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Kissinger and the world order of the 21st century. Brief review of Henry Kissinger's book "World Order"

Henry Kissinger

World order

Dedicated to Nancy

Introduction

What is “world order”?

In 1961, as a young scientist, I remembered President Harry S. Truman while speaking at a conference in Kansas City. When asked what accomplishments of his presidency he was most proud of, Truman replied: “That we completely defeated our enemies and then brought them back into the community of nations. I like to think that only America has managed something like this.” Recognizing America's enormous power, Truman was primarily proud of American humanism and commitment to democratic values. He wanted to be remembered not so much as the president of a victorious country, but as the head of state who reconciled enemies.

All of Truman's successors, to varying degrees, followed his beliefs as reflected in this story, and similarly took pride in the above-mentioned components of the American idea. I note that for many years the community of nations, which they fully supported, existed within the framework of the “American consensus” - states cooperated, steadily expanding the ranks of this world order, observing general rules and norms, developing a liberal economy, abandoning territorial conquests in favor of respect for national sovereignties, and adopting a representative democratic system of government. American presidents, regardless of their party affiliation, have strongly called on other governments, often with great passion and eloquence, to ensure respect for human rights and the progressive development of civil society. In many cases, support for these values by the United States and its allies has led to significant changes in the status of the population of a particular state.

However, today this “rules-based” system has problems. Frequent exhortations addressed to other countries, calls to “make their contribution,” to play “by the rules of the twenty-first century” and to be “responsible participants in the process” within the framework of common system coordinates clearly show that there is no common understanding of this system for all, no common understanding of “feasible contribution” or “fairness”. Outside the Western world, those regions that were minimally involved in the formulation of the current rules are questioning the effectiveness of the rules as currently formulated and have clearly demonstrated a willingness to make every effort to change the rules in question. Thus, " international community", which is appealed to today perhaps more persistently than in any other era, is unable to agree - or even agree - on an unambiguous and consistent set of goals, methods and limitations.

We live in a historical period when there is a persistent, at times almost desperate pursuit of a concept of world order that eludes general understanding. Chaos threatens us, and at the same time, an unprecedented interdependence is forming: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disintegration of former states, the consequences of a predatory attitude towards the environment, the persistence, unfortunately, of the practice of genocide and the rapid introduction of new technologies threaten to aggravate the usual conflicts, aggravate them to the point , exceeding human capabilities and the boundaries of reason. New ways of processing and transmitting information unite regions like never before, project local events onto the global level - but in a way that prevents them from being fully understood, while at the same time requiring government leaders to respond instantly, at least in the form of slogans. Are we really entering a new period when the future will be determined by forces that recognize neither restrictions nor any order at all?

Varieties of world order

Let's not lie: a truly global “world order” has never existed. What is now recognized as such has developed in Western Europe Almost four centuries ago, its foundations were formulated at peace negotiations in the German region of Westphalia, without the participation - or even the attention - of most countries on other continents and most other civilizations. A century of religious strife and political upheaval in Central Europe culminated in the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648; it was a “world” fire in which political and religious contradictions were mixed; As the war progressed, combatants resorted to "total war" against key population centers, and as a result, Central Europe lost nearly a quarter of its population to fighting, disease, and famine. Exhausted opponents met in Westphalia to agree on a set of measures designed to stop the bloodshed. Religious unity began to crack due to the establishment and spread of Protestantism; political diversity was a logical consequence of the multiplicity of independent political units that participated in the war. As a result, it turned out that Europe was the first to accept the familiar conditions of the modern world: a variety of political units, none of which is powerful enough to defeat all the others; adherence to conflicting principles, ideological views and internal practices, and everyone strives to find some “neutral” rules that regulate behavior and mitigate conflicts.

The Peace of Westphalia should be interpreted as a practical approximation of reality; it does not at all demonstrate any unique moral awareness. This peace rests on the coexistence of independent states that refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and balance their own ambitions and the ambitions of others with the principle of a general balance of power. No individual claim to the possession of truth, no universal rule, could reign in Europe. Instead, each state acquired sovereign power over its territory. Each agreed to recognize the internal structures and religious beliefs of its neighbors as realities of life and refrained from challenging their status. Such a balance of power was now seen as natural and desirable, and therefore the ambitions of the rulers acted as a counterbalance to each other, at least in theory limiting the scope of conflicts. Separation and diversity (largely formed by chance in the development of European history) became the hallmarks of a new system of international order - with its own worldview, its own philosophy. In this sense, the efforts of Europeans to extinguish their "world" fire helped shape and serve as a prototype for the modern approach, where absolute judgments are abandoned in favor of practicality and ecumenism; it is an attempt to build order on diversity and containment.

The seventeenth-century negotiators who drew up the terms of the Peace of Westphalia did not, of course, imagine that they were laying the foundations of a global system that would extend far beyond the borders of Europe. They did not even try to involve neighboring Russia in this process, which at that time was establishing its own new order after the hardships of the Time of Troubles, and it elevated into law principles that were radically different from the Westphalian balance of power: absolute monarchy, a single state religion - Orthodoxy and territorial expansion in all directions. However, others major centers the forces did not perceive the Westphalian agreements (as far as they were aware of these agreements at all) as relevant to their territories and possessions.

World order Henry Kissinger

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Title: World Order
Author: Henry Kissinger
Year: 2014
Genre: Foreign educational literature, Foreign journalism, Politics, political science, Journalism: other

About the book "World Order" by Henry Kissinger

The famous world-class politician Henry Kissinger published the book “World Order”, in which he sets out the concept of the political structure of the world, and also comes to the conclusion that the existing system needs to be reconstructed.

Henry Kissinger leads to the main idea of the book gradually, starting with historical information about the formation of the world political system. The author begins the story with Europe: the French Revolution, the Peace of Westphalia, continues to talk about the European balance, mentioning Russia, the Congress of Vienna, Bismarck and Metternich, and asks the question of the legitimacy of power.

