Requisites
One of the little-studied pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War is the activities of barrage detachments. During Soviet times, this issue was shrouded in secrecy. According to the “Rules for maintaining military secrets in the press” Red Army(for wartime)”, approved by order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky No. 034 dated February 15, 1944:
14. All information about barrage detachments, penal battalions and companies"
This order continued after the end of the war. It is not surprising that with the beginning of the perestroika “revelations,” a certain ominous image of “executioners from the NKVD” who shot retreating Red Army soldiers with machine guns was formed in public opinion.
In the last decade, a number of publications have been published with an attempt to analyze the history of barrage detachments based on archival documents (for example). However, the issue remains insufficiently studied. Thus, there is a widespread misconception that barrage detachments appeared only after the issuance of the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.
Due to the vastness of the topic, it is impossible to consider it in one publication. In this article we will limit ourselves to the history of the creation and use of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of military operations in 1941. Thus, the scope of the study includes:
The North-Western Front, formed on June 22, 1941, on the basis of the command and control of the Baltic Special Military District.
Northern Front, formed on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the control and troops of the Leningrad Military District. By Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 001199 of August 23, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts.
The Baltic Fleet, which was under operational control of the Northern Front from June 28, 1941, and under operational control from August 30, 1941 Leningrad Front.
Volkhov Front, formed on December 17, 1941, i.e. two weeks before the end of the period under review is beyond the scope of this article.
At the beginning of February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the NKVD itself and the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). At the same time, military counterintelligence, in accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of February 8, 1941, was separated from the NKVD and transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy of the USSR, where the Third Directorates of the NPO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.
On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issued Directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. Among other things, it provided for “the organization of mobile control and barrier detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command and including in their composition operational workers of the Third Directorate with the tasks:
a) detention of deserters;
b) detaining all suspicious elements that have penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational employees of the Third Directorate of NPOs (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of material along with those detained according to jurisdiction.”
In pursuance of this directive, already on June 28, a control and barrier detachment of NKVD troops to protect the rear of the Active Army was created on the North-Western Front. On July 2, 1941, it was disbanded, and in its place the 1st defensive detachment of the NKVD troops for protecting the rear of the Active Army was created.
In July 1941, the NKVD and NKGB merged. On July 17, 1941, by resolution of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the bodies of the Third Directorate of NPOs were transformed into special departments and also became subordinate to the NKVD. This contributed to the establishment of closer ties between them and the territorial state security agencies. At the same time, special departments are given the right to arrest deserters, and in necessary cases- and shooting them on the spot.
The next day, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, in his Directive No. 169, explained the tasks of special departments as follows: “The meaning of transforming the bodies of the Third Directorate into special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, traitors, saboteurs , deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disruptors.
Ruthless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and discredit the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage.”
To ensure operational activities, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed at special departments of divisions and corps, at special army departments - separate rifle companies, at special front departments - separate rifle battalions staffed by NKVD troops. .
Carrying out their tasks, special departments, in particular, set up barrage detachments in the rear of our troops, as evidenced, for example, by the “Instructions for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front for the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists”:
Special departments of a division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities:
a) organize a barricade service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other traffic routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who have left combat positions without permission;
b) carefully check every detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield;
c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and investigated for trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within 12 hours;
d) all servicemen lagging behind the unit are organized into platoons (teams) and, under the command of trusted commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;
e) in particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires taking decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to shoot deserters on the spot. The head of a special department reports each such case to a special department of the army and front;
f) carry out the sentence of a military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, in front of the line;
g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to the unit and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;
h) daily report to a special department of the army and a special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrested, convicted, as well as the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and equipment transferred to the unit.”
The following document is directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 dated July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line. It says, in particular: “one of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us is organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all, without exception, military personnel who unorganized their way from the front to the front line, as well as military personnel, in groups or alone falling into other parts.
However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is not yet sufficiently organized; the check of detained persons is carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel.
In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in Red Army units, I propose:
1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose assign experienced operational workers to the detachments. Establish, as a rule, that interviews with all detainees without exception should be carried out only by detectives.
2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments and identified through intelligence and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity.
If the investigation does not obtain information about their involvement in German intelligence agencies, such persons will be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, with constant surveillance established over them both by the special department and by the unit’s commissar.”
The daily work of the barrage detachments in the first months of the war is illustrated by the report of the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Divisional Commissar Lebedev, No. 21431 dated December 10, 1941 to the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The barrage detachment under the 3rd department of the Baltic Fleet was formed in June 1941. It was a maneuverable company equipped with vehicles. To strengthen it, on the initiative of the 3rd Department, two homemade armored vehicles were manufactured at one of the enterprises in Tallinn.
Initially, the detachment operated on the territory of Estonia. In order to combat desertion, barriers were placed on the roads leading to Tallinn and Leningrad. However, since the land front at that moment was quite far away, there were few cases of desertion in the area of responsibility. In this regard, the main efforts of the barrier detachment and the group of operational workers assigned to it were aimed at fighting the gangs of Estonian nationalists hiding in the forests and swamps. A significant number of small gangs, consisting mainly of members of the Kaitseliit organization, operated on highways, attacking small units of the Red Army and individual military personnel.
As a result of the work of the barrier detachment in the first days of the war, six bandits were caught in the Loksa area, one of them was killed while trying to escape. According to intelligence reports, three people were arrested at the same time on charges of aiding bandits.
Practice has shown that in areas where gangs operate, it is very important to have informants in grocery stores, cafes and canteens in small settlements, since gangster groups from time to time were forced to purchase food, matches, cartridges, etc., sending their own people to the villages for this purpose. representatives. During one of these visits to a rural grocery store, four bandits were discovered by two scouts from the barrier detachment. Despite their numerical superiority, the latter tried to detain them. As a result, one of the bandits was killed in a shootout, two managed to escape, but the fourth, although, as it turned out, was a former Estonian running champion, failed to escape. He was wounded, captured and taken to the 3rd department.
The raids, combing of the area, secrets and outposts carried out by the detachment significantly complicated the actions of the Estonian gangs, and the cases of armed attacks in the areas that the detachment controlled decreased sharply.
When, as a result of a counterattack by the 8th Army, the Virtsu Peninsula was liberated in mid-July 1941, a platoon of a detachment and a group of operational workers went to this area to carry out an operation to clear the peninsula of persons who were hostile to the Soviet regime and assisted the Nazis. On the way to Virtsu, a platoon of a barrage detachment suddenly crashed into a German outpost in vehicles, located at the fork in the Virtsu-Pär-nu road, on the Karuse farm. The platoon was fired upon by enemy machine-gun and mortar fire, dismounted and took up the fight. As a result of the battle, the Germans, leaving behind an anti-tank gun, a machine gun and ammunition, hastily retreated. The detachment's losses were 6 killed and 2 wounded.
Having transferred the defense of the recaptured area to regular units, a platoon of the barrier detachment arrived in Virtsu. The task force immediately launched its work, as a result of which the head of the local organization “Kaitseliit”, two former members of this organization who were members of the “self-defense” formation created by the German command, the owner of a local restaurant used by the Germans as a translator, as well as a provocateur who betrayed the fascist authorities were detained two agents of our border guard. 6 informants were recruited from among the population of Virtsu.
During the same period, an operation was carried out to clear gangs from Varbla metro station and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnov district. Two platoons of a barrier detachment, reinforced with armored vehicles, together with a fighter battalion captured the indicated settlements in battle, destroying the “self-defense” headquarters and capturing a heavy machine gun, 60 bicycles, over 10 telephone sets, several hunting shotguns and rifles. Among the bandits there were killed and wounded; 4 bandits captured were shot on the spot. Our losses are 1 killed.
In Tallinn, a counter-revolutionary organization that was engaged in recruiting the local population into gangs was discovered and liquidated by a detachment. At the same time, weapons and explosives were seized.
