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Ancient Rus'.

V. L. Egorov

Foreign policy activities Alexander Nevsky, which fell during one of the most difficult periods in history for the Old Russian state, has repeatedly attracted the attention of researchers. The decisiveness and originality of the Grand Duke’s actions in relations with Europe and Asia earned him fame as a thoughtful politician and far-sighted strategist. However, not all of Alexander Yaroslavich’s foreign policy initiatives received unanimously positive assessments in historiography. His firm line on protecting Russian borders from Swedish and German aggression does not cause any disagreement. The prince's victories on the western borders were enthusiastically perceived by his contemporaries and in the same way found and still find a positive assessment among Russian historians all periods.

The view of Alexander Yaroslavich’s relationship with the Mongol conquerors is not so unanimous in science. The opinions expressed on this issue are sometimes diametrically opposed. A number of researchers believe that the prince was forced to reconcile and submit to the prevailing unfavorable circumstances. Others emphasize that Alexander consciously and purposefully entered into an alliance with the Golden Horde and used it for his own purposes. In developing this point of view, L.N. Gumilev went the furthest, proving the existence of a direct political and military alliance between Russia and the Golden Horde.

Alexander Nevsky's relations with the Golden Horde cannot be limited only to the personality of the Grand Duke. They most directly relate to the development of the foreign policy line of the princely power in the new conditions for the Russian state that arose after the Mongol conquest. Clarification of the essence of Alexander Nevsky's relations with the Horde allows us to answer again raised in Lately question: “Was there a Mongol yoke in Rus'?” The forced trip to Central Asia alone, which forced the prince to abandon state affairs for more than two years, is the most convincing evidence of not just political, but purely feudal multifaceted dependence of the Mongols, which permeated the entire structure of Russian statehood.

The Golden Horde as a state arose at the very end of 1242 and already at the beginning of the next year - 1243 - Khan Batu, with his characteristic energy, began to formalize relations with the Russian princes. Yaroslav Vsevolodovich as Grand Duke Vladimirsky was forced to come to the Khan’s headquarters but was called precisely in 1243,2 in order to go through enough humiliating procedure receiving a label confirming his title. As for his son, he could, purely formally, not go to bow to the khan, since he did not occupy the Vladimir table. One can name another reason for the non-appearance of the Novgorod prince at the khan's headquarters. The Mongol troops, in the process of conquering Rus', were never able to reach Novgorod the Great, as a result of which its inhabitants considered themselves unconquered. The power of the Mongols here was exercised indirectly through the Grand Duke of Vladimir and directly by the Novgorodians long time did not collide with the khan's officials. Therefore, Alexander’s openly independent behavior in the eyes of the Mongols was clearly demonstrative. This looked especially contrasting against the backdrop of the trips to the Horde of numerous Russian princes, who tried to extract maximum benefit from them for themselves.

Alexander Yaroslavich managed to refrain from traveling to the Horde for more than four years (1243-1247); This was a period of emphasized, albeit silent, rejection of the khan’s power, all the hardships of relations with which were false; fell on the shoulders of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. Without appearing in the Horde personally, it was during this period that Alexander showed himself to be the defender of Russian prisoners, “sending to the Tsar in the Horde for his people, like his tribe, from the godless Tatars. And he gave a lot of gold and silver to their captives, redeeming them from the godless Tatars, delivering them from troubles and misfortunes.” This chronicle message records one of the most important aspects of Alexander’s activities in the Horde, which he was engaged in for a long time; marriage all my life.

Alexander’s father, Grand Duke of Vladimir Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, quite successfully began to lay the foundation of the political relationship between Rus' and the Golden Horde. His first trip to Khan Batu in 1243 can be considered not just successful, but a serious diplomatic success with an encouraging prospect. This follows from the chronicle’s message that the Golden Horde Khan “almost Yaroslav with great honor and let him go.”4 At the same time, Yaroslav’s son Konstantin left for Mongolia, returning to his father also “with honor” in 1245

However, Constantine's trip was regarded by the imperial government as clearly not corresponding to the level of such a responsible mission. Most likely, Konstantin brought his father a strict order to arrive in Mongolia in person. This assumption is confirmed by the chronicle report that Yaroslav immediately after the arrival of Constantine went to Batu, and from there to Mongolia. Subsequent events took on a pronounced dramatic character, and the sources do not reveal the reasons for such a sharp turn.

In Mongolia, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich was poisoned by the widow of Kaan Ogedei Turashnaya, who was the regent of the throne. How the prince could have displeased her, one can only speculate with to varying degrees reliability. The chronicle reports that he died “on the way from Kanovich in the month of September in memory of St. Gregory,”6 i.e., on September 30, 1246. Plano Carpini became a witness to the sad event, giving details of the death of the Grand Duke seven days after the treat in the Kaan yurt .7 An eyewitness clarifies the Russian chronicle, saying that Kiyaz died not “coming from Kanovich,” but in the yurt assigned to him seven days after the feast, and his body “surprisingly turned blue.”8

Immediately after the death of Yaroslav, the widow of Ogedei - the mother of the new kaan Guyuk - sent a messenger to Alexander Yaroslavich with an order to come to Mongolia to receive his father's possessions.9 This invitation, or rather the order to arrive in Mongolia, shows that the regent had no doubt that who will inherit the power of the poisoned Prince of Vladimir. It is possible that the son faced the same fate upon arrival in Karakorum as his father. Special couriers of the imperial mail covered the distance from Karakorum to Vladimir in about two months, and thus the message was delivered to Alexander at the very end of 1246.

