The Leningrad Front is an operational unification of the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War, created on August 27, 1941 as a result of the division of the Northern Front into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts. The Leningrad Front included the 8th, 23rd, and 48th armies. Lieutenant General M.M. took command of the front. Popov. On September 5, 1941, he was replaced by Marshal K.E. Voroshilov. A.A. became a member of the military council of the Leningrad Front. Zhdanov, and the chief of staff was Colonel N.V. Gorodetsky.
The Leningrad Front was tasked with holding the enemy on the approaches to Leningrad, but on September 8, 1941, German troops reached the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, closing the blockade ring around the city. On September 13, 1941, Army General G.K. became the new commander of the Leningrad Front. Zhukov ; The front headquarters was headed by Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin. By the end of September 1941, the active defense of the troops of the Leningrad Front stopped the German troops advancing on Leningrad from the south, and the Finnish troops from the north-west.

With the beginning of the Moscow Battle G.K. Zhukov was sent to the Western Front. The new commander of the Leningrad Front was Major General I.I. Fedyuninsky (from October 8, 1941), who was replaced in this post by Lieutenant General M.S. on October 26. Khozin. Major General D.N. became the new chief of staff of the front. Gusev (since May 1942 - Lieutenant General). From the formations of the Leningrad Front that found themselves outside the blockade ring, the Volkhov Front was formed. During 1942, the troops of the Leningrad Front conducted several private offensive operations, including the Ust-Tosnensk operation and the Sinyavinsk operation, which were generally unsuccessful. On June 9, 1942, Lieutenant General L.A. Govorov became commander of the Leningrad Front (from January 15, 1943 - Colonel General, from November 17, 1943 - Army General, from June 18, 1944 - Marshal).

In January 1943, troops of the Leningrad Front and Volkhov Front carried out Operation Iskra to break the blockade of Leningrad south of Shlisselburg (Petrokrepost) and restored the city’s land connection with the country. In January-February 1944, the Leningrad Front, in cooperation with the Volkhov Front and the Second Baltic Front, defeated the German Army Group North near Leningrad and Novgorod, completely lifted the blockade of Leningrad and reached the border with Estonia. Since April 1944, the chief of staff of the Leningrad Front was Colonel General M.M. Popov.

On April 24, 1944, the Third Baltic Front was created from the troops of the left wing of the Leningrad Front. In June 1944, the Leningrad Front, with the participation of the Baltic Fleet, Ladoga and Onega military flotillas, successfully carried out the Vyborg operation, as a result of which Finland was forced to withdraw from the war on the side of Germany. In September-November 1944, the Leningrad Front participated in the Baltic operation, advancing in the Tartu-Tallinn and Narva-Tallinn directions. Having liberated the continental part of Estonia, the troops of the Leningrad Front, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet, cleared the islands of the Moonsund archipelago from the enemy from September 27 to November 24, 1944. This marked the end of active hostilities on the Leningrad Front. Subsequently, troops occupied positions on the Soviet-Finnish border and the Baltic Sea coast from Leningrad to Riga. On April 1, 1945, part of the troops of the disbanded Second Baltic Front was transferred to the Leningrad Front, and it was entrusted with the task of blockading the Courland group of enemy forces. On July 24, 1945, the Leningrad Front was transformed into the Leningrad Military District. IN different time The Leningrad Front included the 6th Guards and 10th Guards Armies, 1st Shock, 2nd Shock, 4th Shock Armies, 4th, 8th, 20th, 21st, 22nd I, 23rd, 42nd, 48th, 51st, 52nd, 54th, 55th, 59th, 67th Army, 3rd Air Force, 13th Air Force, 15 - I'm an air army.

The Soviet country greeted the first of May 1942 with intense work for the front. On this day, the workers of the Soviet Union abandoned their holiday rest in order to devote all their strength to quickly defeat the enemy.

More than two years have passed since the Nazis started the war in Europe. For the sake of enriching the German monopolists, this war was launched, for the sake of increasing their profits, the fascists introduced slave-serfdom in the factories of Germany and the conquered countries, a bloody terrorist regime was established in the occupied countries, which brought untold misfortunes and suffering to the enslaved peoples. .

Europe was covered with gallows, the fascist invaders robbed and killed civilians, burned and destroyed cities and villages, and destroyed the cultural values ​​of peoples. In numerous death camps, fascist beasts tortured and killed hundreds of thousands of innocent people with incredible cruelty. They were shot with machine guns, burned alive, and poisoned in gas chambers. So his gang enforced the “new order”.

Anger and indignation at the predatory actions of the Nazis raised new thousands and tens of thousands of honest people of the world to fight for liberation against fascism. Hitler's rear weakened more and more, which led to the further weakening of Nazi Germany and its army.

The struggle of the enslaved peoples against the Nazi invaders began to acquire a universal character. The eyes of all freedom-loving peoples turned with hope to the Soviet Union, whose heroic struggle aroused the admiration of all progressive humanity. The peoples of freedom-loving countries looked at the Soviet Union as a force capable of saving the world from the Hitlerite plague.

For about ten months now, the Soviet country has been waging a fierce struggle against a brutal enemy. During this period, the Soviet people rallied even more closely around the party and government, and the unity of the front and rear was further strengthened. The Soviet Army also became more organized and stronger than at the beginning of the war. The officer cadres of our army were battle-hardened. Its generals became more experienced and insightful. Among the rank and file, complacency and carelessness towards the enemy disappeared. The atrocities, robberies and violence committed by the fascist robbers against the Soviet people aroused severe hatred towards the invaders and taught our soldiers to be merciless towards them. The noble goal of the Great Patriotic War, close to every Soviet person - the liberation of our brothers Ukrainians, Belarusians, Moldovans, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Karelians from the shame and humiliation to which the Nazi barbarians subjected them, increased the strength of Soviet soldiers tenfold, inspired them in the difficult struggle against a strong and dangerous enemy.

The Soviet Union continued to fight one-on-one with the united forces of fascism. The ruling circles of the USA and England, despite the solemn promise to open a second front in Europe in 1942, did not fulfill their obligations, although they had the necessary conditions for this.

In 1942, the British army numbered over 4 million soldiers, the US army - more than 2 million. They also had enough ships to transport troops and ammunition. But the American-British imperialists did not want the complete defeat of the fascists. Their secret plan was that Germany and especially the Soviet Union would bleed themselves dry in the war. This would give American and British bankers the opportunity to establish their dominance in Europe and throughout the world.

By pursuing a two-faced, selfish policy towards the Soviet Union, the imperialists of the USA and England gave fascist Germany the opportunity to concentrate large forces against the USSR by the summer of 1942. In January-February 1942 alone, the Nazi command transferred about 40 divisions from France, Denmark, Greece and the interior of Germany to the Soviet-German front. Of the 256 divisions it had Hitler's Germany, there were at least 179 on the Soviet-German front. In addition to the Nazi-German divisions, 22 Romanian divisions, 14 Finnish, 10 Italian, 13 Hungarian, 1 Slovak and 1 Spanish fought against the Soviet Army. Thus, in 1942, the enemy sent 240 divisions against our army.

At the same time, in North Africa, only 4 German and 11 Italian divisions operated against British troops, and the US Army did not conduct any combat operations against the Italian-German troops at that time.

Taking advantage of the deliberate inaction of the armies of the United States of America and England, Hitler's command launched the summer offensive of 1942 against the USSR. This offensive differed significantly from the offensive of the fascist invaders in 1941. The growing power of the Soviet Army brought great changes to the balance of forces. If earlier fascist troops sought to break through the front in several strategic directions at once, now, as a result of heavy losses suffered in battles with the Soviet Army, they were deprived of this opportunity. In the summer of 1942, the combined forces of the countries of the fascist bloc were thrown in one direction - the South-West. The main goal of the enemy's summer offensive was to bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and Ural rear and then again strike at the capital of the Soviet country.

Having created a large superiority of forces in the South-Western direction, fascist German troops, at the cost of huge losses in people and equipment, broke through the front and began to advance towards the Volga and the North Caucasus. The advance of Hitler's armies towards the oil regions of the USSR was not the main, but an auxiliary goal. The enemy's real plan was to divert our main reserves to the south and weaken the front near Moscow, so that it would be easier to achieve success in an attack on Moscow. This was the main goal of the enemy’s advance towards the oil regions. Subsequent events fully confirmed this: by November 1942, the enemy strike force was not in the south, but in the area of ​​Orel and Stalingrad.

The German General Staff, overestimating its own strength and underestimating the strength and capabilities of the Soviet state, made fantastic plans, even drawing up calendar dates for the capture of Soviet cities. On July 10, 1942, the Nazis intended to be in Borisoglebsk, on July 25 - in Stalingrad, on August 10 - in Saratov, on August 15 - in Kuibyshev, on September 10 - in Arzamas, on September 25 - in Baku.

Offensive actions were launched by the enemy in the Kharkov and Izyum-Barvenkovsky sectors of the front, as well as in the Kursk and Voronezh areas. The battles in the Voronezh region were exceptionally fierce. With strong counterattacks, the Soviet Army forced the enemy to go on the defensive in this section of the front.

Having failed to achieve success in the Voronezh direction, having lost tens of thousands of their soldiers and officers in battles, the enemy concentrated its main forces in the Stalingrad strategic direction. The enemy group aimed at Stalingrad included the 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army. General Paulus was appointed commander of the main group. These troops were supported by the 4th Air Fleet with over 900 aircraft.

On the eve of the offensive, the fascist bosses of Germany secured a new commitment from the Japanese militarists - to oppose the USSR after the capture of Stalingrad by German troops. At the same time, he received assurances from Turkey that it would start a war against the USSR immediately, as soon as the armed forces of Nazi Germany crossed the Caucasus ridge.

In preparation for the offensive in the Stalingrad direction, the enemy command tried to create a more favorable strategic situation on the fronts. Having captured the Kerch Peninsula at the end of May, the Nazis “resumed the assault on Sevastopol, which had been staunchly defending itself for more than 200 days. The presence of the Sevastopol bridgehead of the Soviet Army, which was essentially located in the rear of the Nazi troops, seriously worried the Nazi command and prevented it from launching an offensive to Stalingrad.

At the beginning of June 1942, the Nazi command sent up to 300 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 400 tanks, and 900 aircraft to storm Sevastopol. Bloody battles raged for 25 days. Cut off from land connections with the rear, experiencing great difficulties with the supply of ammunition and food, the defenders of the city of Russian glory showed miracles of military valor and heroism, selflessly fought against a numerically superior enemy. The ships of the Black Sea Fleet provided them with powerful support with the fire of their guns. Every day, Soviet infantrymen, sailors, and artillerymen destroyed thousands of Nazis. The defenders of Sevastopol, from privates to generals, defended the city without sparing their lives.

On June 16, a unit of sailors under the command of Comrade Gusarov, repulsing a fierce enemy attack and quickly pursuing him, broke into enemy trenches and destroyed about 250 Nazis in hand-to-hand combat. The artillerymen of the battery of Senior Lieutenant Vorobyov courageously repelled over 30 fascist attacks in just a few days, while destroying up to 500 enemy soldiers and officers. The garrison of the bunker of commander Gordienko fought off the fierce attacks of the Nazis for 24 hours under continuous artillery fire. At the same time, Soviet soldiers Ryabov, Malyshenko, Zakhroyan, Aliev destroyed more than 300 fascists.

When the crew of an anti-tank rifle went out of action on one of the front sections, his place was taken by regimental commissar Neorgadze, who knocked out three fascist tanks during the day. With his personal example of the greatest courage in the face of the enemy, his endurance and fearlessness, the faithful son of the Communist Party inspired the soldiers and officers of his unit to fight even more mercilessly against the fascist invaders.

At the height of the fighting, the defenders of Sevastopol - the soldiers of the Primorsky Army and the Black Sea residents - received a greeting from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. The greeting said: “The selfless struggle of the Sevastopol residents serves as an example of heroism for the entire Red Army and the Soviet people.”

In a short period of time - from June 7 to July 3, 1942 - the fascist German-Romanian troops lost up to 150 thousand soldiers and officers near Sevastopol (of which at least 60 thousand were killed), more than 250 tanks, up to 250 guns, more than 300 aircraft .

During the 8 months of the defense of Sevastopol, the enemy's losses in killed and wounded amounted to about 300 thousand soldiers and officers. Having inflicted enormous damage on the enemy in manpower and equipment, Soviet troops By order of the Supreme High Command, they left the city on July 3, 1942.

The heroic defense of Sevastopol went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as one of its brightest pages. It enriched the glorious military traditions of the peoples of our Motherland and inspired Soviet patriots to further brave feats in the fight against Hitler’s hordes.

In mid-July 1942, the enemy launched an offensive in the Middle Don region. Here, on the banks of the Don, the Battle of Stalingrad, outstanding in the history of the Great Patriotic War, began, lasting 200 days. The German imperialists threw hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers into this battle, great amount tanks and planes. Soviet troops, blocking the Nazis' path into the interior of the country, heroically defended Soviet land. Every step forward cost the Nazi army enormous losses. But, bleeding through the mountains of corpses of their soldiers, the enemy continued to rush towards the Volga stronghold..

