Home Coated tongue Abstract: Scientific explanation, its structure and main varieties. Prediction

Abstract: Scientific explanation, its structure and main varieties. Prediction

Language and man [On the problem of motivation language system] Shelyakin Mikhail Alekseevich

4. Basic types of scientific explanation

The structure of any scientific explanation consists of a) initial knowledge about the object as an explicandum, b) knowledge used as a means of explanation (the basis of explanation) - an explicate, and c) cognitive actions associated with the use of the basis of explanation, i.e. with the establishment of its functions in relation to the explicandum.

Depending on the chosen explicate and cognitive actions with it, several types of scientific explanation differ.

4.1. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS pointing to the cause and its effect as sequential phenomena, states of affairs in some specific conditions. There are different understandings of the cause, but it is usually determined from the following characteristics:

a) a cause is an actual action that causes an unambiguous factual consequence and exists independently of the effect, b) cause and effect are often united by a law that defines indispensable, necessary connections, c) an effect cannot exist without a cause and one way or another reflects the cause, but not is identified with the cause, d) each cause has only its own consequences (responsible for the effect, “takes the blame for the effect”), e) the cause is aimed at explaining the past or present. Causal explanations are widely used in the study of natural and biological facts, and there has been a tendency to extend causal explanations to phenomena that have behavioral character, but it did not take into account the specifics of these phenomena, which led to the search for other types of explanations.

4.2. RATIONAL EXPLANATIONS indicating a human motive, his rational considerations that determine his actions. Rationality in these conditions does not make a fact necessary, but only possible.

4.3. INTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS (teleological, intentional and goal-oriented, usually associated with rational explanations). They consist of a desired, anticipated result, a goal (goal setting) and the means that are considered necessary to use to achieve it (“the end justifies the means”). A goal differs from a cause in the following characteristics: a) a goal is always intentional, a reason is always factual, b) a goal is aimed at the future, a reason is directed at the past or present, c) reasons are implemented to achieve a goal, i.e. the goal is based on causal determination; d) the goal and the means do not have the necessary internal connection.

4.4. FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS. The term “function” (Latin functio – execution, correspondence, display) is widely used in modern sciences, but is interpreted differently in them. In mathematics, a function is a dependent variable; in physiology, it is a manifestation of the vital activity of organs, tissues, cells, etc.; in sociology, it is the responsibility of social institutions, positions, etc. Usually, the mathematical understanding of a function is distinguished from an objective function. If we generalize the use of the term “function” in non-mathematical sciences, we can highlight the following conceptual features:

1) function is a special property of an integral object as a system or its subsystem and element (function carriers); the concepts of a system, its subsystem and element are interconnected: there is no system, subsystem, element of a system without a function, just as there is no function without a system, subsystem or element of a system (cf. a spring in a clock mechanism and a spring lying on the floor);

2) a function is a derived property of the entire system, subsystem or element of the system;

3) a function always provides something needed, intended, serves for something, i.e. has an exit beyond the boundaries of the system, subsystem or element of the system (cf. the function of an airplane - movement in the air, the function of a drinking glass, the functions of large and small hands on a watch);

4) the function has its own implementation environment and is adaptive to the environment (for example, the environment for the function of a glass is the process of drinking liquids, the environment for a watch is the passage of time);

5) the function connects the system, subsystem or element of the system with its environment and is in relation to the latter;

6) each function manifests itself in systemic (interdependent) relationships with other functions, and functional system in general, it is a system of elements, subsystems with their interconnected functions, subordinate to the functions of the whole system.

7) function as the purpose of a system object or its element is manifested in the very real or potential process of their adaptation to the environment according to the feedback principle.

8) function and system are in mutually determined relationships, and function can act as a leading system-forming factor. The system function should be distinguished from the replaced one

function allowed by the system function. For example, the systemic function of a glass is its use for drinking, which corresponds to its structure, adapted to the peculiarities of the process of drinking liquids, but the use of a glass for storing a butterfly is its use in a replaceable function allowed by the systemic function. The function can be primary and secondary (derived from the primary): such, for example, is the secondary function of buttons sewn on only to add beauty to a dress.

The concept of function is related to the concept of “functioning”. Functioning is the realized manifestation of a function in the environment. Based on the functioning of the object as directly given for observation, its function is determined.

