Background
In July 1927, Japan adopted and published the so-called "China Policy Program". This document declared that Mongolia and Manchuria were a subject of special interest to the Land of the Rising Sun. Just a few days later, General Tanaka Chiichi presented the Japanese Emperor with a memorandum, which, without any diplomatic equivocation, said: “In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China."
Japan considered the military defeat of the USSR to be an inevitable and extremely important stage in the implementation of its warlike plans. However, at the end of the 1920s, the country was not ready for such a global conflict. Therefore, the Japanese decided at this stage to limit themselves to the conquest of Manchuria.
At this time, the so-called “young officers” arose in the Japanese army, which consisted of people from the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. These people were very aggressive and considered Japanese government policy to be insufficiently decisive. But they themselves were determined. Since 1930, the “young officers” have carried out a number of coup attempts and political assassinations. Terror and active propaganda led to increased war sentiment in Japan. In September 1931, the invasion of Manchuria began.
By March 1, 1932, the occupation of Manchuria was over. The state of Manchukuo was created on its territory, formally headed by Emperor Pu Yi. The emperor had no real power, the country completely followed the political course of Japan. The Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo, commander of the Kwantung Army, had the right to veto any decision of the “puppet” emperor.
Soon after the occupation of Manchuria, Japan made claims to the Soviet Union on the territory near Lake Khasan and the Tumannaya River. From 1934 to 1938, there were 231 border violations by the Japanese, of which about 35 resulted in serious combat. Ultimately, the Japanese twice - on July 9 and 20 - handed the Soviet government a note demanding that they immediately leave the disputed territories. The note was rejected, and on July 29 the Japanese attacked the Soviet troops. During the conflict, which lasted until August 11, 1938, the Red Army, although it made a number of unfortunate mistakes, nevertheless inflicted a decisive defeat on the Japanese.
The defeat in the battles at Lake Khasan shook the authority of the Japanese army. The military, in whose hands the power in the country actually lay, could not allow such a development of events. Echo last shots The Hassan clash had not yet had time to subside in the Manchurian hills, and Tokyo was already preparing plans for a new attack on the USSR, much larger than the conflict that had just ended.
Japan needed a victorious campaign not only to heal its wounded pride. Back in 1936, the Soviet Union signed a mutual assistance pact with the Mongolian People's Republic. In accordance with this pact, the 57th Special Corps of the Red Army was based on the territory of Mongolia - a large group of Soviet troops, consisting of more than 30 thousand people, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles, 107 aircraft, as well as a large number of auxiliary equipment and artillery pieces. The Japanese were building a branch line near the border with Mongolia railway, and such a neighborhood did not please them at all. In addition, the USSR provided military assistance to the Republic of China, which Japan really wanted to conquer.
The conflict begins
Japan managed to develop two versions of a plan to attack the Soviet Union. But the Kwantung Army never had a chance to use them. The fighting began not in the early 40s, as the military leaders of the Land of the Rising Sun had hoped, but in May 1939.
IN initial stage the conflict at Khalkhin Gol was like two peas in a pod like the skirmish at Lake Khasan. Only this time Japan made territorial claims against Mongolia, and not the USSR. More precisely, the claims were made by the Manchu authorities. But, as stated earlier, Manchukuo did not have the right to an independent policy. So, in fact, it was Tokyo that demanded from the Mongolian People's Republic move the border between it and Manchuria to the Khalkhin Gol River, although according to all documents the border line ran 20-25 kilometers to the east. Japan ignored the objections of the Mongolian side, as well as the documents presented confirming the correct location of the border. Armed provocations began, as in Hassan. Only their scale was much more impressive. If in 1938 the Japanese violated the borders of the USSR in small groups, then units of up to a battalion burst into Mongolia. In fact, the conflict has already begun, although war has not been officially declared.
May 11, 1939 is considered the date of the beginning of the first stage of the confrontation at Khalkhin Gol. On this day, a detachment of Japanese-Manchu cavalry numbering about 300 people, supported by 7 armored vehicles, attacked the Mongolian border detachment near Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. Having destroyed about 20 border guards, the attackers reached the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.
On May 14, Japanese military aviation began active operations. Border outposts and military airfields were subject to air attacks. The famous ace pilot Morimoto commanded the Japanese air forces in the conflict zone. While aviation was operating, the Kwantung Army hastily transferred additional forces to the battlefield. The prudent Japanese were well prepared: on the territory of Manchuria, barracks were built in advance for soldiers, and warehouses were built for ammunition and equipment.
Developments
Having received information about the concentration of enemy troops, the headquarters of the 57th Corps of the Red Army ordered to strengthen the security of the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic. By the end of the day on May 29, the advanced units of the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade approached the battle area. At the same time, the equipment covered about 700 km under its own power, which was a very impressive indicator for those times. The 149th also pulled up to the border rifle regiment. But, despite this, Japanese troops had a superiority over the combined Mongolian and Soviet units by 2.5 times in manpower and up to 6 times in armored vehicles. In tanks, the advantage was on the side of the USSR: 186 versus 130.
Early on the morning of May 28, the Japanese launched an offensive in large numbers. Their goal was to encircle and destroy the Soviet-Mongolian units on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The attack was supported by about 40 aircraft, which bombed crossings, the rear and the location of Soviet and Mongolian units. Stubborn fighting continued all day. The Japanese managed to squeeze out the Mongolian cavalry from their positions, as well as the combined detachment of Senior Lieutenant Bykov, who defended with it. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated into the hills near the mouth of the Khaylastyn-Gol River (a tributary of Khalkhin-Gol). The Japanese failed to encircle them. When trying to cross, the fire from the Soviet artillery battery of Lieutenant Bakhtin caused serious damage to the Japanese. The Kwantung Army's attack failed. They managed to capture the Japanese headquarters map, which showed the location of Japanese troops. Also, the map directly indicated that the fighting was taking place precisely on Mongolian territory, therefore, the Japanese attack should be considered as aggression, and not an attempt to restore justice.
On May 29, the intensity of the fighting did not decrease. The forces of the Red Army and the Mongolian army launched a counteroffensive, supported by two artillery divisions. By evening, the Japanese were driven back 2 kilometers from the river. The Japanese army lost more than 400 soldiers and officers in killed alone, and many trophies were captured.