The main burden of the defense of Stalingrad fell on our 62nd Army, which was directly assisted by the 64th, 63rd and other armies. During the days of the battle, even on the distant approaches to Stalingrad, the personnel of the 62nd Army showed an example of how to fulfill military duty to the Motherland.

At the end of July 1942, during the battles beyond the Don, in positions defended by four guardsmen: the deputy political instructor of the company Belikov and soldiers - the Russian Samoilov, the Belarusian Aleinikov and the Ukrainian Boloto, the Nazis abandoned 30 tanks. The heroic guardsmen took on an unequal battle. They sacredly remembered the military oath, they remembered the order of the Motherland - not a step back! The guards had only two anti-tank rifles. But the Soviet soldiers were full of confidence in themselves, in the strength of their weapons. The battle went on all day. Several times enemy tanks rushed to attack and retreated each time, suffering losses. Skillfully camouflaging themselves in the trenches, the four heroes knocked out fascist vehicles one after another. When night fell, 15 enemy tanks that had been knocked out and set on fire were smoking on the field in front of the guards’ trenches. Having encountered such a crushing rebuff, the Nazis were forced to abandon further attempts to break through the trenches of the four heroes. Soviet soldiers emerged from this unequal battle without losses. Thousands of other soldiers of our army learned from their feat of perseverance and heroism.

In difficult battles, warriors of all types of weapons glorified themselves. The glorious pilots of the Stalingrad Front from July 20 to August 10 destroyed over 300 fascist aircraft in the air and at airfields, destroyed and damaged several hundred enemy tanks, up to one and a half thousand vehicles with enemy infantry, ammunition, fuel and other military cargo, and quite a few field guns. Bombing attacks were continuously carried out on German trains transporting them to the front. military equipment and living force.

Soviet tank crews, in battles on the distant approaches to Stalingrad, knocked out and destroyed more than 200 fascist tanks, many armored vehicles, transporters and other enemy military equipment.

“We will not spare strength, blood, or life to defeat the enemy!” - said the soldiers of one of the units of the 62nd Army in their resolution adopted at the soldiers’ meeting. With these words they expressed the thoughts and feelings of all the defenders of Stalingrad. The adventuristic plan of the Hitlerite command to take Stalingrad on the move failed. For a month (August 1942), units of the Soviet Army exhausted enemy troops in the big bend of the Don.

The soldiers of the Soviet Army wrote many glorious pages in the history of the heroic defense of Stalingrad in the August days of 1942.

At the end of August, an outstanding feat was accomplished by 33 soldiers and the commander of one of the divisions fighting on the outskirts of Stalingrad. 70 enemy tanks rushed towards the positions of the Soviet heroes. Each fighter had two enemy tanks that had to be destroyed. But this did not deter our soldiers. They understood that they could not move a single step from their positions without an order from the command, that their retreat would worsen the situation in other sectors of the defense. Having entered into an unequal battle, 33 Soviet soldiers, led by deputy political instructor Comrade Kovalev, disabled 27 German tanks and destroyed over 150 enemy soldiers and officers. The heroes stopped a powerful avalanche of enemy forces without losing a single person.

As the resistance of our troops grew, the Nazis’ hopes for a quick capture of Stalingrad became more and more unrealistic. The enemy brought new regiments and divisions into the offensive, hundreds of tanks and planes stormed our positions, but this frenzied onslaught invariably crashed against the inexorable steadfastness of the Soviet Army .

Three tank crews covered themselves with immortal glory in the battles for Stalingrad - Lieutenant Yavkun, Sergeant Semyorkin and gunner-radio operator Boyarchuk. 30 enemy tanks were moving against the rifle battalion, whose defense was supported by the tank crew. In order to divert the attention of the enemy tank column and allow the battalion of our troops to gain a foothold, Lieutenant Yavkun decided to take the brunt of the battle upon himself. The tank, led by Lieutenant Yavkun, took the lead and entered into battle with 30 enemy tanks. In a deadly battle, heroic Soviet tank crews disabled seven enemy vehicles. The enemy managed to knock out a Soviet tank. Then Lieutenant Yavkun drove his burning car towards the ram. In the last minutes of the battle, Lieutenant Yavkun radioed to his command: “All three are wounded. We're burning. I'm going to ram. We are dying for Stalingrad. Take revenge! Let the Volga steppe become a grave for Hitler’s army!”

The exploits of Soviet soldiers were innumerable.

In the air battles for Stalingrad, the legendary feat of Nikolai Gastello was repeated by the pilot Rogalsky, who directed a burning plane into a concentration of enemy tanks and vehicles. The Soviet hero pilot died, but great damage was caused to the enemy.

Having received Hitler's strict order to take Stalingrad at any cost, the fascist troops increased their pressure. After heavy bloody battles, when the best, selected forces of the Nazis, consisting of 36 divisions, were thrown into the offensive, the enemy managed to advance to Stalingrad from the northwestern and southwestern sides. This cost the enemy enormous losses in men and equipment. Nazi soldiers and officers called their path to Stalingrad “the road of the dead.”

The enemy considered the capture of Stalingrad already a done deal. But the fascist beast miscalculated this time too. Long before the start of fighting in the city area, the USSR State Defense Committee took the necessary measures to build powerful defensive lines around Stalingrad. In mid-July 1942, a member of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee G. M. Malenkov arrived in Stalingrad. Under the leadership of G. M. Malenkov, a member of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front N. S. Khrushchev and the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, Colonel General A. M. Vasilevsky, a number of important events were carried out in Stalingrad to ensure the combat operations of Soviet troops in distant and near approaches to Stalingrad. At the direction of G. M. Malenkov, the Stalingrad factories doubled the production of tanks and other types of weapons. The formation of the people's militia was intensified. The combat effectiveness of the units and formations defending Stalingrad increased. To fend off the enemy rushing towards the Volga, the Soviet Supreme High Command put forward new units and formations.

At the direction of the CPSU Central Committee, the Stalingrad City Party Committee created the city Defense Committee, which launched preparations for intra-city defensive lines to transform Stalingrad into an indestructible fortress. The hands of Stalingrad residents in a short time built all kinds of fortifications with a total length of 2,850 kilometers on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the city itself, including 1,170 kilometers of anti-tank ditches, 85 thousand firing points and 125 thousand rifle trenches and shelters.

Having received a report about the enemy’s breakthrough to the Volga north of Stalingrad, Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin demanded that the command of the Stalingrad Front and representatives of the Headquarters immediately liquidate the enemy group that had broken through. The words of J.V. Stalin breathed with the greatest strength and confidence. “The most important thing,” he wrote, “is not to panic, not to be afraid of an impudent enemy and to remain confident in our success.” It was necessary to mercilessly exterminate the enemy who had broken through, inflict concentrated air strikes on him, and use armored trains, artillery, rocket launchers and other combat weapons against him. Soviet soldiers with selfless courage repelled the onslaught of Hitler's hordes.

On August 25, 1942, Stalingrad was declared in a state of siege. At the call of the city Defense Committee, communists, non-party members, Komsomol members stood up in arms in defense hometown. In less than a month, over 80 thousand Stalingrad residents joined the ranks of the 62% army.

The working people of Stalingrad and the Stalingrad region, together with the soldiers of the Soviet Army, heroically fought against the Nazi invaders. To combat positions. The people's militia battalions came out. The enemy was at a distance of 500-800 meters from the tractor plant, but the plant did not stop working. Under continuous bombardment from the air and under shelling from guns, the plant workers produced 200 tanks and 150 tractor units in September. Stalingraders did not leave production even when the fighting was taking place on the streets of the city. Tanks and guns, created by the hands of Stalingrad workers, immediately entered the battle and caused considerable damage to the enemy.

The workers of the front-line areas built fortifications, provided the defenders of Stalingrad with food and warm clothing, and repaired military equipment. Only in the workshops of the Glazunovskaya, Yarskaya and Novo-Annenskaya MTS of the Stalingrad region during historical battle For Stalingrad, 49 guns, 732 vehicles, over 50 Guards Katyusha mortars, 10 aircraft, several dozen tanks and many other weapons were repaired for the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts.

The Soviet people sent reinforcements, weapons, and shells to Stalingrad. Soviet people they worked in the rear, forgetting about sleep, sparing no effort to help the troops defeat the enemy and defend Stalingrad.

Our whole country, the whole world watched the Battle of Stalingrad with great tension.

At the beginning of September, the enemy broke through to the outskirts of the city.

On September 13, 1942, street fighting began in Stalingrad and lasted 143 days. The enemy sent 11 of his best divisions, 500 tanks, 1,400 guns and up to 1,000 aircraft to storm the city.

From September 12, 1942, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the battle-hardened 62nd Army. In the defense of the Volga stronghold, the 62nd Army withstood severe trials. For almost two months, fierce enemy attacks were repeated daily in the area of ​​factories and the station. In the central part of the city, the enemy was met with a bayonet counterattack by the battle-tested guardsmen of General Rodimtsev, famous for their fearlessness and heroism. Rodimtsev's division fought off 12-15 enemy attacks per day.

On September 17, against one of the units of the Guards division defending the Stalingrad-1 station, the Nazi command threw up to two companies of machine gunners and 20 tanks into the attack. Four times during the day the station changed hands. In the end, the Nazis could not stand it and retreated beyond the railway line, leaving 100 killed soldiers and officers, eight burned and damaged tanks at the battle site. On September 19, Rodimtsev’s guards fought an intense battle for the State Bank building. There were several enemy units here. Having captured the three-story bank building, the Nazis turned it into a stronghold and adapted it for all-round defense. At night, under incessant enemy fire, our assault groups broke into the building. The battle broke out on the stairs, in the corridors and in separate rooms. As a result of bold, decisive actions, the guards destroyed the enemy and took possession of the building.

By October 1942, the situation at the fronts worsened and became extremely difficult. The enemy stood 120 kilometers from Moscow, entered the foothills of the Caucasus, and tried to capture Stalingrad. The country temporarily lost all of Belarus, Ukraine and the Donbass, the Baltic states, the Kursk region, part of the Voronezh region, the Rostov region and the Krasnodar region, and was deprived of southern metallurgy, Donetsk coal, Krivoy Rog ore, rich areas of grain crops and livestock farming, and a dense railway network.

Before the war, about 88 million people lived in the territory temporarily occupied by Nazi troops, about a third of the industrial output of the entire country was produced, and 47 percent of the cultivated areas were located. Soviet Union and about half of all livestock. This entire territory was temporarily captured by the enemy.

As in 1941, the Soviet Union alone had to bear the brunt of the struggle against Nazi Germany and its accomplices.

The struggle on the Soviet-German front became increasingly intense. Not only the fate of the Soviet state, but also the liberation of the freedom-loving peoples of Europe from Hitler’s tyranny depended on its outcome. In fierce battles with the invaders, the Soviet Army stubbornly and persistently increased its resistance to the enemy onslaught, learning to fully use against the enemy the wonderful military equipment that the Motherland provided it with.

On October 5, 1942, Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin gave the order to the commander of the Stalingrad Front: “I demand that you take all measures to defend Stalingrad. Stalingrad must not be surrendered to the enemy." This was the demand of the people and the party for the defenders of Stalingrad.

- There is no land for us beyond the Volga! - said the famous Stalingrad sniper, Komsomol organizer of the company Vasily Zaitsev, who was later accepted into the ranks of the Communist Party in Stalingrad, at a soldiers’ meeting. These words were repeated like an oath by all the defenders of Stalingrad.

Supported by the entire country, Soviet troops and the population of the city steadfastly endured difficult trials. They managed to delay the enemy at the Volga stronghold, inflict huge losses on him, and crush many fascist divisions.

In October, the fighting in Stalingrad reached extreme ferocity. Over a thousand planes bombed the city every day. On a narrow section of the front, the enemy threw 2-3 divisions and 150-200 tanks into the offensive. The fighting continued continuously for several days. Starting from October 10, Nazi planes bombed the territory of the Barricades plant for 80 hours in a row, the area of ​​​​which was defended by the Siberian division of Major General Gurtiev. 200 heavy and medium tanks attacked the ruins of the plant. Behind the tanks were regiments of drunken fascist machine gunners. But the Nazis failed to break the resistance of Soviet soldiers. Each block, house, and floor became independent, heroically defending “garrisons.” The commanders of many small “garrisons” were often sergeants and ordinary soldiers. These small groups of Soviet soldiers skillfully repelled attacks by many times superior enemy forces and boldly launched counterattacks. There were cases when several of our fighters resisted the onslaught of an entire battalion. So, on one of the sections of the front, the Germans sent five tanks and a battalion of auto-matches against four soldiers who were covering the flank of a subunit. In an unequal battle, four brave men heroically repelled the Nazi attack and set fire to three tanks.