Further chapters of the book “World Order” are devoted to the political picture of the Middle East, the United States of America, and Asia. Thus, the author touches on five hundred years of human history from the point of view of the formation and development of politics and diplomacy, as well as the resulting global balance of power.

The last chapters of the book “World Order” are devoted to the role of the United States in the alignment of political forces on the world stage. The author talks about the overwhelming burden of responsibilities the American political system has shouldered, what difficult and unpopular decisions have to be made, what levers are available in the hands of American diplomacy and the establishment.

In the last chapters, Henry Kissinger comes to the conclusion that the modern world order has suffered a deafening collapse and the old system, which was formed over hundreds of years, no longer works and requires immediate reform.

The book is written tough and complex language A pragmatist and a realist, she provides a comprehensive understanding of international relations and the political ideology of many countries. The reader will learn the advantages and disadvantages of the world order in different parts of the world, and will also receive information about where the world is heading.

The book “World Order” will be of interest to people interested in history, geopolitics, the political structure of the world and the balance of power.

On our website about books, you can download the site for free without registration or read online the book “World Order” by Henry Kissinger in epub, fb2, txt, rtf, pdf formats for iPad, iPhone, Android and Kindle. The book will give you a lot of pleasant moments and real pleasure from reading. Buy full version you can from our partner. Also, here you will find last news from the literary world, learn the biography of your favorite authors. For beginning writers there is a separate section with useful tips and recommendations, interesting articles, thanks to which you yourself can try your hand at literary crafts.

Quotes from the book "World Order" by Henry Kissinger

From about 1948 until the end of the century, a short period took shape in the history of mankind when it was possible to talk about an emerging global world order, combining in its framework American idealism with traditional ideas about the balance of power.

Since it is physically impossible to read all the books on a particular topic, much less all the books in the world, or to fully absorb everything read, learning from books stimulates conceptual thinking, that is, the ability to recognize comparable facts and events and build models for the future. And the style, as it were, “links” the reader with the author, or with the topic, “weaving” together the essence and aesthetics.

Revolutionaries win when their achievements are taken for granted and the price paid for them is taken for granted.

In theory, Dar al-Islam is at war with Dar al-harb, since the ultimate goal of Islam is the whole world. If the boundaries of the Dar al-harb can be reduced, the social order of Pax Islamia will supersede all others, and non-Muslim societies will either become part of the Islamic community, or recognize its authority and acquire the status of religious communities that are allowed to exist, or autonomous entities maintaining contractual relations with Islam. .

We live in a wonderful time when the strong are weak because of their doubts, and the weak become stronger because they dare.”

“Where is the Life that we lost in life?
Where is the wisdom that we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge that we have lost in the information?

Customization is only a partial manifestation of the global desire to learn how to manage human choice.

Nixon responded in the sense that if America is shirking its responsibilities internationally, then all is certainly not well at home. He declared that “only if we act nobly on our commitments abroad will we remain a great nation, and only if we remain a great nation will we face challenges nobly at home.” At the same time, he sought to curb “our instinctive feeling that we know what is best for others,” which in turn led to “the temptation for them to rely on our recommendations.”

“Americans, being a moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect the moral values we espouse as a nation. But Americans, being practical people, also want their foreign policy to be effective.”

What are we trying to prevent, no matter how, and if necessary, then alone? The answer determines the minimum conditions for the survival of society.
What do we want to achieve even if no multilateral efforts support us? This answer defines the minimum objectives of the national strategy.
What do we strive to achieve or prevent only if we are supported by some kind of alliance? This defines the outer limits of a country's strategic aspirations within the global system.
What should we not participate in, even if we are forced to do so by a multilateral group or alliance? This defines the ultimate conditions for American participation in the world order.
First of all, what is the nature of the values we seek to uphold? Which statements depend in part on the circumstances?
In principle, the same questions can be posed to other communities.

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The role of statesman Henry Kissinger in American politics and world politics in general is very great. Not only supporters of his ideas agree with this, but also opponents. In the book "World Order" he examines the state of world politics, expressing his opinion and trying to convey important information to the people, especially to those in power.

The author of this book begins from afar, giving readers an opportunity to understand how world politics has developed. It takes us back to the past, to those events that took place more than three centuries ago. He writes about the Peace of Westphalia, the French Revolution, the Congress of Vienna, the general state of Europe, Russia, the USA, and eastern countries.

In the book, Henry Kissinger talks about the positive and negative sides of certain actions. He compares the past with what is happening now. And although it seems that all countries are aimed at development, this is often what becomes the cause of conflicts. In a world where everything is globalized, it is difficult for countries to preserve their traditions and nationality. Some of them cannot find the right path to enter the world system, but at the same time maintain their characteristics. It is very difficult to maintain a balance of power. This can lead to wars when some do not want to understand others. The author of this book examines some of the most pressing problems and says that world politics is now in a difficult situation. It must be subject to changes without fail, otherwise it will not lead to anything good.

On our website you can download the book “World Order” by Henry Kissinger for free and without registration in fb2, rtf, epub, pdf, txt format, read the book online or buy the book in the online store.

Henry Kissinger
World order

Dedicated to Nancy

Introduction

What is “world order”?

All of Truman's successors, to varying degrees, followed his beliefs as reflected in this story, and similarly took pride in the above-mentioned components of the American idea. I note that for many years the community of nations, which they fully supported, existed within the framework of the “American Consensus” - states cooperated, steadily expanding the ranks of this world order, observing common rules and norms, developing a liberal economy, abandoning territorial conquests in favor of respect national sovereignties and adopting a representative democratic system of government. American presidents, regardless of their party affiliation, have strongly called on other governments, often with great passion and eloquence, to ensure respect for human rights and the progressive development of civil society. In many cases, support for these values by the United States and its allies has led to significant changes in the status of the population of a particular state.