In addition to the fight against banditry and desertion, the task force of the barrier detachment began work to send our agents to the German rear. Of the three abandoned agents, two returned. Having penetrated the occupied city of Pärnu, they found out the location of German military facilities. Using this information, Baltic Fleet aircraft successfully bombed enemy targets. In addition, information was collected about the local servants of the occupiers from among the Estonian nationalists.
During the battle for Tallinn, the barrier detachment not only stopped and returned the retreating forces to the front, but also held defensive lines. The situation became especially difficult on the day of August 27th. Separate units of the 8th Army, having lost leadership, leaving the last line of defense, fled. To restore order, not only the barrier detachment was sent, but also the entire operational staff of the 3rd department. The retreating men stopped at gunpoint and, as a result of a counterattack, threw the enemy back 7 kilometers. This played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.
The fact that the NKVD fighters did not hide behind other people’s backs is evidenced by the losses suffered by the barrier detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders.
Arriving in Kronstadt, the barrier detachment immediately began recruiting and already on September 7, 1941 sent one platoon with two operators to serve on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, and by September 18 the coast from Oranienbaum to the village. The mouth was fully serviced by the detachment.
In 1941, the barrier detachment detained over 900 people, 77 of them were arrested and convicted. At the same time, 11 people were shot on the spot or in front of the line.
Their “land” colleagues operating in the vicinity of the Baltic Fleet detachment also fought with Estonian nationalists. From the special message of the special department of the NKVD of the Northern Front No. 131142 dated July 24, 1941 to the Military Council of the front about the activities of the special department of the NKVD of the 8th Army to eliminate bandit groups on the territory of Estonia: “On July 15, 1941, a barrier detachment in the area of the location of 320 joint ventures caught two a spy from the local population who informed the enemy about the location of our units. The spies were shot on the spot."
By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation had deteriorated significantly. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by directive No. 001650 of September 5, 1941, satisfied the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko: “Headquarters has read your memorandum and allows you to create barrage detachments in those divisions that have proven themselves to be unstable. The purpose of the barrage detachments is to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of escape, to stop them, using weapons if necessary.”
A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. “Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 to the commanders of front troops, armies, division commanders, and the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions” read:
The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicky and downright hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, throw down their weapons and begin shouting: “We are surrounded!” and drag the rest of the fighters along with them. As a result of such actions by these elements, the division takes flight, abandons its material unit, and then begins to emerge from the forest alone. Similar phenomena are taking place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were up to the task, alarmist and hostile elements could not gain the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we don’t have many strong and stable commanders and commissars.
In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. In each rifle division, have a barrage detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (calculating 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at his disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.
2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to be considered direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the common escape.
3. Oblige employees of special departments and political personnel of divisions to provide all possible assistance to division commanders and barrage detachments in strengthening order and discipline of the division.
4. The creation of barrage detachments should be completed within five days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. Report receipt and execution to the commanders of fronts and armies.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
B. Shaposhnikov ".
Unlike the barrage detachments that continued to exist under special departments of the NKVD, focused mainly on detaining deserters and suspicious elements, army barrage detachments were created with the goal of preventing the unauthorized withdrawal of units. These units were much larger (a battalion per division instead of a platoon), and their personnel were not made up of NKVD soldiers, but from ordinary Red Army soldiers. So, according to the staff of the barrage battalion of the 10th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Front, it should have 342 people (commanding personnel - 24, junior commanding personnel - 26, rank and file - 292). However, the actual number of barrage battalions, as a rule, was significantly lower.
As can be seen from table. 1, only in one of the nine divisions the strength of the barrage battalion corresponded to the regular one.
Table 1
The number of barrage battalions of rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front and their equipment with automatic weapons
|
№ divisions |
Report date |
Number of personnel |
Heavy machine guns |
Manual machine guns |
Automata |
|
No information |
|||||
A very indicative example is the 43rd division, which suffered heavy losses in the December battles (on January 1, 1942, its personnel numbered only 1,165 people). It is obvious that the division’s barrage battalion, whose strength had dropped to 64 people, did not avoid serious combat losses.
Simultaneously with the creation of the barrage battalions of the divisions, a decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00274 of September 18, 1941 was issued “On strengthening the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad.” In this document, signed by the commander of the Leningrad Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov and members of the military council of the front, 1st secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and city committee of the CPSU (b) A.A. Zhdanov and 2nd Secretary A.A. Kuznetsov, in particular, was prescribed:
"5. To the Head of the OVT (Troop Rear Security. - I.P.) Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Stepanova to organize four barrage detachments to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without documents.
To the Chief of Logistics of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Mordvinov to organize feeding points with these barrage detachments.” And indeed, these four barrage detachments were immediately created.
Nowadays it is often asserted that the only thing the barrier detachments did was shoot at their own people. In this case, it is completely unclear why they should organize nutritional points? To feed those being shot before execution?
In October 1941, the Northwestern Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, thwarted the enemy command's plan to bypass Moscow from the north. At the same time, according to a special message from the head of the special department of the NKVD of the North-Western Front, state security commissioner of the 3rd rank V.M. Bochkov dated October 23, 1941 addressed to the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd Rank V.S. Abakumov, during the battles near the village of Lobanovo, a number of servicemen fled from the battlefield. During October 21, the barrier detachment detained 27 people. At another site near the village of Lobanovo, the barrier detachment detained 100 people, including 5 junior commanders. The malicious deserters were arrested, one was shot in front of the line.
According to the certificate prepared by the deputy. Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank S.R. Milstein for the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, “from the beginning of the war to October 10th of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 military personnel who lagged behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 military personnel were detained by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops to protect the rear.
Of those detained, Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the rest
632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front.
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 were shot in front of the line.
This data is distributed along the fronts:
Leningradsky: arrested - 1044 shot - 854 shot before the line - 430 Karelsky: arrested - 468 shot - 263 shot before the line - 132 Severny: arrested - 1683 shot - 933 shot before the line - 280 North-West: arrested - 3440 shot - 160 0 shot in front of the line - 730...” As we see, the overwhelming majority of military personnel detained by special departments and barrage detachments were not subjected to repression, but were sent to the front. Only about 4% of them were arrested, including 1.5% who were shot.
Thus, under the name “barrage detachment” in initial period During the Great Patriotic War, formations of different subordination operated. Barrier detachments detained deserters and suspicious elements in the rear, and stopped retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often suffering heavy losses.
Bibliography:
Kokurin A., Petrov N. NKVD: structure, functions, personnel. Article two (1938-1941) // Free Thought. - 1997. - No. 7.
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: Materials of the USSR state security bodies from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia / Comp. A.T. Zhadobin and others - M.: Publishing house "Zvonnitsa", 2002. - 480 p.
RGANI. F.89. Op.18. D.8. L.1-3. Quote from: Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin Archive. Documents of the highest bodies of party and state power. - M.: International Foundation "Democracy", 2006. - P. 317-318. (636 pp.)
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M.: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 717 p.
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 2. September 1 - December 31, 1941. - M.: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 699 p.
Appendix No. 1 to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 0205-1956. List No. 1 of directorates, formations, units, divisions and institutions of the NKVD troops that were part of the Active Army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. - B.M., 1956. - 100 p.
Pykhalov I.V. The great slandered war. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. - 480 p.
Russian archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (1943-1945). - T. 13(2-3). - M.: TERRA, 1997. - 456 p.
Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. T. 2 / Ch. ed. commission A.A. Grechko. - M.: Voenizdat, 1976. -639 p.
Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. T. 7 / Ch. ed. commission N.V. Ogarkov. - M.: Voenizdat, 1979. -687 p.
Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (CAMO). F.217. Op.1221. D.5.
TsAMO. F.217. Op.1221. D.94.
In the north-west of the country. It is designed to protect Russia's western borders. The headquarters of the Western Military District is located in " cultural capital» our Motherland - St. Petersburg.