Once, in the midst of a battle, the connection between one of the regiments of General Gurtiev’s division and its units was cut off. Sergeant Putilov was ordered to restore communication. While Putilov was looking for the location of the broken wire, a mine fragment wounded him in the shoulder. Despite being seriously wounded, the Soviet soldier crawled to the place of the cliff, but here a fragment of a shell that exploded nearby broke Putilov’s hand. Unable to use his hand, Putilov squeezed the ends of the wires with his teeth, and a current flowed through his body. Communication was restored.

A remarkable example of perseverance and heroism was the feat of Guard Sergeant Yakov Pavlov from the division of General Rodimtsev. Having received the task of occupying a multi-storey building located in one of the city squares, which played exclusively important role In the defense of one of the sectors of the front, Guard Sergeant Pavlov with a small group of soldiers, under heavy enemy fire, made his way through the square to the building where the Nazis were holed up. In a fierce battle, Soviet soldiers knocked out the Nazis from the first floor, and then from the entire building, and firmly established themselves there. The house defended by Pavlov was subjected to continuous attacks by the enemy. The Nazis stormed it with large forces of infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft. The Nazis repeated their attacks on “Pavlov’s house” dozens of times, but could not break the resistance of a small group of Soviet soldiers. For over 50 days, Guard Sergeant Pavlov and a group of fighters held the defended object. All approaches to “Pavlov’s house” were strewn with the corpses of fascist soldiers and officers. The group of brave warriors included Russians Pavlov, Afanasyev, Aleksandrov, Ukrainians Sabgaida and Glushchenko, Georgians Mosiyashvili and Stepanoshvili, Uzbek Turgunov, Kazakh Murzaev, Abkhazian Sukba, Tajik Turdyev and Tatar Romazanov. The native Soviet land was equally dear to all of them. Fiery love for their multi-national Fatherland united them into a single force capable of overcoming any difficulties on the path to victory.

Soviet soldiers knew no fear in the fight. In the decisive days of the defense of Stalingrad, Lieutenant Murashov with ten soldiers repelled 18 enemy attacks within 24 hours and destroyed more than 200 Nazis. Hero of the Soviet Union machine gunner Ermakov for! 7 days of fighting on the streets of Stalingrad exterminated up to 300 Nazis. During the defense of the city, Nanai sniper Maxim Passar destroyed 236 enemy soldiers and officers.

Soviet tank crews covered themselves with unfading glory. One day, eight fascist tanks attacked a Soviet tank commanded by Khasan Yambekov. The heroic crew took on an unequal battle and knocked out four fascist tanks. Khasan Yambekov's tank was set on fire by a thermite shell, but Soviet tank crews continued to shoot from the burning vehicle. Surrounded by Hitler's machine guns, the soldiers did not give up and fought the enemy until the last drop of blood. The radio operator on duty of the tank unit managed to catch the familiar voice of tank commander Khasan Yambekov on the air. The hero tanker said: “Farewell, comrades, don’t forget us...” Then the sounds of the solemn anthem carried through the air: “This is our last and decisive battle...” This was sung by the tankers. Tank commander Khasan Yambekov, driver-mechanic Tarabanov, gunner-radio operator Mushilov and turret commander Fedenko proudly and courageously gave their lives for their Motherland, for Stalingrad.

The Volga Military Flotilla selflessly helped Soviet soldiers. Under continuous artillery fire and air strikes, Soviet sailors ferried reinforcements and thousands of tons of cargo across the Volga. The naval artillery smashed the enemy batteries.

The fierceness of the battle for Stalingrad is evidenced by the fact that during the period of defensive battles on the near approaches to the city and in the city itself, the Nazis launched four general attacks that lasted several days. The enemy brought up to 10 divisions and up to 500 tanks into battle simultaneously. More than fifty attacks were carried out by two or three divisions with 200 tanks; the same number of attacks - with up to one division with 70 tanks; over 120 attacks on the scale of one regiment and thousands of attacks - by the forces of individual battalions and companies with the support of tanks. During the same time, fascist aviation carried out over 100 thousand sorties and dropped on the city and battle formations our troops up to a million bombs weighing about 100 thousand tons.

But no enemy attacks, no onslaught could break the resistance of the defenders of Stalingrad. Soviet soldiers fought to the death. On the eve of the 25th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, soldiers and commanders of the Stalingrad Front addressed a letter to I.V. Stalin. “We,” the letter said, “are writing to you in the midst of a great battle, under the thunder of incessant cannonade, the howl of airplanes, in the glow of fires on the steep bank of the great Russian river Volga; We are writing to tell you and through you the entire Soviet people that our spirit is as vigorous as ever, our will is strong, our hands are not tired of defeating the enemy. Our decision is to stand to the death, at the walls of Stalingrad!.. Fighting today at Stalingrad, we understand that we are fighting not only for the city of Stalingrad. At Stalingrad we are defending our Motherland, defending everything that is dear to us, without which we cannot live. Here, near Stalingrad, the fate of our Motherland is being decided. Here, near Stalingrad, the question is being decided - to be or not to be free for the Soviet people...

Sending this letter from the trenches, we swear to you that until the last drop of blood, until the last breath, until the last heartbeat we will defend Stalingrad and will not allow the enemy to reach the Volga!..”

The defenders of Stalingrad fulfilled their oath to the Motherland with honor. They not only defended Stalingrad, but also bled and exhausted the enemy and thereby prepared the conditions for our troops to launch a powerful counter-offensive.

A major role in the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad was played by constant, skillfully organized party-political work among the soldiers. In the heroic 62nd Army, daily educational work was carried out by all commanders and political workers. They increased the morale of the troops, explained to the soldiers the tasks facing them, talked about the situation at the fronts, and called on them to selflessly fight the enemy. While in combat formations, they showed examples of perseverance and selfless service to the Motherland, leading the soldiers to heroic deeds by personal example. The army commander, Lieutenant General Chuikov, met and talked with soldiers and officers every day.

Particular attention was paid to instilling in soldiers a sense of Soviet patriotism, military duty and honor, promoting the glorious military traditions of the great Russian people, strengthening discipline and organization.

Despite the extremely difficult combat conditions, the army regularly held party meetings, group conversations, rallies, lectures, reports, and newspaper readings. In dugouts dug into the steep Volga bank, films were shown and amateur performances were held. The methods, forms and content of party political work changed depending on the situation. Conversations about the exploits of heroes were held regularly. At party meetings, the results of past battles were discussed, the communists exchanged experience in the fight against the fascist invaders, got acquainted with the situation on other fronts and in the country as a whole, with the international situation, studied the orders and speeches of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin and the “Short Course history of the CPSU (b)".

The unit where Comrade Shcherbakov was the party organizer was located only 30 meters from the Nazis. Despite this, the unit regularly held party meetings, at which the results of the communist military operations were summed up and the next tasks were determined.

“The range of issues discussed at party meetings covered all aspects of life. At party meetings of the unit, where Comrade Levshin was the secretary of the party bureau, in between battles such issues as “Appeal of participants in the Tsaritsyn defense to the defenders of Stalingrad”, “Letter from soldiers, commanders and political workers of the Stalingrad Front to Comrade Stalin” were discussed ", x Report of Comrade Stalin on the 25th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", "On the vanguard role of communists in street fighting", "On the creation of an impregnable defense in the city", "On the education of personnel of units and subunits", “Letter from the commander of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, Colonel General Eremenko, to all communists - defenders of Stalingrad.”

There were cases when party meetings and meetings of the party bureau were interrupted by attacks by the Nazis. Having repulsed the attacks, the communists continued their work. Thanks to the operational party-political work, each feat in the army quickly became known to all soldiers, educated them, and inspired them to an even more decisive and merciless fight against the hated enemy.

The heroic exploits of the defenders of Stalingrad aroused admiration throughout the world. Battle of Stalingrad attracted the attention of all mankind.

At a time when units of the Soviet Army heroically defended Stalingrad, the Supreme High Command pulled up reserves and concentrated huge forces north and south of Stalingrad for a counteroffensive.

In a harsh and tense atmosphere, the Soviet people celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In a report dedicated to this significant date, J.V. Stalin noted that the activities of our state and party bodies over the past period flowed in two directions: in the direction of peaceful construction and organization of a strong rear for our front and in the direction carrying out defensive and offensive operations of the Soviet Army. The strength and organization of the country's rear increased significantly during this period. People learned to work in a military way. The factories reliably supplied our army with guns, mortars, airplanes, tanks, machine guns, rifles, and ammunition. Collective and state farms uninterruptedly provided the population and the Armed Forces with food, and industry with raw materials. The friendship of the peoples of the country and the moral and political unity of Soviet society showed their strength and invincibility. Our troops, supported by a strong Soviet rear, won the love and respect of all freedom-loving peoples of the world with their selfless struggle against the fascist armies.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the brutal fascist hordes raised the international authority of the Soviet Union to unprecedented heights. Under the leadership of the Soviet Union, a powerful anti-Hitler coalition grew stronger, which included the peoples of 28 states. The guiding and decisive role in the anti-Hitler coalition belonged to the country of victorious socialism - the USSR. The struggle of the Soviet people inspired the peoples of Europe to resist the fascist invaders. The isolation of Nazi Germany in the international arena grew. .

The report of I.V. Stalin showed the direct opposite of the program anti-Hitler coalition program of the fascist robber bloc. If the program of the fascist bloc was a program for the destruction of the independence and freedom of peoples, a program for the economic and political enslavement of conquered peoples and the establishment of world domination, then the program of the anti-Hitler coalition was a program for the struggle for the liberation of enslaved peoples and the restoration of their sovereign rights , for the right of every nation to organize itself as it wishes, for the restoration of democratic freedoms and the destruction of the bloody Hitler regime.

It should be said that not all participants in the anti-Hitler coalition sought to implement this great program. If the Soviet Union really wanted and achieved the implementation of these anti-fascist, democratic goals, then the American-British imperialists pursued other, selfish goals, which consisted in getting rid of German and Japanese competitors in the world market, weakening the power of the USSR and establishing achieve your world domination. The heroic struggle of the Soviet people, supported by all freedom-loving peoples, thwarted the implementation of these insidious plans.

The Soviet Army had three main tasks: to destroy the Hitlerite state and its inspirers; destroy Hitler's army and its leaders; to destroy the hated Hitler’s “new order” in Europe and punish its builders. In order to successfully accomplish these tasks, it was necessary first of all to cleanse Soviet soil of Hitler’s evil spirits.

The Motherland and the Communist Party called on the soldiers to steadfastly and stubbornly defend the front line, not to allow the invaders to advance forward, to exhaust the enemy with all their might, to exterminate his manpower, destroy his equipment, to strengthen discipline in every possible way, to maintain the strictest order and unity of command in our army, improve combat training, expand the nationwide partisan movement even more widely behind enemy lines, destroy enemy rear lines, exterminate the Nazi invaders.

Preparations for crushing blows against the enemy were in full swing.

Military production organized by the party and government achieved ever new successes. As a result of the hard work of millions of people, the products of many evacuated military industry factories by the middle

1941 exceeded the pre-war level. Along with this, dozens of new industrial buildings - factories, mines, mines - came into operation every day. The industrial output of the Urals, the main military arsenal of the Soviet Army, more than tripled in the first two years of the war.

The growing military-industrial power of the country made it possible to supply the front with significantly more high-quality weapons and various military equipment. Thus, the production of aircraft by December 1942 increased by 3.3 times compared to December 1941, tanks - almost 2 times, guns - twice.

At the initiative of the Tambov collective farmers and collective farm women, a wide movement to raise funds for the Soviet Army Fund developed in the country. In two weeks, collective farmers and collective farmers of the Tambov region collected 40 million rubles for the construction of the “Tambov Collective Farmer” tank column. Soon to this amount they added more than 40 million rubles in money and over 200 thousand pounds of bread. The example of the Tambov collective farmers was followed by workers in other regions. Billions of rubles were received by the Soviet state for the Motherland Defense Fund. Nationwide assistance to the Soviet Army served as the basis for its glorious victories.

The fight against the fascist invaders required the Soviet people to exert all their strength to the utmost. The enemy's onslaught was persistent and cruel. If in the First World War Germany, which fought on two fronts, fielded only 127 divisions of German and German-allied troops against the Russian front, then in the Second World War Nazi Germany was able to throw almost twice as many divisions onto the Soviet-German front, since the governments of England and The United States deliberately did not open a second front in Europe.

As J.V. Stalin pointed out, “no other country and no other army could withstand such an onslaught of brutal gangs of Nazi bandits and their allies. Only our Soviet country, and only our Red Army, are capable of withstanding such an onslaught. And not only withstand it, but also overcome it.”