In linguistics, the concept of function, as a rule, is used in accordance with its stated characteristics, namely in a generalized form as the ability of a language system, its subsystems and elements to fulfill one or another purpose in transmitting and receiving information.

All the noted features of a function distinguish it from cause and purpose: a function is not, like a cause, an action that causes consequences, and is not a “necessary future”, like a goal, being always given or potential.

The essence of functional explanations is that an object as a system or an element in a system is explained by its function or, conversely, the function of an object and its element are explained by its systemic nature or systemic connections (cf., for example, objects such as a watch, an airplane, a chair and all other artifacts or their individual elements).

4.5. SYSTEM-STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS associated with the concept of a system as a single organized and ordered integrity, consisting of interdependent elements and certain relationships between them, called the structure of the system. The simplest and most universal type of structural relations are binary relations (dyads), which are one of the types of symmetry of nature and organisms (cf. left and right hemisphere human brain with their functional differences, day and night, life and death, inhalation and exhalation, etc.). As is known, Hegel generalized and examined in terms of development binary relations as opposites that are inherent in any certainty. Man's awareness of the binary nature of all things is already reflected in the creation of binary symbolism in the culture of many nations. However, when further development human thinking, other types of structural relationships were realized, reflecting the dialectics of being - binary relationships with intermediate links and P-member relations with a binary structure.

The essence of system-structural explanations is that this or that phenomenon and development is explained from the point of view of the laws of the system, its intrastructural features and intrasystem relations. For example, in psychology and linguistics, many phenomena are explained by associative connections, when one phenomenon causes another by contiguity, similarity, and contrast (associations are based on the mechanisms of neural connections in the brain).

4.6. GENETIC EXPLANATIONS. They suggest explanations this state object by establishing its initial conditions of development over time through the derivation of step-by-step connections and determination of the main lines of development. Genetic explanations are historical explanations, but somewhat specialized in that they explain an object from its original basis. Genetic explanations are widely used in all sciences and are often combined with systems-structural and other types of explanation.

It should be noted that the mentioned types of scientific explanation are not always used in science in isolation from each other, which is determined by its different tasks and aspects.

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The structure of any scientific explanation consists of a) initial knowledge about the object as an explicandum, b) knowledge used as a means of explanation (the basis of explanation) - an explicate, and c) cognitive actions associated with the use of the basis of explanation, i.e. with the establishment of its functions in relation to the explicandum.

Depending on the chosen explicate and cognitive actions with it, several types of scientific explanation differ.

4.1. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS pointing to the cause and its effect as sequential phenomena, states of affairs in some specific conditions. There are different understandings of the cause, but it is usually determined from the following characteristics:

a) a cause is an actual action that causes an unambiguous factual consequence and exists independently of the effect, b) cause and effect are often united by a law that defines indispensable, necessary connections, c) an effect cannot exist without a cause and one way or another reflects the cause, but not is identified with the cause, d) each cause has only its own consequences (responsible for the effect, “takes the blame for the effect”), e) the cause is aimed at explaining the past or present. Causal explanations are widely used in the study of natural and biological facts, and there has been a tendency to extend causal explanations to phenomena of a behavioral nature, but it has not taken into account the specifics of these phenomena, which has led to the search for other types of explanations.

4.2. RATIONAL EXPLANATIONS indicating a human motive, his rational considerations that determine his actions. Rationality in these conditions does not make a fact necessary, but only possible.

4.3. INTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS (teleological, intentional and goal-oriented, usually associated with rational explanations). They consist of a desired, anticipated result, a goal (goal setting) and the means that are considered necessary to use to achieve it (“the end justifies the means”). A goal differs from a cause in the following characteristics: a) a goal is always intentional, a reason is always factual, b) a goal is aimed at the future, a reason is directed at the past or present, c) reasons are implemented to achieve a goal, i.e. the goal is based on causal determination; d) the goal and the means do not have the necessary internal connection.