The first serious battles showed that there were not enough forces concentrated at Khalkhin Gol to repel Japanese aggression. The concentration of reinforcements began. A Soviet tank brigade, 3 motorized armored brigades, a motorized rifle division, a heavy artillery division, a Mongolian cavalry division and more than 100 fighters. A military guard was set up along the state border line of the Mongolian People's Republic.
After this, there were no ground battles throughout June. But a major air battle unfolded. While Soviet and Japanese pilots were fighting for the skies of Mongolia, the commander of the 57th Special Corps was replaced. In place of N.F. Feklenko, whose actions were considered insufficiently decisive, G.K. Zhukov was appointed, in the future - the legendary Soviet commander.
Final round
By July, the Japanese command had developed a plan further actions, called "The Second Stage of the Nomonhan Incident." It provided for a strong attack by the right flank of Japanese forces with the aim of encircling and destroying the Soviet-Mongolian troops. The commander of the Japanese group, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, wrote in the order that the enemy’s morale was low and the time had come to strike a decisive blow.
On July 2, the Japanese offensive began. After artillery preparation, the infantry and tank units of the right flank under the command of General Yasuoka went into battle first. The Japanese immediately brought about 80 tanks into battle, pushing back the Soviet guard units in the southwest.
On the night of July 2–3, the second attacking group, commanded by General Kobayashi, crossed Khalkhin Gol and, after fierce fighting, occupied Mount Bayin-Tsagan. Having knocked out the enemy, the Japanese immediately began to fortify themselves, build dugouts and dig trenches. Japanese infantrymen carried anti-tank and divisional guns up the mountain by hand.
The capture of the dominant heights made it possible for the Japanese to strike in the rear of the defending Soviet-Mongolian troops. Realizing that the situation was critical, Zhukov threw into battle a mobile reserve that had been created in advance. Without reconnaissance or infantry escort, the 11th Tank Brigade went on the attack straight from the march. It was supported by armored vehicles of the Mongolian troops, as well as aviation units.
The attack by Soviet tank crews, accompanied by the fire of all available artillery and air attacks, shocked the Japanese. They had not yet managed to deploy an organized defense, but still held out with all their might. Intensifying artillery fire, they managed to knock out 15 Soviet tanks. In general, without infantry support it was very difficult for the tank brigade. Only in the middle of the day did the 24th Infantry Regiment strike from the west. Tanks and infantry, despite fierce resistance, stubbornly moved forward. The Japanese found themselves locked in a semicircle and pushed back almost to the very top of the mountain. All Japanese troops who had crossed to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol were trapped here. On both sides, about 400 tanks, more than 800 artillery pieces, and several hundred aircraft took part in the battle.
At 15:00 on July 5, the Japanese could not withstand the onslaught and began to retreat randomly across the river. Due to the premature explosion of the pontoon bridge by Japanese sappers, many soldiers and officers drowned while trying to escape by swimming. Only the two-meter depth of Khalkhin Gol and the marshy shores prevented our tank units from pursuing the enemy.
Zhukov's decision to attack the Japanese on the move initially caused many objections and complaints. However, in the end it was recognized that in the current situation it was the only possible one. After the defeat at Bain-Tsagan, the Japanese no longer risked crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.
Zhukov began preparing an offensive. The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army Group under the command of G. M. Stern. New troops began to arrive - infantry divisions and tank brigades. As a result, by the beginning of the Red Army offensive, Zhukov’s group had about 57 thousand people, more than 500 guns and mortars, 498 tanks and 516 aircraft.
The Japanese were also gathering forces, expecting to attack on August 24. Simultaneously with the concentration of manpower and equipment, work was carried out on the construction of defensive structures.
On August 20, Soviet troops went on the offensive, 4 days ahead of the Japanese. The attack was so unexpected that during the first hour not a single artillery shot was fired in response. The command of the Japanese army was unable to immediately determine the direction of the main attack: it was assumed that the Soviet-Mongolian troops were advancing evenly along the entire front. In fact, the main blow was delivered by the southern group of troops. The mistake of the Japanese command led to the fact that, with a strong defense of the center, the Japanese were unable to properly protect the flanks. As a result, on August 26, 1939, Soviet troops completely surrounded the Japanese 6th Army. Attempts to release the encircled group failed.
On August 28, the suppression of Japanese resistance began in the area of Remizov Heights, the last point of defense. By that time, the Japanese artillery was almost completely disabled, they only had mortars and machine guns. About 400 Japanese soldiers, who tried to break out of the encirclement at night, were completely destroyed in a fierce battle that reached hand-to-hand combat.
By the morning of August 31, the territory of Mongolia was completely cleared of Japanese troops. After this, ground battles died down again, but air battles resumed. But here, too, Japan did not achieve success, losing about 70 aircraft and 14 Soviet ones shot down. Realizing their defeat, the Japanese asked for an armistice, which was signed on September 15, 1939.
One of the most important results of the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol is that the Japanese never attacked the USSR during World War II. Even Hitler's demands did not add to their resolve. The defeat led to a government crisis in Japan.
From negative consequences For the USSR, it should be noted that the victory of the Soviet troops forced the military to be overly optimistic about the level of readiness of the Red Army for war. In 1941 they had to pay for it high price. Nevertheless, the triumph of Soviet weapons at Khalkhin Gol, without a doubt, deserves the respect and pride of posterity.
FIGHTING AT KHALKIN GOL (1939)
Material from Wikipedia
Battles at Khalkhin Gol- an armed conflict (undeclared war) that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River on the territory of Mongolia (Eastern (Dornod) aimak) near the border with Manchuria (Manchukuo), between the USSR and Japan. The final battle took place in last days August and ended with the complete defeat of the 6th Separate Army of Japan. An armistice between the USSR and Japan was concluded on September 15.
BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. A “puppet” state of Manchukuo was created on the occupied territory, which was planned to be used as a springboard for further aggression against Mongolia, China and the USSR.
The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area.
In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end.
On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia.
In 1938, a two-week conflict had already occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR.
MAY 1939. FIRST BATTLES
May 11, 1939 A detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. May 11, 1939 - this day is marked in history as the day the Battle of Khalkhin Gol began.
On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko, sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border.
During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.
On May 28, Japanese troops, possessing numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed, largely due to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin.
The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.
JUNE 1939. THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR DOMINANCE
Although there were no clashes on the ground in June, there was an air war in the skies. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. Thus, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.