However, today this “rules-based” system has problems. Frequent exhortations addressed to other countries, calls to “make their contribution,” to play “by the rules of the twenty-first century” and to be “responsible participants in the process” within the framework of a common coordinate system clearly show that there is no common idea about this system for everyone, a common for everyone to understand “a feasible contribution” or “fairness”. Outside the Western world, those regions that were minimally involved in the formulation of the current rules are questioning the effectiveness of the rules as currently formulated and have clearly demonstrated a willingness to make every effort to change the rules in question. Thus, the “international community” that is appealed to today, perhaps more insistently than in any other era, is unable to agree - or even agree - on an unambiguous and consistent set of goals, methods and restrictions.

Varieties of world order

Let's not lie: a truly global “world order” has never existed. What is now recognized as such was formed in Western Europe almost four centuries ago, its foundations were formulated at peace negotiations in the German region of Westphalia, without the participation - or even the attention - of most countries on other continents and most other civilizations. A century of religious strife and political upheaval in Central Europe culminated in the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648; it was a “world” fire in which political and religious contradictions were mixed; During the war, the combatants resorted to "total war" against key population centers, and as a result, Central Europe lost almost a quarter of its population due to fighting, disease and famine. Exhausted opponents met in Westphalia to agree on a set of measures designed to stop the bloodshed. Religious unity began to crack due to the establishment and spread of Protestantism; political diversity was a logical consequence of the multiplicity of independent political units that participated in the war. As a result, it turned out that Europe was the first to accept the familiar conditions of the modern world: a variety of political units, none of which is powerful enough to defeat all the others; adherence to conflicting principles, ideological views and internal practices, and everyone strives to find some “neutral” rules that regulate behavior and mitigate conflicts.

The Peace of Westphalia should be interpreted as a practical approximation of reality; it does not at all demonstrate any unique moral awareness. This peace rests on the coexistence of independent states that refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and balance their own ambitions and the ambitions of others with the principle of a general balance of power. No individual claim to the possession of truth, no universal rule, could reign in Europe. Instead, each state acquired sovereign power over its territory. Each agreed to recognize the internal structures and religious beliefs of its neighbors as realities of life and refrained from challenging their status. Such a balance of power was now seen as natural and desirable, and therefore the ambitions of the rulers acted as a counterbalance to each other, at least in theory limiting the scope of conflicts. Separation and diversity (largely formed by chance in the development of European history) became the hallmarks of a new system of international order - with its own worldview, its own philosophy. In this sense, the efforts of Europeans to extinguish their “world” fire helped shape and served as a prototype for the modern approach, where absolute judgments are abandoned in favor of practicality and ecumenism ; it is an attempt to build order on diversity and containment.

The seventeenth-century negotiators who drew up the terms of the Peace of Westphalia did not, of course, imagine that they were laying the foundations of a global system that would extend far beyond the borders of Europe. They did not even try to involve neighboring Russia in this process, which at that time was establishing its own new order after the hardships of the Time of Troubles, and was enshrining into law principles that were radically different from the Westphalian balance of power: absolute monarchy, a single state religion - Orthodoxy and territorial expansion in all directions. However, other major centers of power did not perceive the Westphalian agreements (as far as they were generally aware of these agreements) as relevant to their territories and possessions.

The idea of world order was realized in a geographical space known to the statesmen of the time; a similar approach is regularly implemented in many regions. This is largely explained by the fact that the dominant technologies of that time did not in any way contribute to the creation of a unified global system - the very thought of the latter seemed unacceptable. Without the means to interact with each other on permanent basis, not having the ability to adequately assess the “temperature of power” of European regions, each sovereign unit interpreted its own order as unique, and regarded all others as “barbarians” - governed in a manner unacceptable to the existing order and therefore considered as a potential threat. Each sovereign unit considered its order as the ideal template for public organization of humanity as a whole, imagining that he is ordering the world through his way of governing.

At the opposite end of the Eurasian continent, China created its own, hierarchical and theoretically universal, concept of order - with itself at its center. The Chinese system developed over thousands of years, already existing when the Roman Empire ruled Europe as a single whole, relying not on the equality of sovereign states, but on the supposed limitlessness of the emperor’s claims. In the Chinese concept, the concept of sovereignty in the European sense was absent, since the emperor ruled over “the entire Celestial Empire.” He was the pinnacle of a political and cultural hierarchy, streamlined and universal, which spread from the center of the world, which was the Chinese capital, outward to the rest of humanity. The peoples surrounding China were classified according to their degree of barbarism, including their dependence on Chinese writing and cultural achievements (this cosmography has survived well into the modern era). China, from the Chinese point of view, must rule the world, first of all, by awe-inspiring other societies with its cultural splendor and economic abundance, and drawing these other societies into relationships that, if properly managed, can lead to the goal of achieving “celestial harmony.”

If we consider the space between Europe and China, it is necessary to note the primacy in this territory of the universal concept of world order that Islam proposed - with the dream of a one-man, God-sanctioned rule that unites and reconciles the world. In the seventh century, Islam established itself on three continents through an unprecedented "wave" of religious exaltation and imperial expansion. After the unification of the Arab world, the capture of the remnants of the Roman Empire and the subjugation of the Persian Empire Islam became the dominant religion in the Middle East, North Africa, many areas of Asia and parts of Europe. The Islamic version of universal order provided for the spread of the true faith throughout the “territory of war” , what Muslims called the lands inhabited by infidels; the world is destined to become united and find harmony, heeding the word of the prophet Muhammad. While Europe was building its multistate order, Ottoman Empire, with its mother country in Turkey, revived this claim to sole "divinely inspired" rule and extended its power to the Arab lands, the basin Mediterranean Sea, Balkans and Eastern Europe. She, of course, paid attention to the emerging interstate Europe, but did not at all believe that she was observing a model to follow: in the European agreements the Ottomans saw an incentive for further Ottoman expansion to the west. As Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror put it, admonishing the Italian city-states, an early example of multipolarity in the fifteenth century: “You are twenty cities... You are always bickering among yourself... There must be one empire, one faith, one power in the whole world.”