4.4. FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS. The term “function” (Latin functio – execution, correspondence, display) is widely used in modern sciences, but is interpreted differently in them. In mathematics, a function is a dependent variable; in physiology, it is a manifestation of the vital activity of organs, tissues, cells, etc.; in sociology, it is the responsibility of social institutions, positions, etc. Usually, the mathematical understanding of a function is distinguished from an objective function. If we generalize the use of the term “function” in non-mathematical sciences, we can highlight the following conceptual features:

1) function is a special property of an integral object as a system or its subsystem and element (function carriers); the concepts of a system, its subsystem and element are interconnected: there is no system, subsystem, element of a system without a function, just as there is no function without a system, subsystem or element of a system (cf. a spring in a clock mechanism and a spring lying on the floor);

2) a function is a derived property of the entire system, subsystem or element of the system;

3) a function always provides something needed, intended, serves for something, i.e. has an exit beyond the boundaries of the system, subsystem or element of the system (cf. the function of an airplane - movement in the air, the function of a drinking glass, the functions of large and small hands on a watch);

4) the function has its own implementation environment and is adaptive to the environment (for example, the environment for the function of a glass is the process of drinking liquids, the environment for a watch is the passage of time);

5) the function connects the system, subsystem or element of the system with its environment and is in relation to the latter;

6) each function manifests itself in systemic (interdependent) relationships with other functions, and the functional system as a whole is a system of elements, subsystems with their interrelated functions, subordinate to the function of the whole system.

7) function as the purpose of a system object or its element is manifested in the very real or potential process of their adaptation to the environment according to the feedback principle.

8) function and system are in mutually determined relationships, and function can act as a leading system-forming factor. The system function should be distinguished from the replaced one

function allowed by the system function. For example, the systemic function of a glass is its use for drinking, which corresponds to its structure, adapted to the peculiarities of the process of drinking liquids, but the use of a glass for storing a butterfly is its use in a replaceable function allowed by the systemic function. The function can be primary and secondary (derived from the primary): such, for example, is the secondary function of buttons sewn on only to add beauty to a dress.

The concept of function is related to the concept of “functioning”. Functioning is the realized manifestation of a function in the environment. Based on the functioning of the object as directly given for observation, its function is determined.

In linguistics, the concept of function, as a rule, is used in accordance with its stated characteristics, namely in a generalized form as the ability of a language system, its subsystems and elements to fulfill one or another purpose in transmitting and receiving information.

All the noted features of a function distinguish it from cause and purpose: a function is not, like a cause, an action that causes consequences, and is not a “necessary future”, like a goal, being always given or potential.

The essence of functional explanations is that an object as a system or an element in a system is explained by its function or, conversely, the function of an object and its element are explained by its systemic nature or systemic connections (cf., for example, objects such as a watch, an airplane, a chair and all other artifacts or their individual elements).

4.5. SYSTEM-STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS associated with the concept of a system as a single organized and ordered integrity, consisting of interdependent elements and certain relationships between them, called the structure of the system. The simplest and most universal type of structural relationships are binary relationships (dyads), which are one of the types of symmetry of nature and organisms (cf. the left and right hemispheres of the human brain with their functional differences, day and night, life and death, inhalation and exhalation, and etc.). As is known, Hegel generalized and examined in terms of development binary relations as opposites that are inherent in any certainty. Man's awareness of the binary nature of all things is already reflected in the creation of binary symbolism in the culture of many nations. However, with the further development of human thinking, other types of structural relationships were realized, reflecting the dialectics of being - binary relationships with intermediate links and P-member relations with a binary structure.

The essence of system-structural explanations is that this or that phenomenon and development is explained from the point of view of the laws of the system, its intrastructural features and intrasystem relations. For example, in psychology and linguistics, many phenomena are explained by associative connections, when one phenomenon causes another by contiguity, similarity, and contrast (associations are based on the mechanisms of neural connections in the brain).

4.6. GENETIC EXPLANATIONS. They involve explanations of a given state of an object by establishing its initial conditions of development in time through the derivation of stage-by-stage connections and the determination of the main lines of development. Genetic explanations are historical explanations, but somewhat specialized in that they explain an object from its original basis. Genetic explanations are widely used in all sciences and are often combined with systems-structural and other types of explanation.

It should be noted that the mentioned types of scientific explanation are not always used in science in isolation from each other, which is determined by its different tasks and aspects.

Explanation is one of the functions of theory and science in general. Explanation is a mental operation of expressing the essence of one object through another, through what is known, understandable, obvious, clear. Explanation is a necessary component of understanding any activity.