Plano Carpini reports that in response to the order, the prince expressed open disobedience and refused to go to Kaan’s headquarters.10 He remained in Novgorod, waiting for the arrival of his father, which could not have happened earlier than April 1247.11 It was under this year that the Laurentian Chronicle reports about the funeral of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, held in Vladimir, to which Alexander also arrived from Novgorod.12 In the Sofia First Chronicle, this episode is supplemented with an interesting and important detail that reveals the character of Alexander himself and his attitude to the frank and cynical, although slightly disguised, murder of his father. He appeared in Vladimir not just with the retinue befitting a prince at a funeral ceremony, but “in the power of a lawyer. And his arrival would be threatening.”18 The further description of this event in the chronicle takes on epic and even hyperbolic shades, echoing the well-known story about how Polovtsian women frightened their children with the name of the Kiev prince Vladimir. The appearance of Alexander in Vladimir at the head of a significant military detachment was clearly of a demonstrative nature in front of the Mongols. Emphasizing the specific direction of this step and as if explaining it, the chronicler adds that news of it reached “the mouth of the Volga.”14

Where Alexander’s squad went next and how long they stayed in Vladimir, the chronicle is silent. Most likely, the foreigner dismissed his army to their homes, and he himself headed to the Horde. But before that, he took part in the elections of the new Grand Duke of Vladimir, who became the brother of the poisoned Yaroslav, Svyatoslav. The chronicle emphasizes the legitimate succession of the supreme power that passed to him by the fact that he “sat in Volodymyr on his father’s table.”15 His nephews (Yaroslav’s children) did not challenge the prerogatives of seniority and order of succession to the power of their uncles, but dispersed to the cities that “their father ordered ".18

However, in the procedure for becoming a prince on the Vladimir table of Svyatoslav, one subtlety was not observed, which left a potential rival with the formal right to challenge power. It consisted in the fact that after his election, Svyatoslav, for some reason, did not go to the Horde to receive the obligatory label confirming such a high title. At least the chronicle does not report anything about such a trip, although it says that immediately after the election of Svyatoslav, Princes Andrei left Vladimir for Bath, followed by Alexander.17

As a result, Svyatoslav’s slowness or neglect of established protocol was taken advantage of by his brother Mikhail, nicknamed Horobrit, and dethroned the legally elected prince, who ruled for only about a year. True, the usurper himself died in the winter of 1248 in the war with Lithuania.19 All these events were directly related to the further fate of the Vladimir table, which was decided in the summer of 1249 in Karakorum.

After the election of Svyatoslav to the Vladimir table, Alexander Yaroslavich apparently still continued to decide for himself the question of a trip to the Mongols. He had a strict order to arrive in Karakorum and repeated invitations from Khan Batu, who roamed the Caspian steppes. And only after his younger brother Andrei left for the Golden Horde, Alexander followed him, heading to Batu’s headquarters. Alexander's departure from Vladimir most likely took place in May-June 1247 (after the funeral of his father and the election of the new Grand Duke of Vladimir). Thus, the first meeting of two rulers worthy in both military and political art could have taken place in July-August 1247 somewhere on the Lower Volga.

d The impression made by the 36-year-old Russian knight on the already elderly and experienced Golden Horde khan was expressed by the chronicler with the words: “Truly she told me that nothing is like this prince. And the king honor him with many gifts and release him with great honor to Rus'.”20 In this phrase from the First Sofia Chronicle, the author concluded an impressive picture of the meeting of two statesmen with the noble gesture of one and the safe departure of the other home. However, the Laurentian Chronicle gives a less emotional description of the meeting and its ending does not look so joyful. Batu undoubtedly knew and remembered not only about Alexander’s summons to Karakorum, but also that the Russian prince did not fulfill this order. In this situation, the khan could only send Alexander to Mongolia, which he did.21 It is impossible to determine exactly when both brothers set out on a long journey, but an analysis of the situation in the Mongol Empire allows us to make some assumptions on this issue.-

Ogedei's son Guyuk was declared kaan in August 1246,2 and his mother Turakina-khatun (guilty of the death of Alexander's father) was herself poisoned 2-3 months after her son's accession to the imperial throne.23 The death of kaanshi, it would seem, allowed Alexander without any particular fears to go to Mongolia. However, the new kaan Guyuk entered into a sharp confrontation with the Khan of the Golden Horde Batu, which brought the two Genghisid cousins to the brink of war. Guyuk, at the head of a significant army, headed against Batu, but in the summer of 1248 he died suddenly in the vicinity Samarkand.24 After his death, Ogul-Kaymish, who secretly helped Batu against Guyuk, became regent.25 And in 1251, her son Munke (Mengu), who had the most friendly relations with Batu, became kaan.

Thus, the analyzed situation allows us to put forward a well-founded assumption that during the tough confrontation between the metropolis and the Golden Horde, Alexander could not travel to Karakorum. Most likely, he and his brother went there after receiving news of Guyuk’s death on the banks of the Volga, i.e. at the end of summer or autumn of 1248.

As a result, the general chronology of Alexander’s first trip to the Horde appears as follows. Departure from Vladimir - at the beginning of the summer of 1247, stay in the possessions of Batu - until the autumn of 1248; departure to Karakorum - in the fall of 1248. At the end of December 1249, Alexander was already present at the funeral of Prince Vladimir Konstantinovich in Vladimir.26 Both princes stayed in Mongolia for several months, which was usual for trips to the Horde.

The consequences of the trip for Alexander and Andrey were not only extremely successful, but also largely unexpected. The princes arrived in Karakorum, having quite serious, firm and benevolent support from the khan of the Golden Horde. There is no doubt that it was the result not only of the personal impression made by Alexander on Batu, but was also reinforced by appropriate gifts and the provision of honors to the khan accepted at his court. Russian sources are modestly silent about this, just as they are silent about the impression Batu made on Alexander. This is understandable, since it was difficult for the Orthodox chronicler to praise the “filthy raw food eater,” and the situation did not allow him to speak out sharply or even simply objectively. It should also be taken into account that the princes were received by the regent of the imperial throne, who was favorably disposed towards Khan Batu.

The confluence of so many favorable circumstances for both princes led to a somewhat unexpected outcome of this trip. Perhaps, in the entire history of Russian-Horde relations throughout the XIII-XIV centuries. there was no more impressive, successful and desirable result, which was achieved by two princes at once with minimal material costs and political concessions. Alexander Yaroslavich received in Karakorum a label for the great reign of Kiev and possession of all Russian land. His younger brother Andrei also received a label, but only for the great reign of Vladimir, that is, for possession of the territory of Zalesoka or North-Eastern Russia.27

The future showed that in this division of spheres of power, fair from the point of view of Mongolian dynastic inheritance law, a time bomb was laid across the entire territory of the Old Russian state. Purely formally, the distribution of power between the princes can be considered fair. The eldest is more authoritative and famous, - received supreme power on a national scale. The younger one - inherited the Vladimir domain of his father, which constituted only part of the lands of the vast Old Russian state. However, the political reality established in Russia after the Mongol invasion of 1237-40 did not correspond far from the purely speculative ideas of the Central Asian rulers.

