Baltic states. Historical claims of the Baltic countries to Russia

Ministry of Education and Science Russian Federation

State educational institution

higher public education

State University management

Institute of Public Administration and Law

Course work in the discipline of geopolitics

on the topic “Baltic Countries”

Is done by a student:

Minasyan A.A.

Faculty: State Medical University, 2nd year, 2nd group

Checked by the teacher:

Loparev Anatoly Vasilievich

Moscow 2012

Introduction

1. The situation with the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

1 Accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR

2 Geopolitical processes in the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

2. The situation with the Baltic countries after the collapse of the USSR and now

1 Political aspect

2 Economic aspect

3 Problems of relations between Russia and the Baltic countries

3.1 Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries

3.2 Boundary issues

3.3 Security in the region

3.4 Social tension

3. Prospects for relations between Russia and the Baltic countries in the future

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of geopolitical relations between Russia and the Baltic countries will never be exhausted, since the Baltic Sea region will always remain in the zone of Russia’s vital interests, which involve ensuring lasting security there on conditions that do not infringe on Russia’s security. The main objective of our country’s foreign policy towards the Baltic countries is to strengthen Russia’s influence in the region in order to strengthen its own security, protect its economic interests and ensure the rights of national minorities through cooperation with these states.

In this course project, an attempt is made to list the main geopolitical factors in relations between Russia and the Baltic countries, their historical background, as well as prospects for the development of the Russia-Baltic geopolitical space, taking into account already existing and newly emerging factors.

The purpose of this work is to understand the relations between Russia and the Baltic countries.

To understand the essence of the problem we will consider:

)Situations with the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

)The situation with the Baltic countries after the collapse of the USSR and now

)Prospects for relations between Russia and the Baltic countries in the future.

1. The situation with the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

.1 Accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR

September and October 10, 1939 - after Germany attacked Poland, and the USSR also sent its troops into the territory of Poland and actually took part in its division - the USSR invited the Baltic states to conclude mutual assistance agreements, including the provision of military assistance, creation of military bases and placement on them Soviet troops(25 thousand people each in Latvia and Estonia and 20 thousand in Lithuania). According to the Baltic states (supported by the West), these treaties were imposed on them by the Soviet leadership, and their subsequent accession to the USSR should be considered annexation. Thus, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, signed on August 23, 1939, actually predetermined the fate of the Baltic states.

Simultaneously with the conclusion of the mutual assistance agreement, the USSR transferred Vilnius and the Vilna region to Lithuania, which were transferred to the USSR after the division of Poland. Less than a year later, the entry of all three countries into the USSR as union socialist republics was formalized - after the entry of Soviet troops into the Baltic states in June 1940, pro-Soviet governments were created in all three countries and elections were held; on July 21, 1940, the Seimas of Latvia proclaimed that Latvia was becoming socialist republic, on the same day the establishment of Soviet power was proclaimed by the Seimas of Lithuania and the Parliament of Estonia, and 3? On August 6, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to join the USSR.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, post-war borders were fixed. The USA and Great Britain essentially recognized the entry of the Baltic countries into the USSR. The leadership of the allied countries did not want to aggravate relations with the Soviet Union at that moment. Subsequently, this did not prevent Western states from supporting numerous public demands for independence for the Baltic republics. At the same time, the official presentation of such demands could lead to the collapse of the entire system of post-war international agreements. The problem found its solution only many years later thanks to centrifugal processes within the Soviet Union itself.

.2 Geopolitical processes in the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

With the beginning of perestroika in 1987, mass anti-Soviet protests began in the Baltic capitals. In 1988, the first perestroika movements emerged. On June 3, 1988, the Sąjūdis independence movement was founded in Lithuania. In January 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Vilnius sparked a pro-independence demonstration of up to 250 thousand people.

On March 1990, the Supreme Council of Lithuania, headed by Vytautas Landsbergis, declared independence. Thus, Lithuania became the first of the union republics to declare independence, and one of two that did so before the events of the State Emergency Committee. Lithuania's independence was not recognized by the central government of the USSR and almost all other countries. The Soviet government began an economic blockade of Lithuania, and later troops were used.

In 1988, the Estonian People's Front was formed, proclaiming the goal of restoring independence. In June 1988, the so-called “singing revolution” took place in Tallinn - up to one hundred thousand people took part in the traditional festival on the Singing Field, and on March 23, 1990, the Estonian Communist Party left the CPSU.

On March 1990, the Supreme Council of Estonia declared entry into the USSR in 1940 illegal, and began the process of transforming Estonia into an independent state.

On May 1990, the Supreme Council of Latvia proclaimed the transition to independence, and on March 3, 1991, this demand was supported by a referendum.

The peculiarity of the separation of Latvia and Estonia is that, unlike Lithuania and Georgia, before the complete collapse of the USSR as a result of the actions of the State Emergency Committee, they did not declare independence, but a “soft” “transition process” to it, and also that, in order to gain control on their territory in the conditions of a relatively small relative majority of the titular population, republican citizenship was granted only to persons living in these republics at the time of their annexation to the USSR, and their descendants.

The Central Union Government made forceful attempts to suppress the achievement of independence by the Baltic republics. On January 13, 1991, a special forces detachment and the Alpha group stormed the television tower in Vilnius and stopped republican television broadcasting. The local population showed massive opposition to this, which resulted in 14 casualties. On March 11, 1991, the National Salvation Committee of Lithuania was formed and troops were sent in. However, the reaction of the world community and strengthened liberal movements in Russia made further forceful actions impossible.

2. The situation with the Baltic countries after the collapse of the USSR and now

2.1 Political aspect

Immediately after the restoration of independence, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia took vigorous steps towards rapid integration into the main European and Atlantic institutions. The Baltics are comprehensively oriented towards the West, and, above all, towards the USA, Germany, the North European countries. The main motive is the “historically justified” desire to overcome dependence on Russia and leave the sphere of Russian influence.

In 1992-1995. For their domestic and foreign policy purposes, the Baltic countries actively used the acute problems of the presence of Russian troops and the status of the Russian-speaking population. Any political crisis in Russia, the Chechen conflict, were used as factors of national mobilization against an external threat.

July 1991, following a meeting of the foreign ministers of the EU member states, a decision was made to establish diplomatic relations with the Baltic states and the readiness of the European communities to assist economic transformations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was expressed.

In May 1992, trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and these countries were signed, similar to those previously signed between the EU and the USSR.

In 1992, the EU PHARE economic program was also extended to the Baltic states, and in June 1993, at the summit in Copenhagen, a decision was made on the fundamental possibility of admitting Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to EU membership along with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia , Bulgaria and Romania.

In fact, the Baltic countries in their relations with the European Union have covered in two years a path that took the states of Central and Eastern Europe about 6 years to achieve. A year after the summit in Copenhagen, free trade agreements were signed between the Baltic countries and the EU (July 1994), which entered into force on January 1, 1995. At the same time, the EU, taking into account the economic situation in these countries, agreed to grant a deferment in the abolition of import duties from Lithuania (for 6 years) and Latvia (4 years).

On June 1995, the Association Agreements between the Baltic States and the European Union (“European Agreements”) were signed in Luxembourg. The agreements contain obligations to establish a free trade regime between the parties, remove restrictions on the movement of capital, services and work force, bringing the legislation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into conformity with the standards adopted in the European Union. Since the signing of the association agreements, the Baltic countries have received the same rights in relations with the EU that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania now have. This means, in particular, that representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can participate in all joint meetings of EU Member States and associated countries within the framework of the latter's "pre-accession strategy" to the European Union, adopted at the Essen summit in December 1994.

In May 1994, the Baltic states, together with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, were granted the status of “associated partners” of the WEU. "Associated Partners" can participate in meetings of the Council of the Western European Union (without the right to block decisions taken by consensus), and also, with the consent of the majority of full members, in military operations of the WEU.

In December 1995, at the next Assembly of the Union in Paris, an initiative was put forward to create, as part of the development of cooperation between the WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and strengthening the role of the Union in the European security system, a “Hanseatic Corps” from the naval units of Denmark, Germany, and Poland and the Baltic countries.

In general, we can say that today the EU is one of the leading political and economic partners of the Baltic states. The countries of the European Union account for 35 to 50% of the total volume foreign trade Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is important to note the effect of the free trade agreement, which came into force on January 1, 1995. In Latvia, for example, in January-November 1995, exports to EU countries increased compared to the same period of the previous year from 39.1 to 45 %, imports - from 39.7 to 50%. This is happening against the backdrop of a decline in trade with the CIS countries - during the same time, exports decreased from 42.5 to 37.5%, imports - from 30.1 to 28%.

Noteworthy is the fact that the “acceleration” of the pace of rapprochement between the European Union and the Baltic countries - giving them the status of “associated partners” of the WEU, the conclusion of free trade agreements, the beginning of the development of “European agreements” - occurred during a period of aggravation of relations between the Baltic states and Russia (problems of troop withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia, adoption of the law on citizenship in Latvia). The EU's increased attention to the Baltic region is also evidenced by the proposal in May 1996 at the summit of the Council of the Baltic Sea States of a new European Union strategy for the region.

The most active agents of the EU's Baltic policy are the Northern European countries - Denmark, and after joining the European Union in 1994 - Sweden and Finland. Northern European states provided active support to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania even during their struggle for independence in 1990-1991. The development of their cooperation after the restoration of independence has deep foundations.

First of all, the Northern European states are interested in stability in the region immediately adjacent to their borders. Hence the promotion of economic reforms in the Baltic countries. In addition, cooperation with the Baltic states to a certain extent contributes to the search for a new identity of the Northern European countries in a changing Europe, and allows them to feel more confident in the EU. Of particular interest to them is the market for relatively cheap and sufficiently qualified labor in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Finally, we cannot discount long-standing historical, cultural and even ethnic (Finland-Estonia) ties.