Meanwhile, on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean opposite from Europe, in the New World, the foundations of a different idea of the world order were being laid. Seventeenth-century Europe was engulfed in political and religious conflict, and the Puritan settlers were determined to “carry out God's plan” and implement it in a “distant wilderness” in order to free themselves from the regulations of the existing (and, in their opinion, “unfit”) power structure. There they intended to build, to quote Governor John Winthrop, who preached in 1630 aboard a ship bound for the Massachusetts settlement, a “city on a hill,” inspiring the world with the justice of his principles and the power of his example. In the American vision of world order, peace and balance of power are achieved naturally, ancient feuds and enmities must be left in the past until other nations have adopted the same principles of government as the Americans. The task of foreign policy, therefore, is not so much to defend purely American interests as to spread general principles. Over time, the United States emerged as the main defender of the order that Europe had formulated. However, even though the US lends its authority to European efforts, there is a certain ambivalence in perception - after all, the American vision is based not on the adoption of a European system of balanced power, but on achieving peace through the spread of democratic principles.

Among all the above-mentioned concepts, the principles of the Peace of Westphalia are considered - within the framework of this book - as the only generally accepted basis for what can be defined as the existing world order. The Westphalian system spread throughout the world as a “framework” of interstate and international order, spanning various civilizations and regions, as Europeans, expanding the boundaries of their possessions, imposed their own ideas of international relations everywhere. They often “forgot” about the concept of sovereignty in relation to colonies and colonized peoples, but when these peoples began to demand independence, their demands were based precisely on the Westphalian concept. National independence, sovereign statehood, national interests and non-interference in the affairs of others - all these principles turned out to be effective arguments in disputes with the colonialists, both during the struggle for liberation and in the defense of newly formed states.

The modern, now global Westphalian system - which today is commonly called the world community - seeks to “ennoble” the anarchic essence of the world with the help of an extensive network of international legal and organizational structures, designed to promote open trade and the functioning of a stable international financial system, establish common principles for the settlement of international disputes and limit the scale of wars when they do occur. This interstate system now covers all cultures and regions. Its institutions provide a neutral framework for the interaction of different societies - largely independent of the values professed in particular societies.

At the same time, Westphalian principles are challenged from all sides, sometimes, surprisingly, in the name of world order. Europe intends to move away from the system of interstate relations that it itself designed and to continue to adhere to the concept of united sovereignty . Ironically, Europe, which invented the concept of the balance of power, is now deliberately and significantly limiting the power of its new institutions. Having reduced its own military power, it has practically lost the ability to adequately respond to the violation of these universalist norms.

In the Middle East, jihadists of both Sunni and Shia persuasion continue to divide societies and dismantle nation states in pursuit of global revolution based on fundamentalist versions of the Muslim religion. The very concept of the state, along with the regional system of relations based on it, is now in danger, it is attacked by ideologies that reject the restrictions imposed by the state as illegal, and by terrorist groups, which in a number of countries are stronger than the armed forces of the government.

Asia, some of the most surprising successes among regions that have embraced the concept of sovereign statehood, is still nostalgic for alternative principles and shows the world numerous examples of regional rivalries and historical claims like those that undermined the European order a century ago. Almost every country considers itself a “young dragon,” provoking disagreements to the point of open confrontation.

The United States alternates between defending the Westphalian system and criticizing its underlying principles of the balance of power and non-interference in domestic affairs as immoral and outdated—sometimes doing both at the same time. The United States continues to consider its values to be universally in demand, which should form the basis of the world order, and reserves the right to support them on a global scale. Yet after three wars in two generations—each beginning with idealistic aspirations and widespread public approval and ending with national trauma—America today is struggling to balance its (still evident) power with nation-building principles.

All the major centers of power on the planet use elements of the Westphalian order to one degree or another, but none considers itself a “natural” champion of this system. All of these centers are undergoing significant internal changes. Are regions with such different cultures, histories and traditional theories of world order capable of accepting some kind of global system as law?

Success in achieving such a goal requires an approach that respects both the diversity of humankind's traditions and the inherent desire for freedom in human nature. It is in this sense that we can talk about a world order, but it cannot be imposed. This is especially true in an era of instant communication and revolutionary political change. Any world order, to be viable, must be perceived as fair - not only by leaders, but also ordinary citizens. It must reflect two truths: order without freedom, even approved at first, in a fit of exaltation, ultimately generates its own opposite; however, freedom cannot be secured and secured without a “framework” of order to help maintain peace. Order and freedom, sometimes viewed as opposite poles of the scale of human experience, should be seen as interdependent entities. Can today's leaders rise above the immediate concerns of today to achieve this balance?

Legitimacy and power

The answer to these questions must take into account the three levels of the concept of public order. World order refers to the state of a particular region or civilization within which a set of fair arrangements operates and there is a distribution of power that is considered applicable to the world as a whole. International order is the practical application of this belief system to a large part of the globe, and the area of coverage must be large enough to affect the global balance of power. Finally, regional order is based on the same principles applied in a specific geographical area.

Any of the above levels of order is based on two components - a set of generally accepted rules that define the limits of permissible actions, and on the balance of power necessary to deter violation of the rules, which does not allow one political unit to subjugate all others. Consensus on the legitimacy of existing arrangements—now as in the past—does not completely rule out competition or confrontation, but it does help ensure that competition will only take the form of adjustments to the existing order and will not result in a fundamental challenge to that order. The balance of power by itself cannot ensure peace, but if it is carefully worked out and strictly observed, this balance can limit the scale and frequency of fundamental confrontations and prevent them from turning into a global catastrophe.

No book can contain all the historical traditions of the international order, without exception, even within the framework of one country that is now actively participating in shaping the political landscape. In my work, I focus on those regions whose concepts of order have had the greatest influence on modern thinking.