A scientific explanation must satisfy the requirements of adequacy (correctness) and fundamental verifiability. From a logical point of view, an explanation is the derivation of consequences from premises. Explanation is carried out both at the theoretical and empirical levels of the organization of scientific knowledge.

There are several models of scientific explanation:

1. Deductive-nomological explanation

A clear formulation of this model was carried out by K. Popper and K. Hempel. In a deductive-nomological explanation, we indicate the cause or conditions for the existence of some event. A set of initial conditions and general laws or hypotheses (major and minor premises) constitutes the explanans of an explanation. The big premise is universal or general laws or stochastic laws of a particular nature. Minor premise – initial or boundary conditions related to specific events or phenomena. The statement to be explained is an explanandum - the conclusion of a deductive conclusion from the premises, i.e. from the explanans.

If a cause or condition occurs, then a certain event occurs necessarily.

K. Hempel developed a model of inductive-probabilistic explanation, when instead of the law of science there is a position that has a probabilistic-statistical nature and the conclusion establishes only the probability of the occurrence of an event. In any case, an explanation based on a deductive-nomological model gives the event being explained a necessary character.

(Example with Faraday's explanation of Arago's experiment on the rotation of a copper disk above a rotating magnetic needle).

The deductive-nomological model of explanation is most characteristic of mathematics and natural science.

2. “Rational” explanation (teleological)

Canadian historian W. Dray showed that in historical science other models of explanation are used. Dray called an explanation that indicates the connection between a person's actions and his motives and beliefs rational. The purpose of such an explanation is to show that some action is “reasonable” from the point of view of the person performing it. Mainly historians when explaining human actions They see not cause-and-effect relationships, but norms or rules of rational action.

In general, the explanation within this model is as follows: show that “in the given circumstances, the people of the period under study acted in such and such a way,” and then consider a specific case. Thus, a rational explanation justifies only the possibility of the event being explained, and not its necessity.

The main attention is paid to the goals, meaning and intentions of people's activities. The big premise is the sum of goals, motives, aspirations. Small parcel – amount of funds. Explanandum is an act, an action. A practical syllogism is a form of teleological explanation. The major premise is the goals of the action. In small - the means to achieve it. Explanandum is a statement that only when acting in accordance with the premises, i.e. with proper consideration of the goals and means of achieving it, one can hope for the success of the action.

3. Functional explanation

The functional explanation is close to teleological ones, because answers the question why? It is used when it is necessary to clarify the role and function of any element or subsystem of elements in a holistic system. (organ in a living organism). Widely used in biology after the creation of evolutionary theory by Charles Darwin.

4. Normative explanations

Normative explanations attempt to identify the meaning and role of norms in explaining the behavior of people in society. They take into account not only a person’s conscious activity, but also moral activity. It is based on the rules and norms established in society, which are fundamentally different from laws that are regular and stable.

5. Cause-and-effect explanation

Causal explanations: during the period classical science mechanical movements and processes, natural phenomena were tried to be explained using the simplest causal or causal laws. It was also used by Galileo to explain the motion of freely falling bodies.

The preceding phenomenon is called the cause, and the given phenomenon (which is explained) is called the consequence. But a causal explanation is not limited to indicating the preceding and subsequent phenomena (P: night replaces day, but night is not the cause of day). For a causal explanation, it is necessary to determine the general causal law, which establishes a regular, necessary connection between cause and effect.

6. Intentional explanation

Intention means intention, goal, direction of consciousness towards a specific object. (From the Latin word intentio - desire). Intentional explanation is sometimes called teleological or motivational. The intentional explanation of human behavior consists of indicating the goal pursued by the individual, establishing the aspirations, intentions or motivations of current events. Such explanations are focused on revealing people's aspirations and can be used to explain behavior. historical figures, explanations of the actions of ordinary people. G. von Wright emphasized the importance of the so-called “practical syllogism” for the humanities and for history.


In all alternative models of explanation (Normative, functional, teleological, intentional), the main attention is paid to the specific features of conscious and purposeful human activity, which is expressed in setting goals, clarifying its functions and role in society, and analyzing norms and rules of behavior.