Military-administrative division of the Russian Federation
The main administrative unit of the Armed Forces is the district. From December 1, 2010, according to the Presidential Decree, four such units were formed in Russia: Central, Eastern, Western and Southern districts. The first two are the largest in terms of area occupied, and the last is the smallest. The military-administrative reform consisted of several stages. Thus, according to the first of them, dated September 1, 2010, five main units were created: the North Caucasus, Volga-Ural, Siberian, Far Eastern and Western military districts. However, this division did not last long. On December 1 of the same year, the second Appendix to the Presidential Decree came into effect, according to which only four administrative units remained.
Central Military District
This administrative unit included within its borders the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Mari El, the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Mordovia, the Republic of Tyva, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Udmurt Republic, the Chuvash Republic, the Republic of Khakassia, the Altai, Perm, Krasnoyarsk territories, Irkutsk, Kirov, Kurgan, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Penza, Samara, Orenburg, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, Tyumen, Ulyanovsk, Chelyabinsk, Tomsk regions, Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug - Ugra and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
Eastern Military District
This administrative unit included within its borders the Republic of Sakha, the Republic of Buryatia, Transbaikal, Kamchatka, Khabarovsk, Primorsky territories, Amur, Sakhalin, Magadan regions, as well as the Jewish Autonomous Region and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
Southern Military District
This administrative unit included within its borders the Republic of Adygea, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Dagestan, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Chechen Republic, the Republic of North Ossetia - Alania, the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, the Rostov, Volgograd and Astrakhan areas.
Western Military District
This administrative unit included within its borders the Republic of Komi, the Republic of Karelia, Arkhangelsk, Belgorod, Vladimir, Vologda, Bryansk, Voronezh, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kaliningrad, Kursk, Leningrad, Moscow, Murmansk, Lipetsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod, Pskov, Ryazan , Oryol, Smolensk, Tambov, Tula, Yaroslavl, Tver regions, the cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow, as well as the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
Composition of the Western Military District
This administrative military unit, formed during the 2008-2010 reform, united two military districts - Leningrad and Moscow. In addition, the Western Military District included the Baltic and Northern Fleet, as well as the First Air Defense and Air Force Command.
ZVO became the first administrative unit formed during this new system division. The troops of the Western Military District consist of two and a half thousand military units and formations. Their total number exceeds four hundred thousand military personnel - about forty percent of the total number of the Russian Armed Forces. The commander of the Western Military District is responsible for all military formations of all branches and types of troops stationed in this territory. The exception is space and strategic purposes. In addition, its operational subordination includes the following formations: Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Border Service of the FSB, units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, as well as other ministries and departments of the Russian Federation that perform tasks in the territory of this district.
Organization and strength Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and Air Defense
The Western Military District includes four airborne units. This is: a separate special guards regiment. assignment, located in Moscow, two guards air assault divisions (in Tula and Pskov) and one guards airborne division (in Ivanovo). It also includes units and marines: a separate motorized rifle regiment (located in Kaliningrad), a separate motorized rifle brigade (in Gusev), a guards brigade Marine Corps(in Baltiysk and the village of Mechnikovo), two coastal missile brigades (in Donskoy, in Kaliningrad and in Chernyakhovsk), an artillery brigade (in Kaliningrad), a separate marine regiment (in the village of Sputnik, Murmansk region). In addition, it included two brigades special purpose. The commander of the Western Military District is responsible for the Baltic and Northern fleets, the aviation of these fleets, the first air defense and air force command, as well as the USC East Kazakhstan region.
Ground troops
The Western Military District includes the sixth combined-arms Red Banner Army (motorized rifle, artillery, anti-aircraft and engineering brigades), the twentieth guards combined-arms Red Banner Army (motorized rifle, tank, missile, artillery and rocket-artillery brigades). The control of the Western Military District also extends to district subordinate units, which include an operational group of Russian troops located in the Transnistria region (Republic of Moldova) and a separate guards motorized rifle Sevastopol brigade.
Commanding staff of the district
The headquarters of this military administrative unit is located in the city. Head of the Western Military District, Lieutenant General A. Sidorov (in this position - from December 24, 2012), in the period from October 2010 to November 2012, Colonel General A. Bakhin was in the position of chief. The chief of staff - first deputy commander is Admiral N. Maksimov. Head of the organizational and mobilization department - deputy chief of staff - Major General E. Burdingsky. Deputy commander of the troops - Major General I. Buvaltsev.
Exercises in the Western Military District
Military reform affected not only the administrative division of the army, but also implies modernization technical base and weapons, combat training has also changed for the better - not only for officers and contract employees, but also for conscripts. Now great attention is devoted to conducting field training and exercises.
Modern soldiers become familiar with military equipment in real field conditions, and not according to methodological recommendations. Thus, from May 27 to June 5, planned exercises with firing from modern Iskander-M missile systems were held in the Western Military District. The exercises took place as part of testing the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, equipped with high-precision weapons. During this event, the military worked out the issues of organizing the combined destruction of air- and ground-based weapons of particularly important objects of the alleged enemy. One missile formation was involved in the exercises Western District, which is armed with long-range aircraft and Iskander-M missile systems.
During this event, the missile unit made a combined march, its length was more than two thousand kilometers. The soldiers practiced reconnaissance issues along the route of the complex, covert deployment, and occupation of firing positions. At the final stage, together with the units, the missilemen conducted combat training to hit a conditional target with air- and ground-based cruise missiles at the maximum possible distance. To evaluate the effectiveness of the results, the latest domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicles were used.
Conclusion
Before the soldiers had time to return to their units and the district leadership had time to debrief the results of the exercises, new, even larger ones began, which involved the following federal administrative districts: part of the Volga, Central and Northwestern. The military district raised seven regiments and five aviation regiments. During these events, radio engineering and anti-aircraft missile forces repelled a massive air raid by the alleged enemy, protecting strategically important facilities from air strikes.
As you can see, today the defenders of the fatherland are not allowed to get bored. The country's leadership is concerned about the combat effectiveness of the army and is doing everything to raise it to a qualitatively new level.
5. Illustration of the unreliability of the official point of view
Assessment of possible losses of the North-Western Front in the summer of 1941
Eat fifth way show the fallacy of the calculation methods of the team of authors of the “Book of Loss”, and in our opinion, despite the logic and transparency of the four other methods shown above, it is the most important.
It consists in continuous comparison information on emergency situations of troops, data on reinforcements received by the troops, and corresponding named data on human losses for a certain period. The first component was selectively used by the authors in the calculations of the “Book of Losses” when analyzing operations where our troops suffered irreparable losses and did not account for them, because there was no one. Data on the number of troops at the start of the operation were partially taken as the basis for calculating losses. But this same method was not used in a global sense to analyze all operations and the war as a whole, most likely due to its complexity. And another important component was completely left out of sight - information about reinforcements arriving at the front. The official calculations of losses were based only on digital reports of troops on losses along the entire vertical for periods of fighting without comparing them with the numerical strength of troops at the beginning and end of the periods and replenishment of them for the same time, without comparison with nominal data on the payroll of all dead and missing in each time interval.
Let's illustrate. Based on the last surviving report from the unit, one can estimate its strength before the battles in which it died. It’s the same in the army and at the front, you just need to spend a little more time. The number of fighters and commanders was strictly correlated with the amount of weapons, ammunition, food, ammunition and equipment. Therefore, data on the number of fighters on a specific date is a priority in any calculations, including in calculating losses. The arrival and distribution of reinforcements was also recorded by the staffing departments of army headquarters. Comparison of the listed strength of a formation after the end of the battles, if it survived and submitted a report on the emergency situation, with the same information submitted before the start of the battles, taking into account reinforcements (if any) gives a reliable picture of the movement of personnel (decreased, or remained the same, or increased ). What's so complicated about this? It can be clarified after a while, if circumstances permit, but in any case, this is an elementary method for any staff officer. But will he send a report to the authorities if this method of calculation was not legalized by the existing Manuals and Instructions?