The balance between legitimacy and power is extremely complex and fragile; The smaller the geographical area in which it is applied, the more harmonious the cultural principles within its boundaries, the easier it is to achieve a viable agreement. But modern world a global world order is needed. The diversity of entities, political units, in no way connected with each other historically or value-wise (except for those located at arm's length), defining themselves primarily according to the boundaries of their capabilities, most likely generates conflict, not order.

During my first visit to Beijing, in 1971, to re-establish contacts with China after two decades of hostility, I mentioned that for the American delegation China was “a land of mysteries and secrets.” Prime Minister Zhou Enlai replied: “You will see for yourself that there is nothing mysterious in China. When you get to know us better, we will no longer seem so mysterious to you.” There are 900 million people living in China, he added, and they see nothing unusual in their country. In our time, the desire to establish a world order requires taking into account the opinions of societies whose views, until recently, remained largely self-sufficient. The mystery to be revealed is the same for all peoples: how best to combine the different historical experiences and traditions in the general world order.

Chapter 1

Europe: a pluralistic international order

The uniqueness of the European order

The history of most civilizations is a tale of the rise and fall of empires. Order was established by the structure of internal government, and not through the achievement of balance between states: strong when the central government is strong and united, disintegrating under weaker rulers. In the imperial system, wars were usually fought on the borders of empires or took the form of civil wars. The world was identified with the extent of the emperor's power.

In China and Islamic culture, political struggles were fought over control of the existing order. Dynasties succeeded, but each new ruling group claimed the status of restoring a legitimate system that had fallen into decay under its predecessors. In Europe, such an evolution did not take root. With the decline of Roman rule, pluralism became the defining characteristic of the European order. The European idea was reduced to geographical unity, to the personification of the Christian world or “civilized” society, to the focus of enlightenment, education, culture, to modern society. Nevertheless, even though in the eyes of other peoples it looked like a single civilization, Europe as a whole never knew one-man rule and did not have a single, strictly defined identity. It changed the principles around which its various units organized themselves quite often, experimenting with new concepts of political legitimacy and international order.

In other regions of the world, the period of competition between “appanage” rulers was called by descendants the “Time of Troubles,” civil war, or “the era of warring kingdoms”; it is a kind of dirge for disunity that has been overcome. Europe actually encouraged fragmentation and in some places even cherished it. Competing dynasties and competing peoples were perceived not as manifestations of "chaos" that needed to be brought into order, but, in an idealized perspective European countries important figures - sometimes consciously, sometimes not at all - as a complex mechanism designed to ensure a balance that preserves the interests, integrity and independence of each people. For more than a thousand years, theorists and practitioners of European government controlled they brought order out of balance, and identity out of resistance to universal rules and norms. This is not to say that European monarchs were not susceptible to the temptations of conquest, that constant temptation of their counterparts in other civilizations, or were more committed to abstract ideals of diversity. Rather, they simply lacked the strength to decisively impose their will on their neighbors. Over time, this pluralism became a distinctive characteristic of the European model of world order. Has Europe managed to overcome pluralistic tendencies in our time, or are the internal turmoil of the European Union again proving their viability?

For five hundred years, Rome's imperial rule provided a single set of laws, guaranteed common defense against external enemies, and an unprecedented level of culture. With the final fall of Rome, usually dated to 476 AD, the empire fell apart. During what historians call the Dark Ages, nostalgia for a lost universality flourished. The vision of harmony and unity increasingly became the responsibility of the church. According to her picture of the world order, the Christian population appeared as a single society governed by two complementary bodies - the civil government, the “successors of Caesar,” who maintained order in the temporal, transitory sphere, and the church, “the successor of Peter,” which preached universalism and absolute principles of salvation. Aurelius Augustine, writing his theological works in North Africa during the era of the collapse of Roman institutions, came to the conclusion that temporary political power is legitimate to the extent that it contributes to a God-fearing life and the posthumous salvation of the human soul. “For there are two [powers], O Emperor and Augustus, by which this world is governed by right of supremacy: the holy authority of the pontiffs and the royal power. Of these, the burden of the clergy is heavier, since they will give an answer to the Lord at the divine court for the kings themselves.” . This is what Pope Gelasius I wrote to the Byzantine Emperor Anastasius in 494. The real world order was thereby recognized as unattainable in this world.

From its very inception, this comprehensive concept of world order had to struggle with a certain anomaly: in post-Roman Europe, dozens of secular rulers claimed sovereignty, there was no clear hierarchy between them, while they all swore allegiance to Christ, but their attitude to the church and authority the latter was ambivalent. The assertion of ecclesiastical authority was accompanied by fierce debate, while the kingdoms, with their own armies and independent policies, maneuvered intensely to gain advantages in a manner that was in no way consistent with Augustine's City of God.

The desire for unity was briefly realized at Christmas 800, when Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne, ruler of the Franks and conqueror of what is now France and Germany, as Imperator Romanorum (Emperor of the Romans). and gave him the theoretical right to lay claim to the former eastern part of the former Roman Empire, at that time called Byzantium. The emperor swore to the pope “to defend the holy Church of Christ from all enemies, to protect it from pagan wickedness and attacks of infidels, both outside and inside, and to increase the strength of the Catholic faith by our adherence to it.”

But Charlemagne's empire was unable to fulfill the emperor's vows: in fact, it began to disintegrate almost immediately after Charlemagne's coronation. The emperor, who was overwhelmed by the troubles of the "metropolis", closer to home, never tried to rule the lands of the former Eastern Roman Empire, handed over to him by the pope. In the west, he achieved some success, winning Spain from the Moorish conquerors . After the death of Charles, his successors made efforts to preserve what had been achieved and turned to tradition, calling their possessions the Holy Roman Empire. But, weakened by civil wars, less than a century after its founding, the empire of Charlemagne disappeared from the historical stage as a single political entity (although the name of the state moved throughout European territory over the centuries until 1806).