The Soviet command had to take radical measures: on May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union, and also had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.
At the beginning of June, N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov. Soon after G.K. Zhukov arrived in the area of military conflict in June 1939, he proposed his plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G. K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to converge on the conflict area. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.
To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops on Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, Army Commander G.M. Stern arrived from Chita to the area of the Khalkhin Gol River.
Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.
In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.
Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here. So, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan, the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy.
At the same time, on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol.
JULY 1939. ADVANCE OF THE JAPANESE FORCE
By the end of June 1939, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the defenses of the Red Army on the operational sector of the front.
On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, General Kobayashi’s troops crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and subsequently destroy them.
Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions, numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. The defending Soviet troops were rescued from a difficult situation by a mobile reserve created in advance by G. K. Zhukov, which was promptly put into action.
Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.
On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuoka did not complete its task.
The group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a general retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. More than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost.
The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.
However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.
JULY - AUGUST 1939. PREPARATION FOR COUNTEROFFENSE BY SOVIET FORCES
The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of the commander - corps commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev and chief of staff of the brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov.
New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.
On July 8, the Japanese side again began active fighting. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned.
Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.
From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required to carry out the offensive operation planned by G.K. Zhukov against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.
On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20.
Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards under the command of Major A. Bulyga was transferred from the Transbaikal Military District. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were identified.
During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from the territory of Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the political leadership of the country.
As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, a Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total complexity amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 500 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China.
General Rippo and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.
During G.K. Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created.
During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks.
The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was carried out by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.
The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.
The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6:15 a.m., a powerful artillery barrage and air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the attack began ground forces. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.
The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G.K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.
Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.
In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and made no attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.
In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, until last person. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23, on the Central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks.
Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.
The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, the undeclared war of Japan against the USSR and its ally Mongolia). So, on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were driven back beyond the state border by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce.
On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.
RESULTS
The USSR's victory at Khalkhin Gol played a decisive role in Japan's non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States.
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, which triggered the US entry into World War II. The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet in order to ensure freedom of action for the Japanese army and navy in Southeast Asia.
In the fall of 1941, the leadership of the USSR received a message from intelligence officer Sorge that Japan was not going to attack the USSR. This information made it possible, during the most critical days of the defense of Moscow at the end of October - beginning of November 1941, to transfer from the Far East up to twenty fresh, fully staffed and well-equipped rifle divisions and several tank formations, which played a key role in the defense of Moscow, and also allowed Subsequently, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941.
TODAY
On September 11, 2008, a regular meeting of the organizing committee under the chief federal inspector in the Trans-Baikal Territory was held in Chita to reconstruct the burial places of soldiers who died in Chita hospitals from wounds received during battles near the Khalkhin Gol River.
According to an employee of the federal inspector’s office, Alexander Baturin, who is a member of the organizing committee, about 30 million rubles are required for the construction of the memorial; to date, about 1.5 million rubles have been collected. Many people are interested in the appearance of the monument - entrepreneurs, regional and city administration structures, students and university management. According to Baturin, today the townspeople treat the old Chita cemetery, where participants of the Japanese war are buried, with disrespect. Although the memorial could play a huge role in the military-patriotic education of young people, who, unfortunately, know too little about the Japanese war, which claimed the lives of more than 18.5 thousand people.
“In general, there are many blind spots in the events of the battle at Khalkhin Gol,” says retired Colonel Vladimir Palkin. It is not in vain that the military pensioner argues this way - he knows some details of the war with Japan that historians are not aware of. With some disappointment, Palkin says that all the works do not take into account the huge role that the Transbaikal Military District played in the war.
Palkin believes that there are not enough monuments to the heroes of the Japanese war in Russia. “The Mongols treat Khalkhin Gol with much more respect. For them, this war is like the Great Patriotic War for the Russians. Mongolia has a lot of museums and exhibitions military equipment, the streets are named after heroes. And in Russia, the issue of restoring the memorial at the old Chita cemetery has been resolved for so long. Besides this, we do not have a film about those events,” says Colonel Palkin. He wrote the script for a documentary film, for which there is all the documentation, action maps and a film crew. The only thing missing is funding. In 2006, Vladimir Dmitrievich made requests to the city and regional administrations, but the 2.5 million rubles required for filming were not found. With bitterness, Palkin says that he will have to turn to the Mongols for help in making the film.
70TH ANNIVERSARY OF VICTORY AT KHAKHIN GOL
In February 2009, a working group led by the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defense, Major General M. Borbaatar, worked in Dornod aimag. The main purpose of the group's trip is to get acquainted with the work and expenses necessary for this region to prepare for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the victory at Khalkhin Gol. The working group viewed the monument, visited the museum and the Khan-Uul school complex, then departed for the Khalkhin Gol somon to get acquainted with the condition of the monument erected in honor of the Victory on Khalkhin Gol and inspect historical and memorial sites. The commission scheduled the celebration of the victory at Khalkhin Gol for August 22-28, 2009. There are still 1,600 war veterans living in the country, 76 of whom took part in the war on the Khalkh River.
Fighting in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River. 05/11/1939-09/16/1939. Military chronicle. Photo-illustrated periodical 2-2001. Russian language. Pages 101.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
- Mongolian War Museum has in its collection more than 8,000 exhibits related to the history of the Mongol army. Located in the eastern part of Ulaanbaatar in the 15th microdistrict.
- Memorial House - Museum of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Branch of the Mongolian War Museum.
New information. New photos. 2011.
- Eastern (Dornod) ayak of Mongolia. General information. Attractions.
- Choibalsan. Administrative center of the Eastern aimag of Mongolia.
PHOTO ALBUM PAGES
NOTES:
- In “Western” historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local “Incident at Nomon Khan”. "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of the Manchu-Mongolian border.
- Translated into Russian “Khalkin-Gol” - Khalkha River
- The troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order
- During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Fukuda Takeo, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured.
- In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.
- On June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
- Zhukov, without waiting for the escort rifle regiment to approach, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve, which was supported by a Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In fairness, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation decision turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.
- The division was formed hastily in the Urals; many soldiers of this division had never held a weapon in their hands, so it was necessary to urgently organize on-site training for its personnel.
- A report dated July 16, 1939 to the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army on the moral and political state of the personnel of the 82nd Infantry Division cited facts of soldiers leaving combat positions without orders from one of the regiments of this division, attempts to deal with the political staff of the regiment, etc. Order in such undisciplined units was induced by exceptional measures, including executions in front of the formation.