After the return of princes Alexander and Andrei from Mongolia, the struggle around the Vladimir table, it would seem, should have stopped, since the contender for it was officially approved in Karakorum. In fact, it has only just entered a new stage. Prince Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, overthrown by Mikhail Khorobrit, could also dispute the rights to the reign of Vladimir. After the death of the latter in the winter of 1248, during the entire period while Alexander and Andrei were in the Horde (that is, until the end of 1249), their uncle Svyatoslav remained the only real executor of grand-ducal functions. Andrei, who arrived in Vladimir, had a label on the Vladimir table with the seal of the khan. However, Svyatoslav, considering himself the heir to his father’s possessions chosen by the congress of princes, went in the fall of 1250 with his son to the Horde to restore his trampled rights.28 Naturally, Batu Khan could not support his claims, since the label for the Vladimir reign already really existed.

As for Alexander Yaroslavich, upon returning from Mongolia, he proceeded to Novgorod through Vladimir. Following this, as V.N. Tatishchev reports, he made an attempt to visit Kyiv to confirm his ownership rights received in Mongolia. However, the Novgorodians opposed such a trip, as explained by V.N. Tatishchev, “for the sake of the Tatars,”29 that is, fearing the loss of a reliable defender from the claims of the Horde. The following year (1251), Alexander became seriously ill and did not leave Novgorod.30 In subsequent reports from sources there is no information that he once again tried to establish himself in Kyiv. The reason for this, first of all, was that Kyiv was in deep decline after the Mongol invasion, having completely lost its former political, economic and cultural significance. The city itself lay in ruins and barely numbered two hundred houses.81 For some time there was still the residence of the all-Russian metropolitan here, however, in 1300, “unable to tolerate Tatar violence,” he moved to Vladimir.81 In addition, communication with Kiev and all Galician -Volyn principalities were actually cut off by the expansion of Lithuania developing to the east and periodic campaigns of the Golden Horde troops through these territories in the western and northern directions.83 As a result, the Dnieper and Carpathian lands throughout the 13th century. politically they are increasingly moving away from North-Eastern Rus', which played a significant role in the future isolation of Ukraine. A radical change in the position of Alexander Yaroslavich himself, his activities and relations with the Golden Horde occurred in 1252. Chronicle articles do not allow us to find out in detail all the reasons for such an unexpected and sharp turn in the princely position, since they cover this far from ordinary event very sparingly. Some of its details are revealed only in the work of V.N. Tatishchev, who may have had at his disposal sources with more extensive texts.34 The two years that passed after the return of Alexander Yaroslavich from Mongolia allowed him to realize with complete clarity that the label he received for the title of great The prince of Kiev is essentially honorary and does not give any real power in the current political situation. The ambition of the elder by birth, bypassed by his younger brother, could also play a certain role. If Alexander could perceive in full accordance with the right of inheritance the presence of his uncle Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich on the Vladimir table, 35 then the appointment of Prince Andrei to this place clearly contradicted the established principle of the transfer of paternal ownership. Of course, it is difficult to judge the personal relationships between the brothers, but the fact that they were very difficult is indisputable."6

Finally, one cannot discount the fact that Alexander Yaroslavich’s trip to the Golden Horde and then to Mongolia (about 7,000 km one way) left a deep imprint on his opinion about the strength and power of the Mongol Empire, which conquered such spaces with a large population. The prince returned from such a long journey not just as a wiser and more experienced man, but also as a tougher ruler, who had drawn up a strategic line of relations with the Mongols for the years to come. The return from Mongolia became a milestone in the activities of the warrior prince; now the primary place in his policy is not war, but diplomacy. And with her help, Alexander Yaroslavich managed to achieve even more than he did with his spear and sword.

The two-year co-government or rivalry between the brothers led in 1252 to a sharp quarrel between them. The prince, active and very tough in character (of which there are expressive examples in the chronicles), could not and did not put up with the fact that his younger brother found himself at the helm of the domestic and foreign policy of North-Eastern Rus'. Most likely, the specific reason for the clash between the brothers was the clarification of subordination in the hierarchy of power. Alexander, who held the title of Grand Duke of Kyiv, undoubtedly laid claim to supreme power in all Russian lands, with which Andrei could not agree, for at least two reasons. The Grand Duchy of Vladimir became virtually autonomous even before the Mongol invasion and, secondly, its establishment was sanctioned by the highest imperial authority in Karakorum.

It is characteristic that in the current confrontation, Alexander did not resort to the usual practice of internecine war, although he had quite powerful military forces. Most likely, he was counting on a purely administrative decision to remove Prince Andrei from the Vladimir table. Andrei, in such a situation, could well have disobeyed the Sarai Khan, for he had a label signed by the head of the entire Mongol empire.

Alexander Yaroslavich went to Sarai in the winter or early spring of 1252 with a complaint against his brother, which contained three main points: 1) Andrei unfairly received the great reign as the youngest; 2) Andrei took his father’s cities, which by right should belong to his elder brother; 3) Andrei does not fully pay the khan “exits and tamgas.”87 From these positions it is clear that Alexander’s personal interests prevailed in the complaint and the third point looks like a necessary addition, without which the dispute between the brothers was purely internal meaning, to which the Golden Horde Khan might not have reacted. Only the third point raised the complaint to the level of an interstate conflict requiring the intervention of the Golden Horde Khan. In fact, this trip of Alexander to the Horde became a continuation of the notorious Russian civil strife, but this time carried out with Mongol weapons. This act may be considered unexpected and unworthy of a great warrior, but it was in tune with the era and was perceived quite normally in the feudal struggle for power. The Golden Horde did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity and, in full accordance with nomadic traditions, organized an openly predatory raid. A large military formation led by the “prince” (i.e. Chingizid) Nevryu and two temniks appeared near Vladimir on the eve of Boris’s Day.38 His actions did not limit themselves to the defeat of Pereyaslavl, where Andrei was staying, but covered a vast rural district, from where many prisoners and livestock were taken to the Horde.89 Judging by the context of the chronicle articles describing this episode, Alexander himself did not take part in the campaign of the Golden Horde troops, remaining all this time in the Horde. He returned only some time after the departure of Nevruy’s detachment “with great honor,” and even received “seniority among all his brothers” in the Horde. Upon arriving home with a label on the Vladimir table, the prince directed his indomitable energy to the restoration of his native Pereyaslavl, which had just experienced a brutal defeat.