It is clear that it would be fair to count all the fighters who were in the military unit after the defeat as lost, or at least as missing in a digital loss report. It was very difficult to back them up with personal lists given the extremely poor records of personnel in the first period of the war or the loss of records. There was no one left to take care of them. But reliable digital data on losses during the war could have been compiled and presented based on an analysis of the emergency response data for the period of fighting! The first thought about the reason for refusing this was that the digital loss accounting system itself, based on submitted reports of subordinate units. Formally, the timing was linked to the submission of data on emergency situations, but did not provide for the simultaneous filling out of a comparison sheet for the reporting period:
– was at the beginning date of the reporting period;
– replenishments arrived for the period;
– remained at the final reporting date;
– loss of personnel during the period.
The second assumption is that the performers lied at their own peril and risk. What if the first was also aggravated by the second? What more is there?
The head of the staffing department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front (hereinafter referred to as NWF), Colonel V. Kashirsky, in August 1941, presented the first report from the front during the war on the number of losses of personnel of subordinate troops immediately for June-July 1941 (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 71, pp. 121–123). Total for 57 207 people of all categories - irretrievable, sanitary, and other losses in combat and other parts of the front, and in the fund of NWF documents and other digital reports that take into account losses all formations and units of the front available at the beginning of the war, during this time there is simply no. They were not preserved, even if they were. In 40 days (June 22 – July 31), a lot happened to the front: it was actually destroyed twice, and several times more people were lost than included in V. Kashirsky’s report. And it “pulls” the loss of only the 4th infantry division of the full wartime staff of 04/100 (14,583 people).
Listed below are the 25 infantry divisions of 12–15.5 thousand initial strength people available at the front before the war started, as well as 8 tank and 4 motorized divisions (hereinafter referred to as TD and MD), each numbering from 8 to 11 thousand people. All compounds lost at least 90% of their original composition, and some lost 1.5 of their composition by 08/01/41. Additionally, in the six Baltic divisions (179–184 Rifle Division), which almost completely fled in all directions after the start of the fighting, there were initially another 30,000 people. By August 21, 1941, there were 40 Latvians left in the 181st Infantry Division, and 60 Latvians in the 183th Infantry Division (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 7, l. 239). These divisions were restored by mid-July due to the replenishment of Russian soldiers from the Moscow Military District (hereinafter VO), who also suffered numerous losses by the time the NWF report of August 1 was compiled. Some of the nationals were able to be counted as having surrendered to the Germans or as a deserter, but the majority were simply forgotten, having lost their registration documents. Many of them later fought with our grandfathers as part of the national SS formations.
In July, new full-blooded formations of the full wartime staff of 04/100 (5 divisions - 70, 111, 118, 235, 237 infantry divisions) additionally arrived at the front. One of them immediately fled in panic after the first pressure from the German infantry regiment (Kostroma 118th Infantry Division), abandoning all their weapons and losing almost 9,000 people in 5 days. (TsAMO RF, f. 1323, op. 1, d. 3, pp. 1–30). The second (Vologda 111th Infantry Division) was defeated east of Ostrov and disintegrated, losing its division commander, and was only reassembled in the Luga area. The third (Ivanovo 235th Infantry Division), after its dissection by the Germans in July, was divided in half by the command of the North-Western direction for the Northern and North-Western fronts, which did not bring any result other than losses and confusion (TsAMO RF, f. 217, op. 1258, 15, pp. 73–74). And only two divisions (70, 237 infantry divisions) entered the battles in a compact mass, which brought success - the famous counterattack near Soltsy, which, however, was never consolidated, and Soltsy had to be abandoned again after just 6 days. Both divisions eventually lost up to 20% of their regular personnel during the week of fighting.
Leaving outside the scope of the study the numerous absurd orders and actions of the command of the direction, the front and the armies, which led to two defeats of such a large mass of front troops in just 40 days of war, we cannot help but say about all the formations and individual units, without exaggeration, that were the bones of the outcome July 1941 (25 RD, 8 TD, 4 MD and others): 5, 10, 11, 16, 23, 33, 48, 67, 70, 90, 111, 118, 125, 126, 128, 179, 180 , 181, 182, 183, 184, 188, 235, 237 SD, 22 SD NKVD, 2, 3, 5, 21, 23, 28, 42, 46 TD, 84, 163, 185, 202 MD, 5 airborne infantry divisions included 9, 10, 201 airborne brigade, 1 ogsbr, 25, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48 UR, 9 and 10 air brigade anti-tank brigade, 10, 12, 14 air defense brigade, 11 separate artillery regiments. From July 14th, as a result of the German offensive, an entire army (8th) consisting of 8 divisions and a rifle corps (41st) consisting of 2nd infantry divisions were separated from the front, and formally became part of the 22nd Army of the Western Front from July 10th, but in fact earlier the remnants of the 126th and 179th infantry divisions, which had hitherto been part of the NWF and whose losses were also losses of the NWF, withdrew. An impressive list, let us bow our heads to the dead!
This is a list of troops at the division - brigade - separate regiment level located in different time as part of the NWF in the period June-July 1941 and suffered huge irrevocable losses, which can only be determined numerically using the calculation method. That is, knowing their number at the time of entry into battle, establishing the amount of reinforcements poured into each formation at the end of the billing period, and knowing the number according to the list at the same moment.
Before the war, on June 9, 1941, the NWF included in the list of combat units - rifle, tank and motorized divisions, artillery brigades of anti-tank and air defense, airborne corps, artillery of the RGK in total 347 987 people (TsAMO RF, f. 16-A, op. 2951, d. 235, pp. 86–124). This document is reliable, it was not compiled “retroactively”, as is assumed in relation to similar documents from military districts in statistical collection No. 1 “Combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War” (M.: IVI MO RF, 1994, p. . 4). The document bears the autographs of the deputy chief of staff of the PribOVO, Major General D. Gusev, and the head of the organizational department of the headquarters of the PribOVO, quartermaster 1st rank F. Kamshilin. It is on file with documents from the pre-war period. By the way, according to statistical collection No. 1, the total number of NWF troops of all types as of June 22, 1941 was 369,702 people. (ibid., p. 16).
Among 347,987 people. the number of formations and units of only combat strength is taken into account (sk, sd, mk, TD, md, ur, airborne infantry brigade, airborne brigade brigade, anti-tank brigade, anti-aircraft brigade, ap RGK) without formations and units of the Air Force, support and logistics units of the Northwestern Front, without numerous construction units and sapper battalions of divisions, including from internal military districts (a total of 99 construction, sapper, motor battalions - TsAMO RF, f. 140, op. 13002, d. 2, l. 75), which were on the construction of lines near the state border . Together with them, the number of all troops located in the NWF zone, including those that at the beginning of the war were still kept in peacetime states, exceeded 400,000 people.
After the start of the war, until July 10, 1941, the NWF received assigned personnel from recruiting regions (Moscow Military District) for the deployment of units and formations to wartime states (about 160,000 people), as well as replenishment with marching battalions from the LVO, ArkhVO, MVO and PriVO in the amount of 26,000 people, including 24 marching battalions, 5 divisions and 12 artillery batteries (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 30, l. 56 and f. 56, op. 12236, d . 117, l. 2). Combined with the pre-war number of combat units (347,987 people), we have a resource of almost 534 000 people, I emphasize, without taking into account the number of other troops in the NWF zone, subordinate directly or operationally to the front headquarters. This is ours resource for analyzing the situation with losses of combat units for the period June 22 – August 1, 1941. The formula is the same: it was, it arrived, they fought, it became. This is where we count losses.
If we imagine that there were no reinforcements pouring into the SD during the battles (and they poured in many thousands into each), and the total losses in each of them, analyzing the data on emergency situations, are estimated on average at 10,000 people. (killed, wounded, missing, others), then even with such a superficial calculation we arrive at a number of 13-10,000 = 130,000 people. missing personnel and almost 22,000 people. from the Baltic formations, a total of 152,000 people. the loss was only in the rifle divisions of the Northwestern Front, which were part of the front at the beginning of the war. But the decline in the SD was even greater, 12–14 thousand or more people since the beginning of the fighting (see Table 4 below)! The same 128th Rifle Division, before the August defeat, was restored in July 2 times, because each time it left the ring only in small groups! What is the documentary confession of the chief of staff of the 128th Infantry Division, Colonel P. Romanenko (TsAMO RF, f. 33, entry 16894 dated July 24, 1942, l. 6) worth: “ It is not possible to provide information and identify losses of personnel of the division and units included in the division since the beginning of hostilities due to the lack of documents relating to personnel records and personnel losses in the period from 06/22/41 to September 1941.».