China had its own emperors, and the Islamic world was ruled by caliphs - the recognized leaders of Muslims. There was a Holy Roman Emperor in Europe. However, the latter had to rely on a much weaker base than his brothers in other civilizations. It did not have an imperial bureaucracy. His power depended on the power in the regions he ruled by dynastic law; in some ways they were, so to speak, family holdings. The status of emperor did not imply official inheritance: the ruler was chosen by seven (later nine) princes; these elections tended to be a volatile mixture of political maneuvering, appeals to religious piety, and enormous financial expenditures. Theoretically, the emperor had the support of the Pope, but political and geographical considerations (distance from Rome) often deprived him of this support, and therefore for many years he ruled as the “elected emperor”. Religion and politics never formed a single structure, which subsequently prompted Voltaire to make a well-known caustic remark: that in fact the Holy Roman Empire was “neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.” The concept of international order in medieval Europe reflected the ongoing agreements between the pope and the emperor—and a host of other feudal overlords. The universal order, based on the possibility of a single government and a single set of laws, was steadily deprived of any practical value.

The true embodiment of the medieval concept of world order occurred briefly with the rise in the sixteenth century of Prince Charles of Habsburg (1500–1558); his reign also resulted in the final death of this idea. Stern and pious, born in Flanders, the prince gravitated towards power from childhood; with the exception of a well-known taste for spices, no vices could be found in him, and public opinion recognized him as immune to ordinary human weaknesses. As a child, he inherited the crown of the Netherlands, and at the age of sixteen he became the king of Spain - with all the vast and growing colonies in Asia and America. Shortly thereafter, in 1519, he won the election as Holy Roman Emperor and thus became Charlemagne's formal successor. The coincidence of titles shows that the medieval vision of imperial destiny seemed ready to be fulfilled. The pious ruler now single-handedly ruled territories roughly corresponding to modern-day Austria, Germany, Northern Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Eastern France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and most of North and South America. (This concentration of political power in one hand was ensured almost exclusively through strategic marriages and led to the Habsburg motto: “Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube!” - “Leave the wars to others; you, happy Austria, marry!” ) Spanish travelers and conquistadors - Magellan and Cortes set out on their campaigns with the approval of Charles - destroyed ancient empires on the American continent and brought the Christian faith and the European political system to the New World. The army and navy of Charles V defended the Christian faith from a new wave of foreign invasions - from the Ottoman Turks and their satellites in Southeast Europe and North Africa. Charles personally led the attack on Tunisia, an expedition financed with New World gold. Taking a direct part in the turbulent events of the era, Charles V was hailed by his contemporaries as “the greatest emperor since the division of the empire in 843,” a ruler destined to return the world to “one shepherd.”

In the tradition of Charlemagne, at his coronation Charles swore to be the "protector and zealot of the Holy Roman Church", and the people made vows and homage to him as "Caesare" and "Imperio"; Pope Clement VII established Charles in the role of secular champion of “the establishment of peace and the restoration of order” among Christians.

A Chinese or Turkish visitor to Europe at that time might have seen the appearance of a familiar political system: the continent was ruled by a single dynasty, whose power was believed to come from a deity. If Charles had succeeded in fully consolidating his power and establishing an orderly succession within the great territorial conglomerate of the Habsburgs, Europe might well have submitted to a dominant central power, like China or the Islamic caliphate.

But that did not happen; Yes, Karl, in general, did not try. By and large, he was satisfied with the establishment of order based on balance. Hegemony may have been his legacy, but it was clearly not his goal, as he proved when, after the capture of his political rival, the French king Francis I, at the Battle of Pavia in 1525, he released him - and allowed France to continue to pursue an independent, competitive foreign policy in the very heart of Europe. The French king repaid Charles for this broad gesture by taking a remarkable step, so atypical for the medieval concept of Christian statehood: he offered military cooperation to the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman, who at that time invaded Eastern Europe and challenged the power of the Habsburgs.

The universality of the church, which Charles V dreamed of, also did not materialize . The emperor failed to prevent the emergence and spread of the doctrine of Protestantism in the lands that were the support of his power. As a result, both the religious and political unity of the empire suffered. An attempt to realize the aspirations befitting such an emperor was beyond the capabilities and abilities of one person. Titian's Portrait of Charles V (1548), now in the Alte Pinakothek in Munich, shows us the suffering of an aristocrat who is unable to find spiritual satisfaction or adequately manipulate the secondary (for him, of course) levers of hegemony. Charles decided to renounce the dynastic title and divide his vast empire, and he did it in a way that once again emphasized that pluralism had clearly prevailed over the former desire for unity. He bequeathed the kingdom of Naples and Sicily to his son Philip. , then handed over to him the crown of Spain along with the global empire. At an emotional ceremony in 1555 in Brussels, Charles V heard the history of his reign, which testified to the zeal with which he carried out his duties, and also handed over the Netherlands to Philip II. That same year, Charles concluded an important treaty, the Peace of Augsburg, which formally allowed the practice of Protestantism within the borders of the Holy Roman Empire. Having destroyed the spiritual foundation of his state, Charles V gave the princes the right to choose the religious orientation of their subject territories. Shortly thereafter, he relinquished his title as Holy Roman Emperor and handed over the care of the empire, its internal turmoil and external challenges, to his brother Ferdinand. And he himself took refuge in a monastery in rural Spain, intending to lead a solitary life. He spent his last days in the company of his confessor and an Italian watchmaker, whose works adorned the walls of his cell and whose craft Karl tried to study. When he died in 1558 and his will was opened, it expressed regret for the violation of the imperial oath during his reign, and Charles advised his son to redouble the efforts of the Inquisition.

Three events completed the collapse of the old ideal of unity. By the time Charles V died, revolutionary change had forced Europe to look beyond its regional scope to a global perspective, while fragmenting the medieval political and religious order through the Age of Discovery, the invention of printing, and the schism of the church.