It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that while in the Horde, Alexander communicated not with Khan Batu, but with his son Sartak.41 The ruler of the Golden Horde himself was at that time in Mongolia, where he participated in the elections of the new kaan Mun-ke. Not a single Russian chronicle notes any special events during the communication between Alexander Yaroslavich and Sartak, limiting itself to the most general information. However, the very fact of the meeting between the Russian prince and the son of the Golden Horde khan allowed L. N-Gumilev to express the categorical opinion that Alexander fraternized with Sartak, “as a result of which he became the adopted son of the khan.”42 Such an opinion has no confirmation in any source and is pure speculation . Moreover, it is absolutely impossible to imagine a Russian Orthodox prince performing Mongolian pagan rite fraternization, during which the blood of two participants in the ritual is mixed in a bowl with kumiss and drunk together. The most that Alexander could afford at the khan's headquarters was to present rich gifts to the ruler of the Golden Horde and his entourage, which was always the first step for the success of the mission.

Since 1252, when Alexander Yaroslavich achieved the much-desired Vladimir table, he never again went to bow to Batu or Sartak, which in itself testifies to a lot. And first of all, this emphasizes the independent internal policy of the prince, pursued by him without regard to the Horde. He also felt free in foreign policy actions of a military nature, which he carried out on his own, without any help from the Saransk khans. The far-fetched, unfounded and unsubstantiated assertions that Rus' at that time had an agreement on mutual assistance with the Golden Horde are refuted by all further activities of Alexander Yaroslavich. There is also no evidence that the support of the Mongols stopped the onslaught from the west on Russian lands.44 In this matter, all the credit belonged entirely to Alexander Nevsky. One can only point out that the western neighbors of Rus' were restrained (and even then not always) by certain fears of invading the sphere of interests of the Golden Horde, which consisted of the Russian principalities.

In the period from 1252 to 1257. Grand Duke Vladimir seemed to have forgotten about the existence of the Golden Horde, dealing exclusively with Russian affairs and not showing any servility before the formidable southern neighbor. This position emphasizes not only the strong character of the prince, but also the validity of the political line he chose in relation to the conquerors. A certain role in this was played by the fact that the period of Batu’s reign for the Golden Horde was the only one when the state he founded did not wage any wars. This relieved one of the most difficult responsibilities of Rus' to the conquerors - the supply of military detachments to the active army and made it possible to preserve strength for a successful fight on the western borders. Not only did this justify Alexander’s policy in relations with the Golden Horde, but also the fact that North-Eastern Rus' under his hand did not know civil strife, using all its forces to eliminate the still tangible consequences of the three-year Mongol devastation.

The attitude towards the Golden Horde as an inevitable evil, from which it is not yet possible to get rid of, is also evidenced by a small episode placed in the chronicle under 1256. After the death of Khan Batu in 1255, the Saransk throne was taken by his young son Ulagchi, to whom they immediately went some Russian princes, thereby expressing their complete loyalty to the new khan. Alexander, however, pointedly did not go to introduce himself to the child khan, but only sent him gifts.45 At the same time, Alexander did not fail to take advantage of the confluence of favorable circumstances, expressed in the change of the ruler of the Golden Horde, and turned to the new khan with a request for the forgiveness of his brother Andrei, who had returned from forced emigration. According to data provided by V. N. Tatishchev, the request was received favorably. After this, in 1257, Alexander Yaroslavich went to the Horde together with Andrei, where the latter received complete forgiveness46 and, thus, the old thorn that darkened the relationship between the brothers was completely eliminated. The case is truly unique in the practice of Russian-Horde relations and testifies to the brilliant diplomatic talent of the Grand Duke of Vladimir.

The next extremely serious stage in Russian-Horde relations was the holding of a population census for the purpose of levying tribute. In essence, the census became initial stage the creation of an extensive administrative and fiscal system that specifically embodied the Mongol yoke in Rus'. The tactics of Alexander Yaroslavich during the stay of the Mongol “numerals” in the Russian principalities were based on the principles of restraining both sides from almost inevitable clashes. The prince clearly understood how powerful and mobile the Golden Horde had and had no doubt that the most trifling reason would be enough to use it, as was the case in the future.

The census itself was a rather labor-intensive and lengthy event, stretching over 1257-1258. Its first stage took place on the territory of Zalesokaya Rus' without any serious incidents, and the chronicle assessed the inevitability of this procedure, albeit as a punishment, but with calmness: “a sin for our sake.”47 In the winter of 1258, the “numerals” reached Novgorod, whose population Until now, it has encountered the manifestation of Mongol power only indirectly, through the Grand Duke of Vladimir. As a result, the Novgorodians did not tolerate the specific power of the Golden Horde at home, embodied in the mysterious procedure of census of the entire population, which in the eyes of the Orthodox was clearly magical in nature. Here Alexander had to act not only by exhortation, but also by more drastic methods, which made it possible to maintain peace both in the city and with the Golden Horde.48

The end of the population census of North-Eastern Rus' marked the formal end of a firmly established tributary allocation from a specific territory. This issue was studied by A.N. Nasonov, who came to the conclusion that the “numerals” created special detachments led by Mongol commanders and constituting the supporting force of the Baskaks, representing the Khan’s administration in the Russian lands.49 This revenge was based on a single chronicle message that summed up the result activities of the “numerals”: “and posted foremen, and centurions, and thousanders, and temniks, and went to the Horde; It’s nothing like abbots, monks, priests, kriloshans, who look at the Holy Mother of God and the ruler.”50 A. N. Nasonov’s assumption about military detachments stationed on the territory of Russian principalities seems not only doubtful, but practically impossible to fulfill. If it is possible to imagine (with a certain degree of tolerance) military formations led by foremen and even centurions, then formations headed by thousanders and temniks (ten-timers) are difficult to even imagine, since for the 13th century this would constitute a huge army. Not only its maintenance and armament, but its organization alone, pose a whole range of serious problems. Taking these arguments into account, as well as relying on the well-known administrative and political principles laid down as the basis of the Mongol Empire by Genghis Khan, the chronicle report on the results of the work of the “numerals” can be interpreted in a different way.

