transport ships were protected by only 50 escort ships. Often, fishing schooners that did not have sonar weapons were attached to escort transport ships.

The Japanese leadership did little to make up for the losses incurred by building new ships. In 1941 At the shipyards, transport ships with a total displacement of 200,000 GRT were built; in 1942, this figure increased to 262,000 GRT. Only in recent years has there come an understanding of the damage that was caused by the actions of American submarines. In 1944, ships with a total tonnage of 880,000 gross tons left the stocks, but even this figure was only half of the lost transport capacity for the year.

The tonnage of ships that Japan had at its disposal was rapidly falling every year. At the end of 1943, there were 5 million brt available, a year later - 2.8 million brt, by the end of the war - about 1.8 million brt.

As a result of the extremely successful actions of the submarine fleet for the United States, it was possible to deprive Japan of much-needed raw materials for the operation of industrial enterprises.

The reasons that led to the high losses of the Japanese transport fleet were: the poor quality of Japanese locators, their poor implementation in the navy and aviation; the unjustified delay in introducing a system for convoying transport ships and the lack of the required number of escort ships at the beginning of the war. Japan's main problems were the lack of understanding of the vulnerability of its island position and the threat posed by the actions of submarine forces on sea lines of communication.

Japan, for its part, also tried to fight on the supply routes for the US Navy. Submarine forces were initially considered secondary by the Japanese leadership; they were given a place in the surface fleet. The combat record of Japanese submarines was opened on December 8, 1941, when the I-26 boat fired from a gun and sank a military transport with a displacement of 3 thousand tons. However, the overall results of the Japanese in the Pacific were more modest than their German counterparts.

During five months of underwater hunting (November 1942 - March 1943) in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Japanese sank 50 merchant ships of Western allies and neutral countries with a total displacement of 272,408 GRT, of which 42 were in the Indian Ocean. From March 1943 to November, another 22 ships were destroyed. At the same time, the increase in losses from the actions of enemy destroyers and aircraft led to the curtailment of operations on enemy lines of communications at the beginning of 1944.

October-December 1944 was marked by the destruction of only 1 transport ship by the Japanese, while the Japanese themselves suffered losses of 27 submarines in June-December. The reason for this was the predominantly single actions of Japanese submarines, a small number of submarines, as well as the well-established anti-submarine defense of the American Navy, which prevented the hunting of enemy boats in the Pacific Ocean. In fact, the success of the Japanese submarine force was disproportionately less than that of the United States.

Assessing the results of Unlimited Submarine Warfare

The doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare was born largely due to the desperate situation of Germany, its inability to challenge the supremacy at sea of the leading naval powers - the British Empire and the United States - by conventional methods. The auxiliary nature of the submarine forces as part of the Kaiser’s and then Hitler’s Germany is confirmed by the fact that naval commanders did not give up attempts to build a powerful surface fleet, thereby scattering raw materials, human, financial, and time resources on battleships and cruisers that performed much worse at the end of the war , whose results of military campaigns could not be compared in terms of the number of enemy ships sunk with the results of submarine crews (in fairness, it is worth noting that the awareness of the need to speed up the creation of a powerful submarine fleet made it possible to increase the pace of submarine construction). Thus, following the results of the Second World War, the merchant fleet of the Allies and neutral countries suffered 9 times more losses from the actions of German, and to a lesser extent Italian and Japanese submarines, than as a result of attacks by surface ships. Despite the losses among submarines, the new class of warships, thanks to their stealth, was a weapon that even the mighty British fleet had to reckon with.

Despite the decline in the effectiveness of submarine operations towards the end of both wars, the use of the doctrine of Unlimited Submarine Warfare brought impressive results. The tonnage of sunk transport ships of the British Empire in the First World War was equal to the total displacement of its merchant fleet in the pre-war period. As a result of the Second World War, the Axis countries destroyed about 4,770 ships of the Allies and neutral countries with a total tonnage of more than 24 million gross register tons. Approximately 2,770 ships were sunk by submarines (total displacement - 14.5 million gross tons). Despite the fact that during World War II the German Navy had 1,143 submarines with a total displacement of 979,169 tons, the ratio of destroyed transport ships/dead submarines was 14:1. An indicator that Germany would hardly have been able to achieve if it had relied on surface ships. Japan, in turn, lost about 5 million gross tons as a result of the actions of American submarines.

The development of attack-defense confrontation in connection with the emergence of such a serious threat to the lines of sea communications as underwater hunters was accompanied by the constant improvement of offensive weapons and anti-submarine weapons. Thus, locators that emerged during the First World War became effective means detection of a hidden enemy, without which it is impossible to imagine modern Navy. The massive distribution of hydro- and radars in the navy and aviation made it possible to protect convoys from unexpected attacks and organize sea patrols in order to clear a given area from enemy boats. Depth charges were improved, and interaction between the fleet and aviation was established. Attack systems (mines, torpedoes) were also improved, and the appearance of the snorkel made it possible to increase the submarine’s stay under water.

It is noteworthy how the weapons of submarine cruisers changed. If in the first months of 1915, when the use of submarines against merchant ships began to be practiced, about 55% of ships sunk were lost as a result of submarine artillery, and torpedoes accounted for approximately 17% of losses (the rest of the ships were lost as a result of mines), then by 1917 about 80% of successful submarine attacks were torpedoes. This ratio remained the same in the future.

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