- M.P. Yakovlev died in this battle from a Japanese sniper’s bullet.
- At that time he was the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment.
- Marshal Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter: “You want to start a big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.”
- All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground was carried out by command personnel only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers.
At first, the Japanese methodically shelled areas that were sources of noise. - Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.
- More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.
- At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups maneuvering to encircle.
- Since Sunday, August 20, 1939, was a holiday, General Ogisu Rippo allowed many of his subordinate generals and senior officers to leave his troops for rest.
- The commander's closest reserve, the Mongolian armored brigade, was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.
- On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next day they were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo. Go.
So on September 2, 4, 14 and 15, Japanese aviation lost 71 aircraft in air battles, while Soviet aviation lost only 18 aircraft in the entire first half of September. - As you know, through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to stop hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border.
- During the defense of Moscow on October 12, 1941, Stalin summoned the commander of the Far Eastern Front, I.R. Apanasenko, as well as the commander of the Pacific Fleet, I.S. Yumashev, and the first secretary of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, N.M. Pegov, to the Kremlin to discuss the possible transfer of troops from the Far East to Moscow, but no decisions were made that day. However, a few days later, when the situation near Moscow deteriorated sharply, Stalin called Apanasenko and asked how many divisions he could transfer to the west at the end of October and in November. Apanasenko replied that up to twenty rifle divisions and seven or eight tank formations could be transferred, if, of course, the railway services could provide the required number of trains. After this, the transfer of troops from the Far East immediately began, taking place under personal control I. R. Apanasenko:
“I look at my I-16 with love. Thank you, my dear “donkey”! You turned out to be much better than the Japanese I-97 fighter.
Both in speed and strength. You saved me more than once, took enemy bullets. Thanks to your creator Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov!”
Vorozheikin A.V., pilot of the 22nd IAP
Brief history of events
The formal reason for the outbreak of the conflict was the claims of Manchukuo to the Mongolian People's Republic. The leaders of the first country (in fact, the Japanese behind them) in the spring of 1939 began to demand a revision of the state border between the states along the Khalkhin Gol River.
The Japanese military began to lay a railway line directed to the USSR border. Due to the nature of the terrain, the road could only pass in an area close to the Mongolian border. Thus, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, it could easily be blocked by artillery fire from the Mongolian side, which, naturally, was unacceptable for the Kwantung Army. Moving the border close to the Khalkhin Gol River, that is, several tens of kilometers deep into Mongolian territory, would solve the problems of the Japanese. Mongolia refused to satisfy the demands of Manchukuo.
The Soviet Union, which concluded a Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic on March 12, 1936, stated that it would “defend the borders of Mongolia as its own.” Neither side was going to compromise. The first shots were fired on May 11, 1939. By May 14, Japanese-Manchurian troops occupied the entire “disputed” territory up to Khalkhin Gol; the Japanese government did not react in any way to the actions of the Kwantung Army and did not respond to the note sent by the Soviet Union. The war has begun. Composition of forces
At the beginning of the conflict in Mongolia, according to the Protocol, the Soviet 57th Special Corps was stationed, consisting of 30 thousand military personnel, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles and 107 combat aircraft. The fighter forces were represented by the 70th IAP, which had 14 I-15bis and 24 I-16 as of May 1939.
The first loss of the Red Army Air Force was a liaison R-5Sh, shot down by Japanese fighters on May 21. And the next day the first air battle between fighters took place: 3 I-16s and 2 I-15bis met with five Ki-27s.
One "donkey", which broke away from the group and rushed to attack, was instantly shot down (pilot I.T. Lysenko died), the rest did not enter the battle. At this time, the Soviet Union began to pull up forces in the conflict area. On May 23, 1939, the 22nd IAP arrived in Mongolia, which, in addition to thirty-five I-15bis (one of them went missing during the flight), included 28 I-16 type 10, and the aircraft were in good technical condition. However, the level of training of the pilots of this regiment also left much to be desired, which did not allow, as it turned out later, to turn the situation in the air in their favor. In addition, the Japanese, in turn, transferred another 20 Ki-27s to Manchuria (two squadrons of the 11th Sentai). On May 27, the very unsuccessful “debut” of the I-16 of the 22nd IAP took place. Near Lake Buin Nur, a battle between six “donkeys” and nine Ki.27s took place. One Soviet pilot was killed, two were wounded; two I-16s were shot down, three were seriously damaged. The Japanese had no losses.
Over time, Soviet pilots began to fight more confidently, and the loss ratios began to improve in our direction. The “transitional moment” can be considered June 22, 1939, when the largest air battle between Japanese and Soviet fighters took place.
18 combat-ready Ki-27s of the 24th Sentai took off to intercept a group of Soviet fighters. From the Red Army Air Force, 105 aircraft took off (56 I-16 and 49 I-15bis). However, they attacked in two waves, and some of the Soviet aircraft did not participate in the battle at all. The Japanese estimate their irretrievable losses at seven aircraft, the Red Army Air Force lost seventeen aircraft (14 I-15bis and 3 I-16), of which thirteen aircraft and eleven pilots were lost in the air. Four I-15bis were set on fire on the ground during landing, but their pilots escaped. Despite the fact that the losses of the Red Army Air Force significantly exceeded the losses of the Japanese, the battlefield remained with the Soviet pilots: the Japanese were forced to retreat. It is noticeable that the units that fought on Polikarpov biplanes suffered significantly more than those armed with the I-16: the obsolescence of the I-15bis made itself felt. Already at the end of July, these aircraft were withdrawn from the first line units (a number of them remained in the air defense of airfields), and new I-153 biplanes with retractable landing gear and a more powerful M-62 engine arrived in their place. Among other new products of the Soviet aircraft industry that were “noted” at Khalkhin Gol, mention should be made of the I-16P (I-16 type 17) - cannon versions of the widely used I-16 type 10, as well as “donkey” variants with M-62 engines. The first such vehicles were obtained by upgrading the I-16 type 10 in the field (the engines were taken from stocks for the I-153); subsequently, factory versions began to arrive, called I-16 type 18... Meanwhile, Japanese troops, under pressure from Soviet-Mongolian forces, began to retreat. On August 20, a decisive offensive operation began to encircle and destroy the Kwantung Army group east of the Khalkhin Gol River. By this day, the strength of the Soviet aviation group had reached its maximum. In the August battles, Japanese aircraft tried in vain to seize the initiative, but they failed. Strikes on Soviet airfields also did not bring desired results
. The air units of the imperial aviation were losing equipment and pilots. In this difficult situation, the impossibility fleet of Ki-27 fighters: the Nakajima plant could produce only one aircraft per day. As a result, the Japanese had to use the 9th Sentai, armed with outdated biplanes, in battles Kawasaki Ki.10. On September 2, 1939, these fighters first appeared in the skies of Khalkhin Gol and immediately began to suffer significant losses. Soon, the defeated Japanese requested a truce. On September 15, an agreement was signed between the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan to cease hostilities from 13.00 on September 16. Before this, the Kwantung Army aviation attempted to launch large-scale attacks on Soviet airfields. Their idea failed: as a result, the attackers suffered greater losses than the attacked. The repulse of the Japanese raid on September 15, during which ten Japanese planes were shot down against six Soviet ones (one I-16 and five I-153), can be considered the last air battle in the skies over Khalkhin Gol.