The first minister, Elü-Chutsai, who was active during the life of Genghis Khan and his successor Ögedei, developed imperial principles for imposing tribute on conquered lands.51 At the same time, he had to overcome the resistance of the conservative part of the steppe aristocracy, which called for the total extermination of the conquered population and the use of the subsequently vacated spaces for the needs of the nomadic cattle breeding. With the help of digital calculations, Yelu-Chutsai proved many times greater benefits of imposing tribute on conquered peoples, rather than exterminating them. As a result, the shared principle of distribution of tribute from conquered lands was approved, according to which the total amount of tributary and tax revenues was distributed as follows. A strictly defined part of total amount was transferred to the general imperial treasury and sent to Karakorum. The rationale for this decision was that all-empire army formations, usually led by several Genghisids, took part in the campaigns of conquest. Campaign 1236-1240 The conquest of Eastern Europe was led by 12 Genghisid princes, and each of them brought his own troops, the general leadership of which was carried out by Batu Khan. In accordance with this, each of the princes had the right to claim their share of the income from the conquered lands. And finally, the third contender for the collected tribute was the head of the newly formed ulus (i.e., part of the empire), which included all the conquered lands. IN in this case was Khan Batu and his heirs.

According to the developments of Elyu-Chutsai, in order to determine the total amount of tribute from the conquered lands and calculate the interest due to each participant in this division, it was necessary to conduct a complete census of the population subject to taxes. As follows from the Russian chronicles, the central Mongolian government did not trust the implementation of this procedure to the ulus khans, but sent its “numerals” for the census. It was these officials, in full accordance with Central Asian nomadic traditions, who divided the entire tributary population according to the usual decimal system. Moreover, the score was sung not heart to heart, but by family and economic units.

In Central Asia, such a unit was a nomadic ail, and in Rus' a courtyard (estate).

The division of the entire population according to the decimal system was aimed primarily at the purely practical organization of the collection of tribute, its calculation, delivery to a certain center and the preliminary calculation of the expected total amount. Thus, the introduction of a decimal system for calculating the population pursued specific fiscal goals, and the message about the appointment of foremen, centurions, thousanders and temniks did not refer to the creation of special military detachments that remained in the conquered territory, but to the approval of those responsible for collecting tribute from the corresponding group of the population. Those supervising this process themselves (foremen, etc.) were appointed from among the Russian population. The final point for collecting all the tribute could only be under the jurisdiction of the great Vladimir Baskak.52 The story about the activities of the “chislikov” by V.N. Tatishchev ends with the message that they “organized everything” (i.e., brought into desired order), “returning to the Horde.”63

It should be especially noted that one of the reasons for the sharp explosion of discontent among the urban lower classes of the population of Novgorod against the “numerals” was precisely the principle of imposing tribute on households.64 In this situation, an artisan from his yard could pay the same amount as a boyar from a vast estate with numerous servants .

“Numbers” appeared in Rus' only 14 years (1257) after the formal establishment of Mongol power (1243) over the conquered lands. This was due to the serious streamlining of the tax system carried out by Kaan Munke in all conquered lands.66

Of particular interest is the fact that the numbers, according to chronicles, acted only on the territory of North-Eastern Rus'. As for the southwestern lands, their appearance here was not noted by chroniclers, for which there can only be one explanation. As already mentioned, 12 Genghisids took part in the campaign against Eastern Europe, who acted together until the end of 1240. After the capture of Kiev in December 1240, the army under the command of Khan Batu completed all the tasks assigned to it by the All-Mongol kurultai of 1235.56 However, Batu was not satisfied with what had been achieved and decided to continue the hike further to the west. Most of the princes, led by Guyuk and Munke, did not agree with this and left with their troops to Mongolia. This fact is also noted in the Ipatiev Chronicle,57 and the text adds that the princes went home after learning about the death of Kaan Ogedei. This addition allows us to talk about the later appearance of this insertion in the chronicle article, since Ogedei died on December 11, 1241,68 and Guyuk and Munke were already in Mongolia in 1241. Khan Batu carried out his further campaign almost exclusively with the troops of his own ulus without the support of all-empire formations. The created situation gave him the right to collect tribute from the Russian principalities west of the Dnieper exclusively for his own benefit, without deducting the accepted share to the general imperial treasury. That is why the “numerals” did not appear on the lands of Southwestern Rus', although the Baskaks from the local population were here as ulus Golden Horde officials, and not representatives of Karakorum.

Those Russian principalities that were conquered by the all-imperial Mongol army are referred to in the chronicles under the jurisdiction of “Kanovi and Batu”, which meant double political subordination and distribution of the total amount of collected tribute between Karakorum and Sarai. The lands conquered only by Batu’s troops paid tribute exclusively to Sarai. Their clear dependence on the khan of the Golden Horde is also confirmed by the fact that not a single prince of South-Western Rus' went to Karakorum to approve the investiture for his homeland. The most striking example in this regard can be Daniil Galitsky, who in 1250 was forced to ask only Batu Khan for a label to own his lands." It was this trip that forced the chronicler to utter the most bitter and emotional words about the Mongol yoke: "Oh, more evil than evil Tatar honor!”62

Alexander Yaroslavich had to experience this evil honor more than once in Sarai and Karakorum, and undoubtedly, he met there many captive compatriots who were in the most pitiful condition. The chronicle especially notes the activities of the Grand Duke of Vladimir, who spent “a lot of gold and silver”63 on the ransom of Russian captives in the Horde. It is possible that it was precisely this aspect of relations with the Golden Horde that prompted the prince to the idea of creating a permanent Russian support center in the capital of the Mongol state. This idea was embodied together with Metropolitan Kirill in the establishment of the Saransk diocese. The chronicles do not contain details revealing the stages of negotiations on the establishment of Orthodox representation in Sarai. One can only express confidence that under Khan Berke, who tried to introduce Islam to the Golden Horde, such an agreement was impossible without the most energetic assistance of Alexander Yaroslavich. In 1261, Mitrofan became the first bishop of the Sarai diocese, the boundaries of which extended from the Volga to the Dnieper and from the Caucasus to the upper reaches of the Don.64 The captives driven away from Rus' received not only powerful spiritual support, but also a strong connection with their homeland, which gave some kind of hope for ransom and return home. There is no doubt that the metochion of the Saransk bishop became a kind of plenipotentiary representation of Rus' in the Golden Horde, whose activities went far beyond church boundaries.