Two tank divisions (2 and 5) were completely destroyed in the first battles (21,000 people), information about their losses and emergency situations is not in the reports of the NWF, because there was no one to represent them. The remaining existing tank and motorized divisions (23, 28 TD, 84, 202 MD) and those newly included in the NWF (3, 21, 42, 46 TD, 163, 185 MD) also lost about 70–90% or more of their personnel each , which in total gives for June-July a loss of no less than 110-115 thousand people for mechanized formations.
As a result, according to the most conservative estimates, based on reports from troops about the presence of personnel, the loss by August 1 in the SD, TD, MD, VDK, ABR, AP alone is estimated at 326 909 people (see Table 4 below). And after all, in addition to the listed battlefields, there were many other very different parts, who also lost a significant part of their personnel.
Table 4
Number of personnel, shortage, assessment of losses of NWF troops by 07/09/41 and 08/01/41
Notes:
1. The number according to the list of combat units of the NWF that submitted reporting documents by 07/03–09/41 (including the restored 90, 180, 181, 182, 183 infantry divisions) without killed formations 67, 184 infantry division, 3 mk, 2, 5 TD.
2. The number according to the list of combat units of the Northern Western Front that submitted reporting documents by 07/10–15/41, including those who left from 07/14/41 to the subordination of the Northern Fleet as part of 8 A.
3. The number according to the list of combat units of the Northern Western Front, which submitted reporting documents by 07/20/41, excluding those who departed from 07/14/41 to the subordination of the Northern Fleet as part of 8 A.
4. Without combat units 8 A.
5. General assessment of the losses of combat units 8, 11, 27 A by the end of 07/09/41 based on information about the combat and numerical strength of troops for the period 07/03–07/09/41 (taking into account the estimate of the number of confiscated and fled Baltic l/s 180, 181, 182, 183, 184 SD - about 21,900 people).
6. General assessment of the losses of the initial list of combat units 8, 11, 27 A by 08/01/41 based on information about the combat and numerical strength of troops for the period 06/22–08/01/41 (taking into account the losses of those who left from 07/14/41 8 A, 41 sk, 126, 179 infantry division, total 12 infantry division, 1 special brigade).
7. Estimation of losses of the 235th Infantry Division without that part (1/2 of the Infantry Division) that was at the disposal of the Northern Fleet after the dissection in mid-July 1941.
8. Losses of 21 TD 10.07–01.08.41 as part of the NWF.
9. General assessment of the cumulative total of losses of combat units 8, 11, 27 A by 08/01/41, taking into account new arrivals and departures based on information about the combat and numerical strength of troops for the period 06/22–08/01/41 (including losses for period 06.22.-07.14.41 8 A, 41 sk, 126, 179 sd, total 12 sd, 1 sbr).
Hull controls are shown with hull parts (obs, sapb, pps, cap, mtsp, etc.).
* the strength of the division after restoration from the remnants.
The table is compiled according to data from TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, dd. 7, 19, 30, 53, 54, f. 344, op. 5558, no. 4.
The overall assessment of the losses of combat units 8, 11, 27 A by the end of 07/09/41, based on information about the emergency situations of troops for the period 03–07/09/41, was 260 298 people taking into account the estimate of the number of seized and escaped personnel of the Baltic 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184 SD - about 21,900 people.
In the official reporting data on the emergency response of the 8th, 11th, 27th armies and units subordinate to the Military Council of the Northwestern Front (see table 5), there are the following figures as of July 10, 1941 (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d . 47, pp. 6–13, 15–20):
Table 5
The difference between the number in the state and on the list was 241,744 people. for everyone, and not just for combat units, formations and units. The same data was confirmed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Western Front, Major General D. Gusev, indicating a shortage of personnel all troops subordinate to the front according to wartime states on July 10, 1941 in 241 017 people (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 47, l. 14). The deputy chief of staff of the front confirmed the above calculations, and the shortage indicated by him took into account the formations of the 8th Army that had not yet been transferred to the Northern Front! And everything seemed to fit, but it wasn’t so.
Our estimate of attrition, according to reports from formations and units only combat personnel on the same date - 260 298 people It turned out that the difference with D. Gusev’s data is explained by the fact that the NWF headquarters provided information on the staffing and payroll strength of not all units and formations of the front. Hence the shortage shown above in Table 5 is underestimated and unreliable. For example, the staff officers did not include the deaths of 3 MK, 2 and 5 Tank Divisions; due to failure to submit, there is no information about the 67 Infantry Division, 3rd Special Brigade, 41 Infantry Division (118, 235 Infantry Division), 21 MK, 21 Tank Division, 70, 237 Infantry Division, and for 111 SD, the data required verification in connection with its defeat (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 47, l. 6). In any case, the difference between the figures of our calculations and those of 70 years ago is visible to the naked eye. And this discrepancy is not in favor of the reporting of the NWF headquarters. After all, the denominators of the calculations are different: the NWF reported on all troops, our calculation – only on combat troops! And its result is greater than the information from the NWF headquarters.
Behind each incoming figure in Table 4 there is a line of an archival document from consolidated and individual reports on the payroll number of personnel of the NWF troops, including field departments of the front and armies and formations and units subordinate to them. It should also be noted that in the period July 3–10, the restoration of 5, 11, 23, 48, 90, 125, 128, 180, 181, 182, 183 infantry division, 84 md, 5 airborne infantry division was carried out due to the assigned reserves arriving from the Moscow Military District composition, about 75,000 people in total. That is, the difference between the staff number and the payroll in the report of the NWF headquarters (241,017 people) was reduced by 75,000 people. If we do not count this “infusion”, then by July 10 the shortage would have been about 316 000 people And this is already close to the truth, since it covers the loss of combat formations and units and includes the loss of all others.
By August 1, 1941, as follows from Table 4, the same combat troops that were part of the NWF at the beginning of the war had already lost 326 909 people for all loss categories. Taking into account the assessment of the losses of the new formations that became part of the NWF in July, the estimate of the total loss of personnel of the combat units of the front by August 1, 1941 is 326,909 + 50,560 = 377 469 people Compare with the report of V. Kashirsky (57,207 people) for parts of all types for the same number. The difference is almost 6.6 times!!!
A small note. If we compare with the actual presence of tanks in PribOVO units according to the list on June 22, 1941 - 1549 PC. (“Combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War,” Statistical collection No. 1 (June 22, 1941),” M.: IVI MO RF, 1994, p. 17) the available number of tanks as of 07/10/41, then the question arises: the shortage for 18 days of war in 316 000 man and 1156 tanks - isn't this a defeat? And by August 1, the NWF troops lost: tanks - 1,767 units. (taking into account the arrival of tanks from the LVO and MVO), guns of all systems - 1597 pcs. (out of 4050 pcs.), mortars - 598 pcs. (out of 2969 pcs.), machine guns of all systems - 7538 pcs. (out of 15,016 units), small arms - 196,814 units. (out of 389,990 units), cars of all brands - 7006 units. (out of 19,111 pcs.), tractors - 1,148 pcs. (out of 2978 pcs.), BS gas masks - 458,517 pcs., flour - 5225 tons, cereals - 518 tons, fats - 155 tons, canned food - 611,300 cans, crackers - 541 tons, oats - 2488 tons, fuels and lubricants - over 20 500 tons in stocks of all subordinates, overcoats - 343,243 pieces, tunics - 426,828 pieces, bloomers - 636,773 pieces, shoes and boots - 466,123 pairs, underwear - 2,091,533 pieces. (TsAMO RF, f. 67, op. 12001, d. 217, pp. 59–65). Higher losses in these same positions, proportionally to the larger number of troops, were on both the Western and Southwestern fronts. All this data has also already been collected and is awaiting further publication.