The defense of Stalingrad played an outstanding role during the Great Patriotic War. In this battle, the Nazi army suffered irreparable losses in manpower and equipment. Under the attacks of the Soviet troops, even before they launched a counteroffensive, the Nazi army lost 182,800 people killed and more than 500 thousand wounded. During this time, our troops shot down and destroyed up to 1,500 tanks, 4 thousand machine guns, more than a thousand mortars, over a thousand guns and 1,337 aircraft. The Battle of Stalingrad was the greatest school of perseverance and mass heroism for Soviet soldiers. In this battle, the Soviet Army again showed itself to be “the best army in the world.”

The heroic defenders of Stalingrad, just like the earlier defenders of Moscow and Tula, Odessa, Sevastopol and Leningrad, showed examples of selfless courage, iron discipline and the ability to defeat the enemy. Not only friends, but also enemies were forced to give an exceptionally high assessment of the tenacity of Soviet soldiers. The crushing blows inflicted by our troops on the enemy near Stalingrad forced the Nazis to talk about the “inaccessibility of the Stalingrad fortress”, about the “Volga Verdun”.

During the heroic defense of Stalingrad, Soviet troops thwarted the enemy's plans to use the advantages associated with the absence of a second front. Through the efforts of the entire Soviet people and their army under the leadership of the Communist Party, they not only repulsed all the frantic attacks of the enemy, but also prepared a counter-offensive of enormous force, which marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Second World War.

S. Golikov

From the book “Outstanding Victories of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War”, Moscow, 1954

Stalin's military campaign plan for 1942

January 5, 1942 a joint meeting took place VGK rates And GKO, where the plan was discussed further actions on the Soviet-German front in winter and spring 1942 I.V. Stalin, who highly appreciated the successful progress of the offensive operation near Moscow, stated that the main goal of the new military campaign should be a general offensive of Soviet troops along the entire front line from Barents before Black seas.

– To the troops of Leningrad (M.S. Khozin) And Volkhovsky (K.A. Meretskov) fronts in interaction with Baltic Fleet (V.F. Tributs) the task was set to defeat the main forces of the army group " North» and completely release Leningrad:

– Troops of the Northwestern Front (P.A. Kurochkin) should have been applied from the area Ostashkov – Demyansk a powerful blow to enemy units and formations at the junction of army groups " Center" And " North»;

– To the troops of Kalininsky(I.S. Konev) And Western(G.K. Zhukov) fronts were tasked with continuing the offensive operation on the central sector of the front and defeating the main forces of Army Group Center in the area Rzhev – Vyazma – Smolensk.

– Troops Southwestern (F.Ya. Kostenko) and Southern (R.Ya. Malinovsky) fronts were supposed to defeat the main forces of the army group " South", liberate left-bank Ukraine and gain a foothold on the right bank Dnieper.

– Troops of the Caucasian Front (D.T. Kozlov) in interaction with parts and connections Black Sea Fleet (F.S. October) should have been completely released Crimean peninsula and lift the siege Sevastopol.

Offer I.V. Stalin the general offensive on the front was fully supported by the marshals K.E. Voroshilov And S.K. Tymoshenko. However, to one degree or another, the deputy chairman spoke out against Stalin’s plan SNK USSR N.A. Voznesensky, boss General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov and commander of the Western Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov. Their arguments were as follows:

1) The offensive can be continued only on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, where, as a result of successful counterattacks near Moscow, the enemy is completely demoralized and is unable to provide worthy resistance to Soviet troops in the near future.

2) In the remaining sectors of the Soviet-German front, one should switch to strategic defense, because: a) there are no objective operational-tactical prerequisites for the successful conduct of offensive operations; b) the country's military-industrial complex is not yet able to produce the required amount of weapons and ammunition to simultaneously carry out several large offensive operations on the entire Soviet-German front.

However, these arguments were not taken into account by the majority of members GKO And Rates, And I.V. Stalin categorically insisted on the approval of his proposed plan for a military campaign in 1942, which ultimately practically failed and ended in a major defeat for Soviet troops, especially in the southwestern strategic direction. Another serious miscalculation of the leader was that he completely trusted the leadership of military intelligence, headed at that time by Major General A.P. Panfilov, gave the order to transfer to Western Front significant military reserves and military equipment from other strategic directions and fronts. IN in this case A fatal role was played by the fact that Soviet intelligence officers fell for the bait of German military intelligence - “ Abwehr", headed by Admiral F. Canaris, whose agents were able to convince them that in the spring 1942 a new general offensive against Moscow will begin, codenamed “Kremlin”.

Military operations at the front in the winter - summer of 1942.

At the end of December 1941 in pursuance of an order VGK rates The implementation of a number of local offensive operations began, which at the first stage were tactically successful.

– During Kerch-Feodosia landing operation ( December 1941 – January 1942) troops Transcaucasian Front (D.T. Kozlov), freeing the eastern part Kerch Peninsula, not only prevented the real threat of invasion by German troops on North Caucasus, but also created a convenient springboard for complete liberation Crimean peninsula from the enemy;

– During Toropetsko-Kholmskoy (January–February 1942) And Demyanskaya(January – May 1942) offensive operations of troops Kalininsky (I.S. Konev) and North-Western (P.A. Kurochkin) fronts, defeating the advanced units 9th (V. Model) and 16th (E. Bush) field armies of the Wehrmacht, advanced 200–300 kilometers and reached the line Staraya Russa– Hill – Velikiye Luki.

During these operations, the plans were realized to the maximum extent VGK rates, however, the remaining offensive operations either completely failed or had little tactical success.
– During the Lyuban offensive operation ( January – April 1942) troops Volkhovsky (K.A. Meretskov) and Leningradsky (M.S. Khozin) fronts were never able to implement the assigned tasks, and 2nd shock (A. Vlasov) and 59th (I. Galanin) The combined arms army of the Volkhov Front switched to forced defense.
– During Rzhevsko-Vyazemskaya And Sychevsko-Vyazemskaya offensive operations that were carried out in January – April 1942 by the forces of thirteen combined arms armies of the High Command of the Troops Western direction(G.K. Zhukov), main operational-tactical goals, in particular the liberation Rzhev And Vyazma, were never achieved. At the same time, during heavy bloody battles, Soviet troops managed to significantly advance 100–200 kilometers and, having successfully completed the Moscow offensive operation, gain a foothold at the line Velizh – Demidovo – Bely – Sychevka – Nelidovo – Gzhatsk – Yukhnov – Lyudinovo. However, it should be noted that during these operations, troops of the 29th Army (V. Shvetsov) of the Kalinin Front and the 33rd Army (M. Efremov) of the Western Front were surrounded near Rzhev and Vyazma.

It must be said that in Lately as part of a large-scale information war against our country, a number of biased authors ( V. Melnikov, V. Safir, F. Sverdlov, S. Mikheenkov) began to very actively discuss the issue of the so-called “Vyazma disaster” of April 1942., in which the army commander tragically died 33rd army lieutenant general M.G. Efremov, who, having been wounded while trying to escape the encirclement, shot himself because of the threat of being captured. Naturally, our “patriots” laid all the blame for the encirclement of Soviet troops near Vyazma and the death of the army commander 33rd to the commander Western Front of Army General G.K. Zhukova, who supposedly always disliked the obstinate commander and deliberately doomed his army to death. However, an analysis of real documents suggests that the blame for the “Vyazma disaster” lies equally with everyone, including Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which actually sanctioned itself Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation.

– During Barvenkovsko-Lozovskaya offensive operation, which was carried out in January 1942 by the Southern troops ( R.Ya. Malinovsky) and Southwestern ( F.Ya. Kostenko) fronts, having moved forward 90–100 kilometers, were unable to complete the assigned tasks for liberation Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Poltava.

In May–June 1942 in various sectors of the Soviet-German front, the enemy managed to achieve significant operational and tactical successes, which significantly complicated the position of the Soviet troops, especially in the southwestern strategic direction.

In the first half of May 1942 troops of the 11th Field Army of Field Marshal E. Manstein, breaking through the defenses of the 44th ( S. Chernyak), 47th ( K. Kolganov) and 51st ( V. Lvov) armies Crimean Front, captured Kerch and forced the remnants of the Soviet troops to hastily retreat to Taman Peninsula. The results of this military disaster, for which the blame lies entirely with the representative VGK rates Colonel General L.Z. Mehlis and the commander of the Crimean Front, Lieutenant General D.V. Kozlov, turned out to be huge: a) German troops on the shoulders of retreating Soviet units burst into the Caucasus; b) Soviet troops were forced to leave the symbol of Russian military glory - Sevastopol, the heroic defense of which lasted almost a whole year.
May 12, 1942 on the initiative Main troops command South-Western direction(S.K. Timoshenko, N.S. Khrushchev, I.Kh. Baghramyan) the Kharkov offensive operation began. And although the leadership General Staff of the Red Army, in particular Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov and Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky, in a rather cautious manner, spoke out against carrying out a large-scale offensive operation in this strategic direction, I.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov and other members T-bills and rates initially supported this outright adventure, the authors of which were S.K. Tymoshenko And N.S. Khrushchev.

In accordance with the plan of the operation to attack Kharkov from the Barvenkovsky ledge and troops of the 6th ( A. Gorodnyansky), 21st ( V. Gordov), 28th ( D. Ryabyshev) and 38th ( K. Moskalenko) armies Southwestern Front. Initially, their offensive developed relatively successfully and by the end of the fifth day of fighting, they had broken through the defenses of the 6th Field Army, Colonel General F. Paulus, they moved forward 25–50 kilometers. But already May 17 completely unexpectedly from the area of ​​Kramatorsk and Slavyansk by troops 9th (P. Kozlov) And 57th(K. Podlas) armies Southern Front lieutenant general R.Ya. Malinovsky a powerful tank attack was carried out by Army Group " Kleist».

In this situation, the new boss General Staff of the Red Army Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky offered I.V. Stalin immediately stop the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front and turn the troops of the 6th Army of Lieutenant General A.M. Gorodnyansky and the frontline task force of Lieutenant General L.V. Bobkina to eliminate an extremely dangerous enemy breakthrough in the zone Southern Front. However Supreme Commander only May 19 gave permission to go on the defensive along the entire front line, but it was already too late. May, 23rd advanced units 6th field army and army group " Kleist» connected further south Balakleya and surrounded the troops 6th And 57th armies. During the fierce fighting that continued May 24–29, 1942, most of the Soviet troops were unable to escape from the encirclement and many soldiers and commanders died the death of the brave on the battlefield, including the deputy commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko and the army commanders L.V. Bobkin, A.M. Gorodnyansky and K.P. Podlas.

In the second half of June 1942 troops of the 59th (I. Korovnikov) And 2nd drum (A. Vlasov) armies Volkhov Front (K.A. Meretskov), heroically fighting the enemy in the area Lyubani, were surrounded and almost completely defeated by superior forces 18th field army colonel general G. Lindeman. At the same time, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov voluntarily surrendered and, having gone into service with the enemy, headed the so-called Russian Liberation Army (ROA), forever staining itself with indelible shame in front of the memory of living and fallen heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

At the end June - early July 1942 during Voronezh-Donbass defensive operation of troops Bryansky (F.I. Golikov),South-West (S.K. Timoshenko) And Yuzhny (R.Ya. Malinovsky) fronts, suffering huge losses, retreated 150–400 kilometers inland and left the entire territory to the enemy Donbass and Rostov region of the RSFSR.

Evgeny Spitsyn,
author of the Unified History Textbook in 4 volumes

Summer-autumn 1942

In the summer and autumn of 1942, ground units of the Red Army actively operated in the northwestern and central sectors of the Soviet-German front. In the second half of May, German troops launched an offensive against the 2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front. Attempts by Soviet troops to expand the bridgehead on the left bank of the Volkhov and develop an offensive in the direction of Lyuban were unsuccessful. The command of Army Group North managed to pull up large forces and, concentrating them at the base of the Lyuban bridgehead, created a threat of encirclement for the formations of the 2nd Shock Army located on this bridgehead.

On May 14, Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army to the eastern bank of the Volkhov. However, the command of the Leningrad Front did not show the necessary efficiency in carrying out this instruction, and at the end of May the enemy managed to cut off the 2nd Shock Army from the main forces of the front. With heavy fighting, its units fought their way out of encirclement until the beginning of July. Although these battles ended unsuccessfully for the Soviet troops, they pinned down significant enemy forces for a long time. The unfavorable outcome of the Lyuban operation was largely determined by the cowardice and inaction of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Major General A. A. Vlasov, who, fearing responsibility for the defeat of the army, betrayed his homeland and voluntarily went over to the Nazis.

After the end of the fighting in the Luban bridgehead area, both sides began preparing larger operations. The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, recreated in July, began to prepare an operation in the Sinyavinsk direction with the aim of breaking the blockade of Leningrad. Hitler's command also urgently began preparations new operation for the capture of Leningrad. To carry out this operation, a significant part of the troops of the 11th German Army from Crimea, as well as several formations from the West, were transferred to strengthen the 18th Army. The enemy concentrated large artillery forces on the approaches to Leningrad. The overall leadership of the operation was entrusted to Field Marshal Manstein.