The Nordic states are the main Western economic partners of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

It is necessary to note the assistance of the Northern European countries in creating the national armed forces of the Baltic states. This primarily concerns border units, since the countries of Northern Europe are concerned about the danger of illegal refugees from third countries, drugs, smuggling of weapons and other goods entering their territory through the Baltic states. At the same time, military supplies to the northern Baltic countries are still limited to equipment and outdated light equipment.

Northern European states are patronizing the inclusion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in peacekeeping operations. In September 1994, these states, as well as Norway and Great Britain, signed a document providing for long-term cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the creation of the Baltic peacekeeping battalion, the official curator of which was Denmark. The decision to create a battalion, which would consist of military personnel from the three Baltic countries, was made in December 1993 in Tallinn. It is expected that the cost of its preparation will total about $27 million.

It is possible that cooperation between the Northern European and Baltic states will also receive a serious institutional basis. There is a plan to turn Sweden into a kind of security curator in the region, creating a security zone that includes Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states. Today, Sweden is already practically the official political patron of the Baltic countries; it acted as a mediator in resolving the dispute over the maritime border between Latvia and Estonia, in resolving the problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia, etc. It is significant that the new Prime Minister of Sweden, G. Peterson, made his first foreign visit after his appointment to Estonia (April 1996).

Among the EU member states, Germany also occupies a special place in relations with the Baltic states.

Germany has long-standing historical and cultural ties with the region, dating back to the 1980s. XIX century the German Baltic barons were the true masters of the Baltic states.

Today, Germany is actively promoting rapprochement between the EU and the Baltic states. During the visit of the presidents of the Baltic countries to the United States in June 1996, B. Clinton named Germany as the possible main “patron” of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in negotiations on accession to the European Union. It is appropriate to recall that it was during Germany’s presidency of the European Union that the EU free trade agreement with the Baltic countries was signed and negotiations began on concluding “European agreements” with them.

In September 1994, Germany concluded military cooperation agreements with all three Baltic countries. It provides Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with specific material assistance in this regard. Thus, the Germans transferred to Latvia two transport aircraft, 8 military boats of the former GDR, 150 trucks and 60 trailers, 136 tons of various military equipment and uniforms. A squadron of German minesweepers visited Latvia twice, the republic was visited by Defense Minister F. Ruhe and others officials.

Germany currently plays a significant role in the economy of the Baltic countries. For Latvia, for example, it is the second largest trading partner in terms of turnover (about 13% of exports and 15% of imports), and ranks third in terms of foreign investment in the republic (about 60 million dollars). Germany also plays a significant role in the Lithuanian economy, where it is the first foreign investor (about $70 million).

However, it should be noted that Germany is very cautious about increasing activity in the Baltic region, and its full potential in this regard has not yet been used.

In the United States, which never recognized the entry of the Baltic states into the USSR in 1940, the restoration of the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is interpreted today as one of the results of the end of the Cold War, and therefore they are not classified as “newly independent states”, but are viewed as “nations that have restored freedom.” The significant interest in the Baltic countries and their relations with Russia that exists in the United States is evidenced by the visits of B. Clinton to Riga on July 6, 1994, A. Gora (March 13, 1995) and H. Clinton (July 8, 1996). ) - to Tallinn.

The North Atlantic Alliance is considered in the Baltics to be the main guarantor of security in the region. The Baltic countries actively welcomed NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative, seeing it as “the right step in the right direction at the right time,” and were among the first states to join the program. The intention to join NATO as a long-term goal was recorded in the “Fundamental Provisions of Latvian Foreign Policy”, approved by Parliament in February 1995, and Lithuania submitted an official application to join the Alliance in January 1994. The Baltic states actively advocated NATO expansion, emphasizing , that this process should under no circumstances leave them on the sidelines, and declaring that it is not directed against Russia. Lithuania was especially active in the issue of NATO expansion, which in this regard was oriented toward Poland.

As is known, the three Baltic states were not included in the first wave of invitations to join the North Atlantic Alliance. To a large extent, the reluctance of Western politicians to spoil relations with Russia and complicate the internal political situation of President B.N. Yeltsin also played a role. Arguments of this kind are well formulated in the 1996 report “From Collective Defense to Collective Security. Transformation and Enlargement” by the influential Dutch Peace and Security Council: “The time for the admission of the three Baltic states into NATO in the near future has not yet come, since this is seriously "It would complicate relations with Russia. It is also not clear whether NATO would be willing or willing to offer countries that are small in area and lack strategic depth a reliable degree of protection in the event that their accession to NATO leads to hostility from the Russian Federation."

However, the protracted process of the Baltic countries joining NATO was destined to end. In 2004, all three Baltic countries were admitted to NATO.

In an effort to avoid aggravation of relations with Russia, the West over the past years has pursued a policy of “squeezing” it out of the Baltic states and including the Baltic states in its sphere of influence. At the same time, the West is not interested in aggravating Russian-Baltic relations, and the West, apparently, is not ready to directly support the Baltic states in their confrontation with Russia. Russia will have to reckon with the special attitude towards the Baltic countries in the West. It is necessary to realize that defending Russian interests in the region will face hidden, and possibly open, opposition from Western states on key issues.

.2 Economic aspect

Economic relations with Russia have three most important aspects for the Baltic countries today:

Firstly, Russia and the CIS countries (Belarus) are the most important source of fuel and other energy resources and minerals for the Baltic states. Due to imports from Russia, for example, 93% of Latvia's needs for fuel, 50% for electricity, 90% for non-ferrous metals, 80% for raw materials for the chemical industry are satisfied. In industries related to the supply of Russian raw materials, Russian investments in the Baltic states are also concentrated, the participation of Russian capital in the corporatization of Baltic enterprises, which is important for the latter;

secondly, servicing transit from Russia is an important source of income for the Baltic states. Today, the volume of Russian transit through the territory of Estonia is, according to some data, up to 9 million tons per year, Latvia - 36 million tons, Lithuania - 10.1 million tons. All three republics plan to increase transit revenues. Plans are being developed for the reconstruction of ports, foreign investors are being attracted, and there are plans to rebuild the former Soviet naval bases in Paldiski and Liepaja. In Latvia, much attention is paid to plans for transporting oil from the Timan-Pechora oil province; they would like to see Ventspils as one of its points in the republic. Estonia, which has a large balance of payments deficit, is also showing interest in attracting Russian cargo flows. Prime Minister T. Vähi called transit a “priority development zone” of the Estonian economy;

thirdly, the sale of agricultural products to Russia, given its continuing importance for the economies of the Baltic countries, as well as the fact that bankrupt farmers are the main opposition to reforms (Estonia) and the electoral base of nationalists (Latvia).

The Baltic republics were the most economically developed in the former USSR. The breakdown of cooperation ties in the spheres of industry and agriculture led to a noticeable decline in production. For example, even in the most prosperous of all Estonia, the level industrial production decreased by one third during the years of reforms. Agricultural production, more oriented to the east, experienced an even deeper decline.

Over the years of reform, the economy of the Baltic states has experienced noticeable structural changes. If Estonia previously specialized in mechanical engineering, metalworking, instrument making and electronics (that is, high-tech industries), now the importance of specific gravity in the economics of processing agricultural products, forestry and wood processing industries. The banking and financial sector, which is necessary for a market economy, has also developed. At the same time, the fishing industry has suffered losses, and the shale industry is experiencing serious problems.

Nevertheless, the progress of economic reforms in the Baltic countries is characterized by the lowest costs in the entire post-Soviet space. So, for the period 1991-1995. Inflation indices in Latvia and Estonia were the smallest and did not exceed double-digit figures (80-85 times), while in Russia the increase in consumer prices was slightly less than 5 thousand times, and in other countries the increase in inflation reached five and six-digit figures. Low inflation rates in the Baltic states were the result of tight monetary and monetary policies. The state budget deficits of the countries under consideration were maintained within the limits of plus or minus 1-2% of GDP.

The economy of the Baltic countries emerged from the crisis decline in production already in 1995. In the last three years, sustainable economic growth has been observed there.

According to the EBRD forecast, the GDP growth rate in 1997 will be 3.4% in Latvia, 3.8% in Lithuania, and 4.9% in Estonia. According to experts from the European Commission, GDP in Estonia will increase by 4.5% this year. The volume of the “shadow” economy, which is not included in official statistics, is 13-14% in Estonia. According to the EBRD forecast, the lowest inflation rate in 1997 will be in Latvia - 10% per year. In Estonia they will be 12%, in Latvia - 13%. The Ministry of Finance of Latvia expects that the rate of annual inflation in this country will decrease by 2002 to 5.7%.

The macroeconomic development of Latvia in 1996 was positively assessed by the IMF. The country achieved GDP growth of 2.5%, the inflation rate dropped to 13% compared to 23% in 1995. Interest rates dropped significantly, high level which in 1995 contributed to the development of the banking crisis in the country.

For its part, Lithuania stated in the spring of 1997 that it would like to reduce its dependence on IMF loans. On a number of points, the Lithuanian government did not comply with the IMF recommendations, on the implementation of which, as a rule, the receipt of its loans depends. Thus, Lithuania refused to reduce its relatively high tariff on imports of agricultural goods (by an average of 27.%).

A wave of banking crises hit Estonia in 1993, Latvia in 1994, and Lithuania in 1995. For example, in Estonia, a third of banks went bankrupt during the crisis. The number of banks in the country decreased from 42 to 15 during the period 1993-1995. Today Estonian banks are considered the best in the Baltic countries. Lithuania also experienced the consequences of the banking crisis in 1996. In Latvia in 1996, the large bank Baltiya collapsed. 2.8. The Estonian economy has the highest degree of liberalization in the region. State intervention in the economy here is reduced to a minimum, and there are no restrictions on property rights. A strict monetary and financial policy ensures free conversion of the national currency, the crown, with its stable exchange rate, as well as a balanced state budget. Since 1991, the country has attracted $800 million in foreign direct investment. In terms of the number of foreign investments per capita, Estonia is second only to Hungary among all CEE countries.

Privatization is given importance in macroeconomic policy.