As a result of studying this chapter, the undergraduate should:

know

  • the essence of scientific explanation, its types, methods and functions;
  • features of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation;
  • methods of explanation in social and humanitarian knowledge;
  • the specifics of explanation in the theory of social work;

be able to

  • identify the unity and differences of the hypothetico-deductive method, abduction and the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation;
  • identify the correspondence of specific methods of explanation to the scientific problems being solved;

own

  • categorical apparatus for studying the methods and functions of scientific explanation as a method of cognition;
  • skills in using the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation when deciding theoretical problems social work.

Characterizing the differences between the natural sciences and scientific social and humanitarian knowledge, we pointed out different role methods of explanation and understanding in the process of comprehending the truth in relation to these branches of scientific knowledge. With the help of methods of explanation and understanding, theoretical problems of scientific knowledge are solved.

Let's consider the specifics of scientific explanation.

The essence of scientific explanation, its types and methods

Explanation is considered in the philosophy of science both as the initial and most important function scientific knowledge, and how the most important method cognitive activity.

Regarding any previously unknown object or phenomenon, a person inevitably has a question about its genesis and causes. So, ancient man, comprehending such natural phenomena as thunderstorms, hurricanes, floods, volcanic eruptions, tried to spiritualize them and explain natural phenomena by analogy with his own actions and behavior. If a storm arose at sea, then the god of the seas Neptune became angry; if a strong thunderstorm rumbled, if lightning flashed, then the man made Zeus angry.

This anthropologization of natural phenomena stems from an attempt to explain the unknown and unfamiliar through the known and familiar. In this case, the explanation appears in various varieties:

  • - How deductive derivation of statements about a fact from generalizations, laws and theories, as well as from those initial conditions that relate to the characteristics of a given fact;
  • - How summing up statements about an event or phenomenon under some general statement: hypothesis, law or theory;
  • - How causal explanations which are the simplest in their characteristics and are therefore widely used in everyday thinking.

The Structure of Causal Explanation turns out to be simple: to explain the phenomenon under study, they refer to another phenomenon that precedes the first and gives rise to this phenomenon. The preceding phenomenon is called reason and this phenomenon consequence, although, as G.I. Ruzavin notes, “it would be more correct to call it action, not to be confused with a logical relation grounds And consequences ".

At the same time, following in time (the cause precedes the effect, the effect occurs after the cause) is a necessary but insufficient characteristic of a causal explanation. In particular, phenomena that are not connected by a “cause-effect” relationship can also follow each other in time.

So, for an observer of a caravan of camels in the desert, one camel after another appears from behind a dune after a certain period of time, but one camel does not cause the other (of course, unless parent camels and camels are their children are following in the caravan). It is not for nothing that the type of logical errors “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” (after this, therefore - as a result of this) is specially highlighted, which are quite common in everyday consciousness, but sometimes penetrate into science.

A causal explanation fulfills its methodological and epistemological role only when that general causal law which establishes a regular, necessary connection between cause and effect.

The Newtonian picture of the world with its dominant principle of Laplacean (mechanistic) determinism is characterized by the desire to explain all natural phenomena using the simplest causal (from lat. causalis – causal) laws. In the history of science, this approach to explanation is usually characterized as Galilean tradition in the explanation.

Indeed, one of the founders modern natural science G. Galileo opposed scientific natural science to scholastic natural philosophy and sought to refute its attempts to explain natural phenomena with the help of various kinds of “hidden qualities” and mysterious forces. In particular, heat was associated with the action of a special liquid - caloric, electrical phenomena - with the action of “electric fluid”, etc.

Thus, when explaining the free fall of bodies, G. Galileo considered causes not mythical entities, but real ones external force– gravity. Consequence This reason is a change in the state of the body: the body accelerates under the influence of gravity. I. Newton and his followers further developed the scientific approach implemented by G. Galileo.

Understanding the complex nature of cause-and-effect relationships led in the middle of the 19th century. J. St. Mill to an attempt to establish connections between causal explanations And inductive methods research. J. St. Mill developed varieties of the so-called eliminative induction according to the method of similarity, induction according to the method of difference, induction according to the method of accompanying changes, etc. The algorithm for such induction set certain rules according to which, from the totality possible reasons of this phenomenon, those events that did not meet the signs of a cause-and-effect relationship were eliminated (eliminated).

Thus, J. Art. Mill set a model of explanation, which boiled down to the deduction of statements about facts from empirical causal laws: “an explanation of a single fact is considered to be an indication of its cause, i.e., the establishment of the law or laws of causality of which this fact is a special case.”