But the Nazis failed to carry out their plans. Having forestalled the enemy, the troops of the Neva operational group of the Leningrad Front and the right wing of the Volkhov Front launched an offensive in the Sinyavinsk direction on August 27. The enemy's defense in the offensive zone of the 8th Army of the Volkhov Front was broken through. The troops of the Neva Group, in cooperation with units of the Baltic Fleet, crossed the Neva and captured two small bridgeheads on its left bank. The fighting developed slowly. The enemy stubbornly resisted. Our troops failed to develop their success. Despite this, the offensive of the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts was of great operational importance, as it forced the fascist German command to use formations intended for the attack on Leningrad to repel the attack of the Soviet troops. The fighting in the Sinyavinsk direction continued until October 6. During the battle, both sides suffered significant losses. The Germans alone lost at least 60 thousand people killed and captured. About 200 enemy tanks, more than 200 guns, 400 mortars, 710 machine guns were shot down and destroyed, and 260 German aircraft were shot down.

The Baltic Fleet took an active part in the struggle for Leningrad during this period. Naval and coastal artillery, as well as naval aviation, were brought in to support ground forces. Naval artillery was especially widely used in the fight against German artillery shelling Leningrad. For the defense of the sea approaches to Leningrad and ensuring the access of submarines to enemy communications in the Baltic Sea, the retention by the fleet of the islands of Lavansari and Seskar, located 100 kilometers west of Kronstadt, was of great importance.

The combat activities of the submarines of the Baltic Fleet took place in very difficult conditions on enemy sea communications. During the transition from their home base - Leningrad - to the Baltic Sea, the boats had to cross the lines of minefields; they were exposed to enemy coastal artillery fire and anti-submarine forces. The difficulties were aggravated by the fact that our submarines crossed the Gulf of Finland and fought on sea communications without the help of aviation and surface ships.

The fascist German command was confident that Soviet submarines would not be able to overcome all these obstacles. But the submariners of the Baltic Fleet honorably carried out their tasks of disrupting enemy sea communications. Some submarines crossed the Gulf of Finland four times. Submarines "Shch-317" - commander Lieutenant Commander N.K. Mokhov and "Shch-406" - commander Lieutenant Commander E. Ya. Osipov each destroyed five transports in one trip. Sometimes, having used up all their torpedoes, the boats opened artillery fire on enemy ships. Thus, a boat under the command of captain 3rd rank S.P. Lisin torpedoed a transport with a displacement of 8 thousand tons. Soon after, she encountered another transport and sank it with artillery fire. The submarine "Shch-303" under the command of captain 3rd rank I.V. Travkin sank a transport carrying 1,500 soldiers and officers, and the submarine "D-2" - a ship with 3 thousand German soldiers. An underwater minelayer under the command of Captain 2nd Rank P.D. Gritsenko successfully crossed the Gulf of Finland and, while crossing into the mine-laying area, discovered a convoy. Despite the fact that the enemy attacked the boat with depth charges, it torpedoed a large transport. In the area designated for laying mines, the boat scouted out the routes of the convoys and placed three mine banks on them, on which two vehicles were then blown up and sank. After that, the boat sank three more ships. Returning from a combat mission, she was damaged by a mine explosion and depth charge explosions, but thanks to the courage of the personnel and the skill of the commander, she arrived safely at the base.

In total, in 1942, submarines of the Baltic Fleet destroyed more than 50 and damaged 10 German transports. For their combat successes, the submarines "L-3", "Shch-303" and "Shch-309" were awarded the honorary title of Guards. The submarine "Shch-406" was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Most submariners received orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the breakthrough of Soviet submarines into the Baltic Sea, the Germans were forced to stop free navigation there and switch to a convoy system. To combat the boats, the Finnish Navy and a German unit were used. navy. At a meeting of the German High Command on naval affairs at the end of 1942, it was noted that every submarine that broke into the Baltic Sea posed a threat to shipping in the entire theater. At the same meeting, the issue of creating a blockade of the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland was discussed that would prevent Soviet submarines from entering its western part.

The combat activities of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were fully supported by the party and Soviet organizations of Leningrad and all the working people of the city. Leningrad in those days was the most a shining example unity of front and rear.

With the onset of spring, the party, Soviet and economic organizations of the city actively began to eliminate the consequences of the difficult winter of 1941-42. From March 27 to April 15, 300 thousand workers went out every day to clean the streets and courtyards to prevent the possibility of epidemics. On April 15, the tram was launched, water supply and sewerage began to work.

In connection with the approach of summer, party and Soviet organizations have done a lot of work to create an additional food supply. Over 9 thousand hectares of urban land were used for individual vegetable gardens. About 270 thousand Leningrad residents received plots for growing vegetables. Every piece of land in gardens, parks and courtyards was plowed and sown. Cabbage, onions, carrots and other vegetables grew on the Field of Mars, St. Isaac's Square, and in the Summer Garden.

Since little coal and other fuels were still imported into the city, all local industrial enterprises, hospitals and schools were heated with wood and peat.

During the summer, 1 million cubic meters were stocked in suburban areas. meters of firewood

Great importance To provide the troops with weapons and ammunition, the production of various types of weapons and ammunition previously manufactured in Leningrad was restored. In April 1942, 50 enterprises producing military products were operating, in May - 57. During this time, Leningrad industry produced 99 guns, 790 machine guns, 214 thousand shells of various calibers, over 200 thousand mines. In addition, workers repaired 227 warships, 360 boats, 163 guns and many other weapons, built 100 tenders, several ferries and collapsible metal barges for the Ladoga military flotilla, which transported railway cars and platforms across Lake Ladoga. In September, the industry was already producing about a hundred different types of military products.

A huge amount of work was done by port workers to prepare for summer navigation on Lake Ladoga. In the spring, the ice track began to deteriorate and was closed on April 21. Preparatory work for summer navigation began long before its opening. By spring, new ports were built with dozens of berths and piers with a total length of 3 kilometers.

Summer navigation on Lake Ladoga opened at the end of May. Until the end of navigation, over 200 ships of the Ladoga flotilla, commanded by Captain 1st Rank B.S. Cherokov, transported more than 1 million tons of various cargo and about 1 million people, of which 250 thousand were to replenish the front and navy troops. Leningrad received the necessary amount of food, ammunition, fuel, and weapons.

The fascist German command tried in every possible way to disrupt the supply of Leningrad through Ladoga. In a directive to the commander of the 1st Air Fleet, Colonel General Keller, Hitler’s headquarters defined the task of disrupting Soviet communications and disrupting transportation on Lake Ladoga in 1942: “To disrupt the evacuation of Leningrad by all means, and especially by air raids on the Ladoga shipping area, so as not to to give the enemy the opportunity to strengthen himself through the transport of troops or armament work, or to achieve an improvement in the food situation and thereby the defense capability of Leningrad.”

In the summer, enemy aircraft in groups of 80-130 aircraft carried out 120 day and 15 night raids on our ports, bases and convoys of ships. But losses from enemy raids during transportation did not exceed 0.4 percent of the total amount of cargo. During this time, the enemy lost 160 aircraft from Soviet fighters and anti-aircraft artillery fire. One of the conditions that ensured the uninterrupted movement of ships in Ladoga was the conquest and retention of the Leningrad Front by aviation. Red Banner Baltic Fleet air supremacy over Ladoga communications.

To ensure an uninterrupted supply of fuel to Leningrad, the front and the fleet, the State Defense Committee adopted on April 25 a resolution on the construction of an underwater pipeline for pumping oil. The completion date for construction was set for June 20. The heroic efforts of the pipeline builders were crowned with brilliant success: on June 18, the pipeline was ready. Having put the pipeline into operation, the builders and sailors of the flotilla began laying an electric cable across the lake. In September, after a long break caused by the blockade, the Volkhov hydroelectric station again began supplying Leningrad with electricity.

In an effort to intercept our communications on Ladoga, the fascist German command by August transferred a large number of landing ships and various boats built in Germany, Italy and Finland to Lake Ladoga. These ships were brought together “into the eastern crossing detachment.” The detachment had the task of disrupting transportation to Leningrad. For the same purpose, the Nazis attempted to land troops on the small island of Suho (Map 9). On the morning of October 22, 38 enemy boats and self-propelled barges with troops, under the cover of German-Finnish aviation and artillery fire, approached the island and began to land troops.

The personnel of the artillery battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant I.K. Gusev offered fierce resistance to the enemy. Using cannon and machine gun fire and bayonet attacks, the island's defenders held back the onslaught of superior enemy forces, trying to gain the time necessary for the flotilla's ships and aircraft to approach.

The patrol ship "TSCH-100", commanded by Senior Lieutenant P.K. Kargin, and the patrol ship "MO-171" under the command of Senior Lieutenant V.I. Kovalevsky, having informed the headquarters of the Ladoga flotilla about the approach of the enemy landing force to the island, entered battle with enemy ships. Having received the report, the commander of the Ladoga flotilla gave the order to immediately deploy forces to strike the enemy. Soon our aviation carried out the first bomb attack on the enemy landing force. The ships of the Ladoga military flotilla also approached the battlefield. The enemy landing force was defeated by the combined forces. Having lost 19 of 38 ships and 15 aircraft, the enemy, pursued by our fighters and attack aircraft, retreated in a northwest direction.

Due to the difficulties of transporting food to Leningrad and the need to increase its garrison, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in July 1942 proposed to the Leningrad Party organization to carry out an additional evacuation of residents. Only the able-bodied population was supposed to remain in the city, which could satisfy the urgent needs of the front, the fleet, the city itself, and at any moment join the ranks of the armed defenders of Leningrad. In his speech on July 6 at the bureau of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A. A. Zhdanov said: “The Central Committee believes that for this purpose... it is inappropriate to have more than 800 thousand people in Leningrad.”

It was decided to complete the evacuation of the surplus population as soon as possible and thereby increase the number of troops. Leningrad was turning into a military city.

The Leningrad party organization successfully completed the task set Central Committee parties. During the summer, of the 1,100 thousand residents remaining in Leningrad, about 490 thousand people were evacuated. By the fall, the evacuation of valuable equipment and the most important enterprises of Leningrad industry was completed.

Intense fighting took place in the summer in the Demyansk region. From May to June, the troops of the North-Western Front went on the offensive three times with the aim of defeating the Demyansk enemy group. The first operation was carried out from May 3 to May 20. Its plan was to use the forces of the 11th and 1st Shock armies to launch counter strikes from the south and north, completely cut off and then defeat this grouping. The troops of the 34th and 53rd armies were ordered to pin down its forces from the east. The Soviet troops failed to cope with the task. Subsequent attempts by the Northwestern Front to liquidate the enemy's Demyansk bridgehead were also unsuccessful. This was explained primarily by the fact that the offensive was poorly organized. The front command acted indecisively, troop control was weak. The attacks were carried out non-simultaneously and on narrow sections of the front, while the rest of the front remained passive. Repeated attacks came from the same area, which made it much easier for the enemy to fight against Soviet troops. Nevertheless, the front troops, through their active actions, firmly pinned down the 16th German Army and inflicted serious losses on it. This army lost up to 90 thousand people in killed alone. The battles for the Demyansk bridgehead were called by the former chief of staff of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General Beck-Berents, “a mill - a reduced Verdun of the First World War.” To repel the attacks of the Soviet troops, the fascist German command had to transfer part of the forces of the 18th Army to the Demyansk area. In addition, the heavy fighting that took place in this area forced the enemy command to use a significant part of its transport aviation to supply the 16th Army, which could not but harm the interests of the main groups operating on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. Finally, the active actions of the troops of the North-Western Front thwarted the large offensive planned by the fascist German command towards Ostashkov, towards their group, which was supposed to attack Ostashkov from the Rzhev area.

Edition: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. In 6 volumes. Military publication of the USSR Ministry of Defense, M., 1960

1942, Defense of Leningrad. The offensive of Soviet troops in the areas of Rzhev and Voronezh

The events of the summer and autumn of 1942 near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus took place in strategic connection with the actions of the parties in other directions of the Soviet-German front. In July - November, an intense struggle unfolded in the northwestern and western sectors of the front and in the Voronezh region. Soviet troops on the defensive undertook several private offensive operations, in which, along with specific tasks (improving the operational position of Soviet troops near Moscow and Leningrad, eliminating the enemy’s Demyan bridgehead, liberating Voronezh), a common strategic goal was pursued - to pin down as many enemy troops as possible, inflict losses on him in manpower and military equipment, force the Nazi command to bring reserves into battle in order to prevent their transfer to the Stalingrad and Caucasus directions.

Fighting near Leningrad and in the Demyansk region

The situation near Leningrad and in general in the northwestern direction by the summer of 1942 was determined by the results of the struggle in this sector of the front in the first half of the year. During intense battles in January - June, troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western Fronts not only pinned down Army Group North, facilitating operations Soviet army in the winter offensive near Moscow, but the plan was finally thwarted Hitler's command for the capture of Leningrad, the connection of German and Finnish troops. Having failed to break the tenacity of the city’s defenders and suffering serious losses, the enemy was forced to begin strengthening its defensive lines on the Leningrad sector of the front.