Conducted by Karakorum officials in 1257-58. the population census made it possible to preliminarily calculate the amount of expected tribute from any individual settlement or parish. And this, in turn, opened up enormous opportunities for “virtually uncontrolled actions of tax farmers.” The revelry of their arbitrariness was noted in the chronicles immediately "after the end of the census - at the very beginning of the 60s. The tax farming system was based on the preliminary payment by a rich moneylender, merchant OR feudal lord of the expected amount of tribute from a particular city or volost to the Horde treasury, after which he received the right to collect this money from the population. At the same time, the arbitrariness of the tax farmers reached extreme limits, which allowed them to return the advance paid to the treasury with huge interest. The violence perpetrated by the tax farmers led to an explosion of indignation among the population of several cities at once - Rostov, Vladimir, Suzdal, Pereyaslavl, Yaroslavl .65 The spontaneously assembled veche decided to expel the tax farmers from the cities and this decision was carried out by residents driven to extremes without the participation of the princely administration. In this extraordinary event, one important detail attracts attention: the tax farmers were expelled, and not killed. In this decision one can see the fruits of the policy of Alexander Yaroslavich, who constantly warned against serious conflicts with the Horde, which could provoke the organization of a punitive expedition to Russia. But we can also assume here the skillful leadership of the indignant people of the representatives of the princely administration. At least the Grand Duke himself was at that moment in Vladimir or Pereyaslavl. Be that as it may, this event did not cause any serious consequences on the part of the Golden Horde, which can also be attributed to the diplomatic steps taken by the Grand Duke of Vladimir.

The last, fourth, trip of Alexander Yaroslavich to the Golden Horde was associated with one of the grave obligations to the Saransk khans, which were part of the numerous duties that formed the system of oppression of the Russian principalities. The reason for this was as follows. In 1262, war broke out between the Golden Horde and Hulaguid Iran. Khan Berke began extensive mobilization and at the same time demanded that the Grand Duke of Vladimir send Russian regiments to the active army. The Sofia Chronicle reports that a special Golden Horde regiment arrived in Rus' to recruit recruits with the task of “capturing the Christians” and taking them to the steppes “with them to become militants.”66 Alexander acted extraordinary this time, showing his remarkable political talents. He himself began to prepare for a trip to the Horde, “in order to pray people out of trouble.” At the same time, he sent his brother Yaroslav with his son Dmitry and “all his regiments with them” to the siege of the city of Yuryev.67 This move made it possible to formally justify to the khan the employment of troops on the western border and preserve an experienced military core, since only units. Alexander undoubtedly understood the serious consequences of refusing to send Russian regiments and that is why he personally went to Sarai, and not with his army to the walls of Yuryev. The generous gifts and diplomatic skill of the Grand Duke of Vladimir contributed to success this time too. However, wintering in the Golden Horde steppes seriously damaged the prince’s health, and on the way home he died in Gorodets on the Volga on November 14, 1263. In total, Alexander Yaroslavich spent more than four years in the Horde.

The result of Alexander Yaroslavich’s foreign policy actions undoubtedly affected the further development of the Old Russian state. This was the period when Rus' began its transformation into Russia and it was for this that the warrior prince became a diplomat prince. After a long, exhausting and bloody period of internecine wars, Alexander Nevsky was practically the first prince to pursue an all-Russian policy on the territory of the northwestern and northeastern principalities. It was of a strategic nature and did not allow the Pskov and Novgorod lands to break away under pressure from the west, as happened with Galician-Volyn Rus.

The precise choice of priorities and the validity of the strategic line of Alexander Nevsky's foreign policy subsequently played a role in the transformation of northeastern Rus' into the core of the Great Russian national state. This becomes especially clear when comparing the foreign policy aspirations of Alexander Nevsky and Daniil Galitszhoy. Daniel's search for support in the west led to the virtual collapse of Galician-Volyn Rus, and in the XIV-XV centuries. and to the seizure of it along with the Kiev-Chernigov lands by Poland and Lithuania. As a result, a hard boundary arose between the two parts of the Old Russian state - the southwestern and northeastern, which became one of the reasons that contributed to the emergence of Ukraine.

History has placed on the shoulders of Alexander Yaroslavich the most important task of choosing the future political development of emerging Russia in an alliance with the West or the East. And it was Alexander who can and should be considered the first Russian politician who laid the foundation for a very special path, which began to be fully comprehended only in the 20th century and received the name Eurasianism. Alexander Nevsky resolved far from ambiguous foreign policy problems in full accordance with the emergency situation that arose around the Russian state in the 40-60s of the 13th century. The Grand Duke responded to the outright territorial claims of the West on the battlefield, preserving and establishing the integrity of the Russian possessions.

The claims of the Golden Horde were caused by the establishment of vassalage of one state over another and ultimately boiled down to the demand of the victors to pay a long-term and significant amount of tribute. This issue touched upon painful internal political problems of the state (primarily the distribution of tributary duties) and Alexander preferred to resolve it at the negotiating table with the Mongols. This forced and rather humiliating position for the prince-warrior emphasizes and reveals not his conformism, but his sober calculation, detailed knowledge of the current situation and flexible diplomatic mind.

One thing is certain: Alexander’s foreign policy was based on the harsh realities of life that arose after the Mongol conquest of 1237-40, on the one hand, and the Swedish-German attacks of 1240-42, on the other. Attempts to seize the Novgorod and Pskov possessions were largely provoked by a three-year pogrom of the armies of Batu, which sharply weakened the military potential of the Russian principalities.