On the map of the world, as educated Europeans of the Middle Ages imagined it, the Northern and Southern Hemispheres will be depicted in a somewhat unusual form for us: from India in the east to Iberia and the British Isles in the west, with Jerusalem in the center. For medieval perception it was not a traveler's map, but a stage ordained by God for the fulfillment of the drama of human redemption. The world, as was then believed, unshakably believing the Bible, consisted of six-sevenths land and one-seventh water. Since the principles of salvation were clearly formulated and known - implanted - including in the lands known as Christendom, there was no need or reward for penetrating the outskirts of civilization. In his Inferno, Dante described Ulysses' voyage through the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar and the heights on the coast of North Africa, on the western edge of the Mediterranean) in search of knowledge; the hero is punished for crimes against God's will - he is doomed to fight a hurricane that threatens to sink the ship and the entire crew.

The modern era ushered in as enterprising communities sought fame and fortune by exploring the oceans and the territories that lay beyond them. In the fifteenth century, Europe and China ventured into the unknown almost simultaneously. Chinese ships, at that time the largest in the world and the most technologically advanced, made exploratory voyages to Southeast Asia, India and the east coast of Africa. The Chinese exchanged gifts with local dignitaries, included foreign nobles in the Chinese “table of ranks,” and brought home cultural artifacts and zoological curiosities. However, after the death of the “chief eunuch” In 1433, Zheng He ordered the end of ocean voyages, and the fleet was left to rot in the ports. China continued to insist on the universal significance of its principles of world order, but from now on it intended to cultivate them exclusively at home, or, at best, to share them with its closest neighbors. And he never again undertook comparable sea expeditions - perhaps until now.

Sixty years later, the European powers also took to the ocean, abandoning a continent where sovereign states competed incessantly; each monarch financed his own naval expedition, hoping primarily to gain a commercial or strategic advantage over his rivals. Portuguese, Dutch and English ships dared to sail to India; The Spaniards and English also flocked to the Western Hemisphere. Gradually they began to displace the existing trade monopolies and political structures. A three-century era of predominant European influence on world affairs began. International relationships, once purely regional, became global from a geographical point of view, their center was Europe, in which the concept of world order and ways to achieve it were formulated.

Then there was a revolution in thinking about the nature of political power. How to convey your thoughts to the inhabitants of lands whose existence was previously unknown? How do they fit into the medieval cosmology of empires and papacy? The Council of Theologians, convened by Charles V in 1550–1551 in Valladolid, Spain, concluded that people living in the Western Hemisphere are the owners of souls - therefore, they also have the right to salvation. This theological conclusion was, of course, a convenient justification for conquest and transformation. Europeans were given the opportunity to increase their wealth and ease their conscience. Global competition for control of territory has changed the nature of the international order. The European perspective expanded - and expanded until the successive colonization efforts of various European states affected most of the globe, until the concept of world order merged with the ideology of the balance of power in Europe.

The second significant event was the invention of printing in the mid-fifteenth century, which made it possible to disseminate knowledge on a hitherto unimaginable scale. Medieval society stored knowledge by simply memorizing it verbatim—or by painstakingly copying religious texts by hand—or by analyzing history through the lens of epic poetry. During the era of world exploration, all newly discovered lands had to be studied and described, and printing made it possible to reproduce travel reports in the required quantity. The exploration of new lands also stimulated interest in antiquity and its discoveries, with special attention to the significance of the human personality. The strengthening of the position of reason as an objective source of understanding and enlightenment shook existing institutions, including the hitherto unshakable power of the Catholic Church.

The third revolutionary upheaval, the Protestant Reformation, began when Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-Five Theses to the door of the castle church in Wittenberg in 1517. He insisted that man is directly related to God; therefore, individual character, individual consciousness - and not at all the mediation of clergy - can and should be considered the key to salvation. A number of feudal rulers saw an opportunity to strengthen their power by adopting Protestantism, imposing it on their subjects, and enrich themselves by seizing church property. Each side of the confrontation called the other's adherents heretics, and theological disagreements quickly escalated into a life-and-death struggle, when religious strife worsened political ones. The barrier separating "home" and foreign affairs collapsed as the overlords began to support rival factions in their neighbors' lands, often provoking - or participating in - bloodshed. The Protestant Reformation destroyed the concept of a world order existing through the “two swords” - the papacy and imperial power. Christianity split, Christians fought with each other.

New world order. Russia's role in it. Will Moscow be able to regain its place in the sun? What are you talking about, dear reader? In the new global world that the Americans are trying to build right now, there is no place for Russia. Ideally, there is no such state at all.

In 2014 it was released last book former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger "World Order". This book is unique.

It was written at a time when the world was approaching another turning point, and it was written by a man who largely predetermined the outcome of the Cold War in favor of the United States and contributed to the destruction of the USSR. What place did this man give to post-Soviet Russia in the new world?

The USA is the basis of the world order

The main leitmotif of the book: “The USA, the basis of the world order.” Their presence in each region of the world gives the system stability and stability. It is the stability of the order built by the United States over the past decades that the author is most worried about. He sees that latest events significantly undermined the unipolar world called Pax Americana. In order to maintain world dominance, the United States has neither the resources nor sufficient superiority over its opponents, which have sharply gained weight. And in order to make the system sustainable, Henry Kissinger proposes returning to the concept of balancers, which formed the basis of the Peace of Westphalia following the results of the first pan-European Thirty Years' War.

Peace of Westphalia

“The seventeenth-century negotiators who drew up the terms of the Peace of Westphalia did not, of course, imagine that they were laying the foundations of a global system that would extend far beyond the borders of Europe. They did not even try to involve neighboring Russia in this process, which at that time was establishing its own new order after the hardships of the Time of Troubles, and was enshrining into law principles that were radically different from the Westphalian balance of power: absolute monarchy, a single state religion - Orthodoxy and territorial expansion in all directions" (Henry Kissinger).

New Europe (German Roman Empire), according to the Peace of Westphalia, became a conglomerate of sovereign entities with equal rights and was virtually helpless in relation to external forces. Throughout the existence of its fragmentation, the armies of world powers passed through its territory many times, absolutely disregarding the sovereignty and rights of monarchs. The “Peace of Westphalia” presupposes the absence of a dominant center of power in Europe and the suppression of one if one arises.