The troops of Army Group North were not able to resume the offensive on Leningrad in the near future, since all strategic reserves and marching reinforcements in the spring and early summer of 1942 were transferred to the south to prepare for and conduct the “main operation” on the southern wing of the Eastern Front. Nevertheless, the forced cessation of active operations of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts in the Lyuban direction, where it was not possible to eliminate the enemy group in the area of ​​​​Kirishi, Lyuban, Chudovo, and the enemy’s success in the relief of the Demyansk group significantly complicated the situation for the Soviet troops. The 42nd, 55th and 23rd armies, the Primorsky and Nevsky operational groups of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet remained in the blocked area around Leningrad.

Harsh living conditions, continuous bombing and artillery shelling did not shake the morale and resilience of Leningraders. Since the spring of 1942, in connection with the improvement of the food and fuel situation in the city due to transportation along the Ladoga Ice Road, the leadership of the defense of Leningrad began to liquidate severe consequences blockade winter of 1941-1942. First of all, measures were taken to restore the health and working capacity of the population. Work began to restore sanitary order, restore the urban economy, and primarily the water supply and transport. All this made it possible to intensify the work of Leningrad industry. The defense of the city of Lenin - the cradle of the Great October Revolution - became the work of the entire Soviet people. Speaking in June 1942 at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, A. A. Zhdanov said: “Every Leningrader, man and woman, has found his place in the struggle and honestly fulfills his duty as a Soviet patriot.”

The Military Council of the Leningrad Front gave combat orders to the troops and the Baltic Fleet, determined production tasks for the teams of factories, factories and construction organizations.

Since the winter of 1941/42, the sniper movement became widespread among the troops of the Leningrad Front. During the blockade, it was of great importance, as it significantly intensified the defense. The combat successes of the most accurate shooters were worthily noted. On February 6, 1942, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 10 snipers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 130 were awarded orders and medals.

Party-political work in the front troops played a major role in mobilizing soldiers to increase combat activity, courage and perseverance, and instilling an unshakable faith in victory over the enemy. The Military Council of the Leningrad Front noted that commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations must work with personnel in such a way “that people seek a fight with the enemy. And this should not be an isolated phenomenon, but a massive one.”

When training soldiers, various forms of party political work were used. Following the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, members of the Military Council of the front A. A. Zhdanov, A. A. Kuznetsov, T. F. Shtykov, N. V. Solovyov, the head of the political department of the front K. P. Kulik, members of the military regularly spoke to the soldiers and commanders army councils, military commissars of operational groups, heads of political agencies of armies and formations.

Meetings with residents of the blockaded city, with delegations from other cities and fraternal union republics had a positive effect on the personnel.

The effectiveness of printed propaganda increased noticeably. Famous writers and poets appeared on the pages of front-line and army newspapers with articles, essays and poems: O. Berggolts, V. Vishnevsky, M. Dudin, A. Prokofiev, V. Sayanov, N. Tikhonov and others. The documentary film “Leningrad in Struggle,” produced by the Leningrad Newsreel Studio, was of great educational importance. It began to be displayed on the eve of the summer battles of 1942 and, as it were, summed up the first year of the battle for Leningrad. The film truthfully and impressively depicted the struggle and life of the heroic defenders of the city. He called on everyone to new military and labor feats.

Thanks to the measures adopted by the Party Central Committee, party political work was carried out specifically and purposefully.

Much work was done to strengthen defensive positions near Leningrad, especially after the loss of the bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva in the Moscow Dubrovka area, called the Nevsky Patch by soldiers. In April, during the ice drift on the Neva, the enemy captured it by storm, depriving the front forces of a favorable starting area for the upcoming offensive to break the blockade. Therefore, the Headquarters, having received information about the loss of this important bridgehead, on April 29 demanded that the Military Council of the front carefully examine the condition of the defensive lines and take measures to strengthen them.

In May, the Front Military Council submitted to Headquarters a detailed work plan to improve the defense of Leningrad, and soon this work began. By the end of the year, each army and task force had installed two lanes. Directly behind them, an internal city defense system (IOG) was created, which consisted of an outer zone and urban sectors. The outer zone of the FOG was divided into four regions: southern, western, eastern and northern. It was equipped in a field manner, that is, in the form of battalion areas prepared for occupation by field troops. Urban defense sectors, planned back in 1941, were a system of strongholds, including buildings and factory areas prepared for all-round defense. During the summer and autumn of 1942, Leningraders equipped more than 8,100 machine gun and artillery firing points, dug over 1,500 trenches, equipped up to 200 command and observation posts, built more than 17 km of barricades, 25 km of anti-tank ditches and 52 km of communication trenches. In total, six defense sectors were created - Kirov, Moscow, Volodarsky, Krasnogvardeysky, Vyborg, Primorsky - and a defensive zone of the Baltic Fleet in the very center of Leningrad. By order of the commander of the internal defense of the city, General S.I. Kabanov, dated June 17, 1942, each sector was determined by the borders, the lines of their front edge, the main defensive lines, resistance nodes and strongholds.

On May 31, 1942, the Leningrad City Executive Committee adopted a special decision to mobilize the city’s population to quickly complete defensive work. After an endlessly long blockade winter, Leningraders again began to build defensive lines. If in April there were 2 thousand people at these jobs, then in July there were about 45 thousand people.

To occupy the outer defense line and sectors, special units were allocated under the leadership of the commander of the FOG. It was assumed that in conditions of an immediate threat, it would additionally receive at its disposal: from the Baltic Fleet - 24 battalions from ships, from the paramilitary and fire departments - 22 rifle battalions, and from the police - 12 battalions. 175 small-caliber artillery guns were transferred from the ships to strengthen the city's defense. 14 anti-aircraft divisions were also involved in firing at ground targets within the city limits. The artillery of the Baltic Fleet was widely used as long-range artillery. As a result, the system of field fortifications in the zones of all armies of the front was improved, and the territory of Leningrad and its suburbs were turned into essentially a continuous fortified area.

Air defense was also improved. Back in November 1941, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front took measures to strengthen it. The 2nd Air Defense Corps quickly subordinated the aviation of the 7th Fighter Aviation Corps and the anti-aircraft weapons of the Baltic Fleet. The commander of the front air forces was instructed to improve the interaction of front-line aviation with air defense forces. The winter respite was used to increase the combat readiness of aviation, anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight units and air defense units.

In the spring of 1942, Leningrad air defense soldiers had to repel the enemy’s air attack on the ships of the Baltic Fleet, organized according to the “Aisshtoss” (“Ice Strike”) plan. The enemy attracted large aviation forces of the 1st Air Fleet and long-range artillery of the 18th Army to this operation. The target of the attack was large Soviet warships frozen in the ice.

The Nazis struck the first blow on April 4. However, it turned out to be ineffective. The enemy failed to suppress the air defense of the city and fleet and ensure freedom of action for its aviation. When enemy bombers attacked, Soviet fighters took off in a timely manner. Powerful barrage of anti-aircraft gunners met the fascist planes on the outskirts of the city. Out of 132, only 58 bombers were able to break through to Leningrad, dropping 230 high-explosive bombs. Having inflicted minor damage to one warship, the enemy lost 18 aircraft in air battles and from anti-aircraft artillery fire.

The second attempt to break through to the ships of the Baltic Fleet was made on the night of April 5. 18 bombers took part in the raid. To illuminate targets, they dropped flare bombs by parachute. Soviet anti-aircraft gunners shot these bombs. Only 8 planes broke through to the city, but they were forced to randomly drop their cargo. At the end of April, the Nazis tried four more times to strike the ships of the fleet. Single aircraft managed to cause some damage to warships. Thus, one bomb hit the battleship “October Revolution”, and the other hit the cruiser “Kirov”. However, the ship's crews were able to quickly repair the damage. In these raids, the enemy lost another 60 aircraft and eventually abandoned Operation Eisstoss.

Having failed to cope with the task of destroying Soviet ships on the Neva, the Nazis resumed mining the fairways in the Gulf of Finland and the Neva delta. From the end of May to mid-June alone, they carried out over 300 sorties for this purpose. During mine laying, fascist aviation lost 75 aircraft.

During the fighting in the spring of 1942, the air defense troops improved their command and control system. In April, the 2nd Air Defense Corps was transformed into the Leningrad Air Defense Army, whose commander was General G.S. Zashikhin, and Chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee P.S. Popkov was appointed a member of the Military Council.

Scientists also made their contribution to strengthening the air defense of Leningrad. A group of Leningrad engineers led by Doctor of Technical Sciences Yu. B. Kobzarev (in 1941, together with other employees of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology, he was awarded the State Prize for work in the field of radar) proposed significant design improvements to the Redut radar station (RUS -2), which made it possible to detect enemy aircraft on the approach to Leningrad in any weather and at any time of the day and destroy them with air defense means.

The number of air raids on Leningrad decreased sharply. But the Nazis persistently continued their barbaric shelling of the city from long-range guns. Therefore, the fight against enemy artillery occupied an important place. It was actively carried out throughout the entire period of the enemy blockade. Having brought long-range artillery to the city, the Nazis destroyed it for a long time with almost impunity. To counter the enemy on the Leningrad Front, a special front-line counter-battery group was created, which initially adhered to defensive tactics: returning fire at enemy batteries only in order to neutralize them. There was still not enough strength or means to completely defeat the enemy batteries.

In March 1942, the Headquarters sent two aviation correction squadrons to the Leningrad Front. At the same time, an aeronautical detachment, two sound-metric batteries and two artillery instrumental reconnaissance divisions were formed here. This made it possible to strengthen reconnaissance of the firing positions of enemy batteries and better adjust the fire of counter-battery artillery. Artillery units of the front began to receive more large-caliber shells (5 thousand monthly). In the fight against enemy artillery appeared real opportunity move from defensive tactics to offensive ones.

The counterbattery fight was led by the chief of artillery of the front, General G. F. Odintsov, the chief of staff of the front artillery, Colonel N. N. Zhdanov, the chiefs of artillery of the 42nd and 55th armies, generals M. S. Mikhalkin and V. S. Korobchenko, the chief of artillery of the Baltic Fleet Rear Admiral I. I. Gren. The front commander, General L. A. Govorov and member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov delved into all the details of this struggle. The chief of artillery of the Soviet Army, General N. N. Voronov, and the chief of staff of the artillery of the Soviet Army, General F. A. Samsonov, paid a lot of attention to it.

The front counter-battery group, subordinate to the front artillery commander, consisted of three corps artillery regiments, a cannon artillery brigade, a naval artillery railway brigade and powerful artillery of the Baltic Fleet - guns of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and forts of the Kronstadt Fortress.

Subsequently, the air forces of the front and navy began to be widely involved in counter-battery warfare. Aviation carried out reconnaissance of the location of enemy batteries, launched bombing and assault strikes on them, and corrected artillery fire.

The counterbattery fight was planned by the headquarters of the front artillery commander. Plans were drawn up for a five-day period and approved by the Military Council of the front. Since the summer of 1942, artillery (and then artillery-aviation) operations began to be carried out to destroy enemy batteries that were shelling Leningrad. The purpose of such operations was not only to destroy batteries, but most importantly, to explode stocks of shells at firing positions. Each operation was developed by the front artillery headquarters together with the headquarters of the front air force commander. It lasted for several days. Powerful artillery and air strikes, as a rule, achieved their goals, although they required a huge expenditure of shells and bombs.

By June 1942, a turning point had occurred in the counter-battery fight. The shelling of the city decreased. If before June the enemy fired 3-4 thousand shells monthly, then in July - 2010, in August - only 712, in September - 926, that is, the intensity of shelling decreased by 3-4 times. Aviation of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet made more than 1,500 sorties to suppress enemy batteries from March to December 1942. The reduction in shelling of the city convincingly indicated that the initiative in the counter-battery fight had firmly passed to the Soviet troops.

One of the active organizers of the counter-battery struggle near Leningrad, General N. N. Zhdanov, cites the following episode: “On Sunday, August 9, 1942, Leningraders for the first time in a solemn atmosphere listened to D. Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony, dedicated by the author to our fight against fascism, our future victory, our native Leningrad. During this unusual concert at the Philharmonic during the blockade, enemy batteries were forced to remain silent, although the Arts Square, where the Philharmonic is located, came under fire very often.

The symphony was performed to the roar of our artillery fire.”

Successes in counter-battery warfare on the Leningrad Front are the result of the fact that soldiers of artillery and aviation formations and units of the front and navy gave all their strength, knowledge and experience to save the city from destruction. And it was not without reason that, recognizing the merits of artillery, Leningraders lovingly called it the fire shield of Leningrad.