Causal connections, according to J. Art. Mill, were established using inductive methods, which, however, make it possible to obtain, as a rule, probabilistic knowledge, the truth of which requires additional verification. Such explanations are appropriate only at the preliminary stage of research. The need to identify theoretical laws (reflecting varying degrees penetration into essence objects under study) leads to the need to expand and generalize the causal model of scientific explanation.

EXPLANATION(in the methodology of science) is a cognitive procedure aimed at enriching and deepening knowledge about real world phenomena by including these phenomena in the structure of certain connections, relationships and dependencies, which makes it possible to reveal the essential features of a given phenomenon. In the simplest case, the subject of explanation is individual empirically recorded facts. In this case, the explanation is preceded by their description. But in principle, the subject of explanation can be reality of any kind in any of its manifestations and at any level of its expression in the system of scientific knowledge. So, say, the laws of science, empirical and theoretical, can be explained; the content of theories of a lesser degree of generality can find their explanation in theories of a more general nature. general level etc. In the structure of explanation as a cognitive procedure, the following elements can be distinguished: 1) background knowledge about the phenomenon being explained (the so-called explanandum); 2) knowledge used as a condition and means of explanation, allowing one to consider the phenomenon being explained in the context of a certain system or structure (the so-called basis of explanation, or explanans); 3) cognitive activities, allowing the application of knowledge acting as the basis of explanation to the phenomenon being explained. Knowledge of various types and levels of development can be used as the basis for explanation, which makes it possible to identify different kinds and forms of explanation based on the explanans type. At the same time, explanation procedures may differ depending on the cognitive techniques and actions used in the process of their implementation.

In the so-called The standard concept of the analysis of science, put forward by supporters of logical positivism and widespread in Western methodology of science in the 40–50s, was dominated by the deductive-nomological model of explanation formulated by K. Hempel and P. Oppenheim in 1948 (see: Hempel K.G. Logic of explanation. M., 1998, p. 89–146). This logical model of explanation was an application of the general hypothetico-deductive scheme (see Hypothetico-deductive method , Hypothetico-deductive model ) to the situation of explanation. In this scheme, we proceeded from considering the so-called explanans. nomological statements formulating the laws of science, and the deduction of knowledge about the phenomenon being explained from these nomological statements was used as a logical method of explanation. The feasibility of such an explanation was considered as a factor of confirmation, justification of the nomological statement (see. Justification of the theory ). Like any logical model of the real cognitive process, it had the character of a very strong idealization of it, exaggerating, firstly, the role of the laws of science as an explanans, and secondly, the outcome, like the standard concept of the analysis of science as a whole, from the opposition opening context And context of justification , she could not take into account the processes of improving knowledge during the implementation of the explanation procedure. As for the role of the laws of science (the so-called nomological statements) in the processes of explanation, then, indeed, the most developed form of scientific explanation are explanations undertaken on the basis of theoretical laws and presupposing the understanding of the phenomenon being explained in the system of theoretical knowledge, its assimilation in scientific-theoretical picture of the world.

However, the author of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, K. G. Hempel, was subsequently forced to generalize it, formulating, along with the deductive probabilistic-inductive or statistical version of the homological model of explanation. But the main thing is that it would be wrong to underestimate the cognitive and methodological significance various forms explanations that are not necessarily based on the laws of science. T.N. nomological explanations are characteristic of theoretical mathematized natural science, primarily physics, and in scientific disciplines where theories in the strict sense of the term are not crystallized (see. Theory ) with their laws, other forms of explanation are common. Thus, in social and humanitarian disciplines, typologies are often used as the basis of explanation. For example, an explanation of the characteristics of human behavior is given on the basis of the typology of characters in psychology, the explanation social phenomena– origin from types social structures And social action in sociology, etc. The most important role in the sciences of living and inanimate nature, social and humanitarian disciplines, explanation plays a role by including the phenomenon under consideration in the context of the systems, structures and connections that encompass it. This is how causal, genetically evolutionary, functional, structural-systemic, etc. arise. explanations, where the explanans are not theories or laws of science, but certain categorical schemes and pictures of the world that underlie scientific knowledge in a given subject area, for example, an explanation of any social or biological phenomena through the establishment of the functions that they perform in social system or living organism.