By the beginning of 1996, Estonia had sold 64% of state-owned enterprises to private strategic investors. Voucher privatization affected mainly housing. In Lithuania, only 1% of state-owned enterprises were sold to external investors. Voucher privatization covered about 70% of the country's enterprises. To attract investors during the privatization process, Estonia used the East German model. Finns and Swedes accounted for 2/3 of strategic investors in Estonia. By the beginning of 1996, only 4% of enterprises (15% of capital) remained in the hands of the state in Estonia. In terms of the share of the private sector in the economy, Estonia is ahead of all OECD member countries. Since 1994, Latvia has also begun to apply Estonian experience in international tenders in the privatization process. In 1996, this process became widespread.

The second stage of privatization (non-voucher) began in Lithuania in 1996. Basically, non-controlling stakes in enterprises that had already undergone voucher privatization were put up for auction. In 1996, out of 800 privatization tenders, only 30 cases offered controlling stakes. As of 1997, 835 enterprises were being privatized in Lithuania, including 14 large ones. Among the latter: “Lithuanian Telecommunications”, “Lithuanian Airlines”, “Lithuanian Radio-Television Center”. Lithuanian Social Democrats opposed such large-scale privatization and demanded a referendum on this issue. In 1998, the Lithuanian government plans to begin privatization of the last stronghold of the state economy - the gas and energy industries. By February 1997, only one small transport company from Klaipeda had been acquired by a foreign investor.

In 1997, the Russian Gazprom, together with the German RUR-Gaz, each purchased a 16.25% stake in Latvian Gas, the national supplier of natural gas in the country.

The privatization process in the Baltics is taking place with the broad assistance of foreign investors. From the point of view of the existing economic and political risks for capital investors, Estonia was considered the most reliable in the West until recently. According to Euromoney, in September 1996, in terms of risks for investors, Estonia was in 71st place in a list of 179 countries, ahead of Latvia (75th place). However, in March 1997, Latvia rose to 63rd place and ahead of Estonia (69th place). In terms of this indicator, Lithuania dropped to 72nd place over the past period. Russia, for comparison, ranks 91st on the Euromoey list. In its assessments, this magazine, influential in financial circles around the world, takes into account 9 indicators - the overall economic development of the country, political risk, debt indicators and fulfillment of payment obligations, access to the national financial market, etc.

In terms of foreign direct investment per capita, Latvia ($86 per year) overtook Estonia ($45) in 1996, leaving far behind the more populous Lithuania ($21). According to this indicator, Latvia is much inferior to Hungary and the Czech Republic, but is on a par with Poland and Croatia. Of course, in absolute terms, foreign investment flows more intensively into the neighboring countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

Along with attracting foreign investment, the Baltic countries began to practice entering foreign financial markets as investors. Lithuania recently issued Eurobonds in the amount of $200 million.

The official unemployment rate remains low. On January 1, 1997, there were 37 thousand unemployed people looking for a job in Estonia. Of these, 19 thousand people had unemployed status, and 17 thousand people received benefits, or 2.3% of the total working population. As a result of the almost 50% decline in agricultural production in Estonia, the unemployment rate there is relatively higher, which represents a serious social problem. The state has actually stopped supporting farm production. Estonia has increased the import of products - meat and poultry, which it previously exported to neighboring republics. Previously popular in Russia, meat and dairy products from Estonia almost never appear on sale in the Russian Federation. European Commission experts strongly recommend that Estonia reduce its cattle population.

Estonia's foreign trade deficit (14 billion crowns in 1996) is almost equal in size to the country's state budget. Export revenues reach only two-thirds of import costs. Russia accounts for 16% of Estonian exports (4 out of 25 billion kroons in 1996) and about 14% of imports (5.2 out of 38 billion kroons). Natural gas, oil and petroleum products are Russia's main exports to the Baltic countries. The share of transit in Estonia's exports is 30%.

Accession to the EU may be accompanied by an increase in structural problems in the economies of the Baltic states. The damage to agriculture and the food industry will be especially serious.

The Baltic countries expect to improve their economic affairs by attracting foreign tourists. However, so far these hopes have not come true. For example, in Estonia, the number of foreign visitors in 1996 (2.5 million) decreased by 20% compared to 1995. Last year, foreign tourists spent $0.5 billion in the country, which is equal to 18% of export revenues . Estonia expects to double the number of foreign tourists over the next five years.

In the summer of 1997, the leadership circles of Latvia discussed the possibility of a partial departure from strict financial policies. The Prime Minister of Latvia, Andris Skele, opposed the change of course and had to leave his post. He noted that weakening the rigidity of the government's financial policy in favor of populist political sentiments will entail a new round of inflation. “The political increase in salaries and pensions,” according to him, may turn out to be only an illusion, because “for lats you cannot buy what you bought the day before.”

Attempts to change the macroeconomic course are not just a consequence of a political game. Despite the external relative macroeconomic prosperity, social tension in the Baltic countries remains. For example, in Latvia, almost 70% of the population, according to The Baltic Times, lives below the poverty line. The average per capita income is estimated at 38 lats (65 US dollars) per month.

As already noted, the Baltic countries' strategic economic goal is to join the EU. For this purpose, in particular, a tough financial policy is being pursued in order to prepare in advance to meet the macroeconomic requirements for the European Monetary Union (EMU) coming into force in 1999 - low inflation rates and a budget deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP. At the same time, in these countries, which spent so much time and effort trying to avoid the economic centralism of the USSR era, they are trying to turn a blind eye to the fact that the creation of a monetary union means the formation of a single central bank in the EU, where monetary measures will be developed. policies (interest rate level, reserve requirements, regulation of operations in financial markets). From an economic point of view, joining the EU will mean absorbing the national sovereignty of the Baltic countries in the field of economic policy.

Entry into the EU will require an even tighter monetary policy and maintaining a fixed exchange rate of national currencies in relation to the EU's common currency, the euro. This will be especially difficult for Lithuania, whose currency, unlike the Latvian and Estonian ones, is pegged to the US dollar, which itself constantly fluctuates with the main European currencies - the German mark, the French franc, and the British pound sterling. As a result, the Lithuanian central bank will be required to continuously intervene in foreign exchange to support the national currency. The director of the Central Bank of Lithuania, Gitanas Nauzeda, recently confirmed the impossibility of a quick reorientation of the litas to European currencies. This moment, obviously, was taken into account in the EU when drawing up the schedule for admitting new members to the union.

So far, more than half of Estonian residents remain indifferent to the country's accession to the EU, and 10% of the population view this prospect extremely negatively. Moreover, this takes place in conditions where the real consequences of this step are not actually discussed in the country. The Euro-orientation of the Estonian population was much more pronounced in 1991. Accession to the EU will initially require the adoption of new or revision of 1000 old laws. The cost of this legislative activity alone will amount to about $30 million.

In recent years, there has been a clear reorientation of the foreign trade of the Baltic countries towards the EU states. At the same time, the importance of Russia as a trading partner of these states is declining. Estonia has the highest degree of dependence on EU markets (51.1% of exports and 64.8% of imports in 1996). For Latvia, the EU value is also high - 44.7 and 49.3%, respectively. For Lithuania, the importance of EU markets is approximately the same as that of the CIS markets - 33.9 and 40.6%, respectively; 44.8 and 36.0%. At the same time, among individual countries, Russia still remains the main trading partner of the Baltic countries.

To date, Western states, primarily EU member countries, account for 40-50% of the total foreign trade turnover of the Baltic countries, while the share of Russia and the CIS countries has decreased to 20-30%. However, behind these visible changes Less noticeable facts are hidden, indicating the transition of dependence on relations with the East to a new quality.

2.3 Problems of relations between Russia and the Baltic countries

geopolitical Baltic border country

2.3.1 Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries

After the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent Baltic states faced the problem of integrating a significant part of the Russian population that had moved to the Baltic states during the Soviet years. Many Russian citizens, who were the national majority in the Soviet Union, turned out to be completely unprepared for becoming a national minority and new living conditions in the newly independent Baltic states. The difficult process of economic transformation, caused by the transition from a planned socialist to a capitalist model and free market relations, is a thing of the past. Currently, the Baltic countries demonstrate economic growth and stable development National economy, which, unfortunately, cannot be stated in relation to the sphere of political development of new European countries.

In recent years, the greatest concern of the global Russian-speaking community has been the situation with the Russian and other Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states. Perhaps all the concerns of former compatriots about the situation in the Baltic countries can be reduced to two main points: a revision of history in general and the history of the 2nd World War in particular, and the problem of integration of national minorities, mainly political integration.

Political integration in general can be viewed from different perspectives. In the case of studying the political integration of national minorities, the development of language policy and political rights comes to the fore. This paper attempts to conduct a brief analysis of the conditions for the integration of national minorities after 15 years of independence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, because the problems in these states have much in common.

In Estonia, which first gained independence, Estonians made up the vast majority of the population - 87.6% according to the 1922 census (Russians - 8.2%). After the 2nd World War, there was a certain labor shortage in Estonia, which intensified during the implementation of large-scale projects industrialization. By the time of the 1959 census, Estonians already made up 74.6% of the total population (Russians - 20.1%, others 5.3%). In 1989, the last Soviet census recorded the share of Estonians at 61.5%, Russians at 30.3% and other peoples at 8.2%. After the restoration of independence in 1991, the outflow of minorities from the republic, as well as the low birth rate among them, led to a change in the demographic composition of the Estonian population: the 2000 census recorded a sharp decrease in the share of Russians (25.6%) and other representatives of the non-Estonian population (6.5 %). The majority of the non-Estonian population is concentrated in Tallinn (46.3% of the city's total population) and in the northeast of the country, where non-Estonians make up the vast majority of the population (for example, 95.1% in Narva, 95.8% in Sillamäe, 82.2% in Kohtla-Jarve, etc.).