The number of serviceable fighters is given in parentheses, if known.
| Period | I-15bis | I-153 | I-16 | I-16P |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.05-31.05 | 13 (1) | - | 5 (1) | - |
| 1.06-30.06 | 31 (2) | - | 17 (2) | - |
| 1.07-31.07 | 16 (1) | 2 (1) | 41 (2) | - |
| 1.08-31.08 | 5 (1) | 11 (4) | 37 (16) | 2 (0) |
| 1.09-16.09 | - | 9 (1) | 5 (1) | 2 (0) |
| Total | 65 (5) | 22 (6) | 105 (22) | 4 (0) |
Non-combat losses are given in parentheses.
Enemy fighters
As mentioned above, the main Japanese fighter in the conflict area was the army Ki-27 (aka “type 97”, Soviet name - I-97) from Nakajima. At first, Soviet pilots mistook it for a Mitsubishi A5M, which debuted in China. The mistake was eventually revealed: this happened after the arrival of war veterans in China to the theater of operations. As A.V. Vorozheikin recalled, at the end of June, Corporal Smushkevich, Colonel Lakeev, Major Kravchenko and some other pilots studied the wreckage of a Japanese fighter and discovered the absence of struts on the landing gear, characteristic of a Mitsubishi product.
In its structure, the Ki-27 is very similar to the A5M, but its engine power is lower. However, due to better aerodynamics and lower weight, it is superior in basic characteristics (except range) to its “brother” from the Imperial Navy Air Force. The armament remained the same: two rifle-caliber machine guns. Both existing modifications of the “type 97” were used at Khalkhin Gol: Ki-27-Ko(other name options: Ki-27a, Ki-27-I) and Ki-27-Otsu(Ki-27b, Ki-27-II). Latest version It was distinguished by a “lantern” with all-round visibility, a redesigned oil cooler, as well as the ability to install underwing fuel tanks and suspension of small-caliber bombs. The Type-97 was superior in its characteristics to both the I-15bis and the I-153. With the I-16 the situation was somewhat more complicated. Horizontal
The maneuverability of the Ki-27 was better than that of any version of the donkey.
In addition, I-16s with M-25 engines were inferior to the Japanese fighter in terms of climb speed and altitude, but had better weapons and armor protection. “Donkeys” also had a more durable design and could reach higher speeds in a dive. An important advantage of the Ki-27 was its high stability, which partly compensated for the low per second weight of the salvo when firing. Even after the arrival of the I-16 Type 18 fighters, superior to the Ki-27 in speed and climb rate, the Japanese fighters remained dangerous opponents. The shortcomings of the aircraft were compensated by the merits of their pilots: according to the recollections of Soviet veterans who managed to fight in Spain, the Japanese were superior to the Italians in experience, and the Germans in aggressiveness. From the interrogation of the captured Japanese pilot Miajimo:
“It’s best to fight with the I-15 on horizontal and vertical turns, with the I-16 it’s the same. He believes that the I-16 fighter is more dangerous, explaining this by the speed and maneuverability of the I-16.
When an I-16 attacks head-on, the I-97 goes up followed by a ranversman. When I-16 attacks I-97 from above, I-97 goes into a turn.
The pilot states that Japanese pilots do not like frontal attacks, they are afraid of damage to the engine, and consider attacks on the I-16 from above from behind to be the best for them. As a rule, exiting a battle with a corkscrew is not used.”
Another Japanese fighter that fought at Khalkhin Gol was the Kawasaki Ki-10 biplane. In general terms, it was an analogue of the Soviet I-15bis and by 1939 it was irrevocably outdated. Here is a description of one of the first battles between the I-16 and the Ki-10:
Captured Ki-10-II, tested at the Air Force Research Institute “On one of the first days of autumn, Senior Lieutenant Fedor Cheremukhin, deputy commander of the 22nd IAP, flew out on a combat patrol. We met completely different cars. The elegant, sharp-nosed biplanes vividly reminded the deputy commander of the old Polikarpov I-3, on which he once began his career as a combat pilot. The ensuing “aerial carousel” immediately showed that the Japanese fighters were superior to the “donkeys” in turns, noticeably inferior to them in speed and rate of climb. Our pilots quickly figured out that it was better to start hitting biplanes from long distances, and, without getting involved in close combat, leave to repeat the attack on the vertical. Soon Cheremukhin managed to get behind one of the Japanese and fire a targeted burst. A stream of white steam escaped from the fuselage of the enemy aircraft. “The radiator is broken,” the senior lieutenant noted to himself and sharply released the gas so as not to overshoot the enemy.