Improving the defense of the city and preparing to repel the enemy assault on Leningrad expected in the summer, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front and the city party committee constantly kept the focus on the only front-line communication - the path through Lake Ladoga, the importance of which for the life and struggle of Leningraders can hardly be overestimated.

One of the urgent measures was the evacuation of women, children and the elderly. Although in the winter of 1941-1942. About 555 thousand people were taken out of Ladoga; by the beginning of July 1942, there were still 1,100 thousand inhabitants in Leningrad.

On July 5, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front adopted a resolution “On necessary measures for the city of Leningrad.” It provided for the evacuation of the disabled population and a certain part of highly skilled workers, industrial equipment, as well as the strengthening of military defense and other defensive measures. In the city it was necessary to leave, wrote the former secretary of the Leningrad City Party Committee A. A. Kuznetsov, only the number of population that was necessary for the needs of the front and navy, to leave mainly such people who would be able at any moment to turn from workers and employees into a fighter.

The leaders of the defense of Leningrad attached great importance to the creation of food reserves, providing the city with fuel and electricity, increasing the number and improving the technical equipment of the troops of the Leningrad Front. The successful solution of all these urgent problems largely depended on the efforts of the Ladoga Military Flotilla and the North-Western River Shipping Company.

Preparations for navigation in 1942 on Lake Ladoga began long before the ice drift. Even in winter, they began to build new ports, piers, berths and access roads. The construction work on the western and eastern shores of the Shlisselburg Bay of the Osinovetsky and Kobono-Karedzhsky ports took on a particularly large scale. By the end of navigation, they had 14 and 13 piers, respectively, powerful railway junctions and were able to provide transshipment of cargo arriving for Leningrad and evacuation transportation.

By the opening of navigation, the Ladoga Military Flotilla and the North-Western River Shipping Company numbered 116 steamships, boats, barges and other vessels with a total carrying capacity of 32,765 tons. However, there were not enough watercraft and they had to be delivered from other river basins. In addition, by decision of the State Defense Committee, the construction of wooden and metal barges began. Wooden barges were built at the shipyard created on the basis of the Syassky pulp and paper mill, and metal ones at the Leningrad shipyards. A total of 31 wooden barges with a carrying capacity of 350 tons each and 14 metal barges with a carrying capacity of 600 to 800 tons were built during the year. In addition, the city's shipyards launched more than 100 small self-propelled tenders with a lifting capacity of up to 25 tons.

To supply the Leningrad Front and the city with fuel, by order of the State Defense Committee, an underwater pipeline with a throughput capacity of 300-350 tons per day was laid between the eastern and western shores of the Shlisselburg Bay of Lake Ladoga. It entered service on June 18, 1942 and was virtually invulnerable to the enemy.

The daily volume of transportation to Leningrad was determined at 4.2 thousand tons of cargo, and from the city - 1 thousand tons of cargo and 3 thousand people. To organize the delivery of goods from the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga and carry out loading and unloading operations, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front created the Delivery Department. In order to increase the volume of transportation across the lake to 7 thousand tons (4 thousand tons from the eastern and 3 thousand tons from the western shore) and increase the number of evacuees to 10 thousand people per day, the Military Council of the Front at the end of June 1942 changed the system organization of transportation. The Transportation Department was reorganized into the Transportation Department. All ports were transferred to his jurisdiction and he was entrusted with the organization of loading and unloading operations. The Ladoga military flotilla was now responsible only for the transportation of goods on ships, for the equipment of the water route and its protection.

Transportation along Lake Ladoga was carried out along two routes: a small one (29 km) - from Kobona to Osinovets and a large one (150 km) - from Novaya Ladoga to Osinovets. Lake barges and tugs of the North-Western River Shipping Company, minesweepers and gunboats of the Ladoga military flotilla operated on the large route. On the minor route, smaller vessels were used, including river barges and tenders. On the large route, transportation was carried out by convoys, on the small route - by single ships.

Navigation on Ladoga opened at the end of May and took place for a long time under unfavorable meteorological conditions. In addition, Ladoga communications were constantly bombed by enemy aircraft. Hitler's headquarters ordered "to disrupt the evacuation of Leningrad by all means, and especially by air raids on the Ladoga shipping area."

In total, in the summer of 1942, German aviation, in groups of 80-130 aircraft, carried out 120 day and 15 night raids on ports, transshipment bases and ships. However, the damage it caused was minor. At the same time, the enemy lost 160 aircraft from Soviet fighters and anti-aircraft artillery.

The enemy also used naval forces to disrupt transportation on Lake Ladoga. German minesweepers, special landing craft and Italian torpedo boats were deployed to the lake. On October 22, 1942, the German command launched an amphibious operation to capture Sukho Island (37 km north of Novaya Ladoga). By capturing the island and destroying the lighthouse and artillery battery located on it, the enemy hoped to complicate transportation along the large highway. However, the island's garrison, ships of the Ladoga military flotilla and front-line aviation thwarted these plans. The enemy flotilla was destroyed.

The enemy failed to interrupt Ladoga communications and starve Leningrad out. Thanks to the precise organization of loading and unloading operations, reliable protection of communications, mass heroism and dedication of the sailors of the Ladoga Military Flotilla and the North-Western River Shipping Company, railway workers, motorists and everyone who served on Ladoga, the delivery of people and cargo was carried out uninterruptedly and on an unprecedentedly large scale .

In total, during the navigation of 1942, Leningrad received more than 790 thousand tons of cargo, half of which was food. A significant part was accounted for different kinds fuel: more than 106 thousand tons of coal were delivered, about 150 thousand tons of fuels and lubricants (including more than 34.5 thousand tons of gasoline, kerosene and naphtha arrived via an underwater pipeline). The total volume of transportation on Lake Ladoga during navigation amounted to about 1,100 thousand tons of cargo and more than 838 thousand people. Almost 290 thousand military personnel arrived to replenish the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet. 20 thousand civilian specialists also arrived in the city.

The mass evacuation of the population from the front city was completed. In total, almost 1,750 thousand people were taken out of Leningrad in an organized manner during the period from June 29, 1941 to April 1, 1943. This is the only case in history of such a huge evacuation of residents from a besieged city.

About 310 thousand tons of cargo were exported into the interior of the country, including over 28 thousand units of industrial equipment (including more than 22 thousand various metalworking machines).

The feat of the heroes of the Road of Life made it possible to create significant food reserves not only in Leningrad, but also in Kronstadt, Oranienbaum and on the islands of the Gulf of Finland, ensure the operation of a number of industrial enterprises in the city, and strengthen the combat effectiveness of troops. The successful completion of transportation across Lake Ladoga was thus one of the most important measures to transform Leningrad into an impregnable fortress for the enemy. It also allowed the defenders of the city on the Neva to begin preparations for the operation to break the blockade.

In the second half of May, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front submitted proposals on a plan of action to Headquarters. It was proposed to direct the main efforts to the defeat of the Mginsk-Sinyavinsk enemy group. If successful, it would be possible to break through the enemy blockade and ease the situation in Leningrad.

Headquarters, in principle, agreed with the proposals of the front command, but postponed the operation, since given the current situation in the south, it was not possible to allocate the necessary forces for its implementation. Therefore, the main task of the Leningrad Front was to improve defense and conduct private offensive operations. The purpose of these actions is to prevent a new assault on Leningrad, to bleed the enemy group concentrated here, to prevent its transfer to the southern wing of the front, and also to prepare the conditions for a successful breakthrough of the blockade.

In the summer of 1942, the troops of the Leningrad Front intensified their actions in all directions. Achieving the dispersal of the enemy strike force, which continued to remain in the area of ​​​​Mga, Tosno, Soviet troops inflicted sensitive blows on the enemy, destroyed his manpower and military equipment, and kept the Nazis in constant tension. Thus, the 42nd Army of General I.F. Nikolaev from July 20 to August 26 and the 55th Army of General V.P. Sviridov from July 23 to August 4 attacked the enemy with limited forces in several areas in the areas of Uritsk and Kolpino. They were supported by front aviation. It was not possible to achieve any significant successes, but the active actions of the Soviet troops forced the enemy to transfer three divisions removed from other sectors of the front to these directions. Private offensive operations of the 42nd and 55th armies were a kind of test of the offensive ability of the troops of the Leningrad Front, as if a rehearsal for breaking the blockade.

While the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts fought intense battles directly near Leningrad, the North-Western Front under the command of General P. A. Kurochkin more than once launched offensives against the enemy group in the Demyansk region.

The first offensive began in the spring - on May 3. The operation, in which the 11th and 1st Shock Armies participated, lasted until May 20 and ended without result. In the summer, troops of the Northwestern Front tried to destroy the Demyansk group by organizing offensive operations in the area of ​​the so-called Ramushevsky corridor, which connected this group with the main forces of the 16th German Army. Due to insufficient preparation of the operation and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, it was not possible to eliminate his group on the Demyansk bridgehead (the length of the front line inside it was 150 km). Hitler's command transferred significant reinforcements from other sections of the Demyansk ledge to the corridor area, but left only about five divisions inside it. Nevertheless, the offensive actions of the Northwestern Front in the Demyansk area had a significant impact on the overall course of the struggle in the northwestern direction and weakened the enemy. The enemy command was unable to launch the planned attack on Ostashkov to meet its other group, which had the task of attacking from the Rzhev area.

As a result of the active actions of the Soviet troops on the Demyansk bridgehead, not only were large forces of the 16th German Army pinned down, but also serious losses were inflicted on many of its formations (the Nazis alone lost about 90 thousand people killed). The former chief of staff of the 16th Army, General G. Beck-Berents, called the battles for the Demyansk bridgehead a reduced Verdun.

To repel the attacks of the Soviet troops, the enemy transferred part of the formations of the 18th Army to the Demyansk area, and also used a large number of transport aircraft to supply the 16th Army to the detriment of the interests of its main group, which was advancing in the south of the Eastern Front. Fighter aviation of the 6th Air Army, commanded by General D.F. Kondratyuk, took an active part in the fight against German transport aviation and shot down several dozen aircraft.

The actions of Soviet troops near Leningrad and in the Demyansk region in the spring of 1942 deprived the fascist German command of the opportunity to transfer the forces of Army Group North from these areas to the south. Moreover, the enemy was forced to replenish his group on the Leningrad sector of the front in order to resume the assault on Leningrad, planned for the autumn of the same year.

The Wehrmacht leadership began careful preparations for the next assault on the city immediately after the end of the fighting in the Lyuban direction. The plan for a new operation was repeatedly discussed at Hitler's headquarters. It was decided to strengthen the troops of the 18th Army, which was again tasked with breaking through the defenses of Soviet troops on the Leningrad borders, transferring formations of the 11th German Army from Crimea and several divisions from Western Europe.

Initially, the fascist leadership planned an attack only on the Oranienbaum bridgehead of Soviet troops with the goal of eliminating it. However, preparations for this private operation were suspended due to the decision of the Wehrmacht command to launch a major offensive directly on Leningrad. Another private operation, aimed at eliminating the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the Pogost region (30 km northwest of Kirishi), was also canceled.

On July 19, the General Staff of the Ground Forces informed the command of Army Group North that “at present there are considerations... instead of an offensive on the Kronstadt Bay front, launch an offensive on Leningrad with the task of capturing the city, establishing contact with the Finns north of Leningrad and thereby turning off the Russian Baltic Fleet". And a day later, on July 21, OKB Directive No. 44 said: “...No later than September, Leningrad will be taken and thanks to this, Finnish forces will be released.” In Directive No. 45 of July 23, Army Group North received specific instructions on the preparation of a new operation to capture Leningrad: “The operations for which preparations are now underway in the front sectors of Army Groups Center and North must be carried out quickly, one after another. In this way, the dismemberment of the enemy's forces and the decline in the morale of his command staff and troops will be ensured to a significant extent.

Army Group North will prepare to capture Leningrad by the beginning of September. The operation received the code name “Feuerzauber” (“Magic Fire”). To do this, transfer five divisions of the 11th Army to the army group, along with heavy artillery and artillery of special power, as well as other necessary parts of the reserve of the main command.”

For a month, Army Group North carefully prepared for this operation. There was a concentration of troops, military equipment, weapons, and ammunition near Leningrad. The operation received a new name - “Nordlicht” (“Northern Lights”). The training took place under the supervision of the supreme leadership of the Wehrmacht. In the last days of July, the deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command, General V. Varlimont, flew to Leningrad for reconnaissance. He proposed conducting an attack on the city from Pulkovo.