This is Kissinger's “offer” for Europe. Should we be surprised by today's problems in Germany? Everything is strictly according to Henry. Germany and France joined forces to become the hegemon of the EU. That is why “terrorists” are shooting civilians in Paris, and hundreds of thousands of refugees from ISIS flocked to wealthy Germany to undermine its economic and political power. The intra-European “balancer” did not work and external soft power introduced a new, all-destructive “variable” into the equation.

How the US won the Cold War

Henry Kissinger considers great Europeans to be people who were very odious for the USSR-Russia:

“Western Europe has found the moral strength to set out on the road to a new world order, and this is due to three great men: Konrad Adenauer in Germany, Robert Schumann in France and Alcide de Gasperi in Italy.” (Henry Kissinger)

It was they who contributed to the consolidation of the Americans in Europe. Under them, NATO and the EU were created (which initially did not claim anything). Konrad Adenauer, moreover, was a fierce opponent of the USSR (and this despite the fact that Germany, which he was restoring, was destroyed by the British and Americans). Who can argue with Kissinger? The “sixes” were good.

It is noteworthy that in the book there is not a single mention of the German Chancellor Willy Brandt (“New Ostpolitik”) and the French leader Charles de Gaulle. The first dared to put forward the idea of a large and peaceful Europe with the inclusion of the USSR in its composition, and the second encroached on the holy of holies of America: the dollar and defiantly withdrew from NATO.

To the East

In general, by the beginning of the 1970s, American diplomacy suffered a lot of painful defeats. By all accounts, this threatened global defeat in the Cold War and loss of dominance in the world. The USSR gained a foothold in East Asia (China) and the Middle East (Egypt). If the United States had lost Europe as well, allowing it to become part of Greater Eurasia (it was called differently then, but the essence was the same), the geopolitical defeat of the United States would have been a foregone conclusion.

The strategy proposed by Henry Kissinger to separate the countries of the Middle East and China from the USSR worked. The world's first Maidan was organized against de Gaulle, and Willy Brandt was accused of conspiring with the USSR.

“Thank you to the CIA and the State Department for our happy childhood,” the “meat” generation of Americans of the 1990s should say.

In Europe, an arms race began to destroy trust between the eastern and western parts. Now the USSR was surrounded by enemies along the entire length of its borders and lost.

Attempt number two

Forty years have passed. Henry Kissinger, having done his job, long ago moved away from official politics. During this time, the USSR was destroyed, Russia almost disintegrated and... was reborn. The situation in the world is exactly the same as in the 1960s:

The overwhelming military power of the United States is a thing of the past. Russia recovered from the devastation and war on its territory and was able to recreate the power of its armed forces. The country's economy is developing successfully (not as fast as in the 1960s, but still) and is preparing for a big technological breakthrough. China is an ally, there has been progress towards mutual understanding in Europe, Russia has returned to the Middle East (Iran and Syria).

The essence of the American problem

Today, a single country cannot create problems for American dominance in the world. Only a political and/or economic union of states whose interests are contrary to the interests of the United States. The most dangerous for Washington is the alliance between Russia and China, to which Iran and India have actually already joined. To create a greater Eurasia, all that remains is to include a united Europe.

“The United States has every reason, historical and geopolitical, to support the European Union and prevent its “failure” into a geopolitical vacuum; The United States, deprived of contact with Europe in politics, economics and defense, will turn into an “island” off the coast of Eurasia, and Europe itself may become an appendage of Asia and the Middle East.” And as a result, Europe is now in limbo between the past, which it is trying to overcome, and the future, which it has not yet defined for itself.” (Henry Kissinger)

Exactly. There is a struggle for Europe. A Europe whose position can decide everything. Europe as an ally makes any alliance stable, but Europe as an enemy creates a lot of problems. And it works in both directions.

At the same time, Kissinger is using old schemes that have already worked once and offers Beijing to share the world with America:

The United States of America and China are the strongholds of the world order

“The presidents of the twenty-first century's main rivals, the United States and China, have solemnly vowed to avoid a repeat of the European tragedy (two world wars) by establishing “a new type of great power relationship.” This concept still awaits joint development” (Henry Kissinger).

Divide and conquer, that's it the main point Kissinger's ideas. This has already worked. Russia is the universal bridge of Eurasia. The destruction of this bridge makes it impossible to form any stable and strong alliance on the continent. That is why “Carthage must be destroyed.” "Nothing personal".

Kissinger is absolutely right when he says that there is a struggle between project unions and he is trying to create the ground for the destruction of the most dangerous (for the USA) of them and proposes a specific mechanism in the book.

That is why there is no place for Russia in the new “world order” from Kissinger. If you read his book, you will find only three fundamental references to this country.

First. Russia emerged into European politics in the 18th century and disrupted the balance of power on the continent.

Second. “The character of the international order came into question when the Soviet Union emerged as a challenge to the Westphalian system of states” (Henry Kissinger). That is, the USSR is a misunderstanding that had to be destroyed to stabilize the world order.

Third. Russia is listed on the list of countries washed by waters Pacific Ocean and therefore has interests in this region.

That's all. Kissinger has entire sections devoted to the new Europe (in which there is no Russia), China, India, Japan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, even a whole chapter is devoted to the Syrian conflict, where he uttered a remarkable phrase:

“And the armed opposition that eventually formed inside Syria hardly fits the description of a democratic, much less a moderate” (Henry Kissinger).

And there is not even a page, not even a line about how he sees Russia in the new “world order.” When he wrote this book, and it was published in the fall of 2014, he did not see modern and future Russia at all. This is what makes this creation most remarkable.

Therefore, should we be surprised at his frequent visits to Moscow and the polite but cold misunderstanding of the Russian leadership. Vladimir Putin also knows how to read and he also read that the United States has already excluded his country from the future world, which means there is nothing to talk about with them except from a position of strength, which he is very quickly building up.