But the long Mongol invasion allowed Alexander to understand the goals pursued by the Genghisids in this war. Their interests boiled down to outright robbery, the capture of prisoners and the subsequent collection of tribute. As for the lands inhabited by Russians, the Mongols remained completely indifferent to them, preferring the familiar steppes, which ideally suited the nomadic way of their economy. In contrast, Western feudal lords sought precisely territorial acquisitions at the expense of Russian possessions. There was another significant reason that influenced the policies of the Russian princes and lay on the surface for contemporaries of the events. The Mongols not only calmly treated Russian Orthodoxy, but even supported it, freeing the clergy from paying tribute. The Muslim Khan Berke did not in any way oppose the creation of the Orthodox Sarai diocese on the territory of the Horde. The Swedish and German occupation clearly brought with them Catholic expansion, which caused massive rejection by the Orthodox population.

The foreign policy strategy of Alexander Nevsky was of an all-Russian nature, taking into account opposite directions (West and East) and uniting the interests of North-Eastern and North-Western Rus' into a single whole. After Alexander Nevsky, such comprehensive foreign policy tasks were only able to be set and largely fulfilled by Dmitry Donskoy, who also acted on two fronts - against Lithuania and against the Golden Horde.

April 2012 marks the 770th anniversary of one of the most famous and great events in our History - the victory of Russian troops over the crusaders in the Battle of Lake Peipus, called the Battle of the Ice. Everyone knows the name of the winner - Novgorod (later Great Vladimir) Prince Alexander Yaroslavich. Today, the factual side of this event, as well as the overall policy of Prince Alexander towards the West, despite various assessments and sympathies, are well known and generally assessed quite objectively, which, unfortunately, cannot be said about Alexander Nevsky’s relations with the Horde. At the instigation of our Eurasian “friends,” a lot of speculation and fables arose around the topic of Alexander’s relationship with the Tatar-Mongols. Just look at the story launched by Gumilyov about the “adoption” of Alexander Batu” (or, as an option, his “fraternization” with Sartak)... And this is not the most important thing in the notorious “Eurasian theory”: everyone knows one of the main provisions of Eurasianism about the alleged “union” of Rus' with the Horde, where Alexander plays a key role.
In particular, one very often hears statements that have become fashionable that it was Alexander Nevsky who was the prince during whose reign and with whose direct participation the Horde yoke was established! At the same time, some (Eurasians) call him “the creator of the “union” of Russia and the Horde” and evaluate this with a “plus” sign, others (liberals and “national” democrats) accuse St. Prince Alexander Nevsky of “pro-Tatar” politics and “aiding “to the conquerors, but in essence the position of both is that Prince Alexander seems to be the main culprit in establishing the yoke and the conductor of the Horde policy in Russia. But was it really so? Can Alexander be considered an “ally/collaborator of the Horde”? What does Alexander Nevsky have to do with the establishment of the yoke? Did Rus' in the second half of the 13th century have a real alternative to the policy pursued by the Great Prince of Vladimir Alexander towards the Horde and how did Alexander Nevsky actually act under the Mongol yoke?

Alexander Nevskiy

VI Alexander Nevsky and the Golden Horde

A new generation of Russian people, the same age as Prince Alexander, quickly realized the scale of the danger threatening the country from the West, and the need for a strong ally. The logic of events and the genius of Alexander Nevsky helped to find this ally in Rus'.

In 1242, Khan Ogedei died. Because of this death, the situation in the Horde of Khan Batu changed radically. Even during the military campaign of 1238-1239, Batu quarreled with his cousin Guyuk. Guyuk insulted Batu, calling him an old woman and threatening to pull him by the hair. Their cousin Buri did not act in the best way: he was going to “beat Batu on the chest and stomach with a log.” For this, Batu, who was the commander-in-chief of the Khan’s army, drove both princes out to their fathers. Their fathers harshly punished them for violating military discipline: they were expelled from the khan's headquarters and deprived of all ranks.

And so, after the death of Ogedei, who was a restraining force in relation to the expelled princes and Batu Khan, he dies, and Guyuk and Buri begin a joint fight against Batu. Guyuk was a contender for the Great Khan, and this greatly complicated Batu’s struggle. He had four thousand warriors at his disposal, and Guyuk, having become the Great Khan, had at least 100 thousand people at his disposal. Batu needed an ally to continue the fight, and the further course of events only confirmed this need.

In 1246, Guyuk was elected Great Khan. Batu's fate hung in the balance, and he tried to find support in Rus'. At that time, any confrontation between the Mongols and Russians did not make sense. In addition, the emotional motives for the confrontation themselves apparently disappeared. The Russians even called Batu “the good khan.” An alliance between Russia and Batu became possible.

It should be noted that Alexander Nevsky’s alliance with the West was also possible, since he knew representatives of Westerners well since the time of the Battle of the Ice. A difficult choice of ally lay ahead. Alexander Nevsky was able to correctly understand the ethnopolitical situation and put patriotism and love for the Motherland above his personal preferences. After all, his father was poisoned in Karakorum, he was poisoned by the Horde khan, as was assumed and was generally accepted at that time. Nevertheless, Alexander Yaroslavovich made a choice not in favor of his personal upheavals, but for the good of his Motherland.

In 1251, Alexander came to Batu’s Horde, made friends with his son Sartak, and then fraternized with him, thereby becoming the khan’s adopted son, his relative.

It was not easy for Alexander to maintain this alliance; many people close to him were against the alliance with the Mongols. His brother Andrei was a Westerner and announced that he was entering into an alliance with the Swedes, Livonians and Poles in order to get rid of the Mongols. Fulfilling allied obligations, Batu sent commander Nevryuy (1252) to Rus', who defeated Andrei’s army, and he was forced to emigrate to Sweden. With all this, the “Nevryuev’s army” caused more damage to Rus' than Batu’s campaign that occurred earlier.

Prince Daniil Galitsky actively opposed the Tatars. His political course was to make the Galician-Volyn principality a feudal independent state oriented to the West.

In general, the Westerners’ program was aimed at, relying on the help of the knights, uniting all the forces of the Russian princes and expelling the Mongols. One must understand how attractive this idea seemed: the Western orders were strong and numerous and could well expel the Mongols and liberate Rus'. That's how it was theoretically. In practice, the Western interventionists set themselves their own task: using Russian warriors, to expel the Mongols from Rus', and then to conquer bloodless Rus', like the Baltic states. And the idea of uniting Rus' at that time was illusory. It finally broke up into the South-Western, North-Eastern and Novgorod lands, which constantly fought among themselves. Alexander Nevsky perfectly understood all these conditions, and therefore took the direction of an alliance with the Mongols.