Demographic changes after World War II led to the emergence of a large Russian community in Estonia, which included both the historical Russian minority and newly arrived representatives of this people. Gradually, on the basis of the Russian community, the so-called Russian-speaking community, which includes both already Russified representatives of other nations, and those who, after moving to Estonia, preferred Russian as the main language of communication outside the home. In 2000, 80% of the total Estonian population had citizenship of their country of residence (among minorities this was only 40%). At the same time, Estonian legislation recognizes only those who have Estonian citizenship as members of minorities. Russians, Germans, Swedes and Jews are recognized as traditional minorities in Estonia, which corresponds to historical realities.

Problems of integration of national minorities caused by the language legislation of Estonia. According to Art. 6 of the Constitution of Estonia, adopted by referendum in 1992, the only official (state) language is Estonian. In 1995, the Riigikogu (parliament) adopted new law about the language, which established fairly strict requirements for the proficiency and use of the Estonian language in different areas public life. The Language Act states that “a national minority language is a foreign language that Estonian citizens - members of a national minority - have traditionally used in Estonia as their mother tongue.”

However, the legislation provides some opportunities for the use of minority languages ​​(in practice Russian) for official purposes. Art. 51 of the constitution and the Language Act establish the right of representatives of national minorities to receive answers in their native language from state and municipal institutions only in those regions where Estonian is not the language of the majority of the resident population. The same rule is contained in the Law on Language (Article 10). In these same regions, the constitution “to the extent and procedure established by law” allows internal records to be conducted in the language of the majority (Article 52). Article 11 of the Language Law provides that permission to use a second language for office work is given by the government of the republic. Not a single corresponding petition received a positive decision from the government. At the same time, for example, the leadership of the predominantly Russian-speaking Sillamäe submitted it twice.

As for all other regions of Estonia (including Tallinn with its 43% non-Estonian population), in official contacts the Russian language (like any other) can be used here only with the consent of officials. In January 2002, Section 8(4) of the Language Act was amended so that persons who do not speak Estonian have the right to communicate with an official through an interpreter, whom they themselves must pay for.

At the local level, problems of political integration are also associated with language restrictions. Until recently, Estonian laws provided for mandatory knowledge of Estonian for deputies at any level. There was even a precedent when a deputy from the predominantly Russian-speaking Sillamäe was deprived of his mandate only because of ignorance of the state language (decision of the Administrative Board of the State Court of October 30, 1998 in RT III 1998, 29, 294).

In November 2001, an amendment was made to the Riigikogu Internal Rules Act establishing Estonian as the sole language of parliamentary business. A similar rule was established for all meetings local governments, regardless of the ethnic composition of their population (it should be noted that members of the local assemblies of Narva, Maardu, Sillamäe and some other cities spoke Russian at sessions, taking advantage of the vagueness of previous legal provisions).

To conclude our consideration of the situation in Estonia, we consider it necessary to note that according to the results of the 2000 census, 20% of the population of Estonia does not speak Estonian. In Tallinn, people without knowledge of the Estonian language make up 26%, in the cities of the northeast, populated predominantly by Russian speakers, 71% of the population. In such a situation, it is quite obvious that the existing language rules do not take into account the interests of this part of the population.

In Latvia, until October 1991, all residents had the same rights. On October 15, 1991, the Latvian Parliament adopted the Resolution “On the restoration of the rights of citizens of the Republic of Latvia and the basic conditions for naturalization,” which divided the residents of Latvia into two main categories: citizens (about 2/3 of the population) and non-citizens (about 1/3). The criterion for inclusion in the population of citizens is that the person or his ancestors had Latvian citizenship before June 1940. According to statistical data from 1993, 876 thousand people were deprived of their political rights, of whom 161 thousand (mostly illegally) were denied even registration in the Register of Residents.

The problem of “statelessness” is almost exclusively a problem of ethnic minorities. As of January 1, 2001, they made up 99.4% of all non-citizens. Among ethnic Latvians, only 0.26% were non-citizens, among non-Latvians - 55.1%.

Non-citizens gained the opportunity to gradually individually restore the political rights collectively taken away by a one-time act only in February 1995, through the naturalization procedure. In 1996, there were 670,478 non-citizens living in Latvia, and as of 01/01/2006 - 418,440 (27.2% and 18.2% of the country's population, respectively). Over 10 years, the number of non-citizens decreased by 252,038 people. The number of naturalized non-citizens (including minor children) amounted to 104,521 people at the end of 2005. The number of foreigners permanently residing in Latvia (mainly former non-citizens who have acquired foreign citizenship) increased by 25,201 people. The number of persons who received Latvian citizenship through registration is 11,350 (including 4,748 minors at the request of non-citizen parents).

Accordingly, a decrease in the number of non-citizens by 141,072 people, or 56%, can be interpreted as a change in their legal status. The remaining 110,966 are the result of emigration and the excess of mortality over the birth rate (in the latter case, it should be noted that a child born in the marriage of a citizen and a non-citizen receives the status of a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania).

Over the same years, the population of the Republic of Lithuania, due to emigration and natural decline, decreased by 178,766 people. Non-citizens account for 62.1% of these losses, with a share of 22.7% in the country's population on average for the period. This 2.7-fold excess is a comprehensive indicator of discrimination against non-citizens compared to Latvian citizens. The status of a non-citizen practically remains hereditary, although since February 1999 a child born after Latvia gained independence can be registered as a citizen at the request of the parents. As of March 1, 2006, only 4,748 children received Latvian citizenship in this way.

The deprivation of the majority of non-Latvians of political rights was followed by a progressive differentiation of the residents of Latvia in other “non-political” rights: social, property rights, employment, etc.

In April 1995, under pressure from European structures (mainly the OSCE mission in Latvia), the Law “On the status of citizens of the former USSR who do not have citizenship of Latvia or another state” was adopted. This law determined the legal status of most non-citizens. Part 3. Art. 2 of the Law established (03/30/2000 it was excluded from the law) that “bodies exercising state power and public administration are obliged to ensure compliance (mentioned in the Law) with the rights and not allow restrictions on these rights in laws, regulations, instructions, orders and others acts issued by state bodies and self-government bodies."

Numerous restrictions on the right of non-citizens to hold positions in the public sector only in some cases comply with the principle of proportionality. In some cases, restrictions apply not only to heads of services, but also to ordinary employees (for example, in the state revenue service or in civil registration departments). The restrictions also apply to popular professions: police officers, firefighters, prison guards.

As a rule, in addition to non-citizens, the corresponding positions cannot be held by citizens of the Republic of Latvia with limited legal capacity, who have committed criminal offenses, who have collaborated in the past with the KGB, or who were activists of the CPSU during the period of its legal activities. In total, there are 22 such restrictions in various areas that are offensive to non-citizens and contribute to inciting ethnic hatred (non-citizens make up about half of non-Latvians), or more than 30% of all restrictions.

In addition, restrictions on membership in the CPSU and cooperation with the KGB are grounds for lifelong deprivation of the right to naturalization (Law on Citizenship, Article 11.1), and therefore a lifelong ban on professions. It should be noted that military personnel of the armed forces and internal troops of the USSR are also deprived of the right to naturalization for life if they were conscripted from outside Latvia. Life imprisonment the right to work in state (8 restrictions) and private (3 restrictions) law enforcement agencies pushes these people to join organized crime.

In Lithuania, after independence, a 1991 law officially granted equal political rights to all its residents through citizenship, regardless of ethnicity. This step prevented the development of interethnic tensions characteristic of the other two Baltic republics.

Taking into account the actual situation in the Baltic countries, we can say that the problems of political integration of national minorities are systemic. Taking into account the significance of the consequences, it can be assumed that without reforming the legal system towards liberalization in relation to national minorities, the situation in Estonia and Latvia is fraught with serious conflicts that could lead to the polarization of society and the split of the country. In order to avoid further negative development of the situation, it is possible to use the European experience in resolving interethnic conflicts and harmonizing the legislation of Estonia and Latvia, affecting the situation and ways of integrating national minorities, in accordance with European standards.

It is necessary to recognize that the current Russian policy is a version of the “damage limitation” strategy, and it has its limits.

The most vulnerable is the Russian position regarding “human rights” in the Baltics. Attracting the attention of the world community to such a formulation of the issue has not yet had much effect. The latest example is the removal of the issue from discussion by the UN General Assembly at the end of 1996 and the removal of monitoring of Estonia by the Council of Europe, when not one of the 20 amendments proposed by the Russian delegation was taken into account. Meanwhile, there are quite strong arguments to support the Russian position on the need to promote the integration of Russians in the Baltic countries. This is, first of all, the interest of the Baltic countries themselves in stability in this area in connection with their integration into the West. The West, in turn, pays attention specifically to the problems of integration of Russians, promotion and facilitation of the naturalization process.

In the longer term, especially if economic recovery begins in Russia, measures such as limiting the development of economic relations with the Baltic countries are a dead end. These measures could also turn against Russia if the processes of its admission to the WTO are accelerated, where the provision of most favored nation treatment to partners is a necessary condition.

.3.2 Boundary issues

In 1991, the most advanced agreement regarding borders between the parties was the agreement on the fundamentals of interstate relations between Russia and Lithuania. Along with the agreement, a special Agreement on cooperation in the economic and socio-cultural development of the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR was signed, in Article 1 of which the parties recognized “the inviolability of the existing border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania along its entire length.”

The agreements on interstate relations between Russia and Estonia and Latvia stipulated that the parties respect each other’s right to territorial integrity in accordance with the principles of the CSCE. It was stipulated that the state border regime between the parties would be determined by special bilateral agreements.

3. The differences in the provisions of the treaties are explained not only by Russia’s special interest in the Kaliningrad region, but also have a historical dimension. After joining the USSR, the territory of Lithuania was increased, and part of the territory of Belarus was added to the Vilnius transferred to Lithuania in 1939. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the territories that went to these states under the terms of the peace treaties of the 1920s. with Soviet Russia, after the war they were returned to the RSFSR.

Almost immediately after the restoration of independence, on September 12, 1991, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia declared invalid the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transfer of a number of territories of the Leningrad and Pskov regions to the Russian Federation (total area - about 2.3 thousand km2). On January 22, 1992, a similar resolution was adopted by the Supreme Council of Latvia in relation to the Pytalovsky and Palkinsky districts of the Pskov region (1.6 thousand km2).