A fair question arises: how did our people withstand all this? It is hardly possible for us, who did not live at that time, who did not experience the full severity of the defeats, to understand with our minds - how did our predecessors survive?...
I especially emphasize: our calculations were carried out using comparable indicators, i.e. the denominator of the calculations when assessing the combat operations of specific formations is the same - reports on the number of personnel of combat units of troops, at one time or another, were part of the NWF: so many entered the battle, so many arrived and reinforcements were poured in, so many remained after the battles. Debit - credit, as financiers say, nothing complicated.
Table 6
Combat strength, number of Soviet troops and losses, according to the “Book of Losses”
As they say, without any fiddling around, feel the difference in estimates in the presentation of data for the same period. Where the authors got the number of NWF troops of 440,000 people (almost 100,000 more than officially available in the two sources indicated by the author of the article above) is a question. In addition, the estimate we presented above for the losses of combat formations and units by the end of 07/09/41 is no less 260 298 people without taking into account the losses of additional troops included in the front and without taking into account the losses of support and rear units - and it is strikingly different from the information in the book. How could the authors of the “Book of Losses” fail to notice the staggering figures for the emergency response of divisions with differences of 12–14 thousand people before the war and after it began? The authors presented losses for all types of troops for the same period as 3 times less, because they were probably based only on reports from troops and the front about losses without comparing these data with their own information about the combat and numerical strength and replenishment of them. But if the 128th SD reported for its losses in the war on August 1, 1941 at 527 people (TSAMORF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 71, pp. 121–123), having lost over 15,600, - Would you like to believe this report? By the way, it was not possible to find in the archives reports of troops about losses such that their amount was comparable to the data of the authors of the “Book of Losses.” The funds of the NWF and its armies have been fully verified.
One more moment. If we follow the logic of the authors of the “Book of Losses” (see Table 6), then the total number of NWF troops on the morning of July 10, 1941 should have been 440,000–87,208 = 352,792 people. What actually happened? According to reports on the NWF emergency response (see Table 5), the total number of all front troops on the list, including the 8th Army, as well as rear and reserve units, amounted to 171,578 people. Where did the authors of the “Book of Loss” get the additional 181,214 people? as of July 10 – unclear.
For comparison: as of July 20, there were 217,872 people on the front list (without the 8th Army). (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 47, l. 51). And here the difference is 135 thousand.
But that's not all. According to the information in the same book (see op. cit., p. 192), during the six months of the war (06/22–12/31/41), the NWF lost only 270,087 people. in all categories. As can be seen from the above material, the loss of personnel we identified for the period from the beginning of the war to July 10, 1941 almost completely covers the six-month official number of front losses included in the calculations of the “Losses Book”. And if we take the estimate of losses for the period before August 1, 1941 (377,469 people), then the difference of 107 thousand people will be already glaring. And after all, until December 31, 1941, there are still 5 months of war and two new failures in the combat operations of the front troops in August and September!!!
In Chapter 10, the issue of NWF losses for the entire 1941 will be examined in more detail.
The deputy chief of staff of the Northwestern Front, Major General D. Gusev, knowingly knowing about the unreliability of his report of July 10, 1941, very carefully called the absence of people a shortage. The front headquarters could not truthfully account for the loss of people and equipment, and it was necessary to report through the chain of command about the lack of troop resources. Subordinate troops did not report their losses to front headquarters, and since there are no reports from below, then there is no report up the chain of command. I had to report only the “shortage”. In fact, it’s a lie, if you call a spade a spade.
What, if not losses, is this “shortage”? The military personnel are not seconded, not demobilized, and are not treated in medical battalions and regimental medical posts at the location of their units. There are no military personnel on the list in the units on a specific date as a result of unfavorable hostilities. They are not in service. They were there on 06/09/41 or became part of the front forces later, and they were gone by 08/01/41. For the warring troops this is a loss of personnel.
Massive changes in the personnel composition of wartime troops had not yet occurred by 08/01/41. The shortage was calculated by the NWF staff officers from a comparison with the wartime staff of units and formations (for the SD staff of 04/100 in 14,583–14,831 people), put into operation from the beginning of the war according to the MP-41 mob plan. This is specifically shown in the front emergency response reports. The staff of SD 04/400 (14,444 people) was not introduced in any of the above-mentioned divisions at the time of calculating the shortage, because all of them were pre-war personnel formations deployed according to the mob plan according to the staff of 04/100. The same picture is typical for all personnel SD of the Red Army that entered the battles in June-July 1941 (160 SD). Only a few personnel divisions in the internal military districts (88, 238) and new additional formations that had begun to form remained in the state of 04/400 for about 2 months from mid-July 1941. The reduced staff of SD 04/600 was introduced on 07/29/41, and was used en masse among the troops only from 09/19/41 (with the exception of broken formations withdrawn to reserve for restoration, which were transferred to it in August). In the tank divisions of the state 010/10 the number was 10,942 people, in the motorized divisions of the state 05/70–11,579 people. The shortage was determined in relation to this number.
It must be said that official historical works, as well as a significant number of current researchers, operate with unreliable information that the rifle divisions of the Red Army from the beginning of the war were maintained according to staff 04/400, approved on 04/05/41 and introduced before the war by the Directives of the Chief of the GShKA dated 29 –05.31.41 (TsAMO RF, f. 140, op. 13002, d. 8, l. 64). You can verify the unreliability of this in any of the archival records of the emergency situations of rifle formations for June-July 1941, of which there are thousands. The enemy did not give us time for the final implementation of this state before the war. Therefore, the deployment of rifle formations according to the MP-41 mob plan after the start of hostilities took place in state 04/100, which was indicated in the divisional mob documents.
Table 4 clearly shows that the border divisions of the NWF already on June 9, 1941 were kept at wartime strength and even exceeded it. The divisions that began to move to the state border, according to the NPO Directive of 06/13/41, were also replenished before the start of the war with recruits intended for the deployment of units of 25, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48 UR, and brought to the military staff time in the period June 10–15, 1941 (TsAMO RF, f. 140, op. 12981, d. 1, l. 360, f. 58, op. 818884, d. 5, l. 188). Each division was supposed to form artillery battalions and other units to be included in the URs, but since the URs did not deploy, the recruits remained in the divisions.
According to the mobile plan, the MP-41 was assigned to formations and units of PribOVO - SZF 233 000 people from the Moscow Military District (TsAMO RF, f. 140, op. 13002, d. 5, l. 5), who began to arrive on June 20, 1941 due to covert mobilization under the guise of being recruited to large training camps. Local nationalities were not included in the troops (see ibid.). After the start of open mobilization on June 24, the remaining assigned personnel from the Moscow Military District began to arrive in dozens of echelons (TsAMO RF, f. 140, op. 13002, d. 12, pp. 1–47). The deployment of the entire variety of wartime units was carried out almost completely, with a few exceptions. These exceptions concerned the unnecessary deployment of border security forces, some of the rear units and institutions. They also refused to recruit the battle-worn SD, TD, and MD again to full wartime strength due to a lack of weapons and all types of supplies. Over 100 thousand sets of uniforms were left at the state border alone and in the rear close to it in 35 district and army warehouses, great amount weapons, equipment, many thousands of tons of ammunition, food, fuels and lubricants (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1372, d. 23, pp. 6–7). The total total losses of weapons and supplies of the NWF by August 1, 1941 are shown above. There was nothing left to clothe, arm, or supply the mass of conscripts assigned before the war from the resources of the front. Therefore, that part of it that did not manage to enter the NWF formations, from the evening of June 27, 1941, was deployed in trains in Sebezh, Nevel, Velikiye Luki, Polotsk and sent back to the Moscow Military District, where 3 NCO divisions began to be formed from them (242, 245, 248 SD - in Kalinin and Rzhev, Vyshny Volochyok, Vyazma, respectively) and several dozen marching battalions. The total number of resources allocated from the PribOVO zone to the rear and not sent to it amounted to more than 70,000 people (TsAMO RF, f. 56, op. 12236, d. 7, l. 1).