On August 23, Hitler had a meeting dedicated to preparing an attack on Leningrad, to which the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal G. Küchler, was summoned. It was decided to transfer not only the divisions of the 11th Army to Leningrad, but also its administration, headed by the army commander, Field Marshal E. Manstein. He, considered an expert in taking fortresses, was entrusted with the leadership of Operation Nordlicht. Hitler’s instructions said: “...Operation Nordlicht is only a means to liberate the Baltic Sea and capture the Karelian Isthmus... Task: Stage 1 - to encircle Leningrad and establish contact with the Finns; Stage 2 - capture Leningrad and raze it to the ground." The approximate date of the offensive was set on September 14. On August 27, the headquarters of the 11th Army arrived at the Leningrad sector of the front. He developed the general concept of the operation to capture the city, which “was to, using first the strongest artillery and air pressure on the enemy, to break through his front south of Leningrad with the forces of three corps, advancing only to the southern outskirts of the city itself. After this, the two corps were supposed to turn east in order to suddenly cross the Neva southeast of the city. They were supposed to destroy the enemy located between the river and Lake Ladoga, cut off the supply route across Lake Ladoga and closely surround the city with a ring, also from the east. In this case, the capture of the city could be achieved quickly and without heavy street fighting...” The operation plan developed by the headquarters of the 11th Army was approved by the command of Army Group North.

The 11th Army was subordinate to: powerful artillery that arrived from the Sevastopol region, 13 divisions, including the Spanish Blue Division, tank and mountain rifle divisions, as well as an SS brigade. Army Group North was given significant aviation forces withdrawn from other sectors of the Eastern Front. The commander of the 11th Army believed that the forces allocated for Operation Nordlicht were not enough. Therefore, it was decided to involve as many Finnish troops as possible in the attack on Leningrad from the north. But K. Mannerheim’s official response to the requests of the fascist German command, as noted by the German representative at the headquarters of the Finnish army, General W. Erfurt, “was very vague. He [Mannerheim] can come out at the right time with small forces and only with a limited task.”

In his memoirs, Manstein tried to somehow justify the failure of the next assault on Leningrad and, above all, by Hitler’s strategic miscalculations. However, the very idea of ​​​​capturing Leningrad, fortified and heroically defended by Soviet troops, with relatively limited forces, was doomed to failure from the very beginning. The battles in the south forced the fascist leadership to continuously send all their reserves and marching reinforcements there. It could not allocate large forces for the summer assault on Leningrad.

There was another reason for the failure of Operation Nordlicht - the Sinyavinsk offensive operation, prepared by the Soviet command as a preemptive strike against the enemy on the Leningrad sector of the front. It was the largest in 1942. Its implementation was entrusted to the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet. The Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge south of Lake Ladoga, where the troops of the fronts were separated by a strip 16 km wide, was chosen as the area of ​​​​combat operations.

The general idea of ​​the operation was to defeat the enemy’s Mginsk-Sinyavin grouping with counter strikes from two fronts, with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Flotilla, and lift the blockade of Leningrad from land. Soviet troops had to overcome well-prepared and heavily fortified enemy defenses with a large number of natural and artificial obstacles. The former commander of the Volkhov Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, wrote: “Only a 16-kilometer space, occupied and fortified by the enemy, separated the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. It seemed that one strong blow was enough, and the troops of the two fronts would unite. But it only seemed so. I have rarely encountered terrain less convenient for attack. I will forever remember the endless expanses of forest, swampy swamps, flooded peat fields and broken roads. The difficult struggle with the enemy was accompanied by an equally difficult struggle with nature. In order to fight and live, the troops were forced to build wood-earth fences instead of trenches, open open areas instead of rifle trenches, lay log decks and roads for many kilometers, and construct wooden platforms for artillery and mortars.”

Following the instructions of Headquarters, the commander of the Leningrad Front, General L.A. Govorov, decided to launch two strikes with the forces of the 55th Army and the Neva Operational Group located in the blocked area: one in the direction of Tosno, the other in Sinyavino with the aim of connecting with the troops of the Volkhov Front. The remaining forces of the front had to conduct active offensive operations in the Uritsky and Staropanovsky directions, pinning down as many enemy forces as possible and not allowing him to transfer them to the direction of the main attack of the front. It was planned to involve small ships of the Baltic Fleet in the operation. They had to land troops on the opposite banks of the Neva and Tosna, capture bridges and crossings and ensure that the main forces of the Leningrad Front crossed the water lines and developed their offensive on Tosno and Sinyavino.

The decision of the commander of the Volkhov Front was to break through the enemy defenses in a 15-kilometer section between Gontovaya Lipka and Voronov with a concentrated strike, connect with the Leningrad Front in the Mgi area and together with it defeat the enemy’s Mginsk-Sinyavin group. The front's strike force was created from two operational echelons: in the first, the 8th Army of General F.N. Starikov was to advance, in the second, the 2nd Strike Army of General N.K. Klykov. In addition, the front commander concentrated a strong front reserve (five rifle divisions and a rifle brigade) in the Volkhov area. It was planned to carry out auxiliary strikes in the zones of action of the remaining armies of the front.

Preparations for the Sinyavinsk operation were carried out in July - August. On the Leningrad Front, the main attention was paid to organizing the interaction of ground forces with the forces of the Baltic Fleet and preparing for the crossing of the Neva. The regrouping of troops of the Leningrad Front was limited mainly to the transfer of formations and units within the armies.

The troops of the Volkhov Front, in conditions of an extremely limited road network, needed to quickly transfer a large number of military formations to the Volkhov area and to the west, secretly from the enemy. In total, it was necessary to regroup 13 rifle divisions, 8 rifle and 6 tank brigades, over 20 artillery regiments and a significant number of other special units and units.

To ensure the secrecy of regroupings and mislead the enemy regarding the direction of the main attack, the command and headquarters of the Volkhov Front carried out a number of disinformation activities. But it was still not possible to achieve surprise. At the end of August, the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the headquarters of Army Group North discovered signs of an impending offensive in the Volkhov Front in the area south of Lake Ladoga. In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder on August 25 it was written: “Army Group North: The situation is the same. Intensive rail transportation... On Volkhov, the enemy is moving his command posts forward.” And the next day, August 26, it was said even more definitely: “Signs of an imminent Russian offensive south of Lake Ladoga are increasing.” However, the German command was unable to establish the start date of the operation and its scale.

The enemy did not expect the troops of the Leningrad Front to launch a decisive offensive from the blocked territory. When on August 19 the troops of this front had already gone on the attack and, supported by artillery fire and boats under the cover of a smoke screen, crossed the Neva and captured a bridgehead in the Ivanovsky area, Halder noted in his diary: “Army Group North: Local attacks, as usual, but this time also on the Neva sector of the front, where the enemy resorts to the help of small fast boats.” The fascist German command managed to stop the advance of Soviet troops from the Neva. Until the end of August, formations of the Leningrad Front tried to build on their success at MGU, but were unable to do so.

The Volkhov Front joined the operation on August 27. Hitler's command was preparing to repel this offensive of the Soviet troops.

Having broken through the front line of defense and wedged into the enemy’s battle formations in the Gontovaya Lipka, Tortolovo sector to a depth of 1-2.5 km, the formations of the 8th Army in the following days, although slowly but persistently advanced in the direction of Sinyavino. The Nazis tried to stop this onslaught with continuous counterattacks of infantry and tanks with air support. However, Soviet troops successfully repelled them and by the end of August, in the center of the front's offensive zone, they reached the approaches to Sinyavino. There were 7-8 km left to the Neva. The enemy managed to delay the advance of Soviet units on the flanks of the breakthrough - in the area of ​​Rabochiy Settlement No. 8, Mishkino and Porechye. With a tough defense, the Nazis pinned down significant forces of the attackers and forced them to wage many days of bloody battles.

In an effort to close the exit of the Volkhov Front formations to the Neva in the Sinyavinsk direction, the German command during the battles (from August 27 to 30) transferred additional forces to the breakthrough area, including the 12th Tank Division from near Leningrad and the 170th Infantry Division from Crimea. Now the formations of the first echelon of the front were opposed by a powerful enemy group, which numbered up to six full-blooded divisions. Enemy resistance increased noticeably, and the pace of advance of Soviet troops slowed down.

In such a situation, General K. A. Meretskov decided to enter the battle on September 1 from the second echelon of the front of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps under the command of General N. A. Gagen. But this measure turned out to be late, and the forces of one corps were not enough to prevent enemy countermeasures. Fresh connections were needed to build up the strike from deep. But there were no reserves.

Simultaneously with the fighting in the Sinyavino area, the troops of the Volkhov Front made an attempt to launch an offensive in the auxiliary direction towards Shapka and Tosno. However, three days of intense fighting did not bring success, and the offensive actions of Soviet formations here ceased. Fierce fighting continued on the flanks of the resulting breakthrough, where troops from the front’s strike group, blocking Workers’ Village No. 8, Mishkino and Porechye, fought to capture these strongholds of enemy defense. In the center of the offensive zone, attacks were carried out on Sinyavino.

The enemy continued to transfer new forces to the breakthrough area. Two divisions arrived from the Crimea and two more from other sectors of the Volkhov Front. This allowed the Nazis in the second half of September to stop the advance of Soviet troops in the Sinyavino area and organize strong flank counterattacks.

During September, the fighting of the Leningrad Front did not stop. In the first half of the month, attempts were made to clear the Yam-Izhora region of fascists. But they turned out to be unsuccessful. From September 3, an offensive was carried out in the Moscow Dubrovka area. Its main goal was to break through the enemy defenses on the left bank of the Neva, capture Mustalovo and, building on the success at Sinyavino, connect with the formations of the Volkhov Front advancing towards them. Two divisions, having crossed the Neva, wedged themselves into the enemy defenses on the opposite bank, but were unable to develop their success and were forced to retreat to their original positions.

A new offensive was scheduled for September 26. The crossing was planned to be carried out in the Annenskaya, 1st Gorodok sector with three rifle divisions and a rifle brigade. On the appointed day, the strike force of the Leningrad Front, supported by 117 combat aircraft, together with marine landings, began crossing the Neva and quickly captured a bridgehead in the area of ​​Arbuzovo and Moskovskaya Dubrovka. By the end of the first day, units of two divisions and a brigade were transported to the left bank. The enemy also brought in a lot of troops. Fierce fighting in the Moscow Dubrovka area - on the revived Nevsky patch - continued until October 6. They were conducted under the leadership of the chief of staff of the Leningrad Front, General D.N. Gusev, who assumed temporary duties as commander of the Nevsky Operational Group.

The troops of the Leningrad Front were unable to expand the captured bridgeheads, break through the defenses to the full depth and connect with the Volkhov Front. By order of Headquarters Supreme High Command the fighting on the bridgeheads stopped, the main forces were evacuated to the right bank. The 55th Army also received orders to retreat to the right bank of the river and gain a strong foothold. The need to withdraw troops was caused by the fact that the enemy had by this time managed to completely repel the attack of the Volkhov Front and, in essence, restore the situation on the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsk ledge. “With the established grouping of enemy troops,” noted the Chief of the General Staff, General A.M. Vasilevsky, in a telegram, “the possibility of his attempt to cross the Neva River is not excluded ... with the aim of striking from the southeast on Leningrad and cutting off our communications in this area "

Headquarters ordered the commander of the Leningrad Front to strengthen the defenses in the sector of the Nevsky Operational Group, to echelon it deeply, to review the artillery grouping in order to provide powerful fire on the approaches to the river, possible enemy landing and landing areas.

The withdrawal of the troops of the Volkhov Front to their original lines ended on October 1, and the withdrawal of the Leningrad Front to the right bank of the Neva - on October 10.

Thus, the Sinyavinsk offensive operation did not solve the problem of breaking the blockade of Leningrad. However, it had a positive significance for the general course of the struggle on the Soviet-German front, and above all near Leningrad. The enemy was forced to transfer formations from other sectors of the front to the battle area, including those prepared for the summer assault on the city. As a result of the active actions of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, the enemy abandoned Operation Nordlicht, on which Hitler's headquarters had high hopes. The Sinyavinsk operation thwarted the enemy's plan for the next assault on Leningrad. Manstein, who from September 4 had to lead the actions of the fascist troops to repel the attack of the Volkhov Front, writes: “And so, instead of the planned attack on Leningrad, a “battle south of Lake Ladoga” unfolded...

Even if the task of restoring the situation on the eastern sector of the 18th Army’s front was completed, the divisions of our army nevertheless suffered significant losses. At the same time, a significant part of the ammunition intended for the attack on Leningrad was used up. Therefore, there could be no talk of a quick offensive.”

During the two-month battles on the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge, the Nazis lost about 60 thousand soldiers and officers killed, captured and wounded.

The results of the struggle in the northwestern direction in the summer and autumn of 1942 showed that Army Group North, reinforced by the 11th Army transferred from the south, was unable to solve the tasks that had been assigned to it in the Barbarossa plan, and then confirmed by OKW directives No. 41 and No. 45. Drawn into defensive battles against the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts, she was unable to begin the operation to capture Leningrad. By active actions, Soviet troops firmly pinned down a large strategic grouping of the enemy and attracted the reserves of the Nazi command. If at the beginning of June there were 34 divisions in Army Group North, then at the end of October there were 44 of them.

Through selfless struggle in this strategic direction, and above all on the Leningrad borders, the soldiers of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts provided significant assistance to the defenders of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, who fought in the south with the main forces of the Wehrmacht.