The basis for such decisions was the same proclaimed legal succession of the modern Baltic states and republics of 1920-1940. The Baltics argue that the peace treaties of 1920 between Moscow and Tallinn and Riga remained in force even after Estonia and Latvia joined the USSR, and therefore the border of these states with Russia should pass precisely according to the terms of these treaties.

Estonia went the furthest, starting to issue Estonian passports to residents of these areas on the grounds that they were citizens of the pre-war republic. The Estonians also took initiatives to involve the CSCE and individual Western countries (in particular, Finland) to mediate in resolving the conflict.

Russia has taken an unambiguously tough position on the issue of border lines. In June 1994, by decree of President Boris Yeltsin, a decision was made to unilaterally mark the border between Estonia and Russia on the ground. In November of the same year, B. Yeltsin, having visited a section of the Russian-Estonian border, declared that “not an inch of Russian land will go to anyone.”

Certain changes in Estonia's position occurred after the resignation of the right-wing liberal government at the end of 1994. In May 1995, the President of the Republic L. Meri announced Estonia's readiness to sign a border agreement with Russia, in which this issue would be finally resolved. At the next round of Russian-Estonian negotiations in October 1995 in Pskov, an important provision was agreed upon regarding the absence of territorial claims by the parties to each other, and in November 1995 in Tallinn an agreement in principle was reached on the direct passage of the border line, while the original one was the current one was taken. Finally, in February 1996, actual work began to describe the border.

At present, the solution to the issue of the border line between Russia and Estonia is hampered only by formal obstacles, namely Estonia’s demand to fix a provision confirming the validity of the 1920 treaty for Russian-Estonian relations. This requirement, however, is of a fundamental nature. As the Ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to Russia M. Helme directly stated, if the 1920 treaty was recognized, Russia would have to recognize the fact of the occupation of Estonia in 1940 with all the ensuing consequences. The official Russian position is that with Estonia joining the USSR in 1940, the 1920 treaty lost force and has only historical significance.

As for Latvia, in Russia’s relations with this republic, issues of the border line have not become as acute as in the case of Estonia. Negotiations on the demarcation and delimitation of the border between Russia and Latvia began in April 1996, while the Latvian side agreed to negotiate not on the “restoration” of the border, but on the “state border” between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation.

Regarding the border problem, some experts at one time raised the question of convening a multilateral (with the participation of Russia and all three Baltic states) conference on a settlement. Considering the situation with Lithuania, it would be possible to “link” all three states by confirming the inviolability of borders. In this case, the principles of the CSCE, as well as the restrained attitude of the West towards the claims of the Baltic states regarding borders, “work” for Russian interests.

.3.3 Security in the region

The entry of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania into NATO entails absolutely obvious negative consequences for Russia’s geopolitical interests. After Poland became a NATO member, the alliance reached the border with the Kaliningrad region of Russia. However, with the admission of the Baltic states, Russia's border with NATO stretches 400 miles to the northeast and now lies just 100 miles from Russia's unofficial second capital, St. Petersburg. The official sphere of NATO military responsibility rested on the western borders of our country, including part of the belt of Russian vital interests in the Baltic states: invigorated by their involvement in the Western bloc, the Baltic states, as best they can, limit Russia’s access to seaports. Moreover, informal zones of responsibility of the alliance are being formed in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The European part of Russia today is beginning to resemble not a “borderland with NATO”, but an enclave within official and unofficial zones increased activity NATO members These crescent zones cover Russia from the northwest, west and southwest. From Azerbaijan and Georgia, they are trying to install a “half-horseshoe” of such zones in the south; the second “half-horseshoe” can be seen in the activity of NATO countries in Central-East Asia. NATO seems to have stepped over the European massif of Russia, undertaking to develop what we are accustomed to consider Russia’s deep Asian rear.

As you know, all the official authorities of NATO and its three newly formed members - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - never tire of repeating that the approach of the North Atlantic Alliance to Russia will only benefit it: security in the region will become stronger and “democratic values” in Russia itself will be strengthened due to such a “pleasant neighborhood”. But there are some not entirely clear facts that have already been repeatedly mentioned in the Russian and international media.

In particular, it is not entirely clear why the construction of the most modern radar surveillance and control system “BALTNET” was suddenly launched on the territory of the Baltic republics even before the official invitation to NATO, with the active assistance of the United States and a number of Western European countries of the bloc? Moreover, this system is not only fully compatible with NATO’s unified radar and electronic surveillance network, but also has capabilities that go far beyond the Baltic region itself. "BALTNET" allows you to control not only the sky over the Baltic states, but also the aerospace space of Belarus and a large part of Russia.

The deployment of BALTNET actually began back in 1997, and the main elements of the system came into operation in 2000, when it seemed that it was still unknown whether the Baltic states would be accepted into NATO or not. The central object of BALTNET is the so-called. "Regional Air Surveillance and Coordination Center", located in the town of Karmelava, 100 km west of the capital of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius. The center is staffed by an international staff representing all three Baltic republics, as well as specialist advisors from the United States and other NATO countries.

The Karmelavsky Center coordinates the work of three national nodes of the BALTNET system, located respectively in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The main part of the equipment for the network was supplied by the United States, and installation, debugging and personnel training were carried out by Norwegian specialists with experience in operating a similar airspace control system in the Finnmark province bordering Russia. The construction of the system's facilities cost $100 million, which was clearly not allocated from the modest budgets of the Baltic countries. Thus, after the formal accession of the Baltic republics to the alliance, no problems naturally arose with the immediate inclusion of BALTNET into the NATO integrated air surveillance and early warning system, and through it into the US-owned global intelligence and information system Echelon.

Moreover, the newly minted Baltic “NATO members”, apparently not without orders from Washington and Brussels, intend not to stop there and continue to build up BALTNET. In particular, Latvia, as has been repeatedly reported in the media, has decided to purchase and deploy in the southeast of its territory, 70 km from the border with Russia, the powerful, latest American radar complex TPS-117. At one time, I remember, plans to deploy this radar caused very violent protests by the Russian-speaking population of the republic, who feared the negative impact of the station’s radiation on the environment and human health.

This “pleasure” will cost the Latvian budget 8 million lats, not counting the cost of operation. The complex will be installed by specialists from the American military-industrial concern Lockheed Martin at a former Soviet military airfield in the Audrini parish of Rezekne County in Latgale (south-eastern Latvia). The geographic location of the radar will allow it, in particular, to confidently cover the entire Pskov region of Russia, including the locations of the Pskov Airborne Division and airfields of military transport aviation of the Russian Air Force.

According to open information about the performance characteristics of the TPS-117 station, its range is approximately 460 kilometers. However, according to unofficial data, radars of this type are capable of detecting high-speed, small-sized air targets, including missile warheads various types in near-Earth space at an inclined range of up to 1000 km and at an altitude of more than 20 km, which makes it clearly an object of strategic importance. Some experts claim that the TPS-117 radar also has a number of “special functions”: using its “pencil beam”, which is practically unaffected by terrain and weather conditions, you can track not only aircraft and missiles, but also stationary and moving objects on sea and land.

According to some reports, half of the maintenance personnel of the “Latvian” TPS-117, at least at first, will be American specialists. Interestingly, the United States plans to install two more stations of this type in Estonia and Lithuania in the future. As a result, a unified system of dense radar and radio-electronic tracking of the adjacent territories and airspace of Russia and Belarus will be created in the Baltics, which will allow NATO to know almost everything happening in the North-West of the CIS. And recently it became known that in addition to TPS-117, three more less powerful medium-range airspace tracking radars of the ASR-7 type will be deployed in Latvia, which, together with similar Estonian radars, will also be included in the general BALTNET network. It is assumed that these radars will be located in the Ventspils region, in Lielvarde or Aluksne.

Against the backdrop of NATO's deployment of a powerful intelligence complex in the Baltics, the obvious miscalculation of the leadership of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in connection with the decision to completely close the intelligence complex in Cuba, which made it possible to obtain unique information from US territory, cannot but cause regret. The bet that the closure of the Cuban center will be compensated by building up the reconnaissance satellite constellation is clearly not justified. We can only hope that the necessary conclusions for the future will be drawn from this.

2.3.4 Social tension

Public opinion in Russia

Two-thirds of Russians consider the Baltic states unfriendly towards our country: Latvia was characterized this way by 64% of respondents, Lithuania and Estonia by 61% each. Older citizens share this opinion much more often than younger ones: Latvia, for example, is called an unfriendly state by 68% of older citizens age group and 56% - the youngest. Age differences are especially pronounced in Moscow, where 83% of older and 59% of young respondents speak of the “unfriendliness” of the same country. Many do not undertake to assess the nature of the relationship between Russia and the Baltic states, and only 14 - 15% of respondents recognize these states as friendly. However, more than half of those surveyed (56%) would prefer relations between the Baltic countries and Russia to be closer than they currently are.

Elderly respondents, people with higher education, as well as citizens with relatively high incomes. Only 11% of respondents, on the contrary, would prefer relations between Russia and the Baltic states to be less close. It is not surprising that this position was taken only by respondents who consider Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to be unfriendly states towards Russia. But even among those who evaluate the attitude of the Baltic countries towards us in this way, only 15-16% are in favor of distancing themselves from them.

The majority of our fellow citizens believe that the Baltic countries and Russia are interested in rapprochement - only 17% of survey participants definitely take the opposite position. But it is curious that the opinion that both sides are equally interested in rapprochement is shared by relatively few (20%), while the view that this rapprochement is needed primarily by Russia is much more widespread (30%), and the opposite view is much less common: only 8 % of respondents believe that the Baltic countries are more interested in it.

By the way, only a quarter of respondents (27%) believe that the Baltic countries were annexed to Soviet Union against their will (a third - 34% - think that their entry into the USSR was voluntary). Even less - three times - is the share of those who believe that being part of the Soviet Union brought the Baltic countries more harm than benefit: only 9% of respondents think so, while 65% are convinced of the opposite.