However, the process of admission of assigned personnel with the return of part of it to the Moscow Military District did not stop. The mobilized reservists assigned to the NWF formations continued to regularly arrive in trains and columns at the disposal of the NWF even after 06/27/41. This is evidenced by an archival document dated 07/07/41 signed by the new chief of staff of the Northern Western Front, Lieutenant General N. Vatutin (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 34, l. 3):
“To the commanders of the zsp and zsp. tp – 148, 140, 145, 195, 143 zsp, 9 zap. etc.
In the incoming replenishment of the assigned personnel, the number of junior command personnel is small, although the need for them is great. Meanwhile, among the arrivals there are Red Army soldiers who have completed full active service, participants in the battles with the White Finns at Khalkhin Gol, who have sufficient combat experience and can successfully occupy positions of junior command staff.
I propose to begin an immediate study of the assigned personnel and promotion of the best from the rank and file to positions of junior command staff. This event should be carried out immediately upon receipt of each individual batch under the direct supervision of the regiment command.”
The document testifies to both the previous intake of enlisted personnel and its upcoming entry in the future. After all, the mobilization process formally ended only on July 22, 1941. By this date, according to the MP-41 mob plan, units should have deployed and been formed with a mobilization period of up to 30 days.
In addition, the NWF also received reserve personnel from the territories that were part of the front line. After the end of the planned mobilization of citizens aged 1905–1918 on June 23–30, 1941. After birth, a considerable number of people of these ages, older ones, and recruits remained registered in each military registration and enlistment office. This is due to the fact that not all those liable for military service of the 1905–1918 age group were subject to mobilization with the declaration of war. birth. Thus, in the Kharkov Military District, 24% of their resources have been mobilized (TsAMO RF, f. 151, op. 13014, d. 61, l. 216–219). In the Transcaucasian Military District - 49% (TsAMO RF, f. 209, op. 1091, d. 4, l. 216). In the Leningrad Military District - 83% (TsAMO RF, f. 217, op. 1244, d. 13, l. 300). Naturally, there was no talk of a planned conscription of persons born in 1905 or new recruits. If the resource were calculated using information about them, then the percentage of those mobilized on 06/23–30/41 would be even lower. Only later will the events of the war force the leadership to make decisions on the mobilization of reserve personnel until 1890 and even 1886–1889. birth.
On the basis of the directorates of the military districts, shortly before the announcement of mobilization from June 03–19, 1941, the directorates of the fronts and reserve armies of the High Command were allocated (TsAMO RF, f. 116, op. 12884, d. 55, l. 2; f. 16- A, op. 2951, pp. 69–70; f. 181, pp. 1–5):
– The Leningrad Military District separated the administration of the Northern Front and formed a new administration of the Leningrad Military District;
- similarly, the rest: Baltic Special Military District - directorates of the North-Western Front and the Baltic Military District, Western Special Military District - directorates of the Western Front and Western Military District, Kiev Special Military District - directorates of the South-Western Front and the Kiev Military District, Odessa Military District - directorate of the 9th Army and Odessa Military District, Arkhangelsk Military District - directorate of the 28th Army and Arkhangelsk Military District, Moscow Military District - directorate of the Southern Front and Moscow Military District, Oryol Military District - directorate of the 20th Army and Oryol Military District, Kharkov Military District - directorate of the 18th Army and Kharkov Military District, North Caucasian Military District - directorates of the 19th Army and the North Caucasian Military District, Privolzhsky Military District - directorates of the 21st Army and the Volga Military District, Ural Military District - directorates of the 22nd Army and the Ural Military District, Siberian Military District - directorates of the 24th Army and the Siberian Military District IN.
From June 3 to June 19, 1941, military leaders from the corresponding positions were appointed to the positions of commanders, chiefs of staff, members of Military Councils, heads of departments and departments of headquarters of fronts and reserve armies of the High Command. When they were transferred to newly vacated positions in the military district administration, their deputies were appointed. The scheme is simple, nothing spontaneous. Everything was pretty clearly thought out in advance. In accordance with the deployment scheme and in accordance with the NPO Directives, the movement of command personnel began in the districts. And it cannot be hidden by the silence of the exact pre-war dates of appointments in the range from June 3 to June 19, 1941 in the service record cards (UPC) of newly appointed generals. All former commanders of military districts in the Criminal Procedure Code of the TsAMO of the Russian Federation do not have dates of appointment to the positions of commanders of the reserve armies of the High Command, allocated from the districts (listed below). All these Code of Criminal Procedure were drawn up “retroactively” after the war to please the official point of view, which states that all these armies were deployed after the start of the war. If we turn to such a solid source of information as “Military personnel of the Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.” (M.: Voenizdat, 1963, pp. 484–493), we will see the following dates for the appointments of commanders:
18th Army: Lieutenant General A.K. Smirnov - 06.26.41;
19th Army: Lieutenant General I.S. Konev - 06.26.41;
20th Army: Lieutenant General F.N. Remezov - 06/25/41;
21st Army: Lieutenant General V.F. Gerasimenko – 06.22.41;
22nd Army: Lieutenant General F.A. Ershakov - 06/22/41;
24th Army: Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin - 06.28.41;
28th Army: Lieutenant General V.Ya. Kachalov - 06.25.41.
On the basis of the administration of the Arkhangelsk Military District, according to Directive GShKA No. org/1/524033 dated June 19, 1941, the deployment of the front field control began (“Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War. General Staff during the Great Patriotic War: Documents and materials. 1941”, volume 23 ( 12–1), M.: TERRA, 1998, p. 34). However, on June 24, 1941, the GSKA Directive No. 2706/org dated June 24, 1941, instead of the front command, ordered the formation of a field command of the army (ibid.), which later (06/27/41) received the number 28. And information about this in official sources published before 90- x years, we will not see.
Even Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin was given the date of appointment as commander of the 16th Army on 06/21/41, while he commanded it from the moment the army was created on 06/21/40 (Muratov V., Gorodetskaya Y. “Commander Lukin”, Kyiv: Voenizdat, 1990, p. 15).
But since the field commands of the armies and the troops subordinate to them began their advance to the West before the start of the war (16th Army - from May 22), it is impossible to imagine a situation in which no one led them. This can be easily verified using the documents of the relevant military districts. For example, the last one, signed by the commander of the North Caucasus Military District I. Konev, member of the Military Council I. Sheklanov, chief of staff V. Zlobin, order to the troops of the North Caucasus Military District No. 00123 is dated June 6, 1941. And the next order to the troops No. 00125 dated June 8, 1941. has already been signed by the hands of the so-called “vrids” (temporary positions) M. Reiter, I. Pinchuk, A. Barmin (TsAMO RF, f. 144, op. 13189, d. 9, pp. 327, 330; d. 24, pp. 514; d. 25, pp. 45, 47). And this is due to the fact that the entire command of the North Caucasus Military District left along with the deployed 19th Army in the North Caucasus Military District in the first ten days of June 1941, and their places at the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District were taken by deputies. Exactly the same thing happened in the remaining military districts, which allocated the reserve armies of the High Command, which went to the West before the start of the war in the second ten days of June 1941. But even on this issue, our official historians and personnel officers are still secretive.