At random, the Japanese pilot was either confused or wounded, but he did not even try to maneuver to get out of the fire, but continued to “pull” in a straight line while descending, leaving a long plume of steam behind him.
| Taking careful aim once again, Cheremukhin fired a long burst at the engine of the disabled car. Instead of steam, thick black smoke poured out of the “Japanese”, and it, increasing its dive angle, crashed almost vertically into the ground.” | |
|---|---|
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Interestingly, according to Japanese data, only one Ki-10 was lost during the conflict. |
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Camouflage schemes |
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Nakajima Ki-27-Ko st. Sergeant Kashida, 2nd Chutai, 59th Fighter Sentai
Nakajima Ki-27-Otsu commander of the 2nd Chutai of the 11th Fighter Sentai Against bombers The Japanese bombers used in the conflict area gave the Soviet aviation leadership another reason for thought: the speed of any of them (not counting the light reconnaissance aircraft and the Ki-36 bomber) exceeded that of the biplane fighters of the Red Army Air Force. Thus, the situation characteristic of the war in Spain was repeated: the I-16 became the main means of intercepting bombers. The main medium bomber in the theater of operations was the aircraft Mitsubishi Ki.21 with a fixed landing gear with a maximum speed of 430 km/h. It was he who suffered the greatest losses among Japanese bombers during the conflict. Another Japanese aircraft, a single-engine reconnaissance aircraft, should be noted Mitsubishi Ki.15-Ko Karigane. Thanks to good aerodynamics (despite the non-retractable landing gear) and light design, this aircraft could reach a maximum speed of 481 km/h, which made it difficult to reach even for the I-16 with M-62 engines. However, seven aircraft of this type were still shot down. The next modification of the reconnaissance aircraft, Ki-15-Otsu, reached 510 km/h, but it did not arrive in time for the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
The use of unguided rockets
From August 20 to 31, a flight of missile-carrying fighters took part in the hostilities, which included five I-16s (flight commander Captain N. Zvonarev, pilots I. Mikhailenko, S. Pimenov, V. Fedosov and T. Tkachenko), armed with installations RS-82. On August 20, 1939, at 16:00, the pilots over the front line met with Japanese fighters and launched the RS from a distance of about a kilometer. As a result, 2 enemy aircraft were shot down. The success was due to the fact that the Japanese flew in close formation and with constant speed. In addition, the surprise factor was at work.| Taking careful aim once again, Cheremukhin fired a long burst at the engine of the disabled car. Instead of steam, thick black smoke poured out of the “Japanese”, and it, increasing its dive angle, crashed almost vertically into the ground.” | |
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The Japanese did not understand who was attacking them (they attributed their losses to the actions of Soviet anti-aircraft gunners). In total, the missile carrier flight took part in 14 battles, shooting down 13 Japanese aircraft without losses. The Japanese military, having studied the wreckage of their equipment, came to the conclusion that large-caliber guns were installed on our fighters. |
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I-16 type 5 commander of the 2nd squadron of the 70th IAP Art. Lt. M. P. Noga, autumn 1938. The blue star instead of a number on the vertical tail was obviously the emblem of the command vehicle. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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The author of the second drawing is Andrey Yurgenson. |
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I-16 type 10 of the 70th IAP. The green protective color was applied in the field over the factory silver-gray paint. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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I-16 type 10 of one of the Soviet aviation formations. The color of the propeller spinner and rudder tip is indicated tentatively. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev. |
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| Tactical and technical characteristics of the I-16 and its main opponents at Khalkhin Gol | I-16 type 10 | I-16 type 17 | I-16 type 18 | Kawasaki Ki.10-II | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nakajima Ki.27 | Manufacturer country | USSRUSSR USSR | USSR USSR | ||
| 1938 | 1938 | 1939 | 1935 (1937**) | 1937 | |
| Start year of release | 9.00 | 9.00 | 9.00Wingspan, m | 11.31||
| 6.07 | 6.076.07 | 7.55 | 7.53|||
| d.* | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.253.00 | 3.25 | |
| Length, m | 14.54 | 14.5414.54 | 23.00 18.56|||
| Height, m | Wing area, m2Engine | M-62 Kawasaki Ha-9-IIb"Army Type 97" | |||
| Power, hp | 750 | 750 | 800 | 850 | 710 |
| Aircraft weight, kg. | |||||
| - empty | 1327 | 14261434 | 1360 | 1110||
| - takeoff | 1716 1810 18301740 | 1790 | |||
| Speed, km/h | |||||
| - near the ground | 398 | 385 | 413 n.d. | ||
| 425 | 461400 | 470||||
| d. | 882688 | 1034 | d. | 920||
| - at an altitude of 448 | 8470 | 8240 | 9300 | 11150 | 10000|
| Rate of climb, m/min | 525 | 417485 | 1100 627|||
| Practical ceiling, m | 16-18 | 17-18 | 17 | d. | 8 |
| Range, km | Turn time, s | Armament | 4 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns | 2 20-mm ShVAK cannons, 2 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns | |
| * upper/lower** year of production of this modification | List of victories of pilots who fought on I-16 during the conflict at Khalkhin Gol | Pilot's name | Subdivision|
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of victories on I-16 (personal + group) | Notes | 8+6 | - |
| Rakhov V. G. | Notes | 6+13 | 22nd IAP |
| Vorozheikin A.V. | Notes | 5 | Flew on I-16P |
| Kravchenko G. P. | Notes | 5 | Commander of the 22nd IAP since July 1939 |
| Trubachenko V. P. | d. | 5 | 22nd IAP |
| Squadron commander I-16P | d. | 4 | - |
| Krasnoyurchenko I. I. | Notes | 2+6 | - |
| Smirnov B. A. | Notes | 2+5 | Skobarikhin V. F. |
| Zvonarev N. I. | d. | 0+6 | - |
| Flew I-16 with RO-82 | Notes | 1 | Antonenko A.K.* |
Commander of the 22nd IAP, died 06/22/1939* aircraft type is not set reliably
Information sources
Kondratyev V. Khalkhin-Gol: War in the air. - M.: “Technicians - Youth”, 2002. Stepanov A. Air war on Khalkhin Gol. // “Corner of the Sky” Astakhova E. Kawasaki Ki-10 fighter. // “Planes of the World” No. 03 (23), 2000. Kondratiev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M., 2008. Mikhail Maslov. Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153 aces. Osprey Publishing, 2010.
- a river on the territory of Mongolia and China, in the lower reaches of which in May-September 1939, Soviet and Mongolian troops repelled the aggression of Japanese invaders who invaded the territory of the then Mongolian People's Republic (MPR).
The pretext for the invasion was the so-called “unresolved territorial dispute” between Mongolia and Manchuria. The purpose of the Japanese attack was an attempt to establish military control over the region bordering Transbaikalia, which would pose a direct threat to the Trans-Siberian Railway, the main transport artery connecting the European and Far Eastern parts of the USSR.