Public opinion in the Baltic countries

According to the majority of nationalist-minded “indigenous” residents in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, signs of the restoration of Russian influence are visible everywhere. These include the “Kremlin-financed media,” local politicians and economic development financed by the Kremlin, and the determination of a third of the population of the Baltic republics, inherited from Russia, spurred on by Moscow; and the “energy club” that the Kremlin loves to use. These tactics - especially the use of Russian money - have created tensions in the Baltics that no one even thought about five years ago.

The main theses of the Baltic nationalists is that “everything that is happening in the Baltic states today is the strategy of Russian President Vladimir Putin to revive Russian influence in most of Eastern Europe.”

Every time someone in the Baltic speaks out against Russian pressure, emotions are triggered on both sides, driven by memories of a difficult common history. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania entered the twentieth century under the rule of the Russian tsars, but won independence after the First World War. In 1939, when Hitler and Stalin signed a non-aggression pact, Soviet troops invaded the Baltic states. Stalin deported hundreds of thousands of Balts to Siberian gulags, to certain death. And when Nazi troops replaced the Soviet troops, many considered the Germans to be liberators - and many Baltic states cooperated with the Nazis and took part in the extermination of local Jews.

The opinion of the older Russian-speaking population is obvious - almost one hundred percent coincidence with the opinion of Russians, but there is a tendency of the younger Russian-speaking generation to focus on European countries. Young people are massively studying English and German for subsequent travel outside the unfriendly Baltic countries and permanent residence in Western European countries.

3. Prospects for relations between Russia and the Baltic countries in the future

Despite everything, it is necessary to clearly and clearly understand that Russian-Baltic relations are the most important vector of Russian policy in the European direction and their relevance will only increase.

There are opportunities in government (the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly, regional government structures) and economic structures (individual Russian companies, their associations, the Russian Business Round Table, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, etc.) that can be more actively involved in the matter improving our bilateral relations for the benefit of all participants in the process.

Currently, the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the relevant departments of the Ministry, and specialists from other foreign policy departments have done a lot of work to rethink the problems facing our states. Various regional initiatives, both initiated by the authorities of the northwestern regions of Russia and the Baltic states, made a significant contribution to the stabilization of relations.

In the foreseeable future, Russian diplomacy will again face the problem of the second wave of NATO expansion. It seems to us that non-inclusion of the Baltic states in the expanding Alliance could become for Russia one of the elements of the “damage limitation” strategy in the event of a hard resolution to the enlargement problem. In this case, an unambiguous firm position will not only weaken the forces seeking to ignore Russia, but will also be advantageous from a domestic political point of view, since there is a consensus within Russia regarding the geopolitical affiliation of the Baltic countries.

Russian long-term interests are met by an evolutionary strategy in the Baltic problem, which from a Western perspective could be formulated as follows:

promoting political and economic reform in the Baltic countries, the success of which is seen as a precondition for the independence of the Baltic states and its integration with the West. Special attention At the same time, attention is paid to resolving the problem of the Russian-speaking minority;

defense cooperation of the Baltic states. The Baltic defense system must be designed so that it can be integrated into the wider regional and international system. Ideally, one should strive for the status that Sweden and Finland currently have - countries that have modern armed forces, but also have very close relations with NATO;

EU enlargement to include the Baltic states. It is necessary to create a precedent - to make at least one of the Baltic states “part of the West” by joining the European Union. Unofficially, it is proposed to admit a first group of countries to the EU, including Cyprus and Malta in the south, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in Central and Eastern Europe and one Baltic state (Estonia) in Northern Europe;

"open door" strategy regarding NATO membership. Closing the “door to NATO” would have a strong negative effect in these countries and possibly undermine the reform process. Simultaneously with the announcement that the Alliance intends to expand to include the CEE countries, it is necessary to publicly confirm that it remains open to the membership of the Baltic countries, and in the future it will be transformed into a pan-European security structure that includes Russia. The strategy outlined should strive to include the Baltic countries in the system of bilateral, multilateral and institutional relations with the West, without provoking Russian reaction, which would increase security threats to these states and seriously undermine other Western policy goals towards Russia.

Some changes are emerging in the situation of Russian-speaking minorities in these countries. In particular, in Latvia the problem of the slow progress of the naturalization process is being actively discussed, and conversations have begun about the need for additions or even revision of the citizenship law. Estonia has taken measures to speed up the process of issuing “alien passports” and residence permits; a bill is being discussed that, if adopted, will ensure that a significant portion of non-citizens will automatically exchange temporary residence permits for permanent ones. According to some reports, the number of people accepting Russian citizenship is decreasing and cases of people leaving it are being observed.

The economic aspects of Russia's relations with the Baltic countries are a powerful factor in rapprochement. At the same time, this factor is far from being fully involved. This can largely be explained by the fact that the current level of development of economic relations allows Russia to satisfy its interests without compromising political guidelines. Despite the elements of economic sanctions against the Baltic countries discussed above, the volume of Russian trade with them has been continuously increasing since 1994, with a positive balance for Russia. The example of Estonia is indicative: despite the absence of most favored nation treatment in trade with Russia, Russian-Estonian trade turnover is increasing. Although business has not yet become a decisive force in the normalization of Russian-Baltic relations, the presence of mutual economic interest is a guarantee against the implementation of ill-considered actions such as “sanctions”. Closer and more active economic ties between Russia and the countries of the region would allow our business to participate in promising projects on a pan-European scale.

And finally, domestic entrepreneurs will have their say in the Russian-Baltic rapprochement. So far, Russia is not one of the countries with large volumes of investment in the Baltics. In terms of investment volumes in Estonia, Russia ranks third among foreign investors (10% of foreign direct investment), in Lithuania - fifth, in Latvia - sixth. However, the objects of investment of Russian funds are very important for the Baltic economy.

In Estonia, Gazprom, which has a monopoly on natural gas supplies to the republic, owns a 30% stake in the Eesti Gaas enterprise. Gazprom's subsidiary, Lentransgaz, won the tender for the privatization of a mineral fertilizer plant in Kokhtla-Jarve (Nitrofert) in 1993 and is now the full owner of the plant. 90% of the company's products (urea and ammonia fertilizers) are exported, providing the republic with an annual influx of foreign currency of 20-25 million dollars. Gazprom has already announced the purchase of a large stake (16.25%) in the Latvian enterprise Latvijas Gaze. It is expected that, together with another foreign investor (RUR-Gaz, also 16.25% of shares), Gazprom will invest $50 million in the development of Latvijas Gaze. This is the second largest investment project in the republic after the restoration of independence. The possibility of participation of Russian enterprises in other economic sectors important for the Baltic states is being discussed. Thus, LUKOIL may participate in the privatization of the Vetspils-afta ​​enterprise, which pumps oil in the Latvian port of Ventspils, and will also invest money in the construction of an oil terminal in Butinge (Lithuania).

Conclusion

Russia has always been an international country, respecting the memory of people of different nationalities, even if we did not feel any sympathy for them. And a good illustration of this is, for example, the monuments to French soldiers on the Borodino field. This is an example of a careful and correct attitude towards history.

On the one hand, residents of the Baltic states have some reason to be outraged by the period they were part of the USSR. On the other hand, the current political elite of the Baltic states builds its own legitimacy on the denial of the entire Soviet past, for which it enjoys the support of most Western countries. The anti-Russian component is embedded in the entire education system; a whole young generation of people is being brought up who have no experience of life in the USSR, but at the same time often in mandatory visit museums of the occupation.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries were very difficult. The abundance of historical grievances and mutual claims prevented the establishment of mutual understanding in the national, cultural, political, and economic spheres.

Attempts scientific analysis the processes taking place in the Baltic region (as, indeed, throughout the entire post-Soviet space) were also not free from a subjective, often overly politicized approach.

The desire to shift responsibility to the opposite party, reluctance to admit one’s own mistakes, lack of data sociological research- all this prevents the formation of an objective view of the geopolitical processes taking place on the world stage.

Relations between the Baltic states and Russia are of particular importance in light of NATO's expansion to the east and the active desire of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to be included in the next tranche of invitees. Moscow's official position on this issue is well known.

At the same time, there is objective positive potential in the economic sphere; Historically, we must not forget about the decisive role played by the leadership of the new Russia in the Baltic countries gaining their independence.

At the moment, objective prerequisites have emerged for the success of such efforts. The leaders of the Baltic states are increasingly aware of the fact that for successful integration into Western structures they need stable relations with Russia; this is one of the mandatory conditions, formulated by the West itself.

The most far-sighted Russian politicians They also realize that the lack of dialogue with the Baltics will ultimately lead to its loss for Russia, just as it happened with Central and Eastern Europe.

It is necessary to overcome imaginary and real contradictions and propose new approaches.

Bibliography

Internet portal of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of the Russian Federation ( );

Internet portal “Compatriots” (http://www.russedina.ru);

Internet portal of the Public Opinion Foundation (http://www.fom.ru);

Internet portal of the weekly “Delo” ( );

Internet portal "InoPressa" (http://inopressa.ru);

Internet portal of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (http://www.ng.ru);

Internet portal of the political expert network “Kremlin.org” (http://www.kreml.org);

Article - “Results of 15 years of freedom: the situation of Russians in the Baltic countries”, Ovseenko Yu.;

Article - “Geopolitical structure of the post-Soviet space: main factors and stages of development”, Lyakhovich A.G.;

Global Internet encyclopedia "Wikipedia" (http://ru.wikipedia.org);

Article - “Estonia’s economy is highly dependent on Russia”, Nikonov V.

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When the Baltic countries are mentioned, they primarily mean Latvia with its capital in Riga, Lithuania with its capital in Vilnius and Estonia with its capital in Tallinn.

That is, post-Soviet state entities located on the eastern coast of the Baltic. Many other states (Russia, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland) also have access to the Baltic Sea, but they are not included in the Baltic countries.