The union gave the Russian princes greater freedom of action. Alexander was interested in the prospect of receiving military assistance from the Mongols to counter the onslaught of the West and internal opposition. But soon he had to experience an incredible shock; the entire political line was suddenly under threat. In 1256, Batu dies, followed by his son Sartak, who is poisoned. Batu's brother Berke Khan establishes a Muslim dictatorship in the Horde. Alexander had no choice but to go to Berke and negotiate the payment of tribute to the Mongols in exchange for military assistance against the Lithuanians and Germans. In the same year, Khan Berke ordered a second census in Rus' (the first was done under the father of Alexander Nevsky). Clerks came to Ryazan, Suzdal and Murom and began to copy every single one of them, so that they could then impose tribute on everyone. We also reached Novgorod. The Novgorodians, having learned that census takers were heading towards them, rebelled. Since Novgorod did not suffer as much from the Tatars as other cities, they believed that they paid tribute by their own consent, and not by oppression. Feeling the approaching danger, Nevsky personally, together with the scribes, came to Novgorod. The Novgorodians flatly refused to pay tribute. But still, thanks to the incredible efforts of Alexander Nevsky, the Tatar ambassadors were not only not offended, but were also released back to the Horde, richly rewarded. The people were worried and suspected Nevsky of conspiring with the Horde against Rus'. Prince Vasily of Novgorod, Alexander’s son, was on the side of the dissatisfied, which was a very unpleasant personal fact for Alexander: he, constantly armed with criticism and suspicions of treason, had to go against his own son. As a result, Vasily fled to Pskov, from where he was soon expelled by Nevsky.

Having brutally dealt with the conspirators and organizers of the riot (they had their eyes gouged out), Alexander convinced the Novgorodians to pay tribute. This, of course, was not pleasant for anyone, but it’s still better to part with money than with independence and life.

The alliance treaty with the horde subsequently turned out to be a blessing for Rus', from the point of view of establishing order within the country. Although Rus' remained dependent on the Mongol-Tatars (there was no strength to resist their direct invasions), a situation of union was established, which seemed to equalize the conditions of Rus' and the Horde, thereby covering up the Mongol-Tatar yoke, leading to the formation of a different attitude of the Russian people towards Mongols as allies and friends, and not as masters of their freedom. Alexander Nevsky achieved a peaceful attitude of the people towards the Horde, even if it was not complete.

It was not easy for Alexander Nevsky to fight off Western enemies, but, having won great victories, the feeling of people's joy and gratitude to him was a reward for his hard military labors and worries. And now Nevsky was forced to curry favor with the khan and his dignitaries, humiliate himself before them, give them gifts, just to protect the Russian land from new troubles. He also had to force his people to pay tribute to the Mongol-Tatars. Sometimes it was necessary to use force, and he had to do it directly himself. I had to punish my people for disobeying the Mongol-Tatars, which made my heart ache painfully.

Many, not as deeply as Alexander Nevsky, understood the current situation, condemned him and called him the oppressor of his people. But Nevsky “oppressed” the Russians truly so that they would not be completely defeated. If he had not committed the so-called oppression by some, more and more pogroms would have fallen on the Russian soil, and it might never have been able to recover. How distinguished diplomat, Nevsky saw the way of survival for Rus' in a cunning diplomatic policy towards the Mongol-Tatars. And, as time has shown, this policy turned out to be very correct.

In such a situation, the Novgorodians were very worried. Nevsky's politics were incomprehensible to them; they suspected that their beloved and revered prince was a traitor. They resisted the Mongol-Tatars.

Let us die honestly for St. Sophia and the houses of the angels,” the people shouted, “let us lay our heads at St. Sophia!”

They were convinced that they were right in relation to the Mongol-Tatars.

However, the news soon arrived that the Khan's regiments were marching towards Novgorod and the admonitions of some prudent boyars had a calming effect. The unrest has subsided. The Novgorodians allowed the Tatars to carry out a census and paid tribute. However, Alexander Nevsky could not burst into all of Rus' and bring the people everywhere to prudence. Novgorod calmed down, other cities became worried. In addition, the khan's collectors behaved extremely rudely and disrespectfully: they took more than the required tribute, confiscated all property at once, and took children into captivity. People couldn't stand it for long. In Suzdal, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Vladimir and other cities, tribute collectors were killed.

Enraged by this news, the Khan, convinced of the obligation of all Russian people to pay tribute to the Horde, began to gather an army and prepare for a destructive invasion of Russian soil. The Horde were preparing to terribly punish the rebels. Having learned about this, Alexander Nevsky, already in constant worries and stress, hurried to the Horde.

It was terribly difficult for him to please the khan and his dignitaries; he spent the winter and summer in the Horde, constantly currying favor with the worst enemies of the Russians. Then, apparently, Alexander Nevsky had a greatly suppressed sense of pride in the Russian people, in their strength and wealth. He did not become proud of the Horde, nor threaten Russian forces, which would have been greatly exaggerated. He didn’t, and never did. The great Russian prince always acted according to need, according to need and reason, and not according to fleeting emotions. He gave himself completely for the sake of preserving the Russian land, the Russian people.

Through enormous efforts and talent as a diplomat, Nevsky managed to obtain an important benefit from the Horde: now the Russians were not obliged to supply recruits to the Mongol-Tatar armies. It was not an easy task, and sometimes even impossible, for the Russian people to shed and fight for their worst enemies, the oppressors and plunderers.

Alexander Nevskiy

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Alexander Nevsky is a famous person in history. Descendants know about his strong-willed decisions, brilliantly won battles, bright mind and ability to take thoughtful actions. However, many of his actions and decisions still do not have an unambiguous assessment. Historians of different years argue about the reasons for certain actions of the prince, each time finding new clues that allow them to be interpreted from a side convenient for scientists. One of these controversial issues the alliance with the Horde remains.

Why did Alexander Nevsky become a friend of the Tatar Khan? What prompted him to make such a decision? And what is the true reason for his seemingly unconventional act for that time?