A special problem that has caused lively debate in the philosophy and methodology of science is associated with the explanation of human actions and actions in various humanities, in history, in the social sciences, where one way or another we have to consider various motivational and semantic attitudes determined by the human mentality as the basis for explanation. In this context, the problem of explanation turns out to be closely related to the problem of understanding in the specific meaning of this term in the tradition coming from Dilthey, in which understanding as the comprehension of the mental prerequisites for the creation of a text or a cultural artifact in general is considered as specific method humanitarian knowledge.

From a methodological point of view, explanation procedures cannot be reduced to automatism deductive conclusions. Already in itself, bringing phenomena under the general law according to the deductive-nomological scheme presupposes a certain constructive work of consciousness, which Kant called the “ability of judgment”, i.e. ability to apply general rule, general norm in a specific situation. Real procedures of explanation in science, even those that can be represented in a deductive-nomological model, are associated with “building bridges” between the object of explanation and its explanans, clarifying the conditions of applicability general position, finding intermediate links, etc. The search for the basis of explanation where there is no ready-made knowledge under which the phenomena being explained can be subsumed becomes a powerful stimulus for the development of scientific knowledge and the emergence of new concepts and hypotheses. In particular, the search for explanatory factors is often a prerequisite for the theorization of knowledge, the transition from its empirical level to the formation of theoretical concepts, the development of what can be called primary explanatory schemes, which at first are ad-hoc (i.e., explanations this case), but can then be developed into a theoretical concept. So, let's say, Durkheim's explanation more murders in Protestant communities compared to Catholic ones, the lower degree of social cohesion in the former compared to the latter, which initially acted as an ad-hoc explanation, served as the basis for the creation of the concept of anomie, which is widely recognized in sociology, as a cause of social disorganization. In a situation where attempts to explain certain facts and circumstances within the framework of certain hypotheses, concepts or theories lead to a contradiction with the latter, i.e. real circumstances act as counterexamples to them (see. Counterexamples in science), the presence of such counterexamples - say, the contradiction of the planetary model of the atom with the stability of electrons in orbit - becomes a necessary condition critical analysis relevant knowledge and an incentive to revise it. This revision does not always lead to the rejection of this knowledge in the spirit of primitive falsificationism (see. Falsification , Falsifiability ), it leads to its clarification, specification, improvement and development. At the same time, it is desirable that the changes made to the theory or hypothesis would not be only ad-hoc explanations of the identified counterexamples, but would increase the explanatory and predictive capabilities of the theory or hypothesis in relation to other facts. The accumulation of a theory or hypothesis with a large number of ad-hoc explanations is evidence of its weakness.

Thus, explanation as a whole is a constructive, creative cognitive procedure, as a result of which not only knowledge about the phenomenon being explained is enriched and deepened, but, as a rule, knowledge used as the basis for explanation is clarified and developed. The solution of explanatory problems acts as the most important stimulus for the development of scientific knowledge and its conceptual apparatus, which indicates the inconsistency of the sharp opposition of the so-called. contexts of justification and discovery when treating explanation within the standard framework for the analysis of science.

The implementation of explanatory functions in science is organically connected with prediction and foresight. Essentially, considering scientific-cognitive activity as a whole, we can talk about a single explanatory and predictive function of scientific knowledge in relation to its object. Explanation, considered in this context, appears not as a private cognitive procedure, but as required function scientific thinking, his cardinal installation.

Literature:

1. Nikitin E.P. Explanation is the function of science. M., 1970;

2. Hempel K.G. Motives and “encompassing” laws in historical explanation. – In the book: Philosophy and methodology of history. M., 1977;

3. Dray W. Once again to the question of explaining people's actions in historical science. - There;

4. Ruzavin G.I. Scientific theory. Logical and methodological analysis. M., 1978, ch. 8;

5. Wright G.F. background. Explanation in history and social science. – In the book: Logical-philosophical studies. M., 1986;

6. Biryukov B.V., Novoselov M.M. Properties of explanation and order in a knowledge system. – In the book: Unity of scientific knowledge. M., 1988;

7. Hempel K.G. The function of general laws in history. – In the book: Logic of explanation. M., 1998;

8. Hempel C.I. Deductive – Homological vs. Statistical Explanation. – Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of science, v. III. Minneapolis, 1962.



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