For courage and heroism in the battles at Khalkhin Gol, more than 17 thousand people were awarded government awards, 70 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and pilots Sergei Gritsevets, Grigory Kravchenko, Yakov Smushkevich became the first twice Heroes of the Soviet Union in the country. Orders of the USSR were awarded to 24 formations and units.
In memory of the events at Khalkhin Gol in August 1940, the badge “Khalkin Gol. August 1939” appeared. It was approved by the Great People's Khural of Mongolia. All persons who were directly involved in the conflict were nominated for the award.
In 2004, Japan received permission from Mongolia to collect and export the remains of Japanese soldiers killed in the 1939 battles near the Khalkhin Gol River.
(Additional
The battles at Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian Khalkhin golyn baildaan or Mongol Khalkhin golyn dain, Japanese ノモンハン事件 Nomon-khan jiken) - an undeclared local armed conflict that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia near borders with Manchukuo between the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic on the one hand and the Japanese Empire and Manchukuo on the other. The final battle took place in late August and ended with the complete defeat of the 6th Separate Army of Japan. An armistice between the USSR and Japan was concluded on September 16, 1939.
In Soviet historiography, these events are usually called a “military conflict.” At the same time, many Japanese historians admit that it was a real local war, and some authors call it the “Second Russo-Japanese War” - by analogy with the war of 1904-1905.
In Japanese historiography, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the “Nomon Khan Incident”, after the name of one of the heights in this area of the Manchurian-Mongolian border.
Background to the conflict
In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. A puppet state of Manchukuo was created on the occupied territory, which was planned to be used as a springboard for further aggression against China, Mongolia and the USSR.
According to the Soviet side, the conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway, which was being built by the Japanese in this area bypassing the Greater Khingan to the USSR border in the area of Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. According to the Soviet historian M.V. Novikov, to substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the Khalkhin-Gol border and “issued a special order to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, on the maps of which the correct border in the Khalkhin River area was given.” Gol", but the Russian historian K.E. Cherevko points out that the administrative border along the Khalkhin-Gol channel was indicated on a map published on the basis of Russian topographic surveys of 1906 and on physical map Outer Mongolia of the General Staff of the Republic of China in 1918.
In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end.
On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia in the form of the 57th Special Corps, which was successively commanded by division commanders I. S. Konev and N. V. Feklenko. By May 1939, the strength of the corps was 5,544 people, including 523 commanders and 996 junior commanders.
In the summer of 1938, a two-week conflict occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR.
In 1939, following the change of Japanese government in January, border tensions increased. The slogan of expanding the Japanese empire “all the way to Lake Baikal” began to be put forward. Attacks by Japanese troops on Mongolian border guards became more frequent. At the same time, Japan accused Mongolia of deliberately violating the borders of Manchuria.
Hostilities
Border provocations
On January 16, 1939, in the area of the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo height, a group of 5 Japanese soldiers fired at a detachment of four MPR border guards from a distance of about 500 meters.
On January 17, at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, 13 Japanese soldiers attacked a detachment of three MPR border guards, capturing the head of the outpost and wounding another soldier. On January 29 and 30, Japanese and Bargut cavalrymen made new attempts to capture the guard detachments of the MPR border guards. And in February and March, the Japanese and Barguts carried out about 30 attacks on the MPR border guards.
On the night of May 8, a group of Japanese up to a platoon with a light machine gun tried to secretly occupy an island belonging to the MPR in the middle of the Khalkhin Gol River, but after a short firefight with the border guards of the MPR, they retreated, losing 3 soldiers killed and one captured (Takazaki Ichiro from the reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division) .
On May 11, a detachment of Japanese cavalry (up to 300 people with several machine guns) advanced 15 km deep into the territory of the MPR and attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. As reinforcements approached the border, the Japanese were pushed back to their original line.
On May 14, a reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Japanese Infantry Division (300 horsemen supported by a flight of five light dive bombers) attacked the 7th border outpost of the MPR and occupied the heights of Dungur-Obo. On May 15, the Japanese transported up to 30 trucks with two infantry companies, 7 armored vehicles and 1 tank to the occupied heights.
On the morning of May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko, sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a sapper company and an artillery battery of the Red Army. At the same time, a division of MPR armored vehicles was sent there. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border.
During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces under the command of Colonel Yamagata consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6-8 armored vehicles and 1 tank.
On May 28, Japanese troops, possessing numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed largely due to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Yu. B. Vakhtin.
The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.
Although there was not a single collision on the ground in June, an air war has developed in the skies since May 22. The first clashes showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.
The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Ya. V. Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience of the war in Spain and China. They began training pilots and reorganized and strengthened the air surveillance, warning and communications system.
To strengthen air defense, two divisions of the 191st anti-aircraft artillery regiment were sent to the Trans-Baikal Military District.
At the beginning of June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place at the suggestion of the chief of the operational department of the General Staff M.V. Zakharov. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Soon after arriving in the area of military conflict in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new combat plan: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to gather in the area of combat operations: the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed a marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.
To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, arrived from Chita to the area of the Khalkhin Gol River.
Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.
In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aviation managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft (the Japanese lost 2 bombers and 3 fighters).
Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here, which for the first time in the world used combat unguided air-to-air missiles, later used to create multiple launch rocket systems. Thus, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan (in this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize dominance in the air. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.
At the same time, on June 26, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol. The words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio.
News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
By the end of June, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the defenses of the Red Army on the operational sector of the front.
Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. The defending Soviet troops were rescued from a difficult situation by a mobile reserve created in advance by Zhukov, which was promptly put into action. Zhukov, without waiting for the approach of the infantry cover, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve (up to 150 tanks T-37A, BT-5, BT-7 and OT-26) and 8 1st Mongolian armored division, equipped with BA-6 armored vehicles with 45 mm cannons. Soon they were supported by the 7th motorized armored brigade (154 armored vehicles BA-6, BA-10, FAI). It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander Stern. To be fair, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of troops, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense in a telegram dated July 15 reprimanded Kulik and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.
Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.
On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete its task.
A group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a general retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians More than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the Japanese themselves, total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8632 people. killed. The Japanese side lost almost all their tanks and most of their artillery. These events became known as the “Bayan-Tsagan Massacre.”
The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.
However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.
July August
The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of: commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, chief of staff brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, aviation commander corps commander Y. V. Smushkevich, corps commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev.
New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.
On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers.
At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned.
Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.
From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required to carry out the offensive operation planned by the chief of staff Bogdanov against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.
On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place. From July 21 to July 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20.
During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter:
“You want to start a big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.”
As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree the Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ryuhei Ogisu (Japanese), consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiment Manchu brigade, three regiments of Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should be noted that most of the soldiers in the Japanese group had combat experience of the war in China.
General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.
During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.
Despite the overall superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.
During the offensive operation, Zhukov, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups maneuvering to encircle.
The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, an auxiliary blow by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne, 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.
The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.
The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the offensive
the total number of Soviet and Mongolian troops was 35 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 216 field and 286 anti-tank guns, 40 mortars, 2255 heavy and light machine guns, 498 tanks, 346 armored vehicles, 581 aircraft;
The total number of Japanese troops was 25 infantry battalions, 17 cavalry squadrons, 135 field and 142 anti-tank guns, 60 mortars and bomb throwers, 1238 heavy and light machine guns, 120 tanks and armored vehicles, 450 aircraft.
The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.
At 6:15 a.m., powerful artillery preparation and air raids on enemy positions began. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters were launched into the air. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing the tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.
The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.
Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.
Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese planes in air battles.
In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.
In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, he took a considerable risk, since the commander’s closest reserve - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.
Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to release its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.
The Red Army captured 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 heavy and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million rounds of ammunition, and much other military equipment as trophies.
The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops.
On the morning of September 4, two battalions of Japanese infantry tried to occupy the heights of Eris-Ulyn-Obo, but were thrown back beyond the state border, losing up to 350 soldiers and officers. On the night of September 8, in the same area, Japanese troops made a new attempt to penetrate into Mongolia with up to four infantry companies, but were again repulsed with heavy losses. In total, in these attacks the enemy lost up to 500 troops killed, 18 machine guns and more than 150 rifles were captured.
After September 8, the Japanese command did not take action with ground troops, but air battles continued. In the first half of September, 7 air battles took place in the skies over the territory of the MPR. The largest one - 120 Japanese planes against 207 Soviet ones - took place on September 15, the day the armistice was signed. On September 16, hostilities on the border ceased.
In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207 aircraft, Japan - 162.
During the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River, Soviet troops actively used artillery: according to incomplete data (the results of the shelling of a number of objects in the adjacent territory were not established), 133 artillery pieces were destroyed by artillery fire (six 105-mm guns, 55 pcs. 75- mm guns, 69 small-caliber and three anti-aircraft guns), 49 mortars, 117 machine guns, 47 artillery, 21 mortar and 30 machine gun batteries were suppressed, 40 tanks and 29 armored vehicles were destroyed, 21 observation posts, 55 dugouts, 2 fuel warehouses and 2 warehouses with ammunition.
Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to stop hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.
The conflict ended in May 1942 with the signing of a final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese, based on the old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats on the Soviet-German front, things were quite a difficult situation
The victory of the USSR and the MPR at Khalkhin Gol was one of the reasons for the refusal of Japan to attack the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the Japanese General Staff, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler’s demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2 it was decided final decision wait until Germany wins for sure.
In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous (August 23) signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 it signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “maritime party” won, defending the idea of cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The German military leadership, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan’s military capabilities very low and did not recommend that Hitler commit himself to an alliance with it.
The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and British Ambassador in Tokyo by Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, denounced on January 26, for six months, and then fully restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and petroleum products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow into Japan until the outbreak of war with the United States.
The events at Khalkhin Gol also became important element propaganda in the USSR. Its essence boiled down to the idea of the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of a major war.
The impact of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.
"Golden Star"
On August 1, 1939, at the height of hostilities, an additional insignia was established to the highest degree of distinction of the USSR, the title “Hero of the Soviet Union” - the medal “Hero of the Soviet Union”, renamed in October of the same year into the medal “ Golden Star" The title was established in 1934, but no special insignia were provided.
The fate of the winners
70 servicemen were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 83 were awarded the Order of Lenin, 595 - the Order of the Red Banner, 134 - the Order of the Red Star, 33 - the medal "For Courage", 58 - the medal "For Military Merit". The commissar of the 8th motorized brigade, Alexander Nikolaevich Moskovsky, was forever included in the lists of personnel of the military unit; on August 28, 1939, he led a night counterattack of a rifle company against a Japanese battalion and died in battle (as a result of a successful counterattack, the Japanese battalion was thrown back, losing over 170 soldiers killed and failed to break through the encirclement).
The government of the Mongolian People's Republic established the badge “Participant in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol,” which was awarded to distinguished Soviet and Mongolian military personnel.
Khalkhin Gol became the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown corps commander, after the victory over the Japanese, headed the country's largest Kiev Military District, and then became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.
The aviation commander of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and Army Commander G. M. Stern were awarded Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force; Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War.
The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the USSR Government, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission for Resolution controversial issues on the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation on the Japanese side, Bogdanov made a “gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, he was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years of labor camp. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR. Great Patriotic War graduated with the position of division commander and the rank of major general.
Combat losses of the parties
According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops during the battles from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured (of which about 20 thousand were Japanese losses). The Soviet-Mongolian troops lost 9831 Soviet (together with the wounded - more than 17 thousand) and 895 Mongolian soldiers.
Reflection in literature and art
The events at Khalkhin Gol were reflected in Soviet and world literature and art. Novels, poems and songs were written about them, and articles were published in newspapers.
K. M. Simonov - novel “Comrades in Arms”, poem “Far in the East”, poem “Tank”.
F. Bokarev - poem “Memory of Khalkhin Gol”
H. Murakami - novel “The Chronicles of the Wind-Up Bird” (a long story by Lieutenant Mamiya).
In cinema
"Khalkin-Gol" (1940) - documentary, CSDF.
“Listen, on the other side” (1971) - Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
“I, Shapovalov T. P.” (1973, directed by E. E. Karelov) - the first part of the “High Rank” duology, an episode in the film.
“On the Roads of the Fathers” (2004) - a television film by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
"Khalkin-Gol. The Unknown War" (2008) - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large amount of chronicles, as well as comments from veteran participants in those events and historians.
“Historical Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze” 1939
Volunteers
My Way (film, 2011) (Korean: 마이웨이) is a Korean film directed by Kang Jaegyu, released in 2011. The film is based on the story of Korean Yang Kyungjong and Japanese Tatsuo Hasegawa, captured by the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol.