The directorates of military districts dealt with all issues of military administration in territories that were not formally included in the areas of responsibility of the newly created fronts and armies. However, in reality, two structures were involved in the formation and reception of reinforcements in the fronts and armies: the staffing department of the front (army) headquarters and the organizational department of the headquarters of the corresponding military district. Sometimes this caused confusion, but more often it helped in the work. Thus, in the conditions of confusion associated with the catastrophic development of events on the Western and North-Western fronts, with the threat of occupation of the territory, the headquarters of the Western and Baltic military districts according to GShKA Directive No. org/2/524678 dated 07/08/41 in the first and second decades of July 1941 . carried out the withdrawal of resources, starting from recruits up to those born in 1891, from the threatened areas to the east (TsAMO RF, f. 127, op. 12915, d. 49, l. 18). This happened in all other military districts (Kiev, Odessa), with the slight exception of Lithuania, Latvia and the westernmost regions of Belarus and Ukraine. In the Baltic states, only those who were in one way or another connected with the Soviet system moved east. Many of those who remained shot the Soviet troops in the back (TsAMO RF, f. 1427, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1, f. 1433, op. 1, d. 1, l. 2). In Estonia, persons of military age were almost completely mobilized and sent to the Arkhangelsk and Ural military districts due to unreliability. There, workers and construction columns and battalions were formed from them (TsAMO RF, f. 217, op. 1244, d. 13, l. 303), engaged in economic work. The Estonians constantly sabotaged tasks in the rear, going to work in numbers not exceeding 40%, which led to the consumption of “lifting” and the lack of funds for their own food due to failure to develop plans, and subsequently to numerous deaths of starvation due to their own fault from exhaustion ( TsAMO RF, documents of fund 113 OSRC). Meanwhile, at the front, warriors of other nationalities who fought died in thousands in battles with the enemy and ultimately stopped him...
In addition to the diversion of resources to the east, some of the conscripts were sent by military registration and enlistment offices according to orders from the headquarters of military districts directly to replenish military units that arrived in the subordinate territory close to the battle areas. There were also many precedents when the command of these units, without any orders from the headquarters of the military districts and the Directives of the GSKA, took the called-up reserves from the assembly points of the RVC, as well as from the route, into their composition for replenishment, without presenting any supporting documents. And the count here was tens of thousands of people. In the Western Military District in mid-July 1941, the number of such persons “seized” by military units from military registration and enlistment offices after mobilization amounted to 19,770 people, who were able to be counted as such at the district headquarters. At the same time, the number of those who did not reach the concentration points out of the total number of those called up and withdrawn by the military registration and enlistment offices of the Western Military District amounted to 42,553 people. (TsAMO RF, f. 127, op. 12915, d. 49, l. 40). A part (about 10,000 people) broke away from the total mass and went on foot to the area of the city of Nevel, coming under attack from the Nazis. The other part was received by military units in excess of the number of 19,770 people. Some of them fled, to be honest.
SZF was no exception. For example, on 07/07/41, the Starorussian RVC sent its remaining free resources after mobilization (578 people) to the disposal of the NWF headquarters directly without instructions from the headquarters of the PribOVO and the GShKA (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 34, l. 12) .
In total, after the return of 70 thousand to the Moscow Military District, just under 160,000 people of the assigned personnel from the Moscow Military District remained at the disposal of the NWF. These were “our own”, previously assigned to formations and units of the front, those liable for military service in the reserve. They did not fall into the “march reinforcement” category, because before the war they were already intended for the Northern Western Front. Information on the number of additional resources of fighters who came to the disposal of the NWF command from local military registration and enlistment offices in its zone of action has not yet been found. What is clear is that this was a considerable multi-thousand “addition” to the 160 thousand that were appointed from the Moscow Military District (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 34, l. 92).
This is where the personnel were drawn from for the numerous military units newly created under MP-41 and the replenishment of each broken division before the arrival of the first marching battalions (07/13–18/41) from the ArchVO and PriVO (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d 30, pp. 33, 56 and d. 34, l. 104).
Enlisted teams arrived every day at the NWF reception and forwarding points in Novgorod, Valdai, Bologoye, Soltsy, Staraya Russa, Luga, which were urgently equipped to receive them. It should be understood that the places for unloading teams according to the plans for transportation and recruitment of PribOVO troops before the start of hostilities were assigned in Lithuania and Latvia (Vilnius, Kaunas, Panevezys, Riga), and not in the Leningrad and Kalinin regions (TsAMO RF, f. 140, op. . 13002, no. 8, pp. 291–293). Supplies for newly arriving teams were also concentrated there. The war did not unfold according to our scenario, so we had to urgently find new solutions and resources against the backdrop of the almost complete irretrievable loss of property and supplies in 21 out of 32 district warehouses (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 8, pp. 177 –179) and in many head and army warehouses of the NWF. As stated above, the total number of almost completely lost warehouses in the NWF reached 35 (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1372, d. 23, pp. 6–7). In total, on the territory of the USSR occupied by July 10, with a depth of 300 to 600 km from the state border, 200 district warehouses were left (or 52% of all district warehouses of NPOs in the border districts), not counting the headquarters and army warehouses. In the Western Special Military District, 32 out of 45 fuel warehouses and all ammunition warehouses were lost (“Strategic outline of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945,” M.: Voenizdat, 1961, p. 199).
In the abandoned warehouses for the assigned personnel coming to the fronts, weapons, ammunition, uniforms, equipment, and ammunition were delivered in advance, which were later acquired by the enemy or destroyed. A similar situation in the NWF took place with the assigned personnel and for the troops of the Western Fleet: trains with tens of thousands of reserves of the Oryol and Kharkov Military District mobilized from 06/23/41 from the Gomel region were returned from 06/30/41 to Kursk, Yelets, Lipetsk, Voronezh, Tambov ( TsAMO RF, f. 56, op. 12236, d. 7, l. 9), while according to the deployment plan they were supposed to be unloaded in the Baranovichi, Bialystok, Pinsk, and Brest regions of Belarus. After the start of the war, the assigned personnel of the divisions of the Volga Military District, which left for the West from 06/17–18/41, also went there, also returning to the Oryol Military District from 06/30/41. In the West, for all this mass of people near the border, as well as in the NWF, huge reserves of weapons, property and equipment were concentrated in military units, in district and army warehouses, lost in the first hours and days of the war:
a) from the property of emergency and mobilization reserves - 370 thousand complete sets of new uniforms, countless amounts of leather shoes, 393 thousand gas masks, 60% of army and front-line food reserves (over 22 thousand tons), 52% of baggage equipment, all advanced and head army and district ammunition depots (1,766 wagons), 70% of fuel and lubricants reserves or 21.5 thousand tons;
b) from weapons in units and warehouses - over 4368 guns of all calibers out of 6437, 1106 aircraft of all types out of 1812, T-26–357 tanks. from 1237, hundreds of thousands of rifles of all types from 773,445, many thousands of PPD submachine guns from 24,237, thousands of DP light machine guns and mounted Maxim guns from 27,574, thousands of mortars of all calibers from 6610 (TsAMO RF, f. 13, op 11624, d. 236, pp. 424–425, pp. 7–279; “Bearance of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. Statistical collection No. 1. June 22, 1941,” pp. ).
In a matter of days there was nothing left to either arm or supply the huge mass of people. Therefore, at the beginning of the process of forming marching battalions from enlisted personnel who did not reach their destination, the GShKA Directive No. mob/1/543109 of 07/03/41 prescribed: “Central supply departments should provide marching battalions with uniforms, equipment, rifles, rifle cartridges and gas masks” (ibid., l. 14). That is, from head to toe it was necessary unscheduled re-provision in fire order to replace lost supplies hundreds of thousands of soldiers with the property and weapons listed on their report cards. Naturally, there were not enough resources for all of the resources collected from the world piece by piece from warehouses, factories, garrisons, military registration and enlistment offices, and rear units, so some of the fighters arrived at the formation points of marching battalions in their own clothes and shoes, and even barefoot, and came out of there to a large extent in uniforms of the second and third categories, which were used (ibid., pp. 63, 69).
To receive incoming human resources, in addition to the army and front-line reserve regiments of the NWF that had retreated from the border (179, 188, 190, 193, 195 zsp, 9 zap. TP), already created under MP-41 from 06/23/41, 4 more regiments were added, formed in the Leningrad Military District on the basis of the personnel of this district and transferred to the NWF from 07/10/41: 140, 143, 145, 148 zsp based in Soltsy, Staraya Russa, Luga, Novgorod, respectively (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364 , d. 34, l. 90).
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