But sometimes this region refers Kaliningrad region Russian Federation. Almost immediately, the economy of the Baltic republics showed rapid growth.

For example, GDP (PPP) per capita there grew 3.6 times from 1993 to 2008, reaching $18 thousand in Latvia, $19.5 thousand in Lithuania, and $22 thousand in Estonia. While in Russia it only doubled and amounted to $21.6 thousand. On this basis, the ruling elites of the Baltic states, imitating Japan and South Korea, proudly began to call themselves the Baltic Economic Tigers. They say, give it time, just a few more years, and then we will show everyone who fed whom in the Soviet Union.

Seven whole years have passed since then, but for some reason no miracle happened. And where could he come from there, if the entire economy of these republics continued to exist exclusively on Russian commodity and raw material transit? Everyone remembers the indignation of the Poles over apples that have become unnecessary and the Finns with their suddenly overstocked dairy industry. Against this background, the problems of Lithuania, which supplied Russia with 76.13% of its vegetables and 67.89% of fruits, seemed not so significant. Taken together, they provided only 2.68% of the country's total exports. And even the fact that Russia bought up to half (46.3%) of Lithuanian industrial products also looked pale in view of the insignificance of the total volume of its production in Lithuania, both in pieces, in tons, and in money. As, however, in Latvia and Estonia too.

In the post-Soviet period, own production was not a strong point of any of the Baltic “tigers”. In reality, they lived, as they say, not from industry, but from the road. After separating from the USSR, they freely got ports through which a cargo turnover of approximately 100 million tons passed, for the transshipment of which Russia paid up to $1 billion annually, which was equal to 4.25% of the total GDP of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1998.

As the Russian economy recovered, Russian exports also grew, and with it the volume of transshipment in the Baltic ports increased. At the end of 2014, this figure reached 144.8 million tons, including: the port of Riga - 41.1 million tons; Klaipeda - 36.4 million tons; Tallinn - 28.3 million tons; Ventspils - 26.2 million tons. Only one Russian liberal “Kuzbassrazrezugol” shipped more than 4.5 million tons of coal per year to its customers through the Baltic states.

The picture with the Baltic monopoly on oil transportation is especially indicative. The Soviet Union at one time built the Ventspils oil terminal, which was powerful at that time, on the coast and extended the only transport pipeline in the region there. When Latvia “gained independence”, all this farming went to Latvia for free.

So in the 1990s, it received a pipe through which the former “occupier” pumped more than 30 million tons of oil and petroleum products per year. If we take into account that logistics cost about $0.7 per barrel, and there are 7.33 barrels per ton, then according to the most conservative estimates, Latvians earned $153.93 million every year for “travel.” Moreover, their “earnings” increased by as Russian oil exports grow.

While Russian liberals were blaming the country for its economic structure being too raw in raw materials, by 2009 the total volume of foreign supplies of Russian oil reached 246 million tons, of which 140 million tons passed through the Baltic ports per year. In “transport money” this is more than $1.14 billion. Of course, the Latvians did not get all of them; part of the cargo turnover went through St. Petersburg and the ports of the Leningrad region, but the Baltic states greatly slowed down their development by all available means. Apparently, there is no need to specifically explain why.

The second important source of “travel money” for the Baltic ports was the transhipment of sea containers (TEU). Even now, when St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Ust-Luga are actively working, Latvia (Riga, Liepaja, Ventspils) accounts for 7.1% of our container turnover (392.7 thousand TEU), Lithuania (Klaipeda) - 6.5% (359.4 thousand TEU), Estonia (Tallinn) - 3.8% (208.8 thousand TEU). In total, these limitrophes charge from $180 to $230 for transshipment of one TEU, which brings them about $177.7 million per year between the three of them. Moreover, the figures given reflect the situation for 2014. Ten years ago, the Baltic share in container logistics was approximately three times higher.

In addition to oil, coal and containers, Russia transports mineral fertilizers by the Baltic Sea, of which more than 1.71 million tons were shipped through Riga alone in 2014, and other chemicals, such as liquid ammonia, 1 million tons of which were pumped by the port Ventspils. Up to 5 million tons of fertilizers were loaded onto ships in Tallinn. In general, we can say with confidence that until 2004, about 90% of all Russian “maritime” exports passed through the Baltic states, providing the “tigers” with at least 18-19% of their total GDP. Here we should also add railway transit. For example, in 2006, Estonia alone received an average of 32.4 trains from Russia per day, which brought about $117 million annually to the port of Tallinn alone!

Thus, for twenty years, in general, only due to their transit position “on the road,” by the way, built by the “Soviet occupiers,” Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia received up to 30% of their GDP.

They shouted very actively at Russia and in every possible way provoked the growth of the conflict base between Russia and the US-EU. They allowed themselves to humiliate and destroy the Russian-speaking population of their countries, assuming that they would never have to answer for this. By the way, many people think so. And they are wrong. No matter how it is.

At the same time, they still had jobs, tax revenues and the opportunity to boast of extremely high rates of their own economic growth, at least one and a half times faster than the Russian ones. Moreover, this did not in the least prevent the Balts from declaring an incredibly huge Russian debt to them for the “destructive” Soviet occupation. It seemed to them that there was simply no alternative and, therefore, this anti-Russian freebie at Russian expense (!) would last forever.

To build a new port like Riga from scratch costs about four times Latvia’s annual GDP. I especially emphasize that for four years the entire country, from babies to decrepit old people, must not drink, not eat, not spend a penny on anything else, just work together to build the port. The improbability of such a scenario created among the Baltic geopolitical moseks the conviction of their absolute impunity. Allowing him to simultaneously claim Russian money and actively participate in the anti-Russian political and economic bacchanalia, and in some places even act as its initiator.

Is it any wonder that in Russia this state of affairs - the loud barking of small geopolitical dwarfs - did not evoke understanding? Another thing is that the result, because of which the Estonian government delegation recently urgently rushed to Russia to “negotiate,” did not arise yesterday and is not a consequence of Russian retaliatory food sanctions.

Even the formal reason - the Russian notification about the transition from 12 to 6 train pairs in rail transportation with Estonia - is just the final point of a batch that began on June 15, 2000, when the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation began implementing the port construction project in Ust-Luga. Although it would be more correct to talk about a whole program that provided for the rapid development of all Russian ports in the Baltic. Thanks to it, the cargo turnover of Ust-Luga increased from 0.8 million tons in 2004 to 10.3 million tons in 2009 and 87.9 million tons in 2015. And at the end of 2014, Russian ports already provided 35, 9% of all container turnover in the Baltic, and this figure continues to increase very quickly.

Gradually improving port facilities and developing its own transport infrastructure, Russia today has come to the point that we can provide more than 1/3 of containers, ¾ of gas exports, 2/3 of oil exports, 67% of coal and other bulk cargo exports on our own. This refers to the popular question among liberals that “in this backward gas station country, nothing really has been built in ten years.”

As it turned out, it was built. And so much so that the need for the Baltic transit transport corridor has practically disappeared. For rail transportation - five times. For containers - four. In terms of general cargo volume - three. In 2015 alone, the transportation of oil and petroleum products through adjacent ports fell by 20.9%, coal - by 36%, even mineral fertilizers - by 3.4%, although according to this indicator they still maintain a high degree of monopolization. However, By and large, that's it - the freebie is over. Now Russophobes can walk on their own.

The sharp decrease in cargo turnover of the Baltic ports in the first quarter of 2016 (for example, in Riga - by 13.8%, in Tallinn - by 16.3%) plays the role of the last straw that can break the camel's back. Actually, Estonia started fussing because it suddenly realized that by the end of this year, approximately 6 thousand people could find themselves without work in the port of Tallinn. And up to 1.2 thousand will have to be laid off on the railway, of which at least 500 people will have to be cut in the next 2-3 months.

Moreover, the fall in freight traffic volumes is finally derailing the entire economy of the railways, both in Estonia itself and in neighboring Lithuania and Latvia. They are becoming completely unprofitable in both the cargo and passenger segments.

For a country with a total workforce of just over 500 thousand people, of whom 372 thousand are employed in the service sector, this is not just a sad prospect, but the collapse of the entire economy. So they ran to please, buy, and atone for sins in all sorts of other ways. But, as they say, the train has left. Having made an unconditional bet on the EU and the United States, bet on the destruction and humiliation of the Baltic Russians, and bet on the humiliation of Russia, the Baltic ruling elites made a strategic mistake that can no longer be corrected. We will remember this for a long time.

Despite all the political conflicts, the life of the Baltic economy throughout the post-Soviet years was ensured only thanks to one thing - trade relations with Russia. And Russia endured for a long time, called on, admonished, persuaded the Baltic elite, receiving nothing but spitting in response. Our Russian imperial approach seemed to them a weakness. For a decade and a half, the Baltic “tigers” did everything to destroy this interest. Finally, we can congratulate them - they achieved their goal.

In the next year and a half, we can expect a final and progressive decline in trade turnover, after which the Baltic economy will be covered with a copper basin and return to what it was two hundred years ago - and will become a remote, poor, impoverished and useless region. Moreover, they look equally hopeless from Brussels, from Moscow, or from Washington.

At the same time, you can bet that both American tanks and NATO fighters will evaporate from there, since there will be no need to defend these remote places either. Therefore, they will most likely be expelled from NATO in the next five years. There won't be a miracle. The freebie is over. Russia will not forgive and will not forget the mockery that the geopolitical mongrels allowed themselves against Russia and the Russians.

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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was interesting to see how sovereign states charted their own course to prosperity. The Baltic countries were especially intriguing, as they left with a loud slam of the door.

Over the past 30 years, the Russian Federation has been constantly bombarded with numerous claims and threats. The Baltic people believe that they have the right to this, although the desire to secede was suppressed by the USSR army. As a result of the suppression of separatism in Lithuania, 15 civilians died.

Traditionally, the Baltic states are classified as countries. This is due to the fact that this alliance was formed from liberated states after World War II.

Some geopoliticians do not agree with this and consider the Baltic states to be an independent region, which includes:

• , capital Tallinn.
• (Riga).
• (Vilnius).

All three states are washed by the Baltic Sea. Smallest area Estonia has a population of about 1.3 million people. Next comes Latvia, where 2 million citizens live. Lithuania closes the top three with a population of 2.9 million.

Based on their small population, the Baltic states have carved out a niche among small countries. The composition of the region is multinational. In addition to indigenous peoples, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles and Finns live here.

The majority of Russian speakers are concentrated in Latvia and Estonia, about 28–30% of the population. The most “conservative” is Lithuania, where 82% of native Lithuanians live.

For reference. Although the Baltic countries are experiencing a high outflow of the working-age population, they are in no hurry to populate free territories with forced migrants from and. The leaders of the Baltic republics are trying to look for various reasons to evade their obligations to the EU on the resettlement of refugees.

Political course

Even being part of the USSR, the Baltic states were significantly different from other Soviet regions in better side. There was perfect cleanliness, a beautiful architectural heritage and an interesting population, similar to the European one.

The central street of Riga is Brivibas street, 1981.

The Baltic region has always had a desire to become part of Europe. An example was the rapidly developing state that defended its independence from the Soviets in 1917.

The chance to separate from the USSR appeared in the second half of the eighties, when democracy and glasnost came along with perestroika. This opportunity was not missed, and the republics began to openly talk about separatism. Estonia became a pioneer in the independence movement and mass protests broke out here in 1987.

Under pressure from the electorate, the Supreme Council of the ESSR issued the Declaration of Sovereignty. At the same time, Latvia and Lithuania followed the example of their neighbor, and in 1990 all three republics received autonomy.

In the spring of 1991, referendums in the Baltic countries put an end to relations with the USSR. In the autumn of the same year, the Baltic countries joined the UN.

The Baltic republics willingly adopted the course of the West and Europe in economic and political development. Soviet heritage was condemned. Relations with the Russian Federation have completely cooled.

Russians living in the Baltic countries had limited rights. After 13 years of independence, the Baltic powers also joined the NATO military bloc.

Economic course

After gaining sovereignty, the Baltic economy underwent significant changes. The developed industrial sector has been replaced by service sectors. The importance of agriculture and food production has increased.

Modern industries include:

• Precision engineering (electrical engineering and household equipment).
• Machine tool industry.
• Ship repair.
• Chemical industry.
• Perfume industry.
• Wood processing (furniture and paper production).
• Light and footwear industry.
• Food production.

The Soviet heritage in the production of vehicles: cars and electric trains has been completely lost.

It is obvious that the Baltic industry is not a strong point in the post-Soviet era. The main income for these countries comes from the transit industry.

After gaining independence, all the production and transit capacities of the USSR went to the republics for free. The Russian side made no claims, used the services and paid about $1 billion a year for cargo turnover. Every year, the amount for transit grew, as the Russian economy increased its pace and cargo turnover increased.

For reference. Russian company Kuzbassrazrezugol shipped more than 4.5 million tons of coal per year to its customers through the Baltic ports.

Particular attention should be paid to the Baltic monopoly on the transit of Russian oil. At one time, the forces of the USSR built the Ventspils oil terminal, the largest at that time, on the Baltic coast. A pipeline was built to it, the only one in the region. Latvia got this grandiose system for nothing.

Thanks to the built industrial infrastructure, the Russian Federation pumped over 30 million tons of oil through Latvia annually. For each barrel, Russia gave 0.7 dollars in logistics services. The republic's income grew steadily as oil exports increased.

The transiter’s sense of self-preservation has become dulled, which will play one of the key roles in the stagnation of the economy after the 2008 crisis.

The operation of the Baltic ports was ensured, among other things, by the transshipment of sea containers (TEU). After the modernization of the port terminals of St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Ust-Luga, traffic through the Baltic states decreased to 7.1% of all Russian cargo turnover.

Nevertheless, in one year, taking into account the decline in logistics, these services continue to bring the three republics about $170 million per year. This amount was several times higher before 2014.

On a note. Despite the poor economic situation in the Russian Federation, many transport terminals have been built on its territory to date. This made it possible to significantly reduce the need for the Baltic transit and transport corridor.

The unexpected reduction in transit cargo turnover had a negative impact on the Baltic economy. As a result, massive layoffs of workers, numbering in the thousands, regularly take place at the ports. At the same time, railway transportation, freight and passenger, went under the knife, bringing stable losses.

The policy of the transit state and openness to Western investors led to an increase in unemployment in all sectors. People go to more developed countries to earn money and stay there to live.

Despite the deterioration, income levels in the Baltics remain significantly higher than in other post-Soviet republics.

Jurmala lost income

The 2015 scandal in show business became a stone in the garden of the Latvian economy. Some popular singers from the Russian Federation were banned from entering the country by Latvian politicians. As a result, the New Wave festival is now held in Sochi.

In addition, the KVN program refused to hold team performances in Jurmala. As a result, the tourism industry lost a lot of money.

After this, Russians began to buy less residential real estate in the Baltic countries. People are afraid that they might fall under the political millstone.

There is a lot of interesting things in the history of the development of each Baltic country - there is something to learn, in some things to take an example, and in some things you can learn from the mistakes of others.

Despite their small territory and small population, they manage to occupy a significant position in various international economic and trade associations.

If you are wondering: what kind of countries are the Baltic countries, how did they develop and how do they live, then this article is just for you, because here you can find all the necessary answers.

In this article we will look at their history, development and current position on the world political and economic stage.

Baltic countries. Compound

Neither more nor less, but three states are called the Baltic countries. At one time they were part of the USSR. Today, all Baltic countries are completely independent.

The list looks like this:

They are both similar and different in their history, development, internal color, people, and traditions.

The Baltic countries cannot boast of large reserves natural resources, which affects the economy. The demographic situation has negative dynamics, since mortality exceeds birth rates. The high level of emigration to other more developed European countries also has an impact.

To summarize, in many ways modern development the Baltic countries is at the expense of the European Union. Of course, this affects both the domestic and foreign policies of these countries.

Since 1992, Estonia has chosen the path of European development as a priority and began to turn away from any interactions with Moscow, while maintaining warm relations.

The rapid transition to a market economy was facilitated by loans and external credits worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In addition, European countries returned funds to Estonia that had been frozen since the republic joined the Soviet Union in the 40s of the 20th century.

The global financial crisis has greatly affected the Estonian economy

In just five years after 2000, the country's GDP increased by half. However, the global financial crisis did not spare Estonia and increased the unemployment rate from 5 to 15%. For the same reason, in 2009 the level of industrial production fell by more than 70%.

Estonia is a fairly active member of NATO and takes part in most peacekeeping operations, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Multinational culture

It's hard to believe, but one country combines the cultures of Latvia, Finland, Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, Sweden, as well as other countries. This is due to the fact that at one time rulers chose one or another vector of development.

Estonia can be proud of its commitment to modernizing all processes. Since 2000, it has been possible to report taxes electronically. Since 2008, all meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers are not recorded in paper minutes - everything happens electronically.

Constant introduction of new information technologies

Imagine - more than 78% of the country's population uses the Internet. This indicator is one of the best in all of Europe. It ranks 24th in the world in terms of information technology development in a ranking of 142 countries.

In this regard, Estonians really have something to be proud of.

Despite mass computerization, spiritual values, as well as the preservation surrounding nature are also a priority in the development of this country. Particularly noteworthy is the national cuisine, which is distinguished by the so-called peasant spirit from the past.

The Baltic countries are a small and beautiful corner on planet Earth

There is a lot to learn from three small countries. Despite the fact that they are completely energy dependent on other states, they managed to make a significant leap in their development compared to other countries that gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

So, what kind of countries are the Baltic countries, how did they develop and how do they live? We hope this article was useful to you and you were able to find all the necessary answers regarding the history, development and current position of these states on the world political and economic arena.

The article talks about the states that are part of the Baltic countries. The material contains data regarding the geographical location of countries, their economies and ethnic composition. Forms an idea of ​​trade and economic relations between the Baltic states and neighboring countries.

List of Baltic countries

The list of Baltic countries includes:

• Lithuania,
• Latvia,
• Estonia.

Three sovereign states were formed in 1990 after the collapse of the USSR. The countries are quite small in area and population. Almost immediately after the declaration of sovereignty, the Baltic states set a course for integration into the pan-European economic, political and cultural space. Today the countries are members of the EU and NATO.

Geographical location of the Baltics

Geographically, the Baltic countries are located in the southeastern part of the Baltic Sea coast. They are located on the border of the East European Plain and the Polish Lowland. On the western borders, the countries of this region neighbor Poland, in the south - with Belarus, in the east - with Russia.

Rice. 1. Baltic countries on the map.

In general, the geographical position of the Baltic countries is quite favorable. They are provided with access to the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea has always played an important role in the international relations of European countries.

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The Baltic lands are poor in mineral resources. The only significant reserves of oil shale are located in Estonia. Oil and gas deposits are of local importance.

Rice. 2. Extraction of oil shale in Estonia.

The main neighbors of the Baltic countries are economically developed powers with a stable economy and peaceful policies. Sweden and Finland already have enough a long period time, occupy a position of neutrality and mutually beneficial cooperation in the international arena.

Peoples of the Baltic countries

The demographic situation in these states is quite far from favorable. There is a process of natural outflow of the population. In addition, the mortality rate exceeds the birth rate. The result is a decline in the population of all three countries.

The average population density of the Baltic countries is significantly lower compared to other European countries.

The distribution of the population in all countries is also quite uneven.

The coasts and areas around the capitals are the most densely populated. The level of urbanization is high everywhere, reaching a figure close to 70%.

In terms of population, the Baltic capitals are leading:

• Riga;
• Vilnius;
• Tallinn.

Rice. 3. Old Riga.

IN national composition the predominant ethnic groups are. In Lithuania, the percentage of the indigenous population is over 80%, in Estonia - almost 70%, in Latvia - more